Ideologies of Arab Media and Politics: a Critical Discourse Analysis of Al Jazeera Debates on the Yemeni Revolution by Al Kharusi, Raiya
I 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideologies of Arab media and politics: a critical discourse analysis of  
Al Jazeera debates on the Yemeni revolution 
 
 
Raiya Sulaiman Al Kharusi  
 
Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
degree of PhD 
 
August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
Abstract and keywords 
 
Abstract:  
Critical discourse analysis investigates the ways in which discourse is to abuse power 
relationships. Political debates constitute discourses that mirror certain aspects of ideologies. 
This study aimed to uncover the ideological intentions in the formulation and circulation of 
hegemonic political ideology in TV political debates that occurred in the 2011-2012 Yemen 
revolution, examining the question of how ideology was used as a tool of hegemony. The corpus 
of the study consisted of fifteen debates (73915 words) from four live debate programmes (The 
Opposite Direction, In Depth, Behind the News and the Revolution Talk) staged at Al Jazeera 
Arabic TV channel between 2011 and 2012. Al Jazeera was selected as the focus of this study 
because of its position as the most popular TV in the Arab world and due to its strong presence 
during the Arab revolutions. Two debate sides were identified: government, representing the 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his regime, and protesters, who represented the discontent 
populace gathering squares who demanded the abdication of the president. Data were also 
obtained from interviews conducted with the Al Jazeera staff who managed the debates. Analysis 
was conducted on the verbal discourse aspects of four debates, one debate from each programme, 
using critical discourse analysis: aspects from the van Leeuwen’s (2008, 2009) Social Actor 
Network model, supplemented by additional linguistic features. The results were triangulated 
using computer-assisted corpus analysis for the entire corpus, the fifteen debates. AntConc 
(version 3.2.4w) was used to process the keyword lists, word concordances and collocations. The 
results of the analysis were then compared with the interviews with AJ staff. The main research 
finding was that although results of the critical discourse analysis correlated with those of the 
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computer-assisted corpus analysis, they differed to a marked degree from the perceptions of Al 
Jazeera staff. Also, evident is that Al Jazeera and the protesters had similar ideological 
intentions, including glorifying the revolution and inciting protests, which was not the case with 
the government speakers. Overall, the findings show that Al Jazeera displayed evident bias, 
excluding the government from its debates in a way that runs counter to its mission statement 
and the tenets of objective journalism. The findings of this study illustrate the powerful role that 
language plays in shaping ideological media intentions and influencing the media audience.  
 
Keywords:  
Al Jazeera, computer-assisted corpus analysis, critical discourse analysis, exclusion, ideology, 
otherness, power, TV political debates, Yemen revolution  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to provide a coherent introduction to the current study. First, an explanation is 
given on the rationale for conducting the study. This is followed by a comprehensive definition 
and discussion of the context of the study, followed by the statement of the research problem, the 
specific aims and questions of the study, the chosen approach to data and corresponding research 
methods, and the significance of the study within the field as a whole. This chapter concludes by 
providing an overview of the structure of the dissertation, in an attempt to make its arguments 
clear and effective.  
 Rationale for the study 1.1
The concept of ideology refers to a set of held beliefs and attitudes, and is linked to language, 
power and society. This concept has also been defined as:  
a mechanism of power in modern society, as against the exercise of power through 
coercive means, and on the other hand has come to see language as a, or indeed the, 
major locus of ideology, and so of major significance with respect to power 
(Fairclough, 2001a, p. 10).  
This quote means that language is a stage for exercising power through ideology. Besides, 
manipulation, which is always intentional and covert, and in which the arguer violates the 
sincerity or responsibility of the speech act of argumentation, and ideology are two focuses on 
the study of language (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012).  
Ideology functions where there are unequal relationships. Showing one’s practices as common 
sense is an ideological power of discourse (Fairclough, 2001a). Therefore, discourse that 
functions ideologically sustains unequal power relations, which occur between social groupings 
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of institutions, young versus old people, women versus men, ethnic groups and societal class 
relations (ibid). 
A person’s representation of the world around her/him is affected by her/his previous knowledge, 
attitude and ideology which s/he has about the world. These three factors are presupposed in 
discourse and are subject to consistent alteration by time, dependent on a range of mitigating 
factors, including social situations, time, place and literacy. For this reason, the study of ideology 
within discourse is significant in linguistic research, whereby discourse is linked to power, 
especially that which exist within many areas such as media and politics. In the current study, 
this investigation is enabled through the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which has the 
goal of seeing beyond texts in the study of diverse topics, such as women, minorities, refugees, 
politics, or the media. The aim of CDA is to examine how language is used in order to uncover 
and better understand power relationships, including hidden ideologies.  
The focus of the present study is media discourse on the revolution in Yemen and, more 
specifically, the way in which it was presented by Al Jazeera (AJ). AJ is the most popular and 
influential TV channel in the Arab region as it is the Arab’s main news source. AJ is also the first 
TV network to challenge the traditions and political restraints in the Arab world by airing 
programmes that present all opinions and political perspectives, to the extent that the network 
was accused of having stimulated protests during the Arab revolutions (2010 to date) (Gelvin, 
2012). Furthermore, AJ has been accused of being a controversial media giant; it started as an 
independent free channel, but was later restricted by Qatar politics. AJ has two channels: English 
(AJE) and Arabic (AJA), the second of which is more popular and widely followed (Al Shroof, 
2015). Therefore, AJA is more representative of the discourse of media in the Arab world and is 
more significant to the Arab events, culture and society. The motto of AJ is ‘the opinion and the 
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other opinion’ which means that the channel is neutral as in its programmes; it involves all points 
of views. So, for any argument, AJ is expected to present all sides of the discussed topic. Despite 
this motto, the channel might reflect a contradiction in its programmes such as having a mixture 
of conservativeness and secularism.  
The discourse of revolutions is a worthwhile significant area for academic study for a number of 
reasons, despite revolution discourse not being widely investigated in literature. This is 
especially true in the Arab context, where no research to date has examined the revolutions of 
certain Arab countries, such as the Yemeni revolution (Tripp, 2014). However, the Arab 
revolutions started in 2010 and are still ongoing in some Arab countries, including Yemen and 
Syria, with results that have become unexpectedly undesirable. It can even be argued that these 
social movements have had a sufficiently destabilising effect to contribute to the Arab world 
becoming one of the most unsettled war zones in the world and a dominating topic in global 
politics. Most significantly, the discourse of Arab revolutions is expected to result in corpus that 
is rich in ideology, especially given that the history of the Arab world is rich in revolutions, in 
the state of Yemen in particular (Day, 2011). Finally, studying the revolution discourse of the 
Arab world may be useful and informative with regards to linguistically detecting the ideological 
perceptions of countries regarding other countries, such as Saudi Arabia’s view towards Yemen.  
1.1.1 Yemen 
Yemen is strategically located in Southwest Asia, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula 
between Oman and Saudi Arabia. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, 
which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Yemen's area is spread over 527,970 square 
kilometres, with its capital city, Sana'a, located in the south.  
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A sizeable proportion of the population of the Arab peninsular originally migrated from Yemen. 
According to Ingramz (2007), approximately 10,000,000 people migrated to the north east of the 
peninsula. 'Struggle for patriotic freedom' is a lifelong theory caused by people’s colonisation 
such as the British intervention in Yemen (Officers, 1993). An example of the diversity in 
Yemen is that the south broadly adheres to Sunnah Islam, whereas the north of the country is 
Shia (Ingramz, 2007). Muslims of different Islamic branches have strong religious and social 
perceptions about each other.  
A significant characteristic of Yemeni politics is the continued influence of the tribal system. 
Interviews with a group of Yemeni officers (1993) have shown that every tribe has a male leader, 
who inherits the position and strongly influences the strength of the tribe through their individual 
personality and wisdom. Most importantly, the closer the link between the tribe and that of 
Prophet Mohammed (pbuh), the more respected it will be among the other tribes.  
 
1.1.2 The Yemeni revolution 
The major surrounding event affecting the vast majority of the Arab world when this research 
began was the revolutionary wave of demonstrations during which the local people protested 
against their governments in the demand for political and economic reforms. The revolutions 
mainly took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, which are listed here in terms of 
their chronological order, from the oldest revolution to the newest, from 2010 to date. The 
revolutions started in Tunisia when a Tunisian youth named Muhammed Bouaziz set himself on 
fire in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. This sparked protests across the Arab world, with nearly every 
Arab country experiencing some level of protests since 2010. The unset was caused by many 
factors. As unemployment was rising due to shifts in the structural growth of resources in the 
Arab world (Kadri, 2014), it is argued that the revolutions were ignited by a lack of jobs in many 
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Arab countries. Added to this is the complex set of social, economic and political foundations 
which brought people to streets including deep oppressive security apparatuses, failed economy, 
widespread corruption, rampant poverty and social injustice (Zurayk & Gough, 2014). At the 
time of writing, the revolutions have so far resulted in the ‘ousting’ of the presidents of four Arab 
countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.  
According to Day (2011), months before the street protests took place in Tunisia in 2011, a 
revolutionary climate was already beginning in Yemen. In fact, the events that transpired in 
Yemen were far from an echo of events in other Arab countries. In fact, Yemen was melting 
down due to upsets in the country, such as the Houthis in the south, and Al-Qaeda’s presence, so 
it can be argued that the origins of the revolution could be traced to 1990, with the country’s 
troubled national unification (ibid). The major focus of the Yemeni revolution took place at the 
Sana’a University campus, leading to the establishment of the permanent site of public protest in 
Sahat al-Taghyir, the Changing Square of Yemen. The venue choices of the Arab revolutions, 
the Changing Squares, were not arbitrary, instead representing what citizens felt about 
institutions and the spaces around them (Tripp, 2014). The revolution in Yemen may also have 
been inspired by the Tunisian uprising, after which it was initiated by students and unemployed 
graduates on 15 January 2011. 
Following is an alphabetical list of major names in the Yemeni revolution.  
Abd al-Rabo Mansour Hadi was the vice president of Yemen from 1994 to 2011, and replaced 
Saleh as the head of state in November 2011. 
Abdullah al-Ahmar was a paramount Sheikh of Hashid tribe, head of the Islamic Islah party and 
speaker of the Yemeni parliament from 1932 to 2007.  
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Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh is president Saleh’s son and head of Republican Guards since 2000. 
Ali Abdullah Saleh was the president of Yemen and founder of the northern ruling party from 
1982 to 2011. Saleh’s family was from a clan of the Sanhan tribe, part of the larger tribe of 
Hashid. Soon after becoming the president, Saleh appointed the men of his extended family in 
top military and security posts (Day, 2011).  
Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar was the general, distinct relative of Saleh and defected from Saleh in 
March 2011. 
Sadiq al-Ahmar was the top Hashid Sheikh who detached from Saleh in May 2011. 
By the time the revolution began in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen had already 
been ruling the country since 1990, making him one of the longest-ruling heads of states in the 
Arab world. Although Saleh announced that he would not contest the upcoming presidential 
elections in 2005, he changed his mind and amended the constitution in 2010, thereby making 
himself the president of Yemen for life. Additionally, the evidence supported the idea that Saleh 
was grooming his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, the commander of the Republican Guard and Special 
Forces, to succeed him (Gelvin, 2012). In February 2012, the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh relinquished power to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, who formed a new 
government that constituted the opposition. Hadi faced huge challenges in light of a collapsed 
economy, a humanitarian crisis, political instability, greater US involvement, and most 
importantly, unresolved conflicts in several parts of the country (vom Bruk, et al., 2014). So, the 
Yemeni revolution took one year from early 2011 to early 2012. 
Yemen is an interesting and valuable subject for study, given its status as the poorest country in 
the Arab world, with high unemployment and illiteracy rates, as well as having an infrastructure 
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that is confined to its major cities. Yemen is also unique, because it remains a strongly tribal 
country, wherein society is linked and profoundly affected by tribal affiliation and violence. 
Yemen also has ‘the most heavily armed population in the Arab world’  (Gelvin, 2012, p. 83). 
Recently in 2015, after many parties took advantage of the situation in Yemen to create conflict 
or to take revenge, the Yemeni revolution has advanced into a war. The war has continued, with 
the situation worsening, until mid-2016, when this dissertation was submitted.  
Women featured as leading participants in the demonstrations. During the protests, women 
shared slogans similar to those of men, however cultural reasons meant that these protests were 
perceived as inappropriate and so they had little strength (Zubaida, 2014). One of Yemen’s 
protesting activists was the journalist Tawakul Karman, who was ‘awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prise in 2011 for her sustained advocacy of human rights and press freedom’ (Tripp, 2014, p. 
150). The participation of women was used by regimes to adversely affect the image of the 
revolution, especially to the vast majority of the Muslim population around the Arab world who 
hold the belief that women should remain in their houses and should not fight. One example of 
this is the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who publically proclaimed during the 
revolution in 2011 that demonstrating constituted improper conduct for women, as they should 
not mix with men in public spaces: 
I demand the protesting youth to condemn the mixing of women and men at the 
University Street; Sharia forbids the mixing. 
Ali Abdullah Saleh (April 15, 2011) 
Touching women’s issues is a sensitive matter for Muslim communities as it is generally 
believed in the Arab world that based on their biological nature, women should not have been 
among the protesting squares of the Arab revolutions.  
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To conclude, the Arab revolutions started in 2010 and are still in the process of development, 
with repercussions that are still evident at the time of submitting this dissertation. However, 
while the Arab revolutions have been associated with the positive outcome of renewal 
springtime, thereby earning the uplifting title the ‘Arab Spring’, the results of the revolutions 
cannot be truly signified until a new era in Arab politics has been inaugurated. The Yemeni 
revolution contains a wealth of interesting events, including those that touched on women’s 
participation in the revolution.  
 
1.1.3 Al Jazeera Channel 
The word ‘Al Jazeera’ means ‘the Peninsula’ in Arabic. It is the name for a large and influential 
media network that started in 1996. Al Jazeera (AJ) is headquartered in the Arab Gulf country of 
Qatar. AJ has provided access to modern journalism for the Arab world by breaking the 
established taboos of media in the region, such as interviewing Israeli officials or dealing with 
Arab regimes. According to Hammond (2007), the Al Jazeera channel has offended almost all 
Arab governments. A sizeable proportion of this offence has been attributed to the actions of Al-
Itojah al-Mu'akis (lit: The Opposite Direction), which is the leading debate programme on the 
channel. The presenter of the programme is Dr. Faisal Al Qassem, who was hired by Al Jazeera 
from the BBC World Service Radio. Al Qassem allows debate guests to express themselves 
freely and allows the show to degenerate into shouting matches. An example of the strength of 
the way in which this programme breaks taboos is the argument between the Egyptian feminist 
Nawal Al Saadawi and the Islamic preacher Yousef Al Badri, who were given a forum to talk 
face-to-face for the first time.  
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The following is an extract from El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) which further reveals a 
perspective on the foundation of AJ as a free media network: 
Officially, Al-Jazeera is an independent network, its only connection to the Qatari 
government being its funding. This freedom has allowed Al-Jazeera’s considerable scope. 
Political talk shows are now a regular feature of Al-Jazeera’s programme listings and 
viewers are now openly encouraged to call in and voice their opinions. Only Al-Jazeera 
has dared to challenge Arabic traditions and political restraints by airing programmes 
open to all opinions and political constraints. Al-Jazeera’s staff prioritise stories 
according to local politics, and much of worthiness, not their acceptability to local 
politics, and much of Al-Jazeera’s material is broadcast live (p. 42).  
 
AJ is the most successful channel and is the leader of the Arab broadcasting (Zayani & Sahraoui, 
2007).  
Al Jazeera has channels that speak either English (Al Jazeera English- AJE) or Arabic (Al 
Jazeera Arabic- AJA) languages. According to Sue Philip, the director who was interviewed by 
Barkho (2011), AJA and AJE have different social and linguistic practices. As they are two 
different channels, using different languages, the selection of language is highly significant. 
 
 Statement of the problem 1.2
When this research commenced, massive demonstrations were developing across the Arab 
world. Many have argued that Al Jazeera has played an important role in these revolutions, 
potentially even having escalated the events by broadcasting incidents from the gathering 
protests and frequently reporting from locations where demonstrations were taking place, in 
addition to giving updates about specific numbers of demonstrators present. AJ relied on the 
event details and numbers as reported by the protesters only (Al Shroof, 2015). Commentators 
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have argued that AJ might appear to be a controversial channel in its policies, future directions, 
and reporting. An example here is whether or not AJ supports the Islamic movements. According 
to Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), AJ has a populist orientation that affects and is affected by Arab 
public opinion by giving people what they want, adding that AJ is somehow lost: 
there is a perception that, in spite of the channel’s proclaimed commitment to multiple 
views; its editorial line is not all that neutral. Even within Al Jazeera, there is a feeling 
that Al Jazeera has a ‘channeling dimension’. Furthermore, there are certain orientations 
at the levels of news broadcasting which are indicative in and of themselves. Rather than 
a clear-cut policy that is well thought out, what prevails in Al Jazeera are poles of power 
which often translate in the work environment into bonding and grouping based on a 
common school of thought, an ideologically affinity or a religious rapprochement (p. 60).  
 
Zayani and Sahraoui (2007) justify the controversy of AJ by stating that the channel was not 
allowed to expand naturally, as the media giant was under the scrutiny of its management and 
leadership. This means that, over time, institutionalisation has become more important than 
success. By studying its discourse, the standing point including the ideologies of AJ could be 
determined.  
In this study, the discourse and ideologies of the debates held by AJ will be examined using 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This approach studies the way in which language is used in 
abusing power relations, which is particularly evident in the media and political spheres. CDA 
uses a wide array of linguistic analysis categories and “endeavours to make explicit power 
relationships which are frequently hidden and thereby to derive results which are of practical 
relevance” (Meyer, 2007, p. 15). 
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 Study aims and questions 1.3
This section presents the aims and the research questions of this study. By studying the ways in 
which language was employed by Al Jazeera Channel and by the political sides of the Arab 
revolution, this research seeks to investigate the ideologies used by media and politicians, 
exploring the significance of language in social relations. The study answered the following 
research questions:  
  Main research questions  
1. Was language used to achieve hegemonic ideology in the Al Jazeera’s political debates of 
the 2011-2012 Yemen revolution? If yes, how? 
2. How can CDA help identify and unpack ideology in discourse? Does CDA need to be 
supplemented by another method?  
Subsidiary research questions  
1. How are social actors represented in the debates by Al Jazeera, government and 
protesters? What ideologies do these representations serve? 
2. Is it possible to detect, implicitly or explicitly, the ideologies of the government and 
protesters? If yes, what objectives do these ideologies serve? Is the language of female 
protesters characterized by the use of emotional discourse? If yes, how? 
3. Is it possible to detect, implicitly or explicitly, Al Jazeera ideologies? If yes, what 
objectives do these ideologies serve and do these objectives correlate with the statements 
of the selected members of Al Jazeera staff? 
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 Data and methods 1.4
This study relies upon two main sources of data. The first of these is a comprehensive overview 
of the Arabic language debates on the Yemeni revolution, which were held by the Al Jazeera 
channel in 2011-2012, the transcripts of which were made available online and readily 
transcribed by the channel online. These debates are important as they provide lexical data of 
many events throughout the period of the Yemeni revolution, thereby helping to ensure that 
findings of the study are based on the use of language by many programme moderators and 
speakers. The other data relied upon in this study were collected from interviews with members 
of AJ who managed the debates. The methodological basis of this study adheres to Critical 
Discourse Analysis as its main methodological approach, the main aim of which is to investigate 
the use of language and its effect on power relationships that are evident in media and political 
discourses.  
 Limitations of the study 1.5
Although decisions were made due to the limited time and resources available to a PhD study, it 
would have been preferable to have been able to include more empirical studies done in the Arab 
revolutions in the literature review and in the critical discourse analysis of the language used 
during the revolutions. This was also influenced by the fact that the Arab revolutions are an 
event that is contemporary to the study and are even still affecting some Arab countries. This in 
fact contributes to the originality and significance of the current study. In Yemen, the result of 
the revolution has deteriorated into war that is ongoing at the date of this dissertation submission. 
In addition, there was a limited access to a relatively secretive and high level media organisation 
such as the number and selection of the interviewed members of AJ. Besides, due to the limited 
participation of females as political debate guest speakers, study findings on the use of political 
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language by female politicians were limited to the discourse used by the one featured female 
speaker.  
 
 Significance of the study 1.6
There is broad agreement in linguistics that “discourse types and orders of discourse vary across 
cultures” (Fairclough, 2001a, p. 40). Although aspects of discourse of the English language have 
been widely investigated in literature, there is a relative paucity of similar studies into the Arabic 
language. Since the Arab cultural context of discourse varies from the discourse of the English 
language culture, this study therefore contributes significant findings in addressing the gap in 
literature of inverstigating Arabic discourse. 
In addition, it is of a great significance to embark upon the language used in Arab media as 
nowadays; Arab news is dominating media, politics and humanitarian crisis across the world. 
Although previous studies have been conducted in CDA of discourses related to the Arab 
revolutions, such as those by Alaghbary (2014), Ayasrah (2015) and Kawakib (2016), none have 
examined the discourse of Al Jazeera and the political aspects of the revolutions. Therefore, this 
study contributes significantly in investigating the discourse of Arab’s leading media giant (AJ). 
 In addition, it is imperative to specifically study the language of the Yemeni revolution as 
Yemen suffers from regional divisions among its people and the country has witnessed many 
revolutions during the course of its history. The regional divisions make linguistic shifts more 
evident. The time the revolution started in response to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions; 
there had already been conflict in Yemen. According to Day (2011), Yemen began to fragment 
into smaller states as early as 2009. The future of the revolution was unclear, as sides other than 
ordinary citizens stood to benefit from the revolution. These parties include Al-Qaeda, which is 
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at its strongest in Yemen, and the Houthis, who are the Zaidi Shia Islamist sect in the South who 
have a history of seeking separation from Yemen.  
From a methodological perspective, the current study has also significance. This study mediates 
how language was used by and towards women. This is of particular importance as gender has 
not been widely investigated in the Arabic language, with studies in language and gender being 
barely known in the Arab Islamic world at large (Sadiqi, 2003). Therefore, this study addresses 
an observed gap in the extant literature, contributing significantly to the understanding of how 
discourse is used by and with women. This study also employs aspects of a critical discourse 
analysis model which was firstly designed for English language corpus and therefore contributes 
to the field of research by utilising the model in the analysis of the Arabic language. 
Most significantly, the results of this study are useful in understanding how ideologies and 
perceptions of the world inform language and actions. Although this study is in linguistics, its 
results and recommendations may be useful for further research in fields as diverse as media 
production, change and policy. To summarize, this study contributed to research in terms of the 
culture of discourse, genre and mode of the corpus, methodological framework employed in the 
study and the surrounding context of the study.  
 The organisation of this dissertation 1.7
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the study, providing the 
rationale of the study, its context which includes the Arab revolutions and AJ debates, a 
statement of the problem, the specific study aims and questions, an overview of the data and 
methods, and a brief discussion of the significance of the study. 
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Chapter two reviews the literature related to the study. First, it introduces discourse and, critical 
discourse analysis and its criticism. Then, it provides four well-known CDA theories. Then, it 
gives the pillars of CDA in this study which are argument, power and ideology. Other theories 
investigated in the second chapter are corpus analysis and conversation analysis (CA). 
Chapter three provides the methodology used in this study. First, the corpus is explained: data 
collection, debates, data representation and, differences between AJ’s transcript and the video 
recordings of the debates. Second, details on the trip to AJ network in Qatar and the interviews 
which were conducted with AJ staff are given. The data analysis framework is also elaborated. 
Chapters four, five, and six present the data analysis. Chapter four presents the analysis of four 
debates, one from each of the four debate programmes, using critical discourse analysis. Analysis 
is provided thematically, based on the notions which have emerged by the analysis. Chapter five 
presents the triangulation of the CDA. Chapter six presents the analysis of the interviews which 
were conducted with AJ staff. 
Finally, chapter seven offers the conclusions, limitations and recommendations of the current 
study. It compares the results of this research with empirical studies done in media discourse, 
political discourse and gender.   
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 Introduction 2.1
This chapter reviews the extant literature related to this study in order to provide a coherent 
theoretical background to the investigation of CDA, situating the empirical research within the 
broader, established tradition of academic work. This chapter starts by discussing the topic of 
‘discourse’, followed by an overview of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the key criticisms 
that have been levelled against this approach. CDA is discussed in relation to four main CDA 
approaches: ‘discourse as a social practice’ by Norman Fairclough, ‘the discourse-historical 
approach’ by Ruth Wodak, ‘social cognition’ by Teun van Dijk and ‘social actor network’ by 
Theo van Leeuwen. Power, ideology and argument are then discussed in more detail, as these 
constitute the three main pillars of CDA. The other theories used in this study, corpus-based 
discourse studies and conversation analysis, are then explained in detail. Extensive reference will 
be provided to important scholars in this field, with particular note of Fairclough and van 
Leeuwen, who are two of the most influential theorists of CDA and whose CDA frameworks 
have been widely influential among CDA researchers.  
 Discourse 2.2
There is no straightforward or universally accepted definition of the term ‘discourse’. Foucault 
(1972), one of the major founders and influencers of the field, notes that discourse is continually 
changing and that definitions should therefore take up the term at its very root. Many academics 
agree that the term discourse is “wide ranging and slippery” and therefore a precise definition for 
it should be avoided (Edley, 2001; Taylor, 2001b). Lahlali (2003) adds that the meaning of 
discourse is multidimensional and intricate, as in addition to expressing ideas and paradigms, 
discourse plays an active role in human interaction and understandings. Another linguist who 
discusses the reasons for which it is difficult to discuss discourse is Attar (2012), who claims that 
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the conflicting and overlapping definitions come from the different disciplinary and theoretical 
standpoints that discourse has. El-Sharif (2011) agrees with this position, arguing that the notion 
of discourse is too complex to be encapsulated in a single definition.  
Although Attar (2012) distinguishes discourse as referring to spoken and written language, it is 
argued here that discourse is more than these languages of communication, which is supported 
by the work of Fairclough who is one of the major theorist of discourse. Fairclough (2001a, p. 
20) states that text is only one aspect of discourse, which actually encapsulates “the whole 
process of social interaction”, including all ways that people utilise language to present the world 
around them, such as the way they feel, believe, and socialise. Fairclough divides this process as 
follows: the process of production, a text is produced, and the process of interpretation, text is a 
resource. In this paradigm, discourse therefore includes verbal and visual terms of language, such 
as shoulder shrugging, head movements, gestures, facial expressions, revolution and posture. 
Fairclough (2001b) links discourse to social life defining it as the representations of social life 
that are positioned in different ways, meaning that discourse can also be understood as “social 
use of language in social contexts” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 81). There are many 
components of discourse, which Gee (2005, p. 33) suggests categorising as ‘situated identities, 
characteristic identities, ways of coordinating and getting coordinated by others, things, tools, 
technologies, symbol systems, places, times, acting, gesturing, thoughts and feelings’. 
Nevertheless, there may be unequal structure given to the power relations in the society that are 
shaped by discourse. Fairclough (2001a) justifies the unequal power relationships in the society 
by showing that the discourse of the non-powerful speakers is controlled by the powerful 
speakers  
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Despite the fact that power relations are constrained by discourse, Fairclough (2008) argues that 
a way in which people identify themselves is the way they use text. Ibid refers to this 
identification as “the texturing of identities”, which figures as a part of social activity within a 
practice, such as part of doing a job; in representations as with the self and others; and in ways of 
being, such as the constitution of political versus ordinary identities.  
  
 Critical discourse analysis (CDA) 2.3
The critical approach is currently one of the more prominent approaches in the field of linguistics 
and is closely related to both critical linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
although the CL and CDA are often used interchangeably. Having been derived from the work of 
Bednarek and Caple (2012), CL and CDA are interested in uncovering power relations and 
ideologies behind discourse. Therefore, CDA has the goal of looking beyond texts in studying 
topics such as women, minorities, refugees, politics and media.  
The first academic recognition of the significance of relations between power and discourse 
occurred in 1970 (Fairclough, 2001a), with the consequence that the study of power within 
discourse is a comparatively new discipline. Scholars in the early 1990s helped CDA to evolve 
more formally, for use as a tool to share political concerns about social inequalities in the world 
(Baxter, 2010). This study dwells on critical linguistics (CL), which investigates the use of 
language in discourse in an attempt to determine how power relations and ideologies are hidden 
within discourse.  
The purpose of CDA is to enable the examination of the social functions of language, in similar 
ways to other approaches, which include pragmatics, systemic functional linguistics, 
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conversation analysis and ethnography (Breeze, 2011). What makes CDA unique is that it 
emphasises the relationship between language, text and discourse and power, political struggle, 
inequity and dominance (ibid). Based on Fairclough (2001b, p. 123), CDA is the “analysis of the 
dialectical relationships between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social 
practices”. The definition by Fairclough is more suitable for Discourse Analysis (DA) than CDA 
as it does not link discourse to power. The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics defines 
CDA as “the study of discourse in relation to the structure of a society as perceived e.g. by 
Marxists; to ideologies etc. seen as underlying its ‘production’; and so on” (Matthews, 2007, p. 
87). This definition is elaborated by the Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied 
Linguistics that defines CDA as: 
a form of DISCOURSE ANALYSIS that takes a critical stance towards how language 
is used and analyses texts and other discourse types in order to identify the ideology 
and values underlying them. It seeks to reveal the interests and power relations in any 
institutional and socio-historical context through analysing the ways that people use 
language (Richards & Schmidt, 2002, p. 133).  
This research is based upon the definition provided by Richards and Schmidt, as this 
understanding of the term is more inclusive of the meaning of ‘critical’ in this context, as well as 
the roles of power, ideology and values in defining CDA.  
The relationship between language and power is indicated in the literature. Althusser points out 
this relationship by claiming that values and beliefs which seem to be normal and common sense 
are actually constructed by organisations around us, and that these beliefs are created and shared 
by language (Thomas, et al., 2004). This view shows that language is powerful to the extent that 
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what seems to be a common sense is actually a production of language. This same view is 
stressed by Thomas et al. (2004, p. 10) who highlight that language creates power and is a site 
for performing power; specifically, “language has a key role in transforming power into right and 
obedience into duty”. Since CDA’s main concern is power then, it should be interested in 
studying unequal relationships in society through language.  
Given that CDA is the main approach that has been selected for this research, it is important to 
begin by addressing the most significant critiques that have been levelled at this conceptual 
framework. In conducting this discussion, the limitations pertaining to CDA will first be 
presented, after which this chapter will outline the robust methodological techniques and 
measures that can be adopted in an attempt to ensure the provision of a sufficiently 
methodologically sound research approach when using CDA.  
A core argument levelled by linguists when questioning the validity of CDA research is that this 
approach increases the risk of the particular backgrounds and ideologies of the discourse analyst 
being brought to the research. For example, Taylor (2001b) opines that the identity of CDA 
researchers is often evident in the selection of topic and research area based on the researcher’s 
interests, sympathies and political beliefs. The researcher takes responsibility for a range of data 
collection variables, including interview, gender, age, confidence, appearance and accent, in 
addition to the subsequent interpretation and analysis of these data (ibid). Given the close 
involvement of the researcher and the subjective nature of many of these factors, the previous 
knowledge and views of the researcher may be more able to affect the outcomes than other 
approaches.  
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Six main strategies are commonly cited as valid means of addressing the aforementioned 
limitations to CDA and to avoid subjectivity in the analysis of data: replicability, researcher 
position within the project, triangulation of the analysis, use of nonverbal aspects of discourse, 
use of large data samples (corpus) and, inter-coder and intra-coder reliability (Breeze, 2011; 
Taylor, 2001b; Wodak, 2007b;). First, Taylor (2001b) introduces ‘replicability’ to CDA research 
as criterion for evaluation, where a different researcher should be able to repeat the project and 
obtain the same or similar results. By ensuring this level of replicability, a researcher can attempt 
to more effectively avoid the possibility of being biased. It has also been argued that analysts 
should endeavour to position themselves within the project by self-description and by presenting 
clear accounts of their own relations to the topic, participants and data (ibid). Breeze (2011) 
elaborates on this by stressing that the analyst should describe where s/he stands in the project 
such as stating her/his political views and beliefs. The next strategy is triangulation of analysis 
through the use of multiple methods or form of data analysis during the investigation of the 
phenomenon being studied. Triangulation is reinforced by many CDA practitioners, such as 
Wodak (2007b), who notes that this approach minimises the risk of bias. Besides, Meyer (2007) 
asserts that triangulation is a methodological design that helps eliminating the beliefs and 
ideologies caused by the analyst’s prejudice and preconceptions. The fourth strategy for ensuring 
objectivity in data analysis is the use of nonverbal aspects of language, such as images, 
photographs and body language. To support this, Bednarek and Caple (2012) defends that a 
photograph never lies and that it contributes to the objectivity of the analysis. The fifth element 
of objectivity in CDA is the use of a systematic method with large samples of data, often in the 
form of corpus (Breeze, 2011). The sixth criterion is used by Karimaghaei and Kasmani (2013) 
who used inter-coder reliability and intra-coder reliability in order to verify their study findings. 
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Inter-coder reliability describes the approach where a proportion (in this case 20%) of the entire 
data set is given to people familiar with the study procedures who analyse the data. The results of 
their findings were in accordance with those of the researchers. In terms of the intra-coder 
reliability, after data collection, the researchers checked 20% of the whole data within an interval 
of three weeks so as to avoid any uncertainty.  
Lahlali (2003, p. 70) adds to the support of CDA by concluding that this approach “is still 
developing and evolving. The vast number of publications in this area which have emerged in the 
recent decade, is a sign of its validity and wide recognition”. Although some criticism has been 
levelled against CDA for not providing a clearly stated method, the fact that it provides a variety 
in methods is arguably a strength. Furthermore, as a critical approach, CDA accommodates 
different methods under one umbrella, thereby avoiding the vagueness that typically 
characterises those methodological approaches that rely on a single methodology (ibid).  
 
2.3.1 CDA frameworks 
The following section seeks to disentangle the principal strands of the general conceptual 
framework utilised in the current study. In so doing, it examines the main theories of CDA, as 
they have been described by their respective theorists. These primary theories are as follows: 
‘discourse as a social practice’ by Norman Fairclough (2007); ‘the discourse-historical approach’ 
by Ruth Wodak (2007b); ‘social cognition’ by Teun van Dijk (2007); and ‘social actor network’ 
by Theo van Leeuwen (2008).  
The discourse-historical approach of CDA follows a complex concept of social critique, whereby 
at least three connected discourse aspects related to cognition and action are embraced. This 
approach aims to ‘integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources, 
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the background of the social and political fields in which discourse is embedded, and the context 
where analysed discourses take place’ (Wodak, 2007b, p. 65). This approach takes into account 
four levels of context: ‘the immediate language or text or internal co-text, the intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, the extralinguistic 
social or sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’, and 
the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded’ 
(ibid, p. 67). 
In addition to the above levels of context, Wodak’s (2007b) discourse-historical approach has 
main characteristics: that it is interdisciplinary in the levels of theory and practice; it is an 
approach that is problem-oriented, rather than being focused on specific linguistic features. 
Practice is the target of this approach so research results are made available in different fields 
with the goal of changing discursive and social practices. 
The discourse-historical approach has widely influenced CDA studies and has been commonly 
employed in research undertaken in this area, both as an independent approach and as a part of a 
multidisciplinary approach (e.g. Badarneh et al., 2010; Buckingham, 2013; Johnson et al., 2010). 
However, the present study does not employ this approach as its analytical framework because 
the aim of the present study is to linguistically investigate discourse without solely focusing on 
social critique or linking the study to other fields. 
One of the most prominent scholars of the socio-cognitive approach of CDA is van Dijk (2007). 
Although interested in the socio-cognitive interface of discourse analysis, the base of ‘the socio-
cognitive approach is solidly linguistic, and includes grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, 
stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narratives’ (ibid, p. 99) and similar forms, as well as the verbal and 
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para-verbal organisation of communicative events. According to this approach, language users 
exercise power through discourse by the use of certain properties or functions, which include 
‘stress, intonation, word order, lexical style, coherence, local semantic moves, topic choice, 
speech acts, schematic organisation and rhetorical figures’ (ibid, p. 112). As with the discourse-
historical approach, this method depends on properties of the context such as ‘aims, participants, 
setting, users and their beliefs and interests’ (ibid, p. 113). The socio-cognitive approach 
introduced a number of important terms used in social cognition and CDA, including knowledge, 
ideology, attitude, action and social structure (ibid). However, it does not implement a clear step-
by-step process for discourse analysis.  
The third approach is the CDA as a social process which was designed by Fairclough (2007). A 
social practice or event includes elements that are the ‘production activity, means of production, 
social relations, social identities, cultural values, consciousness and semiosis (discourse)’ (ibid, 
p. 122). In Fairclough’s approach, CDA stresses that semiosis is a part of social processes, 
featuring the analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis and the different elements 
of social practice. Semiosis includes all forms of ‘meaning making’, including language, visual 
images and body language, with every social practice having a semiotic element. Fairclough 
(2007) perceives that social life exists as consistent networks of social practices of different types 
such as economic, political and cultural. The focus here is on action and interaction that 
reproduce and transform structures and meaning that semiosis is closely integrated with social 
life. In this approach, semiosis functions in social practice in three ways: it figures as a part of 
the social activity within a practice, such as being a teacher assistant as a part of teaching as a 
job; it figures in representations, with social actors, speakers and writers producing 
representations of their own and other practices; and it figures in the ‘performances’ of particular 
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positions within social practices. Factors such as life experiences, gender, social class and 
cultural backgrounds influence the production of social practices (Fairclough, 2007).  
Fairclough’s approach proposes a framework that conducts analysis of the discourse of four 
areas. The framework begins by focusing upon a social problem that has a semiotic (discursive) 
aspect. It then analyses the network of practices where the discourse occurs, as well as the 
relationship between semiosis and other elements of the social practice being examined, and 
conducts structural, interactional, interdiscursive and linguistic analysis of the discourse itself. It 
also considers whether the social order (network of practices) ‘needs’ the problem as whether or 
not discourse contributes to sustaining relations of power and domination. Finally, the language 
as a social process approach identifies possible ways to identify the problems of the network of 
practices (Fairclough, 2007).  
The fourth approach to CDA is the social actor network devised by van Leeuwen (2009). As 
with the preceding approaches, the social actor network views CDA ‘as playing a key role in 
maintaining and legitimizing inequality, injustice and oppression in the society’ (ibid, p. 277), 
providing a critique of dominant discourses and genres which affect these inequalities. The social 
actor theory extends CDA from specific grammatical processes into broader semantic notions. 
‘Exclusion’, for instance, refers to the marginalisation of social actors from the representation of 
actions and events in which they took part. ‘Role allocation’ categorises social actors into 
activated (agent role) or passivated (patient role). In addition, those individuals performing 
actions, ‘social actors’, can be given a generic reference, in which they are either referred to in 
broad generalised classes of people or noted specifically as identifiable individuals. Generic 
reference plays a large role in instituting ‘us’ and ‘them’. Other features prescribed by this 
approach are assimilation, association and disassociation, intermination and differentiation, 
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nomination and categorisation, functionalisation and identification, personalisation and 
impersonalisation, and overdetermination (van Leeuwen, 2009). This approach has a socio-
semantic basis, meaning that it is valid for application to languages other than English (ibid).  
Based on the social actor network approach to CDA, discourses are represented and 
reconstructed in social practice:  
Discourses are social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practices; they 
can be and are, used as resources for representing social practices in text. This means that 
it is possible to reconstruct discourses from texts that draw on them…discourses not only 
represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe purposes to it, justify it, and so 
on, and in many texts these aspects of representation became far more important than the 
representation of the social practice itself (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6).  
 
The social actor network approach considers visualisation as the most competent, explicit, and 
pervasive way of providing explanations, to the extent that these visualisations can be more 
effective at constructing the world in which we live than texts. It also stresses that images should 
be the focus in any inquiry of racist discourse and that people are depicted by images in many 
forms, such as social distance, social relation, and social interaction (van Leeuwen, 2008). The 
multimodal analysis framework provided by this approach for the analysis of nonverbal aspects 
of discourse is notionally similar to that of the verbal aspects.  
The four main approaches to CDA mentioned above link discourse with power, ideology and 
argument. These aspects of the discourse are of paramount importance to the current study and 
are therefore discussed individually in the following section. 
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2.3.2 Pillars of CDA 
In this study, there are three pillars to CDA: power, ideology and argument. In the following, 
these pillars are elaborated.  
2.3.2.1 Power 
Power is a fundamental feature of CDA studies. Being distinguished from other linguistic 
analysis, CDA seeks to uncover and understand power relationships in the society through an 
examination of language, which is closely entwined in social power and power is a central 
condition of social life (Wodak, 2007c).  
Power is a general human capacity that seeks to bring about change in reality. Individuals and 
collectives such as governments usually have this capacity, which can include wealth and 
military force. In discourse, people exercise power over others, such as TV producers, who tend 
to decide what is and is not to be included, with the effect that they therefore dominate the way 
that audiences see and act towards aspects of the world (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). In this 
research, ‘power’ refers to political control of Yemen, either by legal capacity or by influence. 
This view of power in language has been widely explained in literature. According to Fairclough 
(2001a), the more powerful participants of communication constrain the contributions of the less 
powerful, using a wide range of devices, including interruption, enforcing explicitness, 
controlling the topic, and formulation. Fairclough (2001a) explains these devices below, using 
examples from classroom interactions, where the teacher is presented as more powerful than the 
student. The first device is interruption, which is when the more powerful participant stops the 
less powerful to continue talking or repeating what the less powerful has said. An example of 
this is when the student asks for examples of the vowels that are not found in Arabic are v and p 
and the teacher stops the student and says “Can I have another answer, students?”. The next 
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device is enforcing explicitness, describing the situation when the more powerful complains that 
the less powerful is ambiguous and that s/he should make her/his talk unambiguous. This can be 
seen in the example of a teacher replying to the student “Explain how v and p are vowels”. 
Third, controlling the topic is when the more powerful party specifies the topic and nature of 
interaction. An example is when the teacher replies “A good question but let us concentrate on 
today’s class objective which is consonants, not vowels’’. Finally, the last device is formulation, 
which is when the more powerful words what follows, or rewords what has been said. An 
example is when the teacher replies “V and p are two sounds which we have in English but which 
are not found in Arabic” (Fairclough, 2001a).  
The following discussion examines studies that focused on areas of great relevance to the current 
research, having investigated the use of discourse in Arabic political tension, the use of irony and 
presumed knowledge as tools for hegemony, and the ways in which hegemonic practices can be 
practiced in the classroom. The first of these, research by Atawneh (2009), investigated a similar 
topic to the current study, examining the use of discourse of political conflict in the Arab world, 
with an emphasis on how the language of the Israelis and Palestinians mirrored the strengths and 
weaknesses of both sides. The assumption made by the study was that media search would result 
in more threats made by Israelis than by Palestinians, given that the Israeli side is more powerful 
in the Middle East. Data used in the study comprised headlines reported in 428 reports of local 
and world media (ibid). In order to test the assumption that language reflected power, Atawneh 
(2009) analysed speech acts reported in media in relation to threats and appeals from both 
conflict sides. Analysis showed that Israelis used more threats than Palestinians, reflecting their 
strength, while the comparative weakness of Palestinians was reflected in their use of a larger 
proportion of appeals. A number of 145 appeals were used by Palestinians compared to 5 appeals 
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only were used by Israelis. Atawneh claims that these statistics created an irony that the victim 
was more powerful and the victimizer was less powerful. The study gave a focused, objective 
analysis that clearly illustrated the link between discourse and power in the Middle East.  
Another study which linked political discourse with power by the use of irony was performed by 
Nuolijarvi and Tittula (2011). Their study sought to analyse the use of irony during the 
interactions that occurred during TV debates in the 2002 Finnish presidential elections. They 
studied the construction, use, and response elicited by irony within the sequential context. As 
with the current study, Nuolijarvi and Tittula (2011) used televised political debates whereby a 
moderator and opponents were involved in the debates. It also made specific references to 
aspects of conversation analysis (CA), such as turn-taking, which is significant when there is a 
moderator who controls the conversation. The data used were collected from four debates 
between two candidates qualified for the second round of the Finnish presidential election in 
2006 (ibid). Each debate lasted for one to two hours and was hosted by two moderators, in the 
form of a question and answer session, in which the candidates answered the moderators' 
questions and commented on each others’ turns. The methodology employed an analysis of irony 
as a defence and as an attack, using conversation analysis framework (turn-taking). Instances 
which ridicule the opponent and shift the serious modality of the setting were analysed. 
According to Nuolijarvi and Tiittula (2011), irony in public debate was marked by its 
construction and placement in the sequence of spoken discourse. The meaning of irony was also 
recognisable in context, although it was sometimes difficult to be sure of the specific intended 
meaning, particularly as ironic turns occurred in reaction to previous actions, rather than being 
topic-initiated utterances.  
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In linking discourse with hegemony, a study was carried out by Flowerdew and Leong (2010) in 
order to analyse the role of presumed knowledge in Ta Kung Pao’s discursive construction of 
who had the right to participate in Hong Kong’s governance under the concept of ‘one country-
two systems’. It is significant to refer to the study by Flowerdew and Leong (2010), as it is 
possible that debate opponents of the discourse of this study will attempt to reach their ideologies 
through the use of their presumed knowledge, such as their specific knowledge about the 
president or the revolution events. Flowerdew and Leong (2010) raised the main question: what 
kind of knowledge, why discursive strategies and the extent to which these strategies promoted 
hegemony in the discourse of Kung Pao. They drew upon a wealth of data, reviewing 250 reports 
and articles from Ta Kung Pao which had been published between 10 October 2003 and 1 
October 2004, which were analysed from an ideological perspective. The study also considered 
what was explicitly asserted as ‘presumed knowledge’. The textual analysis looked into othering, 
non-naming, and use of metaphor. Findings of the study by Flowerdew and Leong (2010) 
showed that the identity of ‘the patriotic’ was highly politically charged and goal specific. The 
main strategies used by the news reports were othering, non-naming, and metaphors. The 
definition of patriotism was found to be relative and contextual rather than stable or universal 
(ibid). It is believed here that although the study linked discourse with hegemony, it did not give 
a rationale for selecting patriotism as its semantic concept and that patriotism was not specified 
in the research question or objectives. Additionally, like many other CDA studies, no 
triangulation was provided for the data analysis.  
The previous section discussed power as the basic pillar to CDA. Power is extended by 
discussing empirical studies that linked discourse and power, to politics, and to gender.  
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2.3.2.1.1 Discourse, power and politics 
CDA research investigates how language is used in political discourse, which can be attributed to 
the inherent concern that CDA has with power and control, as well as with legitimation and de-
legitimation (Mazid, 2007). As this research studies the management and production of political 
discourse, it is important to briefly outline and explain the link that exists between political 
discourse and power. Political language is always around us (Thomas, et al., 2004), and while 
people tend to achieve power in every aspect of their lives, unequal relationships are also present 
everywhere: family, school, television programmes and parliament (ibid). One forum in which 
unequal power relationships are particularly evident in debates held in the media, such as on 
television. This is particularly pronounced with regards to politics, which generally, “includes 
discourse which represent the varying ways of focusing on political thought, debate, deliberation 
and action in social life such as different political discourses in economic systems and business 
activity” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 83).  
The way in which political parties try to achieve power is elaborated by Fairclough (2001a, p. 
75), who argues that “in politics, each opposing party or political force tries to win general 
acceptance for its own discourse type as the preferred and ultimately the ‘natural’ one for talking 
and writing about the state, government, forms of political action, and all the aspects of politics-
as well for demarcating politics itself from other domains”. The use of discourse by politicians is 
then discussed as follows:  
a skilful politician is able to maximise the positive feedback and support for her/his ideas, 
plans and actions…the political uses of norms of forms of address help articulate and 
reinforce ideologically biased views on behalf of groups, institutions and/or political 
parties in order to influence people’s minds and beliefs, to motivate people to act or to 
obtain increased support for concrete actions (IIie, 2009, p. 9).  
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Many studies have investigated the use of political discourse as a tool of power. As in the current 
study, Shenhav (2009) used CDA as the qualitative analysis method to analyse political debates 
as the discourse source. In this way, Shenhav (2009) investigated whether the structure of 
narratives created a sense of continuity that is central to the construction of community, which he 
examined through the context of political debates from the 1960 and 1976 to 2004 campaigns. 
These data comprised 1100 sentences from 21 presidential debates during nine presidential 
campaigns. Shenhav used a structural approach to qualitative discourse analysis in order to 
evaluate the empirical grounding of political discourse. His findings indicated that seven out of 
nine elections were reported with a strong narrative element in their closing statements. Voters 
were shown to have the tendency to favour candidates in the narrative content of the closing 
statements of presidential debates. Although textual analysis gave interesting conclusions, 
political narratives were not well-defined in the study and neither were political narratives (as a 
term) widely discussed in the literature review (ibid).  
Similar to the type of discourse investigated in the current study, Johansson (2006) used political 
broadcast TV interview of dialogic nature to examine the discourse from a dialogical 
perspective. Johansson sought to study what objects of discourse were constructed and how this 
took place during selected political broadcast interviews, looking at both the dialogical 
perspective, meaning how the other-orientation emerged in the interview, and the socio-
pragmatic perspective. Johansson (2006) hypothesized that the discursive practices were 
constantly reproduced in various media texts in the political and social media texts. The data 
used in the study included political interviews recorded between late 1980s and mid 1990s from 
French TV consisting of four full-length interviews of 40 minutes each and two long fragments 
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from two interview programmes. This extensive corpus was complemented by a contrastive 
corpus of nine radio interviews, which had been recorded between the same periods, comprising 
a total of five hours of recorded material. As in the current study, Johansson analysed the 
speaking activity of both speakers: the journalist and the politician. Johansson (2006) found that 
the politicians oriented towards the public in order to gain support and acceptance, attempting to 
use their answers to persuade and thereby establish specific positions. A range of cognitive-
discursive tasks were utilised to appeal to reasons, emotions and knowledge of the public, 
including description, explications and argumentation. The objects of discourse were mediated 
and belonged to the public sphere. Additionally, they were repeatedly discussed in different 
media in a way that formed the main characteristics of media discourse, namely intertextuality 
and interdiscursivity. The main objects of discourse were the adjacency pairs, questions and 
answers. The strength of Johansson’s (2006) study was that it used TV political interviews as 
data/corpus, showing how politicians appealed for public support through the use of different 
linguistic components.  
Third, Buckingham (2013) adopted a CDA approach similar to that formulated by Meyer and 
Wodak (2001), Richardson (2007) and van Dijk (2001, 20115). As in the current study, 
Buckingham investigated the power of media discourse in shaping beliefs, which she achieved 
through an examination of newspaper coverage of Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) 
membership. Specifically, Buckingham (2013) was interested in the way that the media 
portrayed support for and opposition to this bid, and the extent to which coverage was provided 
for domestic debate on the issue ‘how Turkey was portrayed in the Spanish press of whether it 
should be part of the EU or not. A thorough examination was performed of the rhetorical and 
linguistic means used by the leading daily newspaper in Spain over a 12 year period (ibid). This 
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enabled the proposition to be made that news media did not passively reflect a given reality, but 
instead were agents, constructing perceptions of reality through the way in which events were 
covered and selected. Buckingham (2013) examined articles published electronically in EL Pais 
over 12 years, from 1999 to 2010. These sources comprised 387 articles containing news items, 
editorials, interviews and commentaries, providing a total of 922 topics in relation to Turkey's 
bid for EU membership. Both ‘micro level strategies (topic selection, referential or nomination 
strategies, attribution to characteristic qualities through prediction, metaphors) and macro level 
analysis (framing through reporting perspective, 'voice' selection of spokespeople)’ (ibid, p.  187-
189) were used (ibid). In addition, the study evaluated the extent to which Spanish perspectives 
were articulated by political elites or other social actors, as well as looking at whether Spanish 
media coverage of Turkey replicated the views of EU officials and members of states. The data 
analysis software Wordsmith Tools 4.0 was employed to locate concurrences from the entire 
corpus, focussing on metaphors, keywords, and synonyms. In her investigation into the 
association between discourse with power in the political language of Turkey, Buckingham 
concluded that editorials and commentaries had made particular and repeated reference to the 
role played by religion in the categorizing of Turkey as 'the other' in the culture of the EU. 
Buckingham’s conclusions were solid, as in addition to micro screening of the texts, she 
triangulated her analysis by means of computer software.  
Gadavanij (2002) used CDA as the analytical method as part of an exploration of the use of 
discourse by politicians to achieve their goals. The study relied upon the use of ‘no-confidence’ 
debates, which were examined to determine why the discourse of the popular genre with an 
informal register was employed in parliamentary discourse and the role that this language had in 
the institutionalised discourse (ibid). The underlying assumption of this research was that social 
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practices shaped discourse practices, with the text itself containing the evidence of their impact. 
This hypothesis was tested by limiting the study to text (a transcription of recorded material). A 
combination of CDA (text) and SCA (context-social context analysis) were employed using five 
accusatory speeches and two respondent speeches from recent debates of the Thai parliament 
from 1995 to 1996. In order to make the framework of her study more dynamic, Gadavanij 
(2002) used two levels of analysis, macrostructure and microstructure, to explore the relationship 
between discourse and society in a complete way, and enable the effective investigation of social 
practices, discourse practices, and text. Thai no-confidence debates were shown to ‘offer 
speakers the opportunity to achieve contradictory political and linguistic ends, within the same 
tightly-crafted speech’ (ibid, p. 2), in order to achieve political and social functions. The two 
levels of data analysis framework employed by Gadavanij were useful in linking political 
discourse with power. 
2.3.2.1.2 Discourse, power and gender 
One of the ideologies that can be uncovered by the analysis of political debates is the way in 
which women represent themselves and are represented in the debates. Gender is recognised as a 
key characteristic of speakers that contributes to the various features that may influence language 
use (Shaw, 2000). This means that gender can be relevant in understanding the structure and 
meaning of a given political interaction. This section is dedicated for discourse, power and 
gender because women were involved as debate speakers and debate moderators.  
The link between discourse and gender as a discourse element is well established in the extant 
literature. According to Weatherall (2002), language is the result of communities of practice, 
meaning that social practices should be studied in conjunction with gender as a social element. A 
logical extension of this position is that context can lead to theoretical and practical insights in 
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gender and language variation, as social and cultural beliefs permeate every aspect of thought, 
perception and behaviour and should therefore be central in discussions of discourse. There has 
been a shift in how language reflects the disadvantages of women into the role that language 
constitutes to social reality. The relationship between gender, identity, and language is twofold: 
people have attitudes between women and men’s discourse; and speech cues trigger attributes 
about the gender identity (ibid).  
While one point of view states that each gender borrows from a joint stock of specific linguistic 
devices to exercise power, another view considers women’s language different from men’s 
linguistically, showing women to be more cooperative in speaking than men (Thomas et. al., 
20014). Yates (2001) and Thomas et al. (2004) claim that men challenge those who are speaking, 
whereas women help by giving back channel support, such as the verbal and nonverbal feedback 
to speakers like mum, yeah, good and I see. In addition, men use more interrupting tactics than 
women. . Women more commonly apologize, give explicit justification, question and provide 
personal orientation whereas men give self-promotion, pre-supposition, rhetorical questions and 
authoritative orientations. Women also commonly use attenuated assertions, as with the use of 
hedges and epistemic modals (Thomas et al., 2004), in contrast with men who more typically 
make stronger assertions. Hedges refer to the use of linguistic forms which dilute assertions, such 
as sort of, like, kind of and I think, because they are sometimes not sure about what they say. 
Epistemic modality is the use of modals showing less confidence such as maybe, should and 
might. Overall, these examples suggest that women tend to value cooperation and that their 
language use supports this position, whereas men are uncomfortable with intimacy (Yates, 2001; 
Thomas et al., 2004).  
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The link between political debates and gender representations has been indicated by empirical 
CDA research. In the following section, reference is made to three studies that investigated the 
representation of women in political discourse. As with the current study, Shaw (2000) studied 
gender as a political discourse-variation element and employed elements of conversation analysis 
to investigate the hypothesis that ”political debates were speech events which foregrounded 
issues of power and ‘the floor’, and allowed the opportunity of assessing the ways in which the 
gender of participants affect their construction as more or less powerful participants in debates” 
(p. 406). In so doing, this study established the extent to which the gender of participants can be 
related to the control that a speaker is able to exert over the debate. This was managed through a 
qualitative investigation that combined ethnographic approach with conversation analysis. Five 
political debates of the British House of Commons were used that took place between July 1998 
and March 1999, during which 25% of participants were females. From these data, Shaw 
analysed, identified and categorized debate turns, interventions and interruptions. Her analysis 
uncovered that there was a single flow in political debates, which had two turn-taking systems: 
legal systems and illegal ones, meaning those that deviated from the usual norms of the debate in 
some way. Violations of the turn-taking rules were common and legal turns were interrupted, 
most frequently by male debate members (90% in Shaw’s study). Shaw concluded her finding 
with the following: 
The findings that masculine discourse styles are treated as the interactional norm in 
debates relates to the fact that traditionally women have not been represented in this 
institution, and continue to be underrepresented…there is a strong male culture in debates 
in which is likely to prevent female Members of the Parliament (MPs) from participating 
in these rule-breaking activities (p. 416).  
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So, the discourse of women is influenced by the institutional culture in which the discourse takes 
place.  
While Shaw studied turn-taking in political debates, Hess-Luttich (2007) investigated the use of 
interruption in arguments in TV debates. It is especially significant to discuss this research, as it 
examined political TV debates and utilised CDA as the analysis framework, in common with the 
current study. Hess-Luttich (2007) sought to describe the genre and to chronologically trace the 
structural changes of discourse. Genre referred to context, situations, settings and frames which 
determined the pragmatics of language use. The data used in the study were extracted from 
political talk shows, one broadcast in Germany in the late eighties and one in Switzerland 15 
years later. These data comprised the discursive practices of the host, which were studied in 
terms of empirical criteria such as turn-taking and speaking time, (ibid). The relationship 
between interjections and back channel behaviour was found to be interesting. More than three 
times as many reactions were used by women than men. However, more interjections were used 
by men. The males were shown to interrupt women four times more often than women did, while 
women failed to interrupt twice as often as men. This study by Hess-Luttich (2007) is relevant to 
the current research in looking at political TV argumentation, studying moderator and speaker’s 
discourse, and performing gender-based analysis. 
 
The third study that explicitly referred to the gender-based differences in discourse was 
conducted by Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013). Their research appraised gender representation in the 
1999 Nigerian constitution using insights from CDA, feminism and Systemic Functional 
Linguistics. The study particularly emphasized on a close examination of grammar cohesion 
through the use of lexical and grammatical expressions that encoded gender in the constitution 
52 
 
and ideological positions, in addition to their impact on gender parity and socio-political equity. 
'Male-as-norm' ideology was the subject matter of the paper, with an assumption that since 
language was the means of constructing systematic inequality between genders, language could 
equally be used to deconstruct this inequity (ibid). Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013) used functional 
and socio-linguistic perspectives on the analysis of discourse, drawing insights from two 
approaches to language analysis: CDA and feminism. Their analysis perspectives were tied to 
issues of power and ideology, so the choice of certain words and expressions was analysed to 
grant an insight into the view of language as being intricately tied to power and ideology. 
Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013, p. 687) concluded that ‘generic masculine noun and pronoun 
references, which referred to social and political positions, open to eligible individuals in Nigeria 
while the single feminine referent was a marked case’. A total of 480 masculine pronoun 
references were found, in comparison to only 40 various antecedents referring to persons, clearly 
illustrating profound under-representation of female gendered language. As in the current 
research, Ezeifeka and Osakwe focused on a study of connected language with respect to power 
and ideology through an examination of gender-based differences in discourse. Their work also 
provided suggestions on language features for future constitution reviewers such as the 
replacement of 'chairman' by 'chairperson', as well as discussing the representation of women in 
political discourse and the official document of constitution. Likewise, the representation of 
women in Arab media and political discourse is equally important.  
2.3.2.2 Ideology  
This section is allotted to ideology because it is a main pillar of CDA and is the centre of this 
research. Ideology is defined in the literature of linguistics and is shared widely by many 
theoretical approaches to CDA. Ideology can be defined as being everything we think and know 
(Thomas, et al., 2004). Therefore, people who ask questions on the domination of ideology tend 
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to sound ideological because ideologies become common sense assumptions within any group or 
society. One definition that closely links ideology to the language as a social process approach 
followed by the present study is provided by Fairclough (2008, p. 18) who argues that ideologies 
can be best understood as “representations of aspects of the world which contribute to 
establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation”. Therefore, 
ideology refers to the beliefs that a person or an institution has on any aspect of life, including 
views about groups of people, such as women, or surrounding events, such as the revolution, 
which is the specific context of this research. From a similar perspective to Fairclough’s 
perceptions regarding the power of discourse in enforcing ideological assumptions, van Dijk 
(2007, p. 103) explains that ideologies are basic social representations of social groups:  
CDA research is often interested in the study of ideologically biased discourse, and the 
ways these polarise the representation of us and them. These representations are 
‘particularized’ in mental models then expressed in text and talk. This theory suggests 
that an analysis of the semantic macrostructures and microstructures will result on 
‘positive self-representation’ and ‘negative other representation’.  
 
So, it is significant to analyse the text holistically as well as analyse certain linguistic aspects of 
discourse. The other is negatively represented through the use of discursive tools.  
In his approach to ideology, van Dijk (2007) constructs two significant linguistic terms useful in 
the study of ideology within CDA. These terms are attitudes, culturally shared opinions and 
knowledge, which are the information shared by certain communities such as doctors, academics 
and social revolutions. In this study, ideology represents the shared knowledge and attitudes of 
media and politics of the Arab world.  
54 
 
Having provided an overarching discussion of the broad themes occurring within CDA, a 
discussion will now be provided on three empirical studies that specifically addressed the 
ideology of the Al Jazeera channel (AJ). As well as being the focus of the current study, AJ is 
likely to have been the focus of research because it is the most influential channel in the Arab 
region and has played a significant role in the events of the Arab revolution. Fahmy and Al Emad 
(2011) investigated whether it was possible to validate the claim that Al Jazeera Arabic was 
biased while Al Jazeera English was cleansed by changes and omissions. They hypothesized that 
Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English differed in their coverage of the US/Al Qaeda conflict, 
with the Arabic coverage relying upon fewer American sources and taking a stance that was 
more negative towards the US. The data used for the research was in a total of 1760 Al Jazeera 
English and Al Jazeera Arabic news stories, although only 238 (139 Arabic and 99 English) were 
content analysed. Content analysis included the analysis of prominence of online stories which 
covered the conflict. Findings of the study by Fahmy and Al Emad (2011) indicated no 
significant difference between the news stories in the English versus Arabic websites. The results 
indicated that Al Jazeera websites negatively framed the fighters especially Al Qaeda agents. 
Despite this study only considering the use of Al Jazeera Arabic, since it is the most appealing to 
the Arab audience with a direct connection to the Arab revolutions, it presented the conclusion 
that Al Jazeera did not produce different news coverage to Arabic and English-speaking online 
consumers (ibid).  
The second research that studied AJ was carried out by Leudar et al. (2004). They investigated 
public representations of the participants in violence and of the violence itself, based upon the 
assumption that the presentation of events offered moral accounts of past actions and therefore 
prepared the ground for the future violence, meaning that the depiction and occurrence of events 
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were closely related. This assumption by Leudar et al. is applicable in the case of the present 
study, arguing that investigation of the discourse of AJ enables detection of the ideological 
assumptions of the channel, which represent its foregrounded accounts of the Arab revolutions as 
the actions. The data used in the research consisted of public addresses made soon after the 
attacks: two addresses by the US president, George Bush, to the nation; a statement by British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the British House of Commons along with their ensuing 
parliamentary debate on the events; and two statements by Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, 
that were broadcast on Al Jazeera TV in Qatar. Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) was 
used in order to establish how the key figures involved in the conflict represented the September 
2001 events and the participants in them. According to Leudar et al. (2004), this methodology 
was originally formulated by Sacks in 1960s and then developed by other researchers in order to 
better understand the actions and utterances of people. It was found that any participant in the 
conflict had a double contrastive identity (ibid). Bin Laden presented himself as the defender of 
Islam while Bush was among the crusaders who attacked Islam. Similarly, Bush represented 
himself as among the defenders of freedom and democracy whereas Bin Laden was a terrorist. 
Although the study by Leudar et al. (2004) used a useful data analysis framework which 
identified the representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a systematic way, there was a failure to 
explicitly link these representations to ideology.  
In the third study, Barkho (2011) used corpus from AJ to test how the channel sustained its 
ideology. This involved a study of the role played by internal guidelines in shaping the news 
narratives of AJE and BBC with regards to the Middle East, by highlighting the role of the these 
guidelines in structuring and patterning news discourse. The outcomes of the study cast doubts 
on the openness, transparency and visibility of the editorial process of both channels. Barkho 
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(2011) was able to utilise excerpts from the internal guidelines of the AJE and BBC which were 
strictly confidential and hidden from the public. Textual analysis of the guidelines was used, with 
a reliance on lexicon analysis of terms and phrases that described the struggle between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Power and social relations were implied by lexical and word-choice aspects 
(ibid). Personalisation was also detected. Barkho (2011) moved beyond textual analysis to 
interview editors at both channels, in order to investigate their internal guidelines and better 
understand the relations of the channel with power, dominations and legitimacy. As their 
guidelines were written in the form of orders, rather than advice or suggestions, the study found 
that the two news giants, AJE and BBC, used their organisational power to dissimilate and 
inculcate their ideology and viewpoints in the Middle East conflict (ibid). Most interestingly, the 
editors claimed neutrality despite the discourse analysis of the study showing that these channels 
were actually ideological. Even if this study does not analyse AJ’s guidelines, a reference to the 
guidelines is made when interviewing members of AJ staff (see sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7).  
The ideology of other TV genres and channels had also been covered by literature. Johnson et al. 
(2010) studied the television news discourse on the coverage of Hurricane Katrina. From the 
context of the current study, this is valuable because they used CDA in analysing the ideologies 
hidden in the discourse of media. Their study specifically focused on an examination of the ways 
in which on-air conversation between journalists indicated how racial ideology could be reflected 
in the US television coverage of race-related crises. Interjournalistic discourse regarding African 
Americans in national network and cable news programmes that aired after hurricane Katrina 
was used as the corpus of the study (Johnson et al., 2010). Source of the data was organisations 
such as CBS, CNN and MSNBC, with 65 news programmes in which reporters mentioned 
keywords of racial ideology during the interjournalistic discourse. The methodology used in the 
57 
 
study was one instigated by van Dijk (1995). The transcripts of four news programmes were 
sorted for three types of semantic items: lexicalisation, word choice-propositional framing and, 
us and them. The results of the analysis indicated that the majority of the journalists were white, 
with 17 (77%) out of 22 being Caucasian, while only 4 (18%) were black and 1 (5%) was 
Hispanic non-white. The study concluded that because this cohort of reporters was 
predominantly white and worked for white-owned news organisations, the discursive elements 
reflected the perspectives of the dominant culture in these channels. It also suggested 
implications for reporters to avoid ideological reporting as with black and white. Overall, the 
study by Johnson et al. (2010) therefore suggests that media mirrors aspects of ideological 
discourse, positioning it in a biased stance.  
Another investigative study that examined the ideologies of debates as a tool of exercising power 
was conducted by Attar (2012), who also relied upon CDA as the chosen analytical framework to 
examine public national debates on Genetic Modification (GM). Attar (2012) sought to 
investigate which discursive strategies were adopted by participants of UK public debates on 
technologies and whether those debates attempted to achieve consensus on such issues, rather 
than being polemic. Uncovering the ideologies of the investigated texts enabled the examination 
of the issues of power exercised by dominant groups in public debates on controversial 
technologies, with particular focus on GM foods. The data contained emails and comments 
posted online as general debate, augmented by transcripts of the six tier public meetings, which 
took place in 2003 as part of the UK government’s consultation programme on the 
commercialisation of GM crops. The study used the Fairclough’s approach (2003), relying on 
Nvivo and word-by-word textual analysis. Through use of intertextual analysis, the study 
concluded that debates were argumentative in nature, although most of the debates were 
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summaries more than discussions. Although Attar (2012) used debates, they were public and 
therefore differed from the debate structure of political interviews on television that are 
employed for this study. 
2.3.2.2.1 Linguistic indicators of ideology  
The representations of the world within discourse can be traced by coding the text’s ideological 
linguistic features. Fairclough (2001b) describes the vocabulary that carries ideological 
assumptions as the ideological struggle under the ‘veil of semantics’. This section therefore 
discusses the various linguistic devices that indicate ideology, as these have emerged from the 
extensive body of empirical literature on political ideologies. 
2.3.2.2.1.1 Semantic derogation and Euphemism 
Among the highly indicative elements of political ideology are semantic derogation and 
euphemism. Semantic derogation refers to the use of negative words in representing people or 
things in order to show them as inferior. An example of semantic derogation is the use of 
‘family’ or ‘children’ to refer to the wife in urban areas in Oman. By such reference, the wife is 
linguistically hidden and is instead given the attribution of her own children. In contrast, 
euphemism is “a figure of speech which uses mild inoffensive or vague words as a means of 
making something seem more positive than it might otherwise appear” (Thomas, et al., 2004, p. 
48). An example of euphemism is the use of ‘moderate’ rather than ‘liberal’ or ‘secularist’ when 
discussing opinions in countries that hold strong religious beliefs and practices. The term 
‘moderate’ does not imply anything about the religious background of an individual, whereas 
‘liberal’ and ‘secularist’ often imply a non-religious position, which might be considered taboos 
in societies with religious domination. Ideologically, euphemism therefore functions as a way to 
hide reality.  
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A study which demonstrated the strength of semantics in enforcing political ideology was 
conducted by Waterton and Wilson (2009). They sought to examine the rhetorical resources 
drawn upon in policy, media and public discourses by analysing the socio-political conditions of 
the text. The analysis helped them to chronologically examine the exploitation of African people. 
The study used formal institutional talk, parliamentary debates and political speeches, media 
reporting and everyday talk, observed through a range of computer-mediated communication 
forums. As in the current study, Waterton and Wilson (2009) focused on detecting semantic 
aspects that indicates ideologies of the discourse of media and politics. Data was dated between 
2006 and 2007. The study concluded that the abolition discourse represented the past in a limited 
way of what was considered as damaging for British self-image (ibid). The study by Waterton 
and Wilson (2009) is significant in the study of political discourse as it explicitly showed the 
extent to which politicians deviate from reality, the distressing or damaging past, and their use of 
mild language. Nevertheless, the study did not clearly list the linguistic tools used by the political 
speakers so these tools could be compared with the ones used by Arab politicians. 
2.3.2.2.1.2 Otherness 
Otherness is the reference to others with egocentricity, always with a negative connotation, such 
as ‘I am successful but he is a failure’, or ‘we are clever but they are stupid’. This study utilises 
the concept of otherness to denote the way in which speakers refer to ‘the other’ and the way or 
ways that they distinguish themselves from others, or one side from other sides. It is important to 
note that there are numerous ways in which ‘the other’, as a social actor, can be referred to in 
text, the most important of which can be seen in the following list, adapted from Fairclough 
(2008): 
Variable Explanation/example 
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In the following section, a discussion is provided of seven key empirical studies conducted on 
the subject of ‘otherness’ as an ideological element in political discourse. The first of these, 
Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010), used a CDA framework to examine the justifications and 
persuasive techniques employed by three republicans and three democratic candidates in the US 
presidential election. They relied upon analysis of debates between republicans and democrats 
over the Iraqi constitution of war (the bylaws of war indicated in the Iraqi constitution), with the 
aim of understanding the underlying ideology of both US political parties with respect to the 
Inclusion/exclusion Suppression: to be inferred as not in the text at all 
Back-grounding: mentioned somewhere in the text but has to be 
inferred in one or more places 
Pronoun/noun Noun or pronoun (he, she, it, I, you, we, they) 
Grammatical role A participant in a clause (actor, affected), a circumstance (prepositional 
phrase)  
Active versus passive Is the social actor the actor of the process (the one who does things) or 
the affected or beneficiary (the one affected by the process)? 
Personal/impersonal Personal: the police (referring to the police in their own name) 
Impersonal: the filth (referring to the police as filth, not their name) 
Named/classified Named: Tom Smith 
Classified: the doctor or the doctors 
Specific/generic Specific: teachers are the ones who work in the schools (schools of a 
specific area) 
Generic: teachers tend to be unfair with marks (general to all teachers) 
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issue of the constitution of war. Through analysis using van Dijk’s (2004) framework, they also 
investigated the ways in which the candidates attempted to justify themselves and persuade their 
audience in order to win their consensus over the nation. The study used transcripts of the six 
candidate speeches in presidential primaries of the USA for the 2008 war in Iraq. All transcripts 
were taken from the internet. The study used van Dijk’s framework (2004) in politics, ideology 
and discourse. In order to analyse the data by means of this framework, Rashidi and 
Souzandehfar (2010) selected twenty seven ideological elements such as actor description, 
authority, categorisation, consensus, disclaimer, evidentially, hyperbole, implication, irony, 
lexicalisation, national self-glorification, number game, polarisation, presupposition, vagueness 
and victimisation. As with other studies on ‘otherness’, Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) 
discovered that speakers mainly used negative other-representation and positive self-
representation in order to utilise subtle ideological discourse structures. Other strategies used 
were lexicalisation, pluralisation and rhetoric for persuasion and justification. Although data 
analysis framework was clear and systematic, the study did not triangulate its data analysis 
means of a different method, such as corpus analysis. Nevertheless, it is a useful source for the 
current study, which also uses political debates as the data and studies the ideology of debates, 
with a focus on investigating ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Another discursive element that indicated ‘otherness’ in political debates is forms of address, a 
subject that was investigated by Jaworski and Galasinski (2000). As in the current study, they 
examined vocative address forms and ideological legitimisation in political debates to investigate 
the use of ‘otherness’ as an ideological tool in televised political debates (ibid). The objective of 
their study was to examine the way in which vocative forms of address shape the political public 
ideological discourse of political debate speakers. The study used formal 90 minute debates that 
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took place between 1988 and 1995. The debates took place between two Polish politicians from 
the independent and communist parties, and Lech Walesa, former president of Poland and trade 
union leader of Solidarity. Transcripts of four debates were analysed, mainly the exchanges 
between the main participants in each debate. Jaworski and Galasinski (2000) concluded that 
speakers defined interpersonal space between the opponents by the use of vocatives. However, 
these vocatives were not used to gain the addressees’ attention. Walesa achieved his ideology by 
the use of negative contrast, where one party distanced himself from the other in order to achieve 
his ideology. The choice of vocative forms of address was also shown to be built by politicians 
through positive self-image. The conclusion was that politicians achieved their ideologies by 
using positive self-representation and negative other-representation. This ideological 
legitimisation served their debate aims. 
As with this study, Tileaga (2008) examined the use of ‘framing’ as the linguistic tool in the 
production and management of an ideological representation of revolution discourse, with 
specific reference to the Romanian revolution of 1989. The study used the commemoration in the 
Romanian parliament in order to analyse the hegemonic attempts, with a focus on two specific 
addresses made by the head of state, (now former) President Ion Iliescu on 21 Dec 2000 and 18 
Dec 2003. Tileaga (2008) undertook a critical psychological approach to the analysis of political 
discourse in order to explore issues of agency, examining a range of topics that included 
entitlement and working, patterns of reoccurring shifts, the management of the authenticity of the 
true nature of an event. Findings indicated that the occasional ideological and political 
significance of political events lied in the category of features and consequently of the social and 
ideological context in which it was invoked. The use of political commemorative addresses 
allowed for the fulfilment of the ideological; function of framing.  
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Iiie (2009) offered a fresh look at the strategic uses of parliamentary language patterns in the 
UK, through an in-depth examination of the interplay between these characteristic forms of 
address and institutional discursive practices. Both the study by Iiie (2009) and the investigation 
in the present study seek to understand the ideological implications in the forms of address used 
by political factions, which makes the parliamentary study useful in the current context. The data 
of Iiie’s study comprised the official transcripts of proceedings of the House of Commons (11 
sessions from 2001 to 2004), and the reflex records of the official transcripts in the Swedish 
Riksdag (11 sessions that were held in 2005). Four categories of parliamentary address were 
examined in terms of three parameters: (in)directness, (non)reciprocity and (in)consistency. The 
data analysis focused on the various ways in which members of parliament (MPs) in the two 
parliaments utilised particular addressing and referring strategies in order for them to pursue 
their own agendas and undermine political opponents and to challenge institutional role 
distribution and hierarchical authority. Iiie (2009) discovered that the MPs in both parliaments 
tended to address one each other by means of relatively restricted and well-defined forms of 
address that were specific to the parliamentary context, but which could nevertheless be grouped 
into gender-specific titles, gender neutral titles, institutional titles, and personal names. The 
political uses of forms of address were shown to be particularly important, because they helped 
articulate and reinforce the ideologically biased views of groups, institutions and political parties. 
This, in turn, helped those groups to influence the beliefs and minds of audiences, to motivate 
people to act, and to gain support for the actions of their group (ibid). 
In addition to political debates, the topic of ‘otherness’ has also been studied in political 
speeches, such as the study by Mazid (2007) who used a CDA framework to investigate the 
presuppositions and strategic functions in the speech delivered by George W. Bush, nine days 
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after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, Pentagon, and other US targets that took place on 
11
th
 September 2001. Mazid (2007)’s study is similar to the current research, in the sense that 
both explore the ideological notion of ‘us and them’ in political discourse through the use of 
CDA. However, Mazid (2007) focused on an exploration of idealism and pragmatism, the 
conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and other aspects of ideologies and power relations that were 
found in the speech. The study relied upon data a speech by Bush, nine days after the attacks of 
September 11 2011 (ibid), using CDA and political discourse analysis to identify presuppositions 
in the speech, which were then thematically grouped in order to facilitate examination (into 
tragedy, immediate response, fear, US/Utopia, terrorism, Islam was not bad, US authority, 
world-wide-support and retaliation) (ibid). Mazid (2007) concluded that Bush’s speech revealed 
many strategic functions which characterized political speeches such as delegitimisation, 
resistance, protest and opposition. In the speeches, ‘us’ was portrayed as free, developed and just 
while ‘them’ was doctorial, illegitimate and uncivilized. 
Another study which investigated political speeches in terms of otherness was by Oddo (2011) 
who studied war legitimisation discourse through the representation of 'Us' and 'Them' in two 
‘call-to-arms’ style addresses given by the US President F.D. Roosevelt in 1941 and another two 
by George. Bush in 2002. As with the present study, the theme of ‘us and them’ functioned as a 
tool of ideology in political discourse. Intertextual analysis was conducted to identify the specific 
legitimation strategies and thematic formations that underlie the rhetoric of both speakers. The 
speeches were also situated within their wider social and historical context in an attempt to study 
the various ways in which both presidents may have influenced or manipulated the public. Data 
analysis comprised an examination of the polarisation of lexical resources to constitute 'Us' and 
'Them', analysis of representations of past and future function to legitimise violence in the four 
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speeches and examination of how presidents demarcated group membership in order to discredit 
opponents of war at home. Oddo’s (2011) analysis illustrated that both presidents had drawn 
upon similar thematic formations and rhetorical strategies during their attempts to lead the US 
public into war. In their speeches, the concept of 'US' was presented through the use of positive 
and neutral nouns, like defend and protect, whereas 'them' was represented by the use of 
negatively valued nouns and processes, such as attack and kill. The study gave a clear 
methodology comprising three levels of analysis that were used to understand and compare the 
speeches of two presidents (ibid). However, although the numbers and frequencies of words 
were given, no corpus software package was used to triangulate the analysis. 
Media was another genre in which otherness was the vehicle of demonstrating political ideology. 
As with the current study, Pasha (2011) examined the concept of ‘otherness’ as a tool of 
ideology in the discourse of media in the Arab world. The study focused on front page news and 
headlines reports published in al-Ahram during 2000 and 2005, as well as by reference to the 
online index of the newspaper. The textual analysis focused on transitivity, sourcing, lexical 
choice and presupposition (ibid). This enabled an investigation of how ‘Islamists were socially, 
discursively and linguistically represented in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram, and so how 
Islamists were represented in the mainstream Egyptian official media, and the factors that 
influenced this representation’ (ibid, p. 5). The assumption made by Pasha (2011) was that the 
western newspaper and the Egyptian elite's al-Ahram held similar representation of Islam and 
Muslims; a representation based on the ideology of exclusion and othering. The study concluded 
that the Egyptian regimes have been practicing a systematic way of excluding the Muslim 
Brotherhood. According to Pasha (2011), the Egyptian government was trying to instil fear of 
Islamists among the population in order to gain the support of the west. The study highlighted 
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the process of news making, the ‘role of ideology, the history of Islamism, and the type of 
relationships between Islamists and the regimes linguistically through ideology, media and 
othering’ (ibid, p. 4). However, there seemed to be selection bias with regards to the data and 
methodology, as in many areas was in favour of the Islamists. Additionally, no triangulation was 
performed of the analysis, so its neutrality could not be confirmed.  
 
2.3.2.2.1.3 Metaphor 
Metaphor is an expression where something is described by stating another word or concept with 
which it can be compared. For example, in the case of ‘her words stabbed at his heart’, the words 
referred to did not actually stab a person in the heart, but their effect was painful or harmful to 
the individual and so can be compared to the feeling of being stabbed by a knife (Richards & 
Schmidt, 2002). Every language has its own metaphors and, for this reason, metaphors can be 
attributed to ideology, as they represent cultural connotations and backgrounds that help to shape 
the beliefs and attitudes of people. 
The power of the use of metaphors in political discourse is acknowledged in literature. Billig and 
MacMillan (2005) emphasise that the use of metaphors in political discourse generate new 
meanings and challenge beliefs, as well as serving as routine idioms to deaden political 
awareness. Similarly, Archakis and Tsakona (2010) explain that metaphors are words used in 
political speeches in order to activate specific positive or negative emotional connotations among 
the audience. Overall, the functions of metaphor and presupposition are to ‘stigmatize, 
stereotype, exclude, silence opposition, distract, call names, background certain issues, preclude 
argument, establish territories and draw ideological boundaries’ (Mazid, 2007, p. 360).  
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It is essential to refer to studies that investigated metaphor as the linguistic tool to achieve the 
speakers’ ideological stances by employing CDA. This is because the speakers of the debates in 
this study can be expected to use metaphors extensively, in order to achieve their ideological 
intentions. This is especially likely in the context of Arabic discourse, where cultural aspects are 
evident in language including the use of metaphors in debates. Four studies are quoted below and 
organised according to their data analysis methodology. The first two studies were by Shenhav 
(2007) and Archakis and Tsakona (2010), who both used a comparative analysis. Shenhav 
(2007) presented seven types of confidential discussions through the analysis of the discourse of 
Israeli government members and prime ministers. He made the assumption that there is a need to 
‘regard some of these traces as an inevitable part of the process of constructing political 
discourse’ (ibid, p. 77), because politicians typically fail to provide the general public with all of 
the information that they have at their disposal. Shenhav (2007) used ‘a comparative analysis of 
in-camera and public political discourse in Israel, suggesting techniques for identifying 
unintentional disclosure of information’ (ibid, p. 179). Israeli politicians were shown to employ 
seven types of traces of ideological stands: ‘evading answering the question, presentation of a 
standpoint, appraisals and thoughts, general statements and vague concepts, vague 
communications and incoherence, fragmentation of narratives, and metaphorical and metonymic 
displacement’ (ibid, p. 195).  
Another important study to adopt a comparative analysis approach was conducted by Archakis 
and Tsakona (2010), who sought to better understand how journalists created ideological 
networks in parliamentary discourse and newspaper articles, by analysing the speeches of the 
members of parliament (MPs). Their study employed data from parliamentary debates that took 
place on 9
th
 February 9, 2005, regarding a new bill in Greece. These official written proceedings 
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of the debates were supplemented by newspaper articles referring to the particular parliamentary 
session, which were published on the next day (10
th
 February, 2005) (ibid). The comparative 
analysis included parliamentary proceedings and related newspaper articles with an emphasis on 
metaphor. So, the study by Archakis and Tsakona (201) is similar to this study in that it 
investigates the metaphors in political and media discourses. They found that reported facts were 
selected on the basis of their unusual consequences, rather than by virtue of their legal or 
political significances, adding that newspaper reports were not an imperial reflection of reality 
but rather value-laden reality-representations (ibid).  
Other methodologies that were used in the detection of metaphors as a linguistic tool of ideology 
were the historical approach and inter-disciplinary approach. Billig and MacMillan (2005) 
examined the idiom 'smoking gun', which was extensively used in the controversy regarding the 
search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Through the use of their historical approach, they 
were able to obtain a better understanding of the ways in which metaphors can enter the political 
lexicon and the change in their usage and meaning over time, with metaphors gradually evolving 
into idioms (ibid). They discovered that, 'red-handed' was used more often than 'smoking gun' in 
14 of the 20 years, 'smoking gun' became markedly more common in 4 years (1987, 1988, 2002 
and 2003) (ibid). Billig and MacMillan (2005) found that idioms were used rhetorically to 
achieve different purposes, with the context of 'smoking gun' being clearly ideological as it was 
used in controversies about political leaders. With the constant repetition of the idiom, the 
metaphorical meaning of smoking gun was blunted, leading to a dull literal meaning and 
therefore, ideological concealment. In this way, Billig and MacMillan provided convincing 
evidence that suitable linguistic strategies could result in a phrase shifting from a 'simile' to 
'metaphor' to 'idiom' over time. They also demonstrated the importance of considering metaphors 
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and related linguistic tools such as similes and idioms in investigating ideology of political 
discourse (ibid), and for this reason due consideration is given to these subjects in the current 
study.  
El-Sharif (2011) utilised an inter-disciplinary approach to analyse metaphorical language in 
order to investigate the significance of metaphoric language in strengthening Islamic religious 
beliefs. He made the assumption that religion could be instrumental in supporting ideological 
beliefs which aimed to lead and control the souls of mankind. In addition, prophetic tradition 
constituted a planned discourse that mirrored aspects of Islamic religious doctrine and ideology 
(ibid, p. 26). This assumption is significant in the context of the present study, as the Arabic 
discourse used in this discourse is permeated by reference to religion, including metaphors of 
religious origins. As a powerful linguistic tool in reaching intended ideological assumptions, this 
can be expected to dominate political discourse. El-Sharif (2011) used an Arabic version of the 
Niche of Lamps, a well-known collection of Prophet Mohammed's sayings, comprising a large 
corpus of 320,000 words. As El-Sharif was unable to use corpus based software with the large 
Arabic corpus, concordances were done manually. Instances of explicit metaphor markers 
followed, mainly lexical connotations from context. The metaphors were then classified into 
three categories: ‘highly conventional (appearing more than nine times), conventional metaphors 
(appearing four to eight times), and novel metaphors (appearing three times or less)’ (ibid, p. 
100). The inter-disciplinary approach he used was based on three stages: compilation of corpus, 
identification of instances of metaphors, and contextual and critical analysis of the identified 
metaphors. El-Sharif (2011) identified that prophetic metaphors conform to the conventional 
systems of belief of the early Arabs who lived at the times of the prophet. The prophetic 
metaphors varied considerably in terms of the target of their domains, such as message of unity, 
70 
 
solidarity, brotherhood in Islam, and relationship between believers. El-Sharif (2011) used a 
neutral analysis framework, which was important when using religious language. However, 
although the study analysed discourse qualitatively and quantitatively, no software was used in 
counting the concordances of Arabic data despite the availability of such software. 
2.3.2.2.1.4 Style 
According to Fairclough (2008, p. 159), styles are “the discourse aspect of ways of being, 
identities”, how we define ourselves in the way we speak, write and move, as well as the ways 
that people identify themselves and are identified by others. Styles are commonly identified by 
the interplay between ‘language’ and ‘body language’, such as gestures, stance and facial 
expressions (Thomas, et al., 2004). As an illustration of this, metaphor can be realised in a range 
of linguistic styles, including phonological pronunciation, stress, intonation and rhythm; 
vocabulary; metaphor intensifying adverbials, such as dreadfully and awfully; and swear words, 
such as bloody (Fairclough, 2008). In this study, style mainly refers to the use of religious 
discourse and, the shift between the standard and nonstandard variety of the discourse used for 
analysis.  
Various studies draw attention on the richness of the reference to religion as a discursive style in 
Arabic. Badarneh et al. (2010) examined the intertextual borrowings of ideological nature in 
political discourse related to the Middle East. This is significant in the context of the current 
study, which seeks to link Arabic political discourse to ideology through the use of religious 
discourse. Badarneh et al. (2010) relied upon a range of English and Arabic texts related to a 
small number of key political social actors in the Middle East: Bin Laden, Bush, and the Pope of 
the Catholic Church. In order to examine their purpose, code of behaviour, and audience, the 
study employed a multi-disciplinary framework of CDA, specifically that proposed by van Dijk 
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(2003). In so doing, an attempt was made to understand why the actors were saying what they 
were saying, their intended objectives, their unique characteristics, and anything that they did not 
do which others commonly did. Questions relating to the code of behaviour gathered information 
about: the speaker, his actions, expected behaviour, and societal rank. Finally, audience related 
questions examined the intended target of speech, information on the discourse community, and 
identifying his friends and enemies. Religious discourse representations in the speeches were 
analysed in terms of intertextuality: mixing genres and voices. Badarneh et al. used 
intertextuality by mixing genres, orders of discourse and social change, where values were 
integrated with the text, with ‘hidden discourses involving the reformation of existing social, 
cultural and ideological values and moulding them in order to reach the speaker’s goals’ (ibid, p. 
2). Badarneh et al. justified the methodology they used by stating that ‘direct representation, 
quoting others-people with religious history, had linguistic functions such as making the text 
producer seem neutral and objective, giving the impression that the producer was talking about 
things as facts, conveying ideological messages, and saving the producer’s face through 
alienating from the proposition by the original speaker’ (ibid, p. 14). Badarneh et al. (2010) 
showed that opposing parties attempted to legitimise the war in the name of God: Bin Laden 
combined religion with politics, stating that his religion commanded him to fight or occupy in 
order for him to perform holy war ‘jihad’; and Bush claimed to fight in the name of God, 
exercising hegemony over the Middle East. Momani et al. (2010) support the assertion that 
political discourses often use religious style in order to achieve hegemony. Badarneh et al. (2010, 
p. 1) summarised their key findings that the events after 9/11 caused the presence of religion in 
the Middle East discourse to increase.  
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Another study in this area, by Albirini (2011) studied the social functions of code switching 
between the standard and dialectical Arabic employed by educated speakers of Egyptian, Gulf, 
and Levantine Arabic domains in order to better understand spoken shifts between standard and 
nonstandard Arabic. In order to detect systematic patterns (pragmatic and sociolinguistic 
functions), Albirini (2011) used 35 audio and video recordings in the domains of religious 
lectures, political debates and soccer commentaries. The participating speakers were found to 
switch to standard Arabic in order to introduce ‘formulaic expressions, highlight important 
segments of discourse, mark emphasis, introduce direct quotations, signal a shift to a comic or 
serious tone, produce rhythmic stretches of discourse, take a pedantic stand and indicate pan-
Arab or Muslim identity’ (ibid, p. 125). This shift from dialectical to standard Arabic creates a 
sense of importance, high prestige, identity, seriousness, eloquence and sophistication (ibid). 
Overall, Albirini’s (2011) study demonstrated that Arabic discourse is rich in shifts from non-
standard to standard Arabic in using direct religious quotations, which leads to ideological 
assumptions (ibid). 
2.3.2.2.1.5 Visual inputs 
As with texts, visual inputs function in social control and power. Visual inputs include voice 
pitch, voice volume, gesture, posture, physical distance (kinetic), eye contact, and face work like 
losing and saving face (Bloor & Bloor, 2007). In this study, the visual aspects of discourse are 
the video recordings of the debates, which included aspects such as the images, movements, 
camera angles, and voices in the recordings. The significance of visual inputs is demonstrated in 
literature. According to Fairclough (2001a, p. 172), “the combination of verbal and visual 
elements to constitute texts is becoming increasingly important in our society…the salience of 
the image has been taken to be one of the main characteristics of contemporary society 
postmodern culture”. This section provides a background on visual inputs, which is important in 
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the context of this study, given that the application of visual analysis of TV political debates 
constitutes a significant aspect of the methodology. However, as the source material led to 
linguistic analysis of text only, the decision was made to control the scope of this research by not 
including visual analysis. 
This section will begin with a discussion of the works by Bednarek and Caple (2012), 
contemporary linguists who have written extensively about their empirical studies on the analysis 
of visual language. In their discursive approach in the construction of news values, Bednarek and 
Caple (2012) explain that debate images are not selected randomly, as a ‘concern for 
composition and balance in the image frame is central to the work of any televised photographer’ 
(p. 163). There are numerous considerations regarding the use of images in the construction of 
news values, including ‘the contextualisation of the image participants, which refers to where 
and with whom the participants are photographed and how much or how little of this is included 
in the image frame (the denotative aspects). The second major consideration is the technical 
considerations: shutter speed (how fast), aperture (how much light), focal length (how much in 
focus), lens (how distorted, natural and condensed the shot) and angle (how high or low the angle 
is- connotative aspects)’ (ibid, 58). 
In addition to the above image consideration elements, Bednarek and Caple (2012) produced key 
photographic devices or values that are determined from images, with one image potentially 
having one or more of these devices. The first device is the evaluative elements which constitute 
the way participants are photographed and show their importance and status. ‘It also portrays the 
prominence of participants whether photographed in the middle of a media scrum with 
microphones and cameras pointed at them or surrounded by body guards, negative or 
prominence: uniforms and official regalia and negative value: low camera angle (below) or high 
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camera angle (high) of the participant although the image should concentrate on the participant 
or speaker’ (ibid, p. 39). The second element is intensification which refers to images which 
repeat information. Comparison is the third device and represents the different sizes of images 
which construct comparisons leading to superlativeness and novelty. The fourth device is the 
references to emotion that is ‘showing social actors’ emotional responses in an image which 
construe a variety of values such as negativity (negative emotions), personalisation (an emotional 
response especially when combined with close-up shot), and novelty (depictions of surprise or 
shock in facial expressions and gestures, impact (with casual emotions) and superlativeness 
(strong emotional responses)’ (ibid, p. 54). Reference to time and place is another device that 
refers to time, which is difficult to depict in images, and place, which can easily be shown, such 
as to show proximity. Timeliness can also be constructed through images, as in the case of 
showing of weather conditions (snow is equal to winter) or flora/fauna (Jacaranda blossom is 
equal to spring). Role labels is the sixth device, such as photographing bookshelves to show the 
person is an academic and a police station to show the photographed subject is a member of the 
police, referencing to individuals and personalizing of what individuals do. The seventh device is 
aesthetic elements which shows how the participants who are arranged in the image impact the 
balance and aesthetic quality of the image making the event positive because of its ‘beauty’. 
Finally, moving images are about camera share causes images to blur. Excessive revolution of 
images can convey negativity and superlativeness. Impact can be constructed by capturing image 
sequences showing cause and effect (ibid).  
The ideology of news values through the examination of visual inputs was investigated by 
Bednarek and Caple (2013), who sought to ‘bring news values to the attention of critical 
linguists, encourage a constructive approach to news values and introduce a new framework to 
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the analysis of news values’ (ibid, p. 2). A corpus of 70000 words of news stories from national 
UK newspapers in 2003 was analysed by a combination of corpus assisted multimodal discourse 
analysis (CAMDA-word frequency by word forms, clemmas and clusters) where all corpus was 
used, and microanalysis of selected data. Findings revealed that systematic linguistic analysis 
showed the discursive devices used in British press in order to construct news values or ideology. 
The study by Bednarek and Caple (2013) reinforced corpus assisted CDA studies in the study of 
ideology through news worthiness and supported the analysis of semiotic text aspects like 
images, layout and typography.  
Visual inputs of texts have been investigated by other researchers. For example, Carvalho (2011) 
did CDA of Time magazine articles written in Arabic language on the war on Iraq prior to the 
2003 occupation. Her study attempted to determine the major themes used by Time magazine to 
report the case of war and whether the themes were influenced by the themes present in Bush's 
speeches. Carvalho used corpus of Time magazine articles from February to March 2003, and the 
speeches by President Bush during the same period. Both text and images were both considered 
as data, a total of 25 articles of eight issues and four presidential addresses. Carvalho performed 
a qualitative analysis in search of patterns of discourse such as how opposition, president, Iraq 
and Saddam were characterized. Major themes presented were polarisation of us and them, 
patriotism and the ‘if’ discourse. However, it should be noted that this study would have been 
more objective and reliable if more than one analysis method were used and if triangulation of 
analysis was carried out by another researcher.  
Despite the relative paucity of research in this area, another study dealing with the visual inputs 
of discourse was conducted by Norton and Gieve (2010), who explored the creation of native and 
non-native speaker identity in the discourse of television lifestyle, travel and documentary 
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genres, where an English native speaker audience was assumed. The study was conducted with 
the assumption that foreigners are ideologically represented on television. A corpus of travel 
based programmes was used, including lifestyle shows, celebrity travelogues and living abroad 
documentaries that were filmed between 2003 and 2005 (ibid). The study relied upon critical 
language awareness and CDA to uncover 'otherness', with data analysis involving coding 
categories based on mediation degree, unseen/unheard and not reported, unseen but reported, 
seen/unheard, seen/heard in English and seen/heard unmediated. Verbal as well as visual and 
aural representations of actors were analysed (ibid). Findings indicated that dominant voices 
represented in the programmes were those of presenters and producers, than of the local people. 
Norton and Gieve’s (2010) focused on social relations, identities and power relations, which was 
supplemented by a corpus that focused on two debates. The study was also critical and honest 
about what could be analysed about camera/visual aspects of the corpus especially with 
mediation levels. 
 
2.3.2.3 Argument  
Arguments feature prominently in political debates. The general structure of a typical debate is 
that a debate starts with hearing of statement, such as proposals and declarations, and followed 
by reactions of different debate members or short speeches (Guillem, 2009). A similar debate 
organisation is suggested by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 36), who explain that an 
argument is “a set of statements (explicit or implicit), one of which is the conclusion (claim) 
while the others are the premises”. Premises explain the conclusion which follows the premises. 
From this definition, we can trace three elements of an argument: statements, conclusion, and 
premises. Edley (2001) better specifies the argument components which are grounds (premises), 
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warrants (justifications) and claim. The following is an example on the argument structure, 
adapted from Edley (2001): 
Globalisation delivers goods in the South (grounds); globalisation will deliver goods if changes 
are made in national and global power (warrant); changes should be made in global and 
national power (claim). 
 
In TV argument, there are at least two sides of guest speakers and the arrangement is designed to 
maximise the number of arguments and warrants in an attempt to influence the opinion of the 
public. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) identify four categories of responding to the argument. 
These categories are cognitive responses (judgments), intentional responses (drawing intentions), 
decisional responses (decisions) and behavioural responses (actions).  
Next, two empirical studies done on argumentation are elaborated. Similar to this study, Simon-
Vandenbergen (2008) studied arguments in political discourse of television debates in an attempt 
to determine the extent and way in which ‘the party abandoned views which led to the verdict?’ 
To address this line of enquiry, the study examined a newspaper and a 2004 television debate 
between Dewinter and Vermeersch, two politicians of the extreme right-wing party of the 
Flemish anti-immigration Bloc in Flanders (Belgium). Dewinter had 30 turns (1762 words) and 
Vermeersch had 31 turns (1456 words). The English translations were from Dutch, the official 
language in Flanders. Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) concluded that direct replies were given 20% 
of the cases. In addition, they were always embedded in equivocal contexts and contained 
hedges. Remarks on the private lives of opponents were tools to win the debate, by lowering the 
credibility of opponents. This may be useful or insightful given the potentially combative nature 
of the subject of debates in the current study.  
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Another study which used argumentative discourse was by Macagno and Walton (2010) who 
sought to examine the argumentative use of emotive words that were studied in the recent 
literature on persuasive definitions. They showed how words, reality and common knowledge 
were linked. This study is significant to be mentioned here because it is expected that this study 
concludes in gender-based differences in the use of discourse especially with words that express 
emotions. An investigation was conducted into the semantic and the argumentative structure of 
certain emotive words, after which the study looked at why the emotive words were so powerful 
when used as argumentative instruments and the conditions under which the persuasive 
definitions were legitimate. Macagno and Walton (2010) employed a methodology of a 
pragmatic perspective by presenting an analysis of persuasive definition based on argumentative 
scheme and the concept of presupposition. Three levels of data analysis were employed: the 
semantic, the argumentative and the pragmatic level. Findings indicated that emotive words were 
sometimes utilized in alteration way that changed the interlocutor’s values. The justified and 
unjustified use of emotive words could be evaluated on a case-by-case using the reasonableness 
conditions of persuasive definitions. In critiquing the study by Macagno and Walton (2010), their 
study focused on argument as the discourse genre but CDA was not employed in the 
methodology. In addition, the framework they employed did not make use of well-known 
linguistic theorists.  
 
 Corpus-based CDA 2.4
The use of computer software to perform corpus analysis is an accepted triangulation method for 
use with CDA. In fact, the majority of studies that are published in discourse analysis and 
ideology are based on corpora (McEnery & Xiano, 2006). 
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The term corpus (the singular of corpora or corpuses) refers to the “collection of linguistic data, 
nowadays stored in computers, which is seen to be representative of a certain type of a text, 
interaction or discourse” (Yates, 2001, p. 103). Corpus is used to describe discourse data, 
particularly with reference to large collections stored on computers from which patterns can be 
electronically accessed, recognised, and manipulated (Taylor, 2001a; Baker, 2007). In this 
research, the term ‘corpus’ denotes the political debates that comprise the discourse of the study.  
Richards and Schmidt (2002) distinguish four types of corpora: the general corpus, or reference 
corpus, is a large collection of many different types of texts, such as dictionaries; the specialized 
corpus, which is a collection of similar texts, such as PhD theses; the comparable corpus, which 
refers to more than one corpus of different languages or varieties of one language; and the 
learner corpus, which describes a collection of texts produced by students. This research is based 
upon a specialized corpus that is comprised solely of televised political debates.  
There are many benefits of employing corpus analysis studies. Corpus analysis, or corpus 
linguistics, is the most appropriate method to show how discourses change between texts, 
providing an effective tool for the investigation of variation in node word selection (Edwards, 
2012). Corpus work is primarily quantitative, as it involves statistics such as the counting and 
measuring of linguistic features. This makes corpus studies especially useful for studying the 
relationship between language practices and other variables, such as context or culture (Yates, 
2001). As corpus studies utilise computers for most of their core operations, data can be gathered 
and processed with speed, accountability, accuracy, reliability and sorting linguistic items 
(Baker, 2010; Kennedy, 1998). Specifically, corpus linguistic approaches enable researchers to 
quantify linguistic patterns, providing solid conclusions (Baker, 2010). There are a number of 
advantages offered by corpus-based approaches that are especially significant to discourse 
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analysis (Baker, 2007). For example, they enable the reduction of research bias, such as self-
awareness, objectivity, and restrictions to cognitive biases. Corpus analysis studies the 
incremental effect of discourse as word or grammatical construction may suggest the existence 
of a discourse rather than relying on our intuition or existing bias (ibid). Studies using corpus can 
also be effective in dealing with resistant and changing discourses, as they can highlight 
discourses that may not be easily visible in other types of analysis. Finally, corpus analysis is an 
extremely productive means of triangulation. For this reason, the current study uses corpus 
analysis as a means of triangulating the findings of the CDA.  
Corpus works can generally raise many questions for researchers, such as whether the corpus 
resembles any other forms of communication or records of that communication; whether the 
corpus is written by a man or woman; where and when it was written; whether the corpus 
employs happy, sad, ironic, factual, friendly or aggressive language; the number of conversations 
that the corpus includes; or whether the turn-taking makes sense (Yates, 2001). The term KWIC 
(Key Words In Context) is particularly useful, as it denotes the frequency of word occurrences. 
Examples of word concordance software that enable the analysis of corpora are WordSmith, 
AntConc, Wmatrix and Nvival (ibid).  
Despite their abundant strengths, corpus-based approaches have been criticized for being too 
broad, not allowing for close readings of texts, and for being limited to the verbal domain of 
discourse although discourses are communicated through means other than words (Baker, 2007). 
As analysis is being employed as a supplementary approach to CDA in the current study, it is 
hoped that this weakness is mitigated or avoided.  
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Many of the empirical studies that were discussed in this chapter used computer assisted corpus 
linguistics as a supplementary methodology to CDA, almost exclusively in order to triangulate 
the CDA analysis. However, Edwards (2012) conducted corpus analysis as the main data 
analysis method to investigate the ideological strands of political texts. CDA and corpus analysis 
were employed to examine the 2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British National Party, with the 
Wordsmith programme being used to perform a contrastive qualitative analysis (concordance 
contexts and relevance) (ibid). Edwards analysed a range of features that included genre, 
pronouns, speech acts, agency, presupposition, and intertextuality. One significant finding by 
Edwards was that the first person pronoun was used 197 times, constituting less than 1% of both 
the 2005 and 2010 corpus. The study by Edwards concluded that the distribution of 'our' in the 
2005 and 2010 manifesto was even because it referred to British nation in both years. However, 
while the word 'white' signified identity in 2005, it was used to refer to ‘skilled employees’ in 
2010. The meaning of 'human' was also found to differ between 2005 and 2010. Edward’s study 
was interesting as he used ‘time’ as a variable. However, time was not considered as a variable in 
this study due to issues of space and because it was not judged to be salient to the research 
questions at hand.  
 
 Conversation analysis  2.5
Elements of conversation analysis were used in this study for the in-depth examination of 
discourse, with particular reference to the differences that occurred between female and male 
speakers. The process by which two or more participants take turns in communication, 
conversations can be formal, such as parliamentary debates, or informal, like friends chatting in a 
coffee shop. The Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics defines 
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conversation analysis (CA) as a research tradition that studies the social organisation of natural 
conversation of a detailed inspection of recordings and transcriptions by investigating meanings 
and pragmatic functions of conversations. Conversation analysts study the sequential 
organisation of talk, turn-taking and the way people identify and repair communication (Richards 
& Schmidt, 2002). Wooffitt (2001, p. 49) describes CA as “a method for the analysis of naturally 
occurring interaction. CA’s key assumption is that language use is a site for social interaction. 
People do things to each other when they talk”.  
Conversation analysis is a CDA strand that is developed by ethno methodologists and, for this 
reason, can be used as an effective tool in CDA research for answering questions that are 
formulated in order to analyse language. Fairclough (2001a, p. 9) adds the following in the link 
between CA and CDA: 
Conversation analysis is one prominent approach within discourse analysis that has been 
developed by a group of sociologists known as ‘ethnomethodologists’. 
Ethnomethodologists investigate the production and interpretation of everyday action as 
skilled accomplishments of social actors, and they are interested in conversation as one 
particularly pervasive instance of skilled social action.  
 
One important concept of CA is the maxims of conversation developed by Grice (1975). An 
explanation of the four maxims of conversation is provided below, having been adapted from 
Fairclough (2008). In the following, the maxims are listed and examples are provided for how 
each maxim could be violated.  
Maxim Maxim violation example 
Maxim of quantity Speaker A: Why do you like your friend Sara best? 
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(Give as much required 
information, and no more than 
the required in the context) 
Speaker B: Because I like her best. 
Comment: Maxim is not satisfied as concrete reasons on 
why Sara is liked best are not given. 
 
Maxim of quality 
(Speak the truth) 
 
Speaker A: Who is your best friend? 
Speaker B: Nora  
Comment: As speaker B does not reply with the truth that 
her best friend is Sara, the conversation is not of quality.  
 
Maxim of relevance 
(Speak relevant information) 
 
Speaker A: Is Sara your best friend? 
Speaker B: Let’s go shopping! 
Comment: Reply of speaker B does not answer the 
question raised by speaker A, so the response is irrelevant. 
 
Maxim of manner 
(Be clear) 
 
Speaker A: I heard your best friend is Sara. 
Speaker B: Well, Sara speaks good English and enjoys 
outings. 
Comment: Maxim of manner is violated as speaker B’s 
reply is ambiguous and does not clearly state whether 
her/his best friend is Sara.  
 
Despite the relevance of these maxims in conversation, CA has been criticized in some aspects. 
Bloor and Bloor (2007) criticise the maxims by stating that people do not always observe the 
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guidelines in practice, instead often lying, waffling and disagreeing. People may also refuse to 
speak or simply provide a sign of disagreement. It is also dependent on the receiver to make 
assumptions about what the speaker produces, rather than to rely only upon what is said. Maxims 
can also be violated by a number of face threatening activities, such as starting an unsolicited 
conversation, challenging an opinion or assertion made by the addressee, interrupting another 
person’s turn, raising a topic that is unknown by or unwelcome to the addressee, changing the 
topic, raising taboo topics or words, or ending an interaction (ibid).  
Aspects of conversation analysis are evident in the examination of TV political debates. These 
include shouting, gesturing, interruption hesitations, turn-taking, holding the floor, and violations 
of the conversation maxims. For this reason, CA is a valuable methodology to be deployed 
within this study. However, because power is investigated within discourse, CA is insufficiently 
holistic and robust to capture the complexity of the research questions and so must be used in 
conjunction with the other chosen methodologies.  
 
  Conclusion 2.6
This study is a corpus assisted critical discourse analysis research that studies the ways in which 
discourse is employed in media political debates as a tool for exercising power. This research has 
specifically focused on ideologies by media and political parties of the Arab world. This chapter 
has provided a focused examination of the existing literature in media and political discourse in 
order to situate the current study within the wider field of critical discourse analysis and corpus 
linguistics. The review has demonstrated a broad consensus regarding the importance of 
ideology in media and political discourse however, some degree of contention exists with respect 
to the area of interest to this study, namely the linguistic components which imply ideological 
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strands and the importance of combining two or more research methods in the analysis of data. 
As this research seeks to investigate the use of language in the mass media and the impact of 
these choices on audience bias, the review in this chapter suggests there is currently limited 
understanding with the use of ideology within Arabic texts. Therefore, in the next chapter of this 
study, an outline of the choice of methodology will be provided. As will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter, this study has been informed by the literature to utilise a 
combination of research strategies to achieve its aims, with critical discourse analysis, computer 
assisted corpus analysis, and conversation analysis all playing an important role in answering the 
research questions.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 Introduction  3.1
The review of literature in the previous chapter clearly illustrates that CDA is an approach to 
methodology rather than the methodology itself, and no specific techniques or conditions are 
accepted as standard for data collection or data analysis in CDA (Al-Ali, 2006; Badarneh, et al., 
2010; Buckingham, 2013; Hardman, 2008; Hess-Luttich, 2007; Mazid, 2007; Meyer, 2007; ). 
Additionally, computer assisted corpus analysis was shown to be a functional and commonly 
utilised triangulation method to ensure the objectivity of the results generated by CDA.  
The chosen methodology of this study is outlined as follows: the corpus of the study is described, 
with information being given on the composition of the data collection debates and data 
representation. After this, information is provided on the chosen approach for the interviews that 
were conducted with AJ staff, which is followed by a definition of the data analysis framework 
in this study and the rationale for its selection. It is important to point here that in the analysis, 
the Arabic corpus utilised is the text as transcribed by AJ, which has been translated into English 
for the sake of clarity and readability in this dissertation. The translation was done by the 
researcher’s research assistant and was checked by a professional translation company.  
 The corpus 3.2
The corpus used for analysis in this thesis comprises the AJ debates. This section is divided into 
sections that discuss the following: data collection of the corpus, information on the debates 
themselves, data representation, and the key differences that exist between the actual recordings 
of the debates and the corpus as a transcript (obtained from AJ website). 
3.2.1 Data collection 
The success and viability of research using CDA is highly influenced by the quantity and quality 
of data available. In covering the revolution in Yemen, AJ broadcast a wide range of media, 
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including news, live documentaries, documentaries, talk shows, discussions, and conversation 
programmes. Debates were selected as the study genre because they are a concise representation 
of media and political discourse, which is central to this study. So, in this research, debates refer 
to the conversations staged by the Arabic channel of the Al Jazeera network, which involved 
participants arguing their thoughts about the 2011 Yemen revolution. These participants are 
sometimes geographically separated, speaking remotely from other locations and countries, and 
are sometimes interviewed in the Al Jazeera studio in Qatar. Since all the debates were broadcast 
live, they represented the actual language of politics and media in the Arab region.  
Table 1 Number of debates  
Debate program Total number of debates 
Revolution talk 3 
Behind the news 6 
In depth 3 
The opposite direction  3 
 
All the debates were broadcast in four live programs: the Opposite Direction, In Depth, Behind 
the News, and The Revolution Talk. Fourteen of the debates took place at the studios of the AJ 
channel in Doha, Qatar. Only one debate took place in an open air studio in Yemen. The debates 
were staged over a year from 22 May 2011 to 21 May 2012. The corpus contains fifteen debates, 
with three to five episodes from each of the four programmes. Each debate lasted for 23:31 to 49 
minutes and contained 27430 to 7064 words. The debates dealt with important and emerging 
events related to the Yemen revolution, such as the breaking news, the chronological progress of 
the revolution, and what guest speakers thought about events or likely developments within the 
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revolution. Each debate contained a main discussion theme, depending on the progress of the 
revolution at the time of recording, each of which was divided into subthemes within the same 
debate. Questions addressed to guest speakers were on the same subthemes so all questions fell 
under one theme. For further information on the debates, including date, programme name, titles 
and subtitles, moderator name, guest speakers and their relation to the revolution, revolution 
stage, duration in minutes, and number of words, please refer to Appendix 1. The Al Jazeera 
channel has made these debates available online, in both written and video recorded formats. 
Audio recordings and transcription (written record) of each of the debates are archived at: 
http://www.aljazeera.net/portal. 
It should be noted that the only female guest speaker participating in the debates was Tawakul 
Karman, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning journalist who actively participated in the revolution. It is 
assumed that male debate participants outnumbered females due to a similar ration of males to 
females in Yemeni political life, as women place a much smaller role in Yemeni politics than 
men.  
 
The debates are only available in the Arabic language, standard Arabic. All readily transcribed 
debates of the Yemen revolution of Al Jazeera were used for the study. These debates were an 
important source of language data, given the many events throughout the period in which the 
Yemeni revolution occurred, as well as to ensure that findings of the study were based on the use 
of language by as many programme moderators and speakers.  
Recent developments in the Arab world have clearly illustrated the power of media discourse in 
shaping political protests and social resistance (Chiluwa, 2012). An example here is the way in 
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which the revolution events were covered by media. The selection of political debates staged on 
Al Jazeera television, one genre, as the corpus is significant. First, debates represented the 
formalized attempts by the revolution sides of either with or against in order to gain public 
support for a pre-emptive war against one another. Secondly, debates pointed out significant 
statements on the parties’ plans for the future of the war of Yemen. These formalized debates 
were readily comparable across a spectrum of factors, such as genre, word-count and 
participants.  
The online transcriptions of the chosen debates are organised in the following format on the AJ 
website: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Debate structure 
 
Programme name 
Debate title 
Webpage and video link 
 
Moderator name 
Guest speakers (speaker name and relation to the revolution) 
Debate date 
 
Debate subtitles 
 
Pictures of moderators and guest speakers 
 
Name of speaker: discussion 
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This clearly shows that the transcription of every debate was organised and included the 
elements of the debate. Examples of these elements were the programme name, debate title, 
debate subtitles, moderator, guest speakers and the discussion.  
Each debate involved at least three people (the moderator and two speakers) and was broken into 
three main segments (the introduction, the discussion, and a conclusion). The introduction 
includes a summary and report produced by Al Jazeera about the coinciding revolution event, 
which is supported with videos, images and people speaking about the event. In the debate, the 
discussion phase takes the form of a question and answer session, during which the moderator 
poses questions to each of the invited speakers and gives them an opportunity to respond. Each 
debate is based around one main theme, which is further divided into subthemes, meaning that 
the discussion covers questions related to subthemes of the same theme. A conclusion is given by 
the moderator, finishing the debate by expressing gratitude to the speakers for their contribution 
and thanking the viewers for their attention. Sometimes this final statement also involves both 
speakers being asked to give a short concluding remark about their predictions for the future of 
the discussed topic.  
Although turn-taking is primarily controlled by the moderator and signalled by means of 
questions explicitly directed to the guest speakers, turns are also occasionally taken by 
statements directed by the moderators. In rare cases, speakers question the moderator. Some 
turns are either as short as a single word or as long as sentences. The following table illustrates 
that less turns are given to speakers who are not present in the studio in Qatar whose live 
contribution is aired by technology. 
 
91 
 
Table 2 Turn-taking by ‘in studio speakers’ versus ‘aired speakers’ 
 Government Protesters Total  AJ moderator 
Number of speakers at studio 4 (50%) 12 (42.9%) 16 15 
Turn-taking 165 (83.3%) 339 (89.4%) 504 (42.7%) of 
total turns 
677 (57.3%) of 
total turns 
     
Number of aired speakers 4 (50%) 16 (57.1%) 20  
Turn-taking  33 (16.7%) 40 (10.6%) 73  
Total speakers/turns 8 (22.2%) 
198 (34.3%) 
28 (77.8%) 
379 (65.7%) 
  
 
Although it is evident that the protestors take a greater number of turns than the government 
speakers, however this is almost certainly because more protesters speakers are involved in the 
debates, meaning that they have more to say and get more turns. The fact that the AJ moderators 
account for almost half of the total turns taken is also readily explainable, as all of the turning is 
primarily facilitated by the moderator’s questions addressed to the guest speakers.  
The number of government face-to-face (in the studio) speakers in this data sample is equal to 
that of the government aired speakers (via skype), however there are more aired protesters 
speakers than face-to-face protesters speakers. One justification for this is that the only female 
participant is on the side of the protesters and will have not travelled to the channel. An 
additional justification is that many of the protester speakers may have been too busy to travel, 
due to their obligations or roles in the revolution.  
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3.2.2 Debate participants 
Debate participants are the guest speakers who are invited to the debates as well as the debate 
moderators. The majority of those involved in the debates were government representatives and 
protesters, although neutral speakers were present in some debates and did not favour either 
sideParticipants not only included the number of the speakers but also their roles in the debates, 
their relation with the revolution, their intended aims, their shared backgrounds, and the social 
actors (the doers of the actions mentioned in the debates). Every debate was overseen by one AJ 
moderator. In addition to the aforementioned participants, between two and six guest speakers 
were also involved in the debates, representing government, protester, or neutral positions. 
Government speakers refer to the invited guests who supported Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, 
such as ministers and spokespersons, and for this reason they supported the government and 
opposed the revolution. The protesters were representatives from the youth who were gathering 
at the demonstrating squares, and so they were usually the young people who supported the 
revolution for regime change. Neutral speakers neither supported the government nor the 
protesters, including delegates from the United Nations or Gulf Initiative. Almost all of the 
speakers from both the government and protester factions were Yemenis, whereas many neutral 
speakers were not. Despite the range of available participants, not all of the debates included 
speakers of different political standpoints, with some sessions only including protestors, despite 
the aims of the events being to present both perspectives of the revolution. It is expected that 
since all speakers are from the Arab world then, they share similar facts about the revolution, 
cultural knowledge, behaviour and institutional practices.  
The relation between the guest speakers and the revolution, with speakers from a diverse range 
of backgrounds, included university professors, researchers, journalists, spokespersons, lawyers, 
activists, leaders in government, revolution and parties and, delegates from the United Nations, 
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and the Gulf Initiative. The role of AJ moderators was to introduce the debate by giving a 
summary of the debate theme and the coinciding revolution events. The moderator was in charge 
of controlling the debate, which was principally managed by the distribution of turns to guest 
speakers. These turns were given by asking questions, interrupting, asking speakers to address 
their actual points, or to limit the amount of time they spend on a given topic or argument. The 
overall mode of the debates was formal and the debates were principally in standard Arabic, 
although some of the speakers, including AJ moderators, occasionally chose to use nonstandard 
Arabic in short phrases or sentences. 
The role of guest speakers was to answer the questions raised by the moderator. Their language 
mainly aimed to convince the Arab audience of their political views. This is evident in their 
language choice, although Arabic language is linguistically rich in discourses that signal 
ideological perspectives, and this is particularly true in political Arabic discourse: 
Political discourse in the Middle East has witnessed an unprecedented dynamism. With 
the acceleration and escalation of events in the Middle East after the events of September 
11, 2001; different political parties have been involved in a linguistic war not less vicious 
than military war. …combination of different genres and discourses makes off social 
practices and ideologies (Badarneh et al., 2010, p.1). 
AJ moderators addressed guest speakers and the guest speakers addressed them in return. Guest 
speakers also spoke to each other, especially where interruptions occurred. However, the guest 
speakers generally spoke to the large Arab TV audience. 
Although discussions got heated and expressive vocabulary was selected, no insults were 
explicitly traded between speakers at a personal level, such as references to their private lives. 
Additionally, those topics that are generally considered to be taboos in the Arab world, such as 
sex and secularism, were not discussed in the debates.  
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3.2.3 Data Representation 
In this study, only one TV channel was used as the debate source: Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA). The 
use of corpus from Al Jazeera is representative and sufficient for answering the research 
questions for many reasons, as explained below. 
Al Jazeera is the most popular news channel in the Arab world. People enjoy watching AJ 
because it is a trusted source and broadcasts news items in a way that matches public preferences 
with regards to delivery or content. It is also generally recognised that AJ has played an active 
role in the Arab revolutions (Al Shroof, 2015). For example, AJ was shown on wide screens in 
the gathering squares by protesters during the revolutions. An important sub-channel of AJ is Al 
Jazeera Mubasher (Al Jazeera live), which enabled the recording of demonstrations in gathering 
squares to be broadcast live. Many of AJ staff were either killed or taken hostage by the regimes 
people were demonstrating against. The corpus used in this study comprises all 15 debates, from 
four debate programmes, held during the period of the Yemen revolution, with online transcript 
staged at AJA. A total of 40 people participated in the debates (moderators, twenty four 
protesters, four government speakers and five neutral speakers), with the resulting corpus 
totalling 73,915 words.  
Although Al Jazeera has an English channel as well as the Arabic one, only the Arabic channel is 
considered in the present study, for a number of reasons. First, the Arabic channel is the most 
popular in the region with a large number of viewers of 60 to 80 million views at a time at peak 
time (between 8.00 p.m. and 12.00 am) (Al Shroof, 2015). Second, most of the participating 
speakers of the debates are Arabs who live in the region, therefore only speak Arabic fluently. 
This means that the corpus of the Arabic channel is authentic. Third, the English Al Jazeera 
channel has a western style of broadcasting and coverage, meaning that it has certain important 
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differences from its Arabic counterpart with regards to the way of presenting and debating. AJA 
is directed at the Arab audience, the central focus of this study, and therefore comprises the most 
logical source of language for analysis. 
Although some aspects of conversation analysis are used in this study, such as turn-taking and 
interruptions, common transcription conventions are not used. This study deals with strategies 
used by speakers to maintain their roles in debates and therefore transcription of the said words is 
not applicable. Transcription conventions are not necessary in the study of language ideologies.  
3.2.4 Differences between AL Jazeera transcription and video recording 
This section highlights the discrepancies between the video recordings of the debates and the 
scripts available on the AJ website online. The 15 videos were compared against the script and 
the differences were identified (for more information, see Appendix 2, which lists the differences 
between the debates’ video recordings and online transcript). 
A few considerations are highlighted here. First, the repetition of letters and sounds is not 
considered, meaning that only completed words were studied. Additionally, the decision was 
made not to study certain grammatical forms that were deemed irrelevant to the substance of the 
study, such as the use of articles (specifically, the word ‘the’ attached to words) or critical marks 
or music breaks, as these are neither indicated in the script nor in the recording so they were not 
considered. Pauses and interruptions are not acknowledged in the text and are therefore not 
examined.  
3.2.4.1 Arabic and English grammar 
While Arabic grammar shares some characteristics with English grammar, it differs in many 
important aspects, the most important of which are discussed in this section. First of all, while 
English sentences tend to be verbal comprising of at least one verb, an Arabic sentence can also 
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be nominal comprising no verb. In Arabic, pronouns can be separate words or affixes attached to 
verbs, meaning that these pronouns become the subjects of the verbs to which they are attached. 
In English, a noun is identified as singular (one) or plural (more than one), whereas in Arabic a 
noun can be singular (one), dual (two), or plural (more than two). All pronouns in Arabic can be 
identified by either feminine or masculine; additionally, all Arabic nouns and verbs can be 
distinguished as feminine or belonging to females by adding a case ending at the end of the 
word. With regards to articles, Arabic does not contain indefinite articles (a, an), and so no 
replacement is written for the indefinite articles in Arabic.  
3.2.4.2 General remarks 
The total number of discrepancy cases between what AJ has written in the transcript and what 
was actually said in videos is 935 occurrences. A detailed description and analysis of the 
occurrences is provided below. The occurrences comprise a total of 68 omissions of the filler ‘I 
mean’, 230 omissions of immediately repeated words (one after another), and 637 cases of other 
discrepancies.  
3.2.4.2.1 The filler ‘I mean’ 
Although the use of ‘I mean’ by the speakers is generally indicated in the script, 68 other 
recurrences of ‘I mean’ are not indicated in the transcript. Throughout the corpus, the lexical 
chunk ‘I mean’ is employed as a filler in order to achieve the following purposes: 
1. To signal a pause that the user of ‘I mean’ has not finished speaking and is still thinking. 
‘I mean’ is mostly used by one of the female AJA moderators; 
2. To get the speaker engaged until she/he comes up with the next point, while thinking 
instead of pausing completely as the other speaker (opponent) might seize the opportunity 
to fight back and therefore attack; 
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3. As a bridge to move a conversation onto the next word/idea, which is an accepted 
speaking style in Arabic. 
 
3.2.4.2.2 Repetitions  
Although repetitions are generally indicated in the scripts, the unindicated repetition of words, 
phrases and sentences by all debate speakers is 230 recurrences. Every recurrence happens one to 
three consecutive times. Speakers attempted repetitions for the following rhetorical purposes: 
1. To make the opponent tentative of what is being said; 
2. To silence the other speaker; 
3. To stress or emphasise a point. 
3.2.4.2.3 Other discrepancies  
In addition to the unindicated repetitions and filler ‘I mean’ elaborated above, 637 discrepancies 
occurrences emerged from the transcripts, as summarised in the table below.  
Table 3 Discrepancy types 
Discrepancy type Number of occurrences 
Omission (AJ omits words that are said in the video) 364 
Substitution (AJ replaces a certain word by another word) 182 
Addition (AJ adds words that are not said in the video)  63 
Spelling mistake (AJ spells certain words wrongly) 17 
Reorder (AJ changes the order of the said words) 11 
Total 637 
 
This table illustrates that the AJ channel made another 637 discrepancies in its transcripts. These 
deviations from the source can be categorised into 364 omissions, 182 substitutions, 63 
additions, 17 spelling mistakes and 11 reorders. An example for each of these discrepancy types 
is presented below, in one of five tables. The first of these is an illustration of omission.  
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Table 4 Omission 
Category Actual video example AJ transcript  
Omission  She he says yesterday. He says yesterday. 
 
This example shows that the pronoun ‘she’ that is said in the corpus is omitted by AJ transcript, 
showing a missing ‘she’ in the write up of AJ.  
Table 5 Substitution 
Category Actual video AJ transcript 
Substitution that signing will be in three 
places 
that signing will be at three places 
 
In this example, the transcript AJ substitutes pronoun ‘in’ with ‘at’. In Arabic, pronoun ‘in’ 
stands as a separate word while ‘at’ is attached as an affix to the noun ‘three’, which causes 
differences in the spelling and number of words involved in the pronoun.  
Table 6 Addition 
Category Actual video AJ transcript 
Addition that it be a conflict between 
parties(nunation absent from 
‘conflict’) 
that it be a conflict between parties 
(nunation present in ‘conflict’) 
 
AJ added nunation to the word ‘conflict’ as a critical mark added as a particle to the noun.  
Table 7 Reorder 
Category Actual video AJ transcript 
Reorder I am speaking today in the 
name of 
I am today speaking, speaking in the 
name of  
 
99 
 
In this example, AJ revered the verb ‘speaking’ with the time phrase ‘today’ giving more 
importance to time than action.  
Table 8 Spelling mistakes 
Category Actual video AJ transcript 
Spelling mistake Does he want to wear it for 
picnic; he wants to be proud 
of it? 
Does he want to wear for picnic for 
it; he wants to be proud of it? 
 
A spelling mistake has been made here, by splitting the verb from the object and adding a letter 
at the beginning of the object. These changes in the spelling create a total different meaning from 
‘makes something wear’ into ‘wears for something’.  
Table 9 lists the sociolinguistic functions associated with the types of discrepancies that can be 
seen between the recordings and transcripts of the debates.  
Table 9 Functions of discrepancies 
Grammatical 
description 
Adjective, pronouns (demonstrative, prefix, indicative, subject, 
relative, possessive), object (complete, incomplete, conjunction, 
address form), noun (common, proper, reference, plural verses 
singular), verb (passive verses active, verb ending, verb form, case 
ending), prefix, suffix (possession, verb, preposition), repetition, extra 
information, tense indicator, negation, article(definite, subject), hedge, 
subject, phrase (prepositional, conditional), yes (intensifier), number, 
sentence (verbal, nominal), feminine marker (verb, noun), genitive, 
filler, phrase (standard, colloquial), question (standard, colloquial), 
modifier, meaningless words/slips of the tongue, discourse marker, 
determiner, introductory okay, explanatory paragraph, sarcastic 
metaphor, video, speech 
Sociolinguistic 
functions 
Euphemism, dysphemism, semantic derogation, intensifier 
Other functions Meaningless language variation, correction of slips of the tongue, 
spelling errors 
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AJ can be seen to have perpetrated omission, substitution, addition, or reorder of various 
grammatical categories shown on the table. These discrepancies serve the sociolinguistic 
functions of euphemism (making negative meanings less strong), dysphemism (making 
meanings negative), semantic derogation (making the referred to inferior) and intensifier 
(stressing or exaggerating the meaning). Other functions of the discrepancies that do not carry 
sociolinguistic purposes are meaningless language variations, including corrections of spelling 
errors and unintended speech errors (misspeaking). Table 10 presents four significant 
occurrences regarding the omission discrepancies, each of which occurred only once.  
Table 10 Omission examples 
 
The first example reveals the deletion of ‘Oh you’re so eloquent!’ which is a metaphor in Arabic. 
This metaphor is in the form of a vocative, which denotes the other side as being the son of the 
earth/desert, indicating wisdom or that the person is knowledgeable. Deleting the metaphor cools 
down the conversation. 
No Grammatical 
description 
Source 
 
Data 
1 Omission of 
metaphor 
Video Oh you’re so eloquent! I don’t know who Humaid is.  
Transcript I don’t know who Humaid is. 
2 Omission of an 
explanatory 
paragraph 
Video For the revolutionary youth in Sanaa. In order to correct the 
description and not make any mistake that could be misunderstood. 
So, Mr. Qurashi is a member of the Organisation Committee of the 
Revolution youth in Sanaa. Mr. Qurashi, what role 
Transcript of the revolutionary youth in Sanaa. Mr. Qurashi, what role 
3 Omission of speech Video Saleh, ‘we neither want nor need power, but we need to transfer 
power to safe hands’. 
Transcript -  
4 Trim in video  Video How would you expect a country, a country to withstand it, in your 
opinion? 
Transcript How would you expect a country, a country to withstand when it is 
24-hour drunk, in your opinion? 
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The second example, a full explanatory paragraph on the background of the speaker is omitted in 
the transcript, suggesting less importance and creating vagueness regarding his identity. In other 
words, AJ semantically derogates the speaker by deleting the section of text that offers basic 
necessary information and which was actually said by the moderator in the actual debate. 
An exclusion of Saleh’s speech is shown in the third omission example, causing a euphemism 
case, because the speech by Saleh provides an evidence of what was said and therefore heats up 
the discussion by indicating that the speaker/s disagree with Saleh. 
The most interesting example is the fourth example, in which a section of the dialogue of the 
moderator was omitted, although the same part remains in the transcript. This suggests that AJ 
may have chosen to deduct it from the video, because the utterance ‘it is 24-hour drunk’ is 
inappropriate to the Arab and Muslim culture. Speaking and writing about alcohol/drinking is a 
taboo in the Arab society. The moderator referred to the whole people of Yemen as drunken 24 
hours a day, exhibiting an extreme absence of mind and thinking.  
 
 The interviews 3.3
The following section provides salient details about the trip to AJ network in Doha, Qatar, to 
interview selected members of AJ staff who work on the debates: moderators, director of AJ 
online, and head of output. This section is divided into a discussion on ethical approval, which 
was obtained from The University of Hertfordshire prior to the commencement of the study; the 
interview questions; issues of consent; interviewees; the first interview; pre-visit arrangements; 
the visit to the AJ network in Qatar; the Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards of AJ; and an 
overview of the AJ code of Ethics. 
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3.3.1 Ethical approval  
It was necessary to obtain ethical approval from the University of Hertfordshire in order to 
ensure that the research complies with general standards of good practice, as well as those of the 
University of Hertfordshire. 
Explicit ethical approval was granted by the University of Hertfordshire’s Ethics Committee in 
order to conduct the interviews. The letter of approval to visit Al Jazeera for data collection was 
obtained on September 16, 2014 from AJ Chief Bureau in Muscat, Oman (to see the AJ approval 
letter, please refer to Appendix 4. The ethics approval certificate from the University of 
Hertfordshire is available in Appendix 5).  
 
3.3.2 Obtaining participants’ consent  
Outside the academic community, obtaining participation consent through the use of a consent 
sheet can be difficult in the Arab world as people are sometimes cooperative and thus welcome 
research without formalities. However, the ethical procedure for data collection was followed 
strictly with the first interviewee, as per the guidelines stipulated by Hertfordshire University. 
This procedure includes stating the aim of the study and asking the participant to sign the consent 
form (Appendix 7) and Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 8). In the Arab context, asking 
non academics to sign forms can result in the withdrawal of participants, even if they are willing 
to participate. Therefore, it was not possible to get participants to sign the consent form. 
Answering interview questions was therefore interpreted as being sufficient to show the approval 
of the participants to participate in the interviews.   
Although the questions were drafted in Arabic and English (Appendix 9), participants felt more 
comfortable speaking in Arabic since they worked for AJA. Six of Al Jazeera staff were 
interviewed: the director of AJ net (AJ online); the head of output (chief editor); and four 
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moderators. Two of the moderators were female, but all other interviewees were male. The 
majority of interviews took place face-to-face; however for reasons of scheduling, it was 
necessary to interview the director of AJ net over the phone. Each face-to-face interview took 
approximately 25 to 35 minutes. One of the female moderators was interviewed in Muscat 
(Oman); all other interviews took place at the AJ network in Doha (Qatar). All face-to-face 
interviews were voice recorded, with the explicit consent of the interviewees. Each interview 
took a structured format of questions raised by the researcher and answers were given by the 
interviewees. During the first interview, which took place in Oman, the interviewee was given a 
hard copy of the questions so she could read and answer each in turn since her schedule was 
busy, which helped in saving time and ensuring all questions were answered.  
 
3.3.3 The interview questions  
The questions were drafted and edited over a period of approximately six months. The questions 
were grouped into sections based on areas related to the context of AJ debates. They were 
designed to obtain information about the background of the participants, including their time 
working for the channel, the place where the staff worked prior to joining AJ, and any critical 
incident that they had encountered while working on debates. General questions involve 
questions on the channel policies, training programmes and editorial standards such as the 
particular selection of vocabulary by moderators. The speakers section involves questions related 
to selecting speakers and whether or not these speakers are aware of the questions before the 
debate. The moderator section comprises questions related to the full process of selecting AJ 
moderators for the debate programmes, such as the language used, supervision during the debate, 
flexibility with the questions, and neutrality of the moderator. Finally, the transcription section 
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involves questions on the full process of preparing the debates for the AJ website and the 
discrepancies that exist between the actual debates and the transcripts. 
3.3.4 Pre-visit arrangements  
After the cancellation of the first trip by the AJ moderator, the trip was re-arranged by another 
well-known moderator who was conducting training in Muscat during the period of June 10-11, 
2015. The moderator was interviewed in Muscat and helped in arranging for the trip to the AJ 
networks. It was agreed that the best time to conduct the interviews in Qatar was the second 
week of September, as this is the end of the holiday period and so staff would be present.  
The trip went as scheduled, although the second moderator who had arranged the visit was 
unable to attend due to work commitments in ‘occupied Palestine’. The trip arrangements were 
therefore transferred to the staff in charge of the visit (Senior Producer, Output Department, 
AJA). Both the moderator and senior producer said that AJ specifically welcomes students from 
Western universities, however they refused the request to interview 15 members of AJ staff, 
explaining that the staff are busy and that it is unnecessary to interview more than five 
individuals, as the same answers would be elicited. Selection of the interviewed staff and order 
of interviews was controlled by the senior producer. 
3.3.5 Visit to AJ Network 
An entry permit for one week was obtained on September 16, 2015. AJ was visited for two days, 
over two shifts each day, which were principally spent in the AJA newsroom. Overall, the 
researcher was treated with courtesy, generosity, and a high degree of respect. The senior 
producer arranged the entry permit, met first with the researcher, and arranged the interviewees, 
with the time of each interview selected in accordance with the availability and preference of 
each interviewee. Three interviews (50% of total) took place inside the newsroom, in the small 
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office of the senior producer of AJA. It should be noted that he was present at the beginning of 
each interview and occasionally returned to his office during each interview.  
Feedback from all interviewees was almost identical, except for the fourth moderator (M4) who 
was interviewed in a meeting room without the presence of the senior producer throughout the 
interview. It was realised too that the Head of Output (HO) was suspicious and tense 
immediately prior to the interview with M4, perhaps because of a suspicion that M4 would offer 
different feedback than that which was expected. It is important to mention here that although 
other moderators were present in the newsroom during the time of the visit, it was not possible to 
interview them without the approval of the senior producer and these individuals were not 
selected. 
It was planned that interviews be structured in order as drafted and grouped. However, 
interviews were semi-structured as most of the questions were asked but not necessarily in the 
same order and sometimes follow up questions were added, all based on the duration of the 
interview, feedback received from each participant, and their role at AJA.  
3.3.6 QUALITY ASSURANCE and EDITORIAL STANDARDS 
The Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards (QAES) document was obtained during this trip 
to AJ, however the code of ethics was only sent to the researcher on October 25, 2015, more than 
a month after the visit. During the trip to AJ and upon the request of the researcher, a copy of the 
Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards document was received by the HO. The QAES 
document is written in Arabic, as it targets the practices of AJA, and includes code of ethics; 
general principles, such as accuracy and neutrality; partial productions, like reports and news; 
and general productions, such as repeated material and recorded programmes. The following are 
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the highlights from the quality standards document that are explicitly related to the linguistic 
aspects of conversation programmes: 
1. In case of any mistake, as with the pronunciation of names, the mistake is corrected when 
the material is republished (page 19). 
2. If there is an affected party then this party leads the correction of the mistake or the 
decision for it to remain unchanged, so long as it is so, s/he does not affect the reputation 
of AJ (page 19).  
3. The mistake is to be published and corrected on AJ net online (page 20). 
4. It is forbidden for the network’s policies to be involved unless requested by the general 
director (page 33). 
5. Accuracy must be ensured with respect to the connotation and denotation of the 
vocabulary used such as ‘killing’ and ‘execution’ (page 41). 
6. Vague vocabulary should be avoided as with ‘recently’ and ‘a couple of months ago’. 
Instead, accurate years and months are required (page 41). 
7. Vocabulary should not express opinion or judgements (page 43). 
8. AJ does not use colloquial words or vocabulary that is off general principles or which is 
impolite (page 44). 
9. Publishing news must always be neutral and free from judgment such as ‘an explosion of 
this size’ or ‘collapse of negotiations has opened to violence’ (page 48). 
10. Statistical accuracy be ensured, such as ‘the number of injured’ as inaccurate numbers 
can worsen the situation and create complications among the concerned parties (page 50). 
11. No name shortcuts may be used, such as ‘Najad’ instead of ‘Ahmedi Najad’ for Iran’s 
president (page 51). 
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12. In the case of news that can invoke debate or fear, AJ should invite experts to provide 
clarification and explanation (page 52). 
13. Impartiality must be maintained so information is offered without inciting any party even 
if the journalist is convinced by the arguments of one party. Inviting one side of any issue 
is against ‘impartiality’ (page 57). 
14.  All guests must be treated with equal respect. For example, one guest should not be 
addressed as ‘Abu D’ (father of X) while the other is ‘your highness the president’ (page 
62). 
15.  News from witnesses should be dealt with care and suspicion, in the sense that additional 
witnesses should be found to corroborate or disprove the testimony of initial witnesses 
(page 69). 
16. The moderator should be strict yet not aggressive (page 195). 
17. The moderator should be funny where needed but without being excessive (page 195). 
18. The moderator should be dynamic but not rigid (page 195). 
19. The moderator should control her/his voice tone while interviewing guests (page 195). 
20. The moderator should avoid the use of prolapsed idioms that need representation by 
facial expression, which serve to mock guests (page 196). 
21. The moderator’s slogan should be ‘the fixed variable is to seek knowledge’ and every 
attempt should be made to extend this slogan to the viewer (page 202). 
22. Invitations should be extended to as many guests who hold the opposing ideas to those of 
the moderator, programme or channel in order to test reliability and not exclude ‘the 
other’ (page 203). 
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23. With regard to the control of programmes, the moderator has the responsibility for 
controlling time, covering all questions and controlling the behaviour and disagreements 
between guests (page 204). 
24. The moderator should be able to control her/himself and not be high tempered, being able 
to absorb crisis and give the guest time to revise her/himself and apologise where 
appropriate (page 205). 
25. The moderator should read and research each topic, and address it from all angles and 
perspectives (page 208). 
26. A topic should be addressed deeply but in a simple way because the audience varies in 
educational level, from university professors to individuals with more limited education 
and views (page 209). 
27. Interruptions during conversation programmes should be logical and only occurs when 
there is a good reason such when a guest has spoken for too long, when clarification is 
required, or when rejecting an answer (page 231). 
28. Interruption should be equally applied to all guests in cases where more than one guest is 
in a conversation (page 213). 
  
3.3.7 Al Jazeera Code of Ethics 
An electronic copy of AJ code of ethics was received from the senior producer (Output 
Department, News Directorate, AJA), who claimed that it was obtained from the official internal 
site of the network (TAWASUL). The code of ethics comes in English and Arabic; however they 
differ in length and content. The English version is shorter and includes international standard 
regulations, such as standing by colleagues in the profession and ensuring continued cooperation 
with journalistic unions (item 10 of AJ Code of Ethics-English). The Arabic version of the Code 
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of Ethics includes a short introduction stressing that the code is based on Press Charter, after the 
aims of the code’s regulations are listed. Sixteen items are then included as the validity and 
reliability regulations. The four regulations presented below are those that relate to conversation 
programmes in some way. 
1. To not distort stories, realities and information under any circumstances (regulation 2) 
2. To not make judgements and to avoid descriptive analysis that is not based on 
data/evidences or upon information that can be certified for authenticity (regulation 3) 
3. To avoid words and phrases that can be vague or cause doubts, as with the use of 
‘recently’ instead of ‘finally’ in order to avoid important dates being checked (regulation 
4) 
4. To respect the privacy and uniqueness of the cultures and traditions of nations as well as 
to refrain from offering generalized attributions such as the description of a certain cloth 
as being ‘national’ or a young man with a tattoo as being ‘delinquent’ (regulation 8) 
  
 Data analysis framework 3.4
CDA approaches are problem-oriented, rather than being focused on specific linguistic items. As 
CDA theory and methodology are integrated, this approach can be helpful in understanding 
social problems (Meyer, 2007). Having comprehensively reviewed CDA literature with respect 
to political discourse, CDA functions as a method, model, and a multidisciplinary structure, as 
well as a theoretical and analytical framework. In this study, CDA serves as the main theoretical 
approach and analytical framework. 
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Many data analysis frameworks have been utilised in CDA studies. The first example of these is 
the ‘membership categorisation analysis’ (Leudar et al., 2004), which is employed to study the 
alternative representations of events, specifically how they justify past events or prepare bases 
for future events. The membership categorisation analysis was not used because this study relies 
upon TV debates belonging to a single genre. The setting of the study is the 2011 to 2012 Yemen 
revolution. The discourse is studied as it occurred and is not compared with other discourses over 
different periods of time.  
Another CDA data analysis framework is the procedure adapted by Rashidi and Souzandehfar 
(2010) from van Dijk’s 2004 framework. Their approach requires the selection of ideological 
strategies, such as irony or lexicalisation, which enables politics, ideology and discourse to be 
linked. This framework is not followed in this study, because CDA has been criticized for being 
too qualitative with regards to textual analysis, meaning that a framework that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis is important for analysis triangulation. Maingueneau (2006) 
emphasises this importance by advising that CDA analysts should be critical and choose the 
strong path by analysing the production and management of texts. This study analyses the 
production of discourse through a study of its verbal aspects, as well as examining the 
management of discourse through the behaviour and production of the moderators. The elements 
of the analysis of the production and management of discourse, as well as the discourse itself 
comprise both quantitative and qualitative analysis, which helps to ensure the neutrality of data 
analysis.  
As mentioned before, based on the findings and recommendations of previous studies done in 
CDA, the decision was made to integrate more than one method into the data analysis approach. 
For their data analysis, recent studies in CDA integrate CDA approaches with corpus analysis 
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(Attar, 2012; Bednarek and Caple, 2013; Buckingham, 2013; Edwards, 2012; Hardman, 2008; 
Lahlali, 2003; Norman, 2012; Shenhav, 2004). An important aim of using corpus analysis is to 
avoid any analysis bias that might occur as a result of the background or interests of the 
researcher. Corpus analysis enables objectivity, as it provides a wealth of statistical data and 
offers a holistic view into the corpus. In addition to the corpus based CDA analysis, interviews 
were conducted with a group of individuals working on the debates at the AJ channel. The 
interviews provide an additional perspective to the debates, enabling comparisons to be drawn 
between the ideological practices of AJ that have emerged from the CDA analysis and the 
official or unofficial stance of the channel. The research methodology designed and followed by 
the current study is outlined below, in table 11. 
Table 11 Data analysis: theory and framework 
Method Critical Discourse Analysis Computer-assisted corpus 
analysis 
Interviews 
Frame-work Elements of van Leeuwen’s 
Social actor network (2008, 
2009) and further linguistic 
aspects  
Computer software (AntConc 
version 3.2.4w) 
Members of AJ 
staff who work with 
debates 
Data Four debates, one from 
each programme (17,350 
words) 
  AJ (7,600 words) 
 Government 
speakers (1,150 
Fifteen debates of Al Jazeera,  
(73,915 words)  
 AJ (27,186 words) 
 Government speakers 
(7,659 words)  
 Protesters speakers 
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words)  
 Protesters speakers 
(8,500 words)
 2
  
(30,512 words)
 3
  
 
 
 
As illustrated by table 11, the methods of data analysis included CDA as the main approach, 
triangulated by computer-assisted corpus analysis and compared with the results of the 
interviews with AJ staff. Whereas the corpus analysis examined the entire set of linguistic data, 
CDA focused on textual analysis of four debates (one from each of the debate programmes). The 
textual analysis applies elements of the van Leeuwen’s (2008, 2009) social actor network and 
other linguistic components. Once collected, data for both the CDA analysis and the corpus 
analysis was categorised as belonging to Al Jazeera, the government, or the Yemeni protesters.  
3.4.1 Social Actor Network 
The social actor network model employed for analysis in this study is based on the works of van 
Leeuwen (2008, 2009). This theory maintains the basic aspects of CDA, in which ideas, texts 
and talks are deemed to play a significant role in maintaining or legitimizing inequality, injustice 
and oppression in contemporary society. It is also a valuable tool for the examination of the 
discourses of powerful agencies, without restricting the investigation to a single analytical 
method. The social actor network theory extends CDA’s study of the specific grammatical 
discursive processes such as ‘passive agent deletion’ and ‘nominalisation’ into broader 
                                                 
2
 The remaining words were excluded from the study as they were records of neutral speakers, such as United 
Nations and Gulf Initiative representatives. 
3
 The remaining were excluded from the study as they were said by neutral speakers, such as United Nations and 
Gulf Initiative representatives. 
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discourse-semantic concepts like ‘exclusion’ of social actors (discourse doers) from the 
representation of the actions or events which they do or participate. Based on the social actor 
network, social actors are doers of actions. They can be referred to generically as classes of 
people or specifically as identifiable individuals. As this approach has a socio-semantic basis, it 
can be applied to languages other than English (van Leeuwen, 2009). A careful review of the 
literature of CDA with respect to the Arabic language revealed an absence of studies using the 
social actor network, meaning that this study appears to contribute to knowledge in this field by 
being the first to use the social actor network for the Arabic language.  
The social actor network theory views discourses as social cognitions of knowing social 
practices, meaning that they can be used as resources for the presentation of social practices 
within texts. This, in turn, means that conclusions can be drawn from texts, since ‘discourses are 
reconstructed in social practices and so discourses are reconstructed from texts that draw on 
them. Discourses not only represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe purposes to it 
and justify it’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6). Aspects of the social actor network are therefore 
expected to support the findings of this study in being representative of Arab media and politics. 
  
It is significant to state here that in addition to analysing social actions, the social actor network 
approach is also a valid framework to examine social actors, which can be represented using 
textual and visual aspects of discourse. However, social actions can be analysed by a variety of 
different components from the van Leeuwen model (van Leeuwen, 2008), although the current 
study limits this analysis to text. The following is a short explanation of the linguistic categories 
analysed in this study as per the social actor model. 
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Exclusion  
Although social actors are represented in discourse, they may be included or excluded to suit the 
interests and purposes of speakers in relation to their audience. Exclusions are either ‘innocent’ 
leaving no negative traces on the social actors, or have close ties to the propaganda strategies. 
The two main ways of excluding social actors are backgrounding (actors are not mentioned in 
relation to a given context but mentioned elsewhere in the text) and suppression (no actors 
mentioned anywhere in the text, “The police…the killing of demonstrators”) (ibid, p. 28). Of 
these, suppression can take a further two forms: deletion of passive agent “the car was damaged” 
and nominalisation “The level of support for stopping…”. As for suppression, deletion of the 
passive agent and nominalisation were considered as these two are evident in the data. 
Role allocation (activated agent role and passivated patient role: subjection and beneficialisation) 
Role allocations are the functions that social actors fulfil in representations, with activation 
occurring when actors are shown as being dynamic forces within an activity (e.g. “People seek 
aspects of commercial television…”). In contrast, passivation occurs when actors are represented 
as undergoing the activity or receiving the end of the action. Passivated social actors are 
categorized into either subjected (treated as objects of the representation, “Australia was 
bringing about 70,000 migrants a year”) or beneficialised (treated as third party which positively 
or negatively benefit from the action, “22000 Hong Kong Chinese arrived last year, bringing 
bulging wallets to cities”) (ibid, p. 32). 
Due to space constraints, the analysis is limited to two actors, which appear in top keyword list, 
shared by all data groups of the corpus analysis: ‘Saleh’ and ‘the people of Yemen’. 
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Generalisation and specification 
Generalisation refers to the representation of actors as generalized groups or classes (“Non-
European immigrants make up 6.5 per cent of the population”) whereas specification refers to 
specific identifiable individuals (“Staff in both play groups and nurseries expressed willingness”) 
(ibid, p. 35). Specification is used with elites which dominate while generalisation is used with 
groups of ordinary people. Most of the specification cases are for singular actors only. 
Assimilation: aggregation (definite quantifiers) and plurality 
Assimilation involves the grouping of actors, either in the form of aggregation, which quantifies 
people in numbers and is realised by definite and indefinite quantifiers (although only definite 
quantifiers are analysed), or plurality, which refers to social actors as groups by using mass 
nouns like thousands and hundreds. Aggregation makes the representation of actors strong as 
numbers usually carry surveys and research statistics (“A number of critics want to see our 
intake halved to 70,000”) (ibid, p. 38).  
Indetermination and differentiation  
Indetermination is used for social actors who are represented as unspecified, as with anonymous 
individuals or groups. This is realised by means of indefinite pronouns like ‘somebody’, 
‘someone’, ‘some’ and ‘some people’ (e.g. “They won’t let you go to school until you’re five 
years old.”). Differentiation explicitly differentiates an individual social actor or a group of 
actors from a similar actor or actors, creating a distinction between ‘self’ and ‘the other’, or 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (“…‘uptown’ people in American terminology-others are ‘downtown’ 
people from places like Vietnam…”) (ibid, p. 40). 
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Personalisation and impersonalisation  
Personalisation describes the representation of social actors as human beings through personal, 
possessive or proper nouns/names, including the features of human beings (“Australia is 
generous to a fault.”). Similarly, impersonalisation is the use of attributions of nonhumans in 
order to describe human beings (“Australia is in danger of saddling itself up with a lot of 
unwanted problems”) (ibid, p. 46). 
Overdetermination  
Overdetermination has been explained by van Leeuwen (2008) as occurring when social actors 
are represented as simultaneously participating in more than one social practice, such as when a 
story in a distant past or future, even though it deals with contemporary issues in order to avoid 
political or other censorship.  
The linguistic features that were added to the social actor network model appeal to religion; style 
(marked by the use of colloquial Arabic); repetition; use of hedges; euphemism and 
dysphemism; and proverbs and idioms, based on empirical studies written in media and political 
discourse.  
To conclude, the decision was made to follow selected aspects of the van Leeuwen’s social actor 
network for the analysis of texts. This approach provides a systematic analysis model that is 
appropriate for use with Arabic data. It also provides an analysis of broader linguistic aspects. 
The corpus used in this study constitutes discourses that are mainly related to the doers of the 
action (social actors), such as president ‘Saleh’ or ‘the people of Yemen’, making these data 
perfectly suitable for analysis with this model. 
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3.4.2 Computer based corpus analysis 
The following table presents a list of the terms used in the corpus analysis. The list is given in 
alphabetical order.  
Table 12 Corpus analysis: key terms, adapted from McEnery and Xiano (2006) 
Term Definition 
Collocations particular words or sets of words which associate with other words 
Concordance an alphabetical index of a search pattern in a corpus showing every 
contextual occurrence of the search pattern  
Corpus a collection of sampled texts, written or spoken, in machine readable form 
which may be annotated with various forms of linguistic information  
Frequency the actual account of a linguistic feature in a corpus  
Keywords content words in a corpus whose frequency in unusually high (positive 
keywords) or low (negative keywords) 
Unicode a character-encoding system designed to support the interchange, processing 
and display of all the written texts of the diverse languages of the world  
 
The sample of corpus that has been chosen in the current study is representative of the type of 
language used here: TV political discussions for mediated political debates. The debates are 
focused on the conflict of views between the two opposing sides of the Yemen revolution, 
namely the government and the protesters. Therefore, the speakers should be selected to provide 
a balanced perspective that grants an insight into the beliefs held by both political sides regarding 
the Yemen revolution, and for this reason the debates included speakers from a range of different 
political beliefs, which provided a representation of the corpus on politics in the Arab world. In 
addition, the language used by AJ broadly represents the media of the Arab world, as AJ is the 
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most popular media network in the region. AJ is the most successful channel and is the leader of 
the Arab broadcasting (Al Shroof, 2015; Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007). For more information on 
data representation, see section 3.2.3.  
  
3.4.2.1 AntConc version 3.2.4w 
Studies in corpus linguistics use various computer analysis software, such as AntConc, WMatrix, 
Word Smith, NVival, micro Concord, Oxford Concordance program OCP, TACT, and Word 
Cruncher. The software used for this study is AntConc, version 3.2.4w. This software is the only 
computer program able to deal with Arabic and for this reason it was chosen for use in the 
current study. In addition, it is highly functional, providing all of the statistics required in the 
current analysis, including variables like keywords, concordances, and collocations. This 
comprehensive nature makes AntConc suitable for achieving the intended aims of the corpus 
analysis in the current study, namely triangulating the critical discourse analysis. The interface of 
AntConc version 3.2.4w is presented in the image below (see image 1). 
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Image 1 AntConc version 3.2.4w Interface 
 
In order to use this software, technical steps were followed. First, the required data groups were 
saved in separate plain text files, as the software is only capable of reading pure text files. The 
data groups were organised in accordance with the responses by the three groups (AJ, the 
government, and the protesters), and then the file of the corpus required for analysis was loaded 
from the file on the toolbar of the software. In order to enable Arabic language to be processed, 
Unicode (UTF-8) from the Character Encoding was selected, which is located in the Global 
Settings toolbar. The three linguistic features for statistical analysis in this research are wordlists, 
concordances, and collocations. After inserting the file required for analysis and Unicode 
120 
 
characters, the wordlist was created by clicking on the wordlist button below the toolbar, 
followed by the search button on the bottom of the software. The wordlist is provided, in 
conjunction with word ranks and frequencies. The top thirty words of this list were copied, after 
which the content words were chosen for analysis, as function words are generally deemed to be 
insignificant in the study of ideological discourse. Image 2 below displays the AntConc Wordlist 
interface.  
  
Image 2 AntConc Wordlist Interface 
 
The next stage involved a keyword being selected from the wordlist, which automatically 
directed the screen to the occurrence of the word in the list of concordances. The number of 
words to display on the left and right of the selected word was chosen from the settings on the 
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bottom of the view screen. This produces a screen similar to the one presented below (see image 
3): 
 
Image 3 AntConc Concordances Interface 
 
Finally, the start button below the collocations provides the rank and list of the word 
occurrences. The options at the bottom of the screen enable the selection of variables such as 
cluster size, or the number of right and left aligned collocates (see image 4).  
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Image 4 AntConc Collocations Interface 
  
Additional statistics that can be provided by the software are keyword lists, clusters, concordance 
plots, and file view. However, the current research has declined the use of these options, as the 
options mentioned initially are adequate to comprehensively answer the research questions and 
therefore fulfil the aim and objectives of the research. The additional options also provide similar 
results, allowing the required statistics to be accessed by counting wordlists, concordances, and 
collocations only.  
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3.4.3 Translation 
This study conducts an analysis of Arabic text. Arabic as well as translation from Arabic into 
English are offered only for the extracts used for the CDA of this dissertation. The aim of this 
translation is to ease readability of this dissertation. Therefore, a reference to literature is 
provided on any ideological practices that are subjected to translation. One of the most 
prominent scholars of translation positioning in discourse is Baker (1992, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2010 
a, 2010 b), who later collaborated with another important scholar  (Baker & Maier, 2011). Baker 
(1992) confirms that translating all levels of discourse from isolated words to sentences is 
complicated by cultural issues, the collocational environment that surrounds discourse, and the 
grammatical variation of languages. The data in this study were not filtered as Arabic was used 
in the CDA and computer analysis, however precaution measures were utilised in the translation 
of the excerpts. Baker (1992) confirms that these measures are significant because the work of 
translators plays a vital role in the formation of political reality. Therefore, since this study seeks 
to uncover ideological strands depicted in discourse, the methodology should not imply any 
ideological methods. As quality standards and ideology are all woven around the text and the use 
of discourse, it has been suggested that translators are commonly influenced by political and 
socio-cultural constraints (Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner, 2012). 
To investigate ideology within translation further and suggest ways to avoid subjectivity in 
translation, the following section discusses two studies that link translation to ideology. The first 
of these was conducted by Ayyad (2012) and is arguably the most relevant to this research, given 
its focus upon the translation of Arabic discourse into English. Ayyad’s study examined the 
ideological factors that informed translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated 
texts by readers. Ayyad used five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives and their 31 
Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of 2001 to 2003 (ibid). Ayyad (2012) analysed 
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names, origins, meaning and typology, with data analysis including the production, creative 
ambiguity in the road map as a metaphor, the roadmap and its translation, textual function and 
principles of audience design, the Arabic translations of the roadmap, and the Hebrew 
translations of the roadmap. These considerations combined to establish the ideological and 
political affiliation of the institutions and new media for translated versions of the roadmap. 
Overall, the translation process was shown to reinforce ideologies and political agendas (ibid). 
Inspired by Ayyad’s study, this research seeks to provide useful insights into the ways in which 
objectivity can be achieved by CDA studies, bringing into sharp relief the political implications 
of lexical choices, in both the original and translated texts. 
The conclusion of Ayyad’s study was supported by Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner (2012), who 
provide valuable insights into translation and ideology. Their research examined two translations 
of a novel published in 1942 and 1981, having been translated by two different people, in order 
to examine the ideological reasoning of translators in the structure of discourse that is associated 
with political and social life. The assumption made was that the translator prefaces offered 
concrete directions in the construction and contestation of authority, in a way that was ultimately 
likely to influence the perception of readers. In other words, translation brought the ideology to 
the surface. Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner (2012) used Halliday's systemic-functional grammar 
(1994) by focusing on theme-rheme structures developed in the prefaces. The key findings of 
their study were: the occurrence of similarity in translation; specific choices of semantic 
configurations, such as references to emotions, and differences; and choices of frame references 
in construction representations in relation to literacy values. Consequently, the study hypothesis 
was validated, concluding that the construction of discourses were influenced by the socio-
political contexts (ibid). It is therefore significant for this study to endeavour to avoid any 
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ideological choices of semantic configurations. One way to ensure objective translation is for the 
translation to be triangulated by another translator, as was achieved in this study. 
To conclude, in order to avoid any inconvenience caused by translation, Baker (1992) argues that 
translation ethics should be incorporated within translator training programmes, with trainees 
being prepared with techniques that enable any ‘reframing’ in the translated texts to be more 
effectively avoided. Training should consider the translation of the ‘function’ not just the 
structure (ibid). For this reason, the translation of the excerpts of this study was conducted by a 
translator who holds her degree in translation of Arabic into English and vice versa. 
Additionally, in order to provide maximum benefit of translation ethics, the translation was 
triangulated by a certified translation company (triangulation certificate attached in Appendix 3). 
Therefore, every effort has been undertaken to ensure that the translation has been completed 
professionally, with the avoidance of ideological influences and increased objectivity.  
 
 Conclusion  3.5
Chapter 3 detailed the methodology used in this study in order to situate the current study within 
the wider field of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics. The chapter defined the target 
data, data collection techniques, and data representation, after which it outlined the discrepancies 
between the AJ transcript of the debates and the actual video recordings of the same. An 
overview was given of the data collection trip in Qatar and the chosen framework for data 
analysis. 
The detailed methodology has demonstrated a broad consensus regarding the importance of 
combining CDA with corpus analysis in the analysis of the debates, as well as interviews with 
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AJ staff in order to compare the linguistic analysis with the perceptions of the staff. However, the 
methodology in this chapter suggests there is currently limited number of female speakers who 
participated in the debates as well as a limited number of the interviewed staff of AJ.  
The following three chapters present the analysis of the data: chapter four analyses the selected 
debates through critical discourse analysis; chapter five uses computer-assisted corpus analysis 
to triangulate these findings and chapter six analyses the interviews with AJ staff.  
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Chapter 4: Critical Discourse Analysis  
 Introduction  4.1
In chapter 3, the details on the methodology employed in the study were presented. This chapter 
provides the qualitative analysis of the four debates (listed on table 11) using critical discourse 
analysis. The analysis was performed in several stages. The data was divided into three groups 
(AJ, government, and protesters), which was then coded using selected aspects of van Leeuwen’s 
social actor network model (2008, 2009), in addition to further linguistic components. The 
number of occurrences was then counted under each linguistic component, after which the coded 
examples were divided in accordance with their ideological functions. This chapter presents that 
notions and other ideological strands that emerged from the analysis are ‘us’ and ‘them’, AJ’s 
reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women. These ideological intentions 
(intended aims of the utterance) and linguistic tools have been organised from general into 
specific and explicated, with commentary supported by excerpts from the data.  
 The analysed debates 4.2
For the sake of the CDA analysis, one debate from each of the four programmes was selected. 
All of the four debates were staged in 2011 when the Yemeni revolution was ongoing, before Ali 
Abdullah Saleh was ‘ousted’. The only female guest speaker who participated in the debates was 
Tawakul Karman who spoke in two debates only: Behind the News and In depth programmes. 
The two debates she participated in were selected. Analysis was performed with regards to the 
debate on The Opposite Direction which took place in 2011. The guest speakers on this 
programme did not speak in the other debates of the same programme. The earliest episode of 
The Revolution Talk debate was selected, which took place on May 22, 2011, during the peak of 
the Yemen revolution. The analysed debates are 17350 words. Data is divided into 7600 words 
by AJ comprising 43.8%, 1150 words by the government comprising 6.6% and 8600 words 
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constituting 49.6% by the protesters. In a similar way to the entire corpus, the four debates that 
were selected for the CDA analysis in the present study demonstrate that the government 
speakers were excluded from the debates, as can be seen by the relative scarcity of government 
representatives invited to participate as guest speakers. Therefore, the number of words they 
contributed to the debates was less. Table 12 offers background information of the four debates 
that were used for the CDA analysis.  
Table 13 Debates used for Critical Discourse Analysis 
No Date
4
  
Programme 
Debate title and subtitles AJ 
Moderator 
Speakers 
1 22/5/2011 
Revolution Talk 
Yemen revolution's progress 
and the gulf initiative 
1) The protesters and 
the failure of the 
Saudi initiative 
2) Yemen and civil 
war's possibilities 
3) Yemen's 
revolutionists 
between the peaceful 
and armed paths 
4) Expectations of the 
next stage 
Mohammed 
Kreshan 
(Male) 
1) Jamal al-Milaiki (male: 
researcher and a Yemeni 
activist) 
2) Abdulmalik al-Mikhlafi 
(male: leader in the joint 
Congress) 
3) Ali al-Maamari (male: 
formal spokesperson of the 
Parliamentary bloc for 
liberated independent) 
4) Abbas al-Masawi (male: 
Yemen's extension media in 
Beirut) 
5) Sarhan al-Otaibi (male: 
head of the Saudi Society 
for Political Sciences)  
6) And others 
2 19/09/2011 
In Depth  
Yemen…at the edge of the 
revolution 
1) Massacres continue 
and uprising rise 
2) Gulf initiative and the 
regime's behaviour 
3) Implementation 
mechanism in a 
timely manner 
4) Revolutionary 
escalation Friday and 
Ali al-Dufairi 
(Male) 
1) Humood al-Hattar (male: 
former Yemen minister of 
Endowments) 
2) Tawakul Karman (female: a 
leader in National Youth 
Revolution of Yemen) 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Listed chronologically 
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army's role 
5) Extent of political 
parties' influence in 
society's sectors 
3 8/10/2011 
Behind the News 
Last explicit connotations of 
Yemen's president 
1) Tawakul withdraws 
lights from Saleh 
2) Sceneries of the 
delivery of authority 
3) Saleh and the security 
council's decision 
4) Youth and problems 
of the delivery of 
power 
Fairouz 
Zayyati 
(Female) 
1) Tawakul Karman (female: a 
leader in the National Youth 
Revolution) 
2) Yasir al-Yamani (male: a 
leader in Yemen's ruling 
party) 
4 13/12/2011 
The opposite 
Direction 
Yemen to the first square 
1) Army security file 
2) Continuation of sit-
ins in the Change 
Square 
3) Youth of the 
revolution and their 
persistence in Saleh's 
trial 
4) Upcoming struggle 
for undertaking 
Yemen's power 
Faisal al-
Qasem 
(Male) 
1) Jamal al-Milaiki (male: 
researcher and a Yemeni 
activist) 
2) Abbas al-Masawi (male: a 
Yemeni journalist) 
  
Table 13 presents the notions and the ideological intentions that emerged from the CDA analysis, 
namely revolution, the people of Yemen, protesters, president/Saleh, regime, army, fighting and 
Gulf Initiative, ‘us’ and ‘them’, AJ’s reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women. 
The CDA model for analysis relied upon the van Leeuwen’s (2008, 2009) social actor network 
model, augmented by further linguistic components (for more discussion of this framework, see 
Chapter 3, section 3.4). 
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Table 14 Emerged notions and their ideological intentions for CDA analysis  
Notion Ideological intentions 
Revolution   To glorify the revolution (AJ + protesters) 
 To empower the revolution (AJ + protesters) 
 To distort the revolution’s image (government) 
The people of Yemen
5
  To show the people of Yemen as victims  
(AJ + government + protesters) 
 To praise and empower the people of Yemen (protesters)  
Protesters  To show the protesters as victims (AJ + government + 
protesters) 
 To empower the protesters (AJ + protesters) 
 To praise and inspire the protesters (AJ + protesters) 
 To incite the protesters (AJ) 
 To disperse the protesters’ image (government) 
Saleh  To derogate Saleh (AJ + protesters) 
 To weaken Saleh (AJ + protesters) 
 To incite revenge against Saleh (AJ) 
 To announce war against Saleh (protesters) 
 To criminalise Saleh (protesters) 
 To doubt Saleh (protesters) 
 To threaten Saleh (protesters) 
 To glorify Saleh (government) 
 To empower Saleh (government) 
Regime
6
   To distort the regime’s image (AJ + protesters) 
 To derogate the regime (AJ + protesters) 
 To weaken the regime (protesters) 
 To threaten the regime (protesters) 
 To order the regime (protesters) 
 To express power (government) 
Army   To empower the army (AJ) 
 To incite the army in joining protests (protesters) 
Fighting   To describe massive killing (AJ + protesters) 
 To describe fighting intensity (AJ) 
Gulf Initiative   To distort the GI’s image (AJ + protesters) 
Us and them  To identify the government as ‘the other’ 
 To differentiate ‘Saleh’ and ‘regime’ from ‘people’ and ‘army’ 
 To provide a negative generalisation to Saleh’s circle 
 To identify Saleh as ‘the other’ 
AJ’s reference to Arab 
leaders 
 To derogate the Arab leaders 
 To distort the Arab leader’s image 
                                                 
5
 بعشلا 
6
 ماظنلا 
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The discourse of female 
speakers  
 Emotional discourse 
 Interruption 
 
In the following sections, the analysis is organised thematically, in terms of the notions that 
emerged from the CDA analysis. The ideological intentions supported by coded examples with 
the linguistic aspects used by the speakers are explained, after which the key similarities and 
differences between the data groups are highlighted. Due to space limitations, selected examples 
are presented as data excerpts, along with their English translation. The number of the examples 
utilised is dependent on the number of the linguistic aspects that were used by the speakers in 
attaining their ideological purposes.  
4.2.1 Revolution 
The three groups examined in this study, those representing Al Jazeera, the government, and 
protesters, all utilised the topic of the revolution in order to reach their ideological intentions. 
Revolution was one of the first 30 words in the list of lexis produced by the computer assisted 
corpus analysis of the debates, illustrating that the results shown here coincide with those of the 
statistical analysis. In this section, the ideological intentions of the three data groups are 
explained. The most notable finding here is that both AJ and the protesters share ideological 
intentions that portray the revolution as a positive event, glorifying and empowering the 
revolution, whereas the revolution was only accorded a negative intention by the government, in 
an attempt to distort the revolution’s image. 
First, both AJ and the protesters glorified the revolution in a way which made the revolution’s 
image look like a sign of victory in the history of Yemen. In order to portray the revolution as a 
glory, AJ and the protesters shared euphemism and appeal to religion as the linguistic aspects:  
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giving the lives of 180 people as offerings for the anticipated democratic change.  
 ةايح ةمدقم180  ًاصخشً انابرق بقترملا يطارقوميدلا رييغتلل 
 
(AJ: euphemism) 
 
Let me, dear brother, greet whom you called in your report the noblest, the purest and 
the strongest national youth revolution in history.  
 كريرقت يف مهيلع تقلطأ امل ةيحتلا هجوأ ةيادبلا يف زيزعلا يخأ ينعدةروثًىوقأوًرهطأوًلبنلأ  امبر ةيبعش ةيبابش
اتلا اهدهشيناسنلإا خيراتلا رم ىلع ينعي خير  
(Protesters: euphemism) 
 
In this extract, AJ praised the exposure of protesting youth to killing that protester’s death is 
given a positive connotation of ‘sacrifices’ or ‘offerings’. In the culture of the Arabic language, 
when ‘death’ is described as ‘sacrifices’, then the aim of the death is perceived as being noble 
and glorious. Similarly, the protesters used euphemisms to exalt the image of the revolution. The 
protesters praised the people that were being killed for the sake of a revolution, claiming that it 
was ‘the noblest, purest and strongest’, praising the revolution in strong terms:  
and the wounded people offered 26 Yemenis as sacrifices 
 نأ ناكومدق حيرجلا بعشلا هنيبارق 26  ًاينمي 
Quranic source: “And recite to them the story of Adam's two sons, in truth, when they 
both offered a sacrifice [to Allah], and it was accepted from one of them but was not 
accepted from the other. Said [the latter], "I will surely kill you." Said [the former], 
"Indeed, Allah only accepts from the righteous [who fear Him]” Qur’an (Suratt Al 
Ma’idah (5),verse 27) 
(AJ: appeal to religion) 
The youth today won their battle, which means they have taken a first step 
 مه مويلا بابشلامهتكرعمًيفًنورصتني ةيلوأ ةوطخ يه ينعي اهربع يتلا 
Quranic source: (“And when they went forth to [face] Goliath and his soldiers, they said, 
"Our Lord, pour upon us patience and plant firmly our feet and give us victory over the 
disbelieving people”) Quran (Suratt Al Baqarah (2), verse 250) 
(Protesters: appeal to religion) 
Here, AJ employed an extract from a verse of the holy Quran which mentions the phrase ‘offered 
a sacrifice’, in order to show that the protesters were fighting for an aim of glory and victory. 
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Appeal to religion as a linguistic component typically has a strong impact on Arab audiences, 
since religious sources such as the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet (pbuh) are widely 
believed and followed by the people. Appeal to religion was a tactic that was extensively used by 
the debate speakers: 28 cases by AJ and 58 cases by the protesters. In addition, the protesters 
used qur’anic expressions like ‘won’, ‘battle’ and ‘victory’ in order to represent the revolution as 
a glory. This contributed to reaching the protesters’ intended ideological aim which was to create 
a positive image about the revolution. 
Additional linguistic strategies used by AJ in the glorification of the revolution are 
indetermination and overdetermination. The protestors instead tended to rely upon appeal to 
religion, repetition, metaphors, idioms and personalisation in representing the revolution as 
glorious:  
but there are those of the regime who defy and provoke this peace and kill people 
 نكلزفتسيوًىدحتيًنمًةمث سانلا لتقيو ماظنلا لبق نم ةيملسلا هذه  
(AJ: indetermination) 
 
With respect to you and to the revolution’s youth, everyone made the Yemeni revolution. 
 نميلا ةروثو ،ةروثلا بابشلو ،كل يمارتحإ عماهعنص عيمجلا 
(AJ: overdetermination) 
The use of indetermination here contributes to AJ’s glorification of the revolution, as while 
‘those’ refers to unknown parties who attempted to change the tone of the revolution towards a 
more aggressive tone, claiming that the revolution retained its peaceful character, despite these 
negative intentions. 
Likewise, AJ selected the use of the past tense here although the present tense was possible for 
the sake of emphasizing the completed action of the making of the revolution. This is important 
because using the present tense here would have meant that the revolution was still incomplete 
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and therefore accorded less status. Additionally, attributing the instigation of the revolution to 
‘everyone’ grants it additional strength because it shows that everybody supports them:  
I am amazed that the ousted president, on the day his people, his great people, are 
awarded, and who the world describes now as the people of peace. 
 هيف مركي يذلا مويلا يف عولخملا سيئرلاب لصي نأب ةبجعتم انأهبعشًءانبأًهبعشًءانبأ  نلآا ملاعلا هفصي يذلاو ميظعلا
ملاسلا بعش هنأب 
(Protesters: repetition) 
while the second reason is that the protesters and the opposition will continue with the 
peaceful revolution no matter how much blood is shed  
لاو راوثلا نأ وهف يتاذلا يناثلا ببسلا امأ ناك امهم ةيملسلا ةروثلا يف اورمتسيس ةضراعمعفديًيذلاًمدلا 
(Protesters: metaphor) 
In the first excerpt, the protesters repeat the glory of the Yemeni people who have won a Nobel 
Prize due to the revolution. Describing the people as ‘great’ in this context praises them for their 
involvement in the revolution. 
In the second excerpt, the protesters identified the blood as being the price paid in exchange for 
the glory of freedom. By the use of this metaphoric expression, the importance of the revolution 
is underlined, portraying people as giving their ultimate possession, their ‘blood’, to ensure its 
glory and success:  
We cannot go backwards, we cannot even stop in the middle of the road. Since yesterday, 
we forged a great path towards the attainment of victory. 
سمأ ذنم نحن ,قيرطلا فصتنم يف فقن نأ ىتح نكمي لاو ,ءارولا ىلإ عجرن نأ نكمي لاًًاعئارًاقيرطًانققشرصنلا لامكإ وحن 
(Protesters: idioms) 
Let me, dear brother, greet those who you called in your report the noblest, purest and 
strongest national youth revolution’ in the history of human kind.  
 كريرقت يف مهيلع تقلطأ امل ةيحتلا هجوأ ةيادبلا يف زيزعلا يخأ ينعدةروثًىوقأوًرهطأوًلبنلأ ةيبابش  اهدهش امبر ةيبعش
يناسنلإا خيراتلا رم ىلع ينعي خيراتلا 
(Protesters: personalisation) 
In this extract, the protesters described the path in which protesters have moved in as ‘a great 
path’ which implies glorification in the culture of the Arabic language. Revolution is referred to 
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as ‘victory’. ‘Great path’ and ‘victory’ give a positive image about the revolution and attract 
more followers since the way to the glory has become shorter. 
In the second excerpt, the protesters use personalisation in order to identify the revolution as the 
same as a ‘noble’, ‘pure’ and ‘strong’ human being, with is a positive way to strengthen its 
image. The use of the superlative in describing the human being also accords the highest quality 
to the revolution and, by extension, to the people involved in it. 
Second, both AJ and the protesters seemed to seek to empower the revolution, relying on 
metaphors to representing the revolution as being powerful: 
Combined, they did not succeed in stopping the torrential rains of freedom in the streets 
of the country  
 فاقيإ يف ةعمتجم حجنت ملةفراجلاًتايرحلاًليس  دلابلا عراوش يف 
 
 
where the youth protesters, the fuel for the explosion of the revolution  
 نومصتعملا نورئاثلا بابشلا ثيحاهدوقووًهروثلاًورجفم 
(AJ: metaphor) 
 
The second reason is the fear of the revolutionary tide coming from Yemen. This is the 
first point regarding external factors. 
يناثلا ببسلاو،  نم افوخيروثلاًدملا نميلا نم يتلآا، يجراخلا لماعلل ةبسنلاب ىلولأا ةطقنلا هذه 
  
 
This thing is that revolutions always start with a spark. Just as the regime shakes, the 
revolutionary institutions must be formed.  
 أدبت امئاد تاروثلا ئيشلا اذهةرارشبلكشتت نأ ةروثلا تاسسؤم ىلع بجي ماظنلا زتهي نأ درجم لعفلاب راوثلا ,،  اذإ لاز امف
ماظنلا طقس 
 
(Protesters: metaphor) 
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In AJ’s examples, metaphors were used in a way that suggested that the revolution was strong 
and powerful. The event was identified in the same manner as ‘torrential rain and wadis7’ and ‘a 
volcano which erupts’, both of which are incredibly potent natural forces that cannot be stopped. 
Just like AJ, the protesters used metaphors in signifying the revolution as powerful. In this first 
example, the protesters identify the revolution as being the same as a wadi or river that flows 
from Saudi Arabia to Yemen. This attribution is similar to the natural, powerful association made 
by AJ. In the second example, the protesters identify the revolutions as fire-like, starting with a 
spark and having immense destructive power, which is once again similar to the metaphor used 
by AJ. Both water and fire signify the revolution as powerful in Arabic language. 
On the other hand, the government sought to distort the image of the revolution. Government 
speakers only utilised one linguistic indicator, dysphemism, to negatively shift the image of the 
revolution:  
He did not reach (power) through coups, conspiring or treachery.  
 ربع لصي ملتابلاقنلاا  ربع لصي ملرمآتلا  ربع لصي ملةنايخلا 
 
(Government: dysphemism) 
In this way, the government refers to the revolution as ‘coups, conspiring or treachery’. The 
government could have used ‘illegally’ in reference to the way in which Saleh did not seize 
power. The different names the government gave to the revolution here depict a negative image 
about the revolution. 
In summary, CDA indicated that the revolution was a notion that emerged from all data groups. 
The ideology that both AJ and the protesters had about the revolution was positive, as they used 
language to glorify and empower the civil events. Both AJ and the protesters utilised 
                                                 
7
 Wadis are water channels  
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euphemisms and appealed to religion and metaphor as linguistic tools to achieve their intended 
purposes. In contrast, the government held a negative ideology about the revolution, indicating 
that the AJ had adopted a bias in favour of the protesters in the Yemen revolution. 
4.2.2 The people of Yemen 
The second notion which has emerged by the critical discourse analysis was the social actor ‘the 
people of Yemen’ which was among the 30 top keyword list of the statistical analysis. However, 
the reference to ‘the people’ by the protesters and government was different. While the protesters 
included themselves as the ‘people’, the government used ‘people’ to denote those Yemeni who 
supported Saleh and the regime, thereby excluding the protesters from ‘people’. 
The most significant finding in this area is that all data groups used the people of Yemen as 
‘victims’, most probably in an attempt to elicit sympathy from their audience. None of the data 
groups gave the people of Yemen an active role as the action doers, however. While AJ and the 
protesters showed the people of Yemen as victims through the use of subjection, the government 
used the tools of beneficialisation and impersonalisation:  
but they also say that through the use of military aircraft, Saleh’s forces have killed, 
slaughtered and bombed these unarmed people? 
 اذه ًاضيأ تارئاطلاب تفصقو تحبذو تلتق حلاص سيئرلل ةيلاوملا تاوقلا نأب ًاضيأ نولوقي مهنكللزعلأاًبعشلا؟ 
 
(AJ: subjection) 
The opposition has conspired and is conspiring against the country and against the 
Yemeni people. 
 ىلع رمآتتو نطولا ىلع رمآتتو نطولا ىلع ترمآت ةضراعملاينميلاًبعشلاًءانبأ 
 
(Protesters: subjection) 
 
not through coups, assassinations and creating crises for the people 
 تامزلأا قلخو تلاايتغلااو تابلاقنلاا ربع سيلبعشلل 
 
(Government: benificialisation) 
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the innocent Yemeni people which (the opposition) has offered as victims and fuel for the 
sedition that it is trying to ignite in Yemen 
 اياحض مهتمدق نيذلا ءايربلأا ينميلا بعشلااهلاعشإًاولواحيًيتلاًةنتفللًدوقوو نميلا يف 
 
(Government: impersonalisation) 
AJ shows the people of Yemen as victims by describing them as ‘unarmed’ civilians who were 
killed, slaughtered and bombed by Saleh’s forces. The active role that is given to Saleh’s forces 
is negative because it harms the object that is the Yemeni people. Similarly, the protesters 
passivate the Yemeni people by making them the objects of opposition’s conspiracy. This means 
that the Yemeni people are portrayed as the victims of the opposition’s negative action and are 
also given an equal role to ‘the country’, in that both ‘people’ and ‘the country’ are phrased as 
being victims. According to the government, ‘the people’ are victims of ‘coups’, ‘assassinations’ 
and ‘crises’. People are given a passive role by being treated as a third party that benefited from 
the end of the action of creating the crises. In addition, the government speakers use language 
that explicitly describes the Yemeni people as ‘the innocent’ which implies that it views the 
people as victims. Furthermore, the government uses impersonalisation for the Yemeni people as 
it identifies them as the same as fuel that is used to start war in Yemen. Making use of the 
Yemeni people in initiating portrays them as victims of the political interest in Yemen. 
Interestingly, only the protesters attempted to ideologically ensure the praising and empowering 
the people of Yemen. For these two socio-linguistic functions, the protesters used deletion of the 
passive agent, subjection and indetermination:  
on the day his people are awarded 
 يذلا مويلا يفمركي بعش ءانبأ هيفه 
 
(Protesters: deletion of the passive agent) 
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The protesters praised the people of Yemen by expressing pride in the people. The awarding 
body is deleted because the stress is on the act of achieving than the agent who awarded the 
people. Praising the people of Yemen also fulfils a propaganda aim, as the protesters are 
including themselves when referring to the people of Yemen. Therefore, praising the people of 
Yemen also praises the protesters and, by extension, the entire revolution:  
and everyone must respect the people’s will  
 اومرتحي نأ عيمجلا ىلع بجيوبعشلاًةدارإ. 
We will remain in power, and the brother president will remain and is ready to hand over 
power tomorrow but only into the people’s hands (people’s hands - repeated 5 times) 
 ربع نكلو ةطلسلا ملسي دغ موي نم دادعتسا هدنعو لظيس سيئرلا خلأاو ةطلسلا هذه يف لظنس نحنايأعشلاًيدبً
(بعشلاًيدايأً-ًًةرركم5ً)تارم 
 
 
(Protesters: subjection) 
I want to say that I am confident in the Yemeni people who are capable of moving Yemen 
into the future with or without the GI, and to take away all of these (regime), I repeat that 
I didn’t say the General People’s Congress. 
سملا وحن نميلاب لقتني نأ ىلع رداق هنأ ينميلا بعشلاب يتقث نأ لوقأ نأ ديرأ ةيجيلخلا ةردابملا ريغب وأ ةيجيلخلا ةردابملاب لبقت
 لكب بهذي نأوءلاؤه ماعلا يبعشلا رمتؤملا بزح لقأ مل ىرخأ ةرم انأو 
 
(Protesters: indetermination) 
In the two examples above, the role of the object given to the people of Yemen denotes power as 
the genitive construction associates ‘will’ and ‘hands’ with the people. ‘Will’ and ‘hands’ show 
power as people have the right as well as the strength to choose their president. In addition, the 
expression ‘people’s hands’ is repeated five times in the same occurrence by the protesters, 
clearly emphasising how powerful the people of Yemen in the perspective of the protesters. In 
addition, this increases the investment by the audience, making them feel like part of the 
revolution and the protestors; therefore turning people against the regime 
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In the second extract, the protesters empower the people of Yemen by showing that they are able 
to ‘moving Yemen into the future’ and ‘take away all of these’. The unidentified ‘these’ refers to 
any power that could stand against the revolution, especially the regime which involves 
individuals as well as groups. Additionally, mentioning ‘the Gulf Initiative’ as the way to move 
Yemen into the future is a way to increase the empowerment of the Yemeni people, suggesting 
to them that they are strong enough to move on, with or without the initiative. 
In summary, all data groups attempted to portray the people of Yemen as victims. AJ and the 
protesters share the linguistic component of subjection; the government used other components 
to make the people of Yemen seem like victims. Protesters added the ideological intention of 
praising and empowering the people so as to encourage them to join the protesting crowds. 
4.2.3 Protesters  
Protesters were important social actors to emerge from the critical discourse analysis. Analysis 
showed that they aimed to employ five ideological intentions. These intentions varied such as 
making use of the protesters as victims, positivizing their role and dispersing their image. The 
most striking finding is that similar to the people of Yemen, protesters were presented as victims 
by all data groups. AJ and the protesters share similar linguistic components in the showing the 
protesters as victims:  
and the wounded people offered 26 Yemenis as sacrifices, whose blood was shed 
yesterday 
 هنيبارق حيرجلا بعشلا مدق نأ ناكو26ًً اينمي ةحرابلا مهؤامد تلاس 
 
(AJ: assimilation) 
A killer is a killer, whether s/he killed ten or a thousand. 
 لتق لتاق وه لتاقلاةرشع  لتق مأافلأ 
 
(Protesters: assimilation) 
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In the first extract, AJ presented the protesters as victims, because a specific number of them was 
reported as being killed during the fights. The way in which these victims were killed was 
described as blood ‘shed’, indicating massive killing. Similarly, the protesters specified that the 
victims included all those killed, whether a small or large number, in so doing illegalising the 
regime and distorting its image. 
Unlike AJ and the protesters, the government presented the protesters as victims by describing 
them as the ‘victims’ of ‘crimes, treachery and disloyalty’, which are derogatory terms when 
compared to more neutral phrasing like ‘the opposition that wants to overthrow the president’. 
The following excerpt demonstrates how the government used dysphemism in order to 
ideologically portray the protesters as the victims:  
those youth who fell victims to crimes, treachery and disloyalty 
 اوحار نيذلا بابشلا ءلاؤهاياحض امعلاوًةنايخلاوًمارجلإاةل  
 
(Government: dysphemism) 
Then, AJ and the protesters therefore shared two ideological intentions: empowering protesters 
and praising or inspiring them. In order to empower the protesters, AJ used nominalisation and 
active role allocation, in contrast to the protesters who employed indetermination:  
The Last Chance Friday: confirmation of the demand of “the peaceful national 
revolution”, and a new GI 
 :ةريخلأا ةصرفلا ةعمجديكأت يبعشلا ةروثلا" بلطمةديدج ةيجيلخ ةردابم ،"ةيملسلا ة 
 
(AJ: nominalisation) 
where the youth protesters, the revolution’s catalysts and fuel, and these in fact reject the 
GI and every other initiative that doesn’t remove Saleh from his palace immediately and 
prosecute him 
 ىرخأ ٍةردابم لكو ةيجيلخلا ةردابملا نوضفري لصلأا يف ءلاؤهو ،اهدوقوو هروثلا ورجفم نومصتعملا نورئاثلا بابشلا ثيح
 لمحت لاحلاص ةمكاحملا ىلإ هب بهذتو ًاروف هرصق جراخ 
 
(AJ: active role allocation) 
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Portraying the demands of protests to enforce a ‘peaceful national revolution’ shows the 
protesters as being strong, with conviction for their demands despite external pressure. AJ 
empowers the protests here, without explicitly stating that the demand for a peaceful revolution 
is by AJ itself. Saleh is given a passivated role that derogates him from power in such a way that 
protesters will be empowered to protest against him. In this same example, at the same time as 
Saleh is passivated, the protesters are given an active role of strength and power:  
The Transitional Presidency Council, and I address an invitation here through the AJ 
channel, has to hold a meeting soon and appoint a representative. If that’s not possible, 
the youth will appoint a representative for the Transitional Council or an official 
spokesperson on their behalf. 
 اونيعي نأ مهيلعو ًاعيرس هعامتجا دقعي نأ هيلع ةريزجلا ةانق ربع هوعد انه هجوأ انأو يلاقتنلاا ةسائرلا سلجم ىلعوً لاثمم  مهل
 نييعتب بابشلا موقيسف كلذ رذعت نإفلثمم  وأ يلاقتنلاا سلجمللقطان مهنع يمسر 
 
(Protesters: indetermination) 
Similarly, the protesters used unknown people, ‘a representative’ and ‘spokesperson’, to show 
the system followed by protesters, indicating that members will play an important role in the 
organisation of the protest, regardless of their specific names. By anonymising these roles, it also 
invites the audience to imagine their own participation which is a subtle way of drawing support 
for a cause. 
 
Furthermore, AJ and the protesters represented the protesters positively by praising and inspiring 
them. AJ used personalisation whereas the protesters deleted the passive agent and used 
metaphor in order to praise and inspire protesters respectively:  
and perhaps the world agrees that Ms. Tawakul Karman is one of those youths who gave 
a bright face to the Yemeni revolution.  
 نيذلا بابشلا ءلاؤه نم ةدحاو نامرك لكوت ةديسلا نأ ىلع عمجأ ملاعلا لعلوً اقرشم  ًاهجوًاوطعأ  ةينميلا ةروثلل 
 
(AJ: personalisation) 
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In this example, AJ personalises the revolution as being the same as a bright face, as form of 
human attribution to the revolution. This positive active role given to the protesters praises them 
and inspirers them to continue and pay more efforts into the revolution:  
and without the revolutionary youth, this initiative would not have been signed 
 نكت مل ةروثلا بابش لاولوعقوتل ةردابملا هذه. 
 
 This blood which are spilt today in the victorious battles, and not the critical battle 
 يتلا ءامدلا هذهبكست مسحلا كراعم تسيلو رصنلا كراعم يف مويلا 
 
(Protesters: deletion of passive agent) 
 
The future is bright, and you will soon hear of a great victory.  
قرشمًلبقتسملا  ادج ابيرق هنوعمستس ميظعلا راصتنلاا لبقتسمو 
 
and we all have to give the opportunity for our youth to steer the march of the 
revolution, and to take it forward 
 يك انبابشل ةصرفلا حيتن نأ اعيمج انيلعوةروثلاًةريسمًاودوقي  ماملأا ىلا اهب اوقلطنيو 
 
(Protesters: metaphor) 
Similarly, the protesters displayed pride in the protesting crowds. As the focus is on the 
protesters themselves as high achievers, the doers of the actions here are insignificant and 
therefore not stated. The actions related to the protesters here are the signing of the GI and the 
sacrifices that individuals made in being killed for the sake of victory. The protesters also utilised 
metaphors to praise and inspire protests, painting the future as being the same as a bright sun in 
the first extract, while the second identifies the revolution as the same as a car that is driven 
towards a goal. In this way, the protesters are encouraging the youth to win victory and lead the 
revolution. 
In addition to this, AJ seemed to wish to incite protesters in numerous linguistic ways, such as 
assimilation, dysphemism, proverbs and idioms: 
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The Algerians revolted and provided more than 200 thousand martyrs. 
نم رثكأ اومدق اوراث نويرئازجلاً200ًديهشًفلأ 
 
(AJ: assimilation) 
Shouldn’t the Yemeni people continue their honourable revolution until they sweep away 
the figures of the hateful past?  
 ىتح ةديجملا هتروث لصاوي نأ ينميلا بعشلاب ايرح سيلأضيغبلاًيضاملاًزومرًسنكي  
 
(AJ: dysphemism) 
We’ll repeat the proverb a hundred times: one can’t make an omelette without breaking 
an egg. 
 ةرم ةيم لثملا ديعنبضيبلاًرسكتًنأًنودًةجعلاًعنصتًنأًكناكمإبًسيل  
 
(AJ: proverbs) 
It is best for the Yemeni people, if they aim to achieve a real revolution, to eradicate this 
regime entirely. 
 نأ هيلع ةيقيقح ةروث زجني نأ دارأ اذإ ينميلا بعشلل لضفلأا نمهيبأًةركبًنعًماظنلاًاذهًثتجي 
 
(AJ: idioms) 
 
In order to incite more protests, AJ showed Algeria as a role model, using assimilation by 
explicitly stating that 200,000 protesting Algerians were killed in the conflict. AJ even identified 
the killed as ‘martyrs’, thereby implying that they were killed for noble reasons that would 
benefit all Algerians. Meanwhile, in the second example, rather than saying ‘remove Saleh’s 
assistants’, the AJ speakers elected to say ‘sweep away the figures of the hateful past’. This 
would have the ideological intention of distorting regime’s image, because this implies the 
removal of something negative by the protesting Yemeni people, also implying that the 
protesters are heroic. 
AJ used a proverb in the third example in order to incite protesters to continue with the 
revolution until Saleh has been removed. In the fourth excerpt, AJ used the idiom ‘eradicate this 
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regime entirely’ in order to incite protesters to continue with the revolution until the entire 
regime is gone.  
Interestingly, only the government sought to associate the protesters with negative connotations 
by dispersing their image. In doing so, the government used repetition:  
There are noble people in this opposition but they became controlled, became controlled. 
 نكلو ةضراعملا هذه يف ءافرش كانهً،نوريسمًاوحبصأنوريسمًاوحبصأ 
 
(Government: repetition) 
According to the government, the good people among protests are being ‘controlled’. Repeated 
is the action of being ‘controlled’ which implies a negative connotation of the small number such 
as not being able to make decisions or even think. 
To conclude, although all data groups portrayed some protesters as victims, the government used 
indirect means that referred to them as the victims of ‘crimes, treachery and disloyalty’. 
Similarly, the way in which the government tried to disperse the image of the protesters was also 
indirect, referring to the good members of the opposition as being ‘controlled’, instead of 
attributing active roles that would make their image negative. This section showed attempts of 
less power by the government speakers.  
4.2.4 Saleh 
Saleh was another social actor who emerged from the analysis. Saleh appeared in the top 
keyword list of the computer analysis at a high frequency and was used by all three data groups 
in order to achieve their diverse ideological intentions. Both AJ and protesters shared negative 
intentions in this usage, whereas the government’s intentions were evidently positive towards 
Saleh. 
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Together AJ and the protesters shared the aims of derogating and weakening Saleh, relying on 
dysphemism to derogate and subjection to weaken him:  
until they prosecute the tyrant and all of his followers 
 ةمكاحم متت ىتحةيغاطلا  هلااو نم لكو 
 
(AJ: Dysphemism) 
I am amazed that the ousted president, on the day his people, his great people, are 
awarded 
 سيئرلاب لصي نأب ةبجعتم انأ ةقيقحعولخملا  هبعش ءانبأ هيف مركي يذلا مويلا يف 
 
(Protesters: Dysphemism) 
In order to derogate Saleh’s status, AJ referred to him as ‘the tyrant’. In this reference, AJ used 
dysphemism, despite other possible neutral references, such as ‘president’. In the same way, the 
protesters used dysphemism to derogate Saleh from power. They selected ‘the ousted president’ 
although other neutral options, like ‘the president who misused power’ being viable:  
and Saudi Arabia greatly influences the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 
decisions, by virtue of their existing relations 
 فقاوم ىلع ريبك لكشب رثؤت ةيدوعسلاوحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلعًينميلاًسيئرلا امهنيب ةمئاقلا تاقلاعلا ًاعبط مكحب  
 
(AJ: Subjection) 
The revolution’s youth were able to persuade Ali Abdullah Saleh that they are capable 
of overthrowing him. 
ا اوعنقي نأ ةروثلا بابش عاطتسحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلع هطاقسإ ىلع نورداق مهنأ 
 
(Protesters: Subjection) 
Saleh is passivated here, being presented with no power. For example, he is unable to stand by 
his own since he is ‘influenced by Saudi Arabia’. AJ too argues that Saleh is so weak that AJ 
claimed that his actions are being influenced by Saudi Arabia and that he was unable to stop the 
Yemeni youth from claiming to be able to overthrow him, thereby implying that the young 
protesters were stronger than Saleh. 
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In derogating Saleh, AJ further employed metaphors, impersonalisation and activate role 
allocation and the protesters used nominalisation and subjection:  
Many of the Yemeni writers say that the final expected end will be by removing the pillars 
of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, the remnants of the regime, represented by his sons, 
brothers and assistants.  
لا ةريخلأا ةياهنلا نإ نولوقي نيينميلا باتكلا نم ريثكلا ةحازإب نوكتس ةعقوتممكحًناكرأ  ماظنلا اياقب نم حلاص الله دبع يلع
ةلثمتملا يفًهناوعأوًهناوخإوًهئانبأ  
 
(AJ: Metaphors) 
Haven’t the protesters accomplished a great achievement by sweeping the president from 
his presidency?  
 اميظع ازاجنا راوثلا ققحي ملأًسنكبسيئرلا  مكحلا ةدس نع 
 
(AJ: Impersonalisation) 
 
while Ali Abdullah Saleh grasps into the chair until his last trick 
 امأحلاصًاللهدبعًيلع ةليح رخآ ىتح يسركلاب ٌثبشتمف 
 
 
Nothing is more evident of the tricks and manoeuvres than Saleh’s way of dealing with 
the GI. 
 يطاعت لثم ةروانملاو ةغوارملا ىلع لدأ ئش لاوحلاص يجيلخلا نواعتلا سلجم ةردابم عم 
 
(AJ: Active role allocation) 
In the first extract, AJ identifies Saleh’s regime (including his sons, brothers, and assistants) as 
the same as the pillars of a house, but one which is broken, with only ‘remnants’ that remain. 
Here, the poor condition of the house infers that Saleh has a weak status. The next approach that 
AJ used was impersonalisation, by identifying the president in the same manner as rubbish that is 
swept up and discarded. Finally, Saleh is also derogated in the above examples, with phrases like 
‘grasps to the chair until his last trick’ and ‘tricks and manoeuvres’ being used to give him a 
negative role. AJ does not deny responsibility for this negative role:  
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There has been disrespect for the Yemeni people and the constitutional legitimacy, which 
he (Saleh) used to sing the praises of 
 متراتهتسا اهب ىنغتي ناك يتلا ةيروتسدلا ةيعرشلابو ينميلا بعشلاب 
 
  
The revolution which has endured this ousted regime all this time 
ماظنلا اذه ىلع ةرتفلا هذه ةليط تربص يتلا ةروثلاًعولخملا 
 
 
in order to resolve their revolution, without controlling, but by  partnering with them 
 نود ،مهتروث مسحلمكحتلا مهعم ًاكيرش نوكي نأ لب 
 
(Protesters: Nominalisation) 
We say to the ousted Ali Saleh that if he has a real intention to step aside or, excuse me, 
to hand over the power 
 عولخملل لوقنحلاصًيلع ةطلسلا ملسي نأ يف اوفع وأ ىحنتي نأ يف ةيقيقح ةبغر هيدل ناك نإ  
 
(Protesters: Subjection) 
Here, Saleh was degraded by the protesters, with the actions and legitimacy of the regime being 
called into question, suggesting that Saleh shows no respect to Yemeni people and legitimacy. 
The regime is degraded because it is considered overthrown and weakened despite the revolution 
being incomplete. Nominalizing the actions in the given examples shows that Saleh lacks 
responsibility for dealing with his people’s demands. In addition, the protesters gave Saleh the 
role of the object of an action done by the protesters, with the subjection showing that he is 
powerless because he passively receives actions from them. 
Among the negative ideological intentions that AJ used for Saleh were inciting revenge against 
Saleh and forcing him to resign. AJ used indetermination and assimilation to fulfil these 
intentions:  
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guaranteeing immunity approved by the government for the president Ali Abdullah Saleh 
and those who worked with him from all judicial prosecution 
 حلاص اللهدبع يلع سيئرلل ناملربلا اهرقي ةناصح نامضهعمًلمعًنمو ةيئاضقلا تاعبتتلا لك نم 
 
(AJ: Indetermination) 
A large number of factories were shut down and tens of thousands of workers were 
dismissed. 
 حيرستو عناصملا نم ريبك ددع قلاغإ متلامعلاًنمًفلالآاًتارشع 
 
(AJ: Assimilation) 
In this extract, AJ incites the protesters to take revenge upon Saleh and upon the unidentified 
group of ‘those who worked with him’. ‘Immunity’ from ‘all judicial persecution’ implies many 
cases against Saleh. Therefore, in order to force his resignation, AJ used assimilation to specify 
the number of workers who are shown as victim as ‘tens of thousands’, giving a reason for his 
abdication, by showing that he has caused Yemeni factories to shut down and corresponding 
hardship for the people. 
Furthermore, announcing war against Saleh, criminalizing Saleh, doubting Saleh, and threatening 
him were specific to the protesters. The protesters used various linguistic tools in order to fulfil 
these intentions:  
and I say our battle is now only with Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons  
 عم انتكرعم نلآا نحن لوقأ انأوحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلع طقف هدلاوأو 
 
(Protesters: Subjection) 
Saleh and his sons are the object of the protesters’ ‘battle’. Meaning that, in this context, the 
protesters effectively announce a war against Saleh:  
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The national youth revolution has prepared a complete file on the crimes of Ali Saleh 
and his regime, and it will submit it to the International Criminal Court. 
حلاصًاللهدبعًيلع ةيبعشلا ةيبابشلا ةروثلا هتدرط 
 
(Protesters: Beneficialisation) 
The brothers in the European Union, United States and human right organisations, have 
to prosecute Saleh. 
 مدقت نأ اهيلع ةيقوقحلا تامظنملا كلذك ةيكيرملأا ةدحتملا تايلاولا يف يبورولأا داحتلإا يف ةوخلأاحلاص .ةمكاحملل 
 
(Protesters: Subjection) 
In the first incident, the protesters benefits from Saleh’s crimes, as it they will file them as 
examples of corruption to the International Criminal Court. In beneficialising Saleh, the 
protesters portray the president as a criminal. Meanwhile, in the second example, Saleh is also 
portrayed as a criminal, with the speakers asking the world, EU, US and human right 
organisations to ‘prosecute Saleh’. 
People might talk about the humanitarian aspects that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
provided to the president Ali Abdullah Saleh, like providing health care 
 سيئرلل ةيحصلا تامدخلا ميدقت للاخ نم ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا اهب تمدقت يتلا ةيناسنلإا بناوجلا نع سانلا ثدحتي دقًىلع
حلاصًاللهًدبع 
 
(Protesters: Beneficialisation) 
In this extract, Saleh benefits from the Saudi health services in order to manipulate and delay. By 
stating this, the protesters demonstrate that they doubt his intentions after he flew to Saudi 
Arabia:  
We will pursue the assets, this looted money by which the Yemeni people are now being 
persecuted. 
 ،ةدصرلأا قحلانس هقحلانةبوهنملاًلاوملأا ينميلا بعشلا اهيف عمقي نلآا يتلا هذه  
 
(Protesters: Personalisation) 
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The protesters linked the concept of ‘looted money’ with the idea of a human being who is being 
chased. By the use of personalisation here, the protesters threaten Saleh, who is implied to have 
‘looted’ the ‘money’. 
In contrast, only the government employed positive ideological functions with relation to the 
president, aiming to meet their intentions of glorifying and empowering Saleh. For both of these 
aims, the government used subjection:  
I speak to sister Tawakul Karman, I am sorry that she refers to the brother president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh as an ousted president 
 نع ثدحتت نأ ينفسؤي نامرك لكوت تخلأل ثدحتأحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلعًسيئرلاًخلأا عولخم سيئر هنأ  
 
(Government: Subjection) 
In this extract, the government glorifies Saleh. Despite him being passivated by the government, 
he is glorified by the context, which shows disagreement with the opinions that the protesters 
have expressed about Saleh. In addition, Saleh is referred to as ‘the brother president’ which 
shows respect and solidarity. So, the government hold on power by supporting Saleh:  
 
The majority of the people still cling to the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
اولاز ام بعشلا اذه ءانبأ نم مظعلأا داوسلا  نوكسمتيحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلعًسيئرلاًخلأاب 
 
while they don’t acknowledge the millions who have come out from all over Yemen, in 
support of the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh 
 ةكسمتمو ةدكؤم نميلا ءاحنأ لك نم جرخت نيذلا نييلاملاب اوفرتعي لا مه امنيببخلأا حلاصًاللهًدبعًيلعًسيئرلا 
 
(Government: Subjection) 
Additionally, the speech of the government representative seeks to empower the president by 
claiming that the majority of the people of Yemen want to keep him as the president. Saleh is 
referred to as ‘the brother president’ and, although he is given the object role, he is portrayed as 
being admired by his people. 
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The ideological aims intended by the data groups with regards to Saleh show their stance and 
whether they are with him or against him. The intentions by AJ and the protesters strongly 
support the idea that they both oppose the president, while the intentions by the government 
speakers showed their struggle to maintain the powerful status of Saleh as the president.  
4.2.5 Regime 
In a similar way to the use of ‘Saleh’, ‘regime’ was used to achieve the ideological intentions of 
negative connotations by AJ and the protesters, and the positive connotations by the government. 
Both AJ and protesters used language that derogated the regime and distorted its image. 
Interestingly, both of them appealed to religion in order to distort the image of the regime:  
Isn’t it a hideous mistake to accept the president’s stepping aside while leaving his 
entourage in the army, security institutions and the media to wreak havoc and desolation 
in the country? 
جأو شيجلا يف هبانذأ كرتو سيئرلا يحنتب لوبقلا عينشلا أطخلا نم سيلأ ملاعلإاو نملأا ةزهًاداسفوًابارخًنوثيعي
دلابلاًيف 
Religious source: “Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His 
Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is none but that they be killed or 
crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled 
from the land”. Quran (5: 33) 
(AJ: Appeal to religion) 
It goes like a wolf in preacher’s clothing; we hear who spent many years defending this 
regime and those who were hired to defend the regime  
 نأ موي بايث بلعثلا يدترينيظعاولا ماظنلا اذه نع عفادي اريجأ ناك امو ماظنلا اذه نع عفادي تاونسلا ةليط ناك نم عمسن 
 
Religious source: “God commands justice, and goodness, and generosity towards 
relatives. And He forbids immorality, and injustice, and oppression. He advises you, so 
that you may take heed.” Quran (Suratt Al Nahl (16),verse 90) 
(Protesters: Appeal to religion) 
 
In its reference to the regime’s practices in this extract, AJ quoted ‘wreak havoc and desolation 
in the country’, derogatory references stated in the holy Quran. This reference implies a bad 
regime image that caused corruption and therefore deserves the punishment stated in the Quran, 
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namely to ‘be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that 
they be exiled from the land’. The protesters also distorted the regime’s image, describing it as 
hypotactic that covers its intentions in the form of a religious ‘preacher’. In the holy Quran, 
preacher is in charge of ‘advising’ others. 
Additionally, both AJ and the protesters derogated the regime. While AJ used dysphemism for 
this purpose, the protesters used repetitions:  
The Yemeni people are still afraid. This is a treacherous government, a treacherous 
regime, the security institutions are treacherous. The army has no other choice than to 
take revenge against the Yemeni people, revenge. 
 هذه افوختم لازام ينميلا بعشلاردغًةزهجأًنملأاًةزهجأًردغًماظنًاذهًردغًةموكح  لاإ همامأ سيل شيجلاماقتنلاا  بعشلا نم
 ينميلاماقتنلاا 
 
(AJ: Dysphemism) 
AJ used dysphemism in derogating the status of the Yemeni regime. AJ used references of 
negative connotations, such as ‘a treacherous government, a treacherous regime, the Security 
institutions are treacherous’. In addition to these derogatory terms, AJ claimed that the army is 
on the side of the protesters and used ‘revenge’ as a derogatory term regarding the expected 
actions of the army against the regime:  
 
These are who squandered public money, these are who misused power, these are that 
the international community now praises 
ءلاؤه  ماعلا لاملا اوردهأ نيذلاءلاؤه  ةطلسلا للاغتسا اوؤاسأ نيذلاءلاؤه يلودلا عمتجملا نلآا مهحدمي نيذلا 
 
(Protesters: Repetition) 
Similarly, the protesters repeated the derogatory reference ‘these’ to show the regime as lower in 
status and weaker in power. The demonstrative pronoun here is followed by derogatory facts 
about the regime, from the perspectives of the protesters, regarding the misuse of public funds 
and power, and who has deceived the international community. 
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Added to this, the protesters had the ideological intentions to weaken, threaten and order the 
regime:  
The Friday of Dignity was on March 18. On March 31, the army joined (the revolution), 
and all of the pillars of the Yemeni regime collapsed. We heard of the resignations of the 
whole diplomatic corps, most of whom are in the diplomatic corps.  
ةماركلا ةعمج  يف تناك18  يف ,سرام21  ,شيجلا مضنا سرامهناكرأًلماكبًينميلاًملظنلاًىواهتو كلسلا تلااقتساب انعمس ,
 يسامولبدلا كلسلا يف نم بلغأ ينعي هلكشب يسامولبدلا 
 
(Protesters: Metaphors) 
which it feeds on, after the international community started closing in on it 
 أدب يلودلا عمتجملا نأ دعب اهنم تاتقي يتلاوقانخلاًهيلعًقيضي 
 
(Protesters: Idioms) 
 
The protesters used metaphors and idioms to portray the regime as weak. In the first extract, the 
protesters identify the regime as being similar to a house with damaged foundations or structure, 
in the form of its pillars. Meanwhile, the ‘resignations of the whole diplomatic corps’ is a 
specific example of the regime’s downfall, with the metaphor implying a weak regime coming to 
an end. In the second extract, the protesters employ the idiom ‘closing in on it’, which also 
implies collapse and weakness, like prey being hunted by the ‘the international community. 
The protesters specifically threatened the government by the use of backgrounding and idioms:  
Nothing remains except revenge; they should all go to the dumping ground of history. 
 نأ مهيلع ،ماقتنلاا لاإ ىقبي نلاوبهذي خيراتلا ةلبزم ىلإ اعيمج 
 
(Protesters: Backgrounding) 
Nothing will remain except revenge. They should all go to the dumping ground of 
history. 
 ىلإ اعيمج اوبهذي نأ مهيلع ،ماقتنلاا لاإ ىقبي نلخيراتلاًةلبزم 
 
(Protesters: Idioms) 
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The backgrounding example by the protesters shows an absence of the subject, although it is 
intended that the subject is Saleh, his family and his regime. The use of backgrounding by the 
protesters is innocent, as the audience are generally likely to have clearly understood who the 
intended social actors were, given the remit of the programmes and the context of the 
discussions. 
The protesters threatened that it would take revenge upon the regime and ensure that Saleh was 
remembered poorly, using the expression ‘the dumping ground of history’ to denote the destiny 
of the regime. To this end, the protesters aimed to order the regime by employing dysphemism:  
They have to acknowledge the goals of the national youth revolution now. Whoever 
wants to hand over power has to acknowledge what is required from Ali, anyone who 
wants to hand over the raped power 
 نأ مهيلعاوفرتعي هأب نلآا نأ هيلع ةطلسلا ملسي نأ ديري نم ةيبعشلا ةيبابشلا ةروثلا فادفرتعي  نم بولطملا يلع نم بولطملا
ةطلسلا ملسي نأ ديري نم لكًةبصتغملا 
 
(Protesters: Dysphemism) 
In order to meet the aim of calling for their demands to be met, the protesters used the strong 
modal ‘has to’ associated with the verb ‘acknowledge’, although these lexical choices were 
softened by mild references such as acknowlege what is required. Dysphemism here is used to 
instruct the regime to follow the collective demands of the protests. 
Again, only the government achieved a positive sociolinguistic intention in their use of regime, 
which was expressing power:  
Government: We are a country, we don’t need to turn into a jungle ( 
AJ: Are these the duties of the country? 
Government: We are a country, we cannot act like these gangs, who are blocking roads, 
terrorising peaceful people, and killing the innocent in the camps. 
AJ: What about the thugs? 
Governemnt: We are a country, it hurts me to hear the word thugs being used to refer to 
the Yemeni people. 
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ةموكحلا :ًةلودًنحن.تاباغ ىلإ لوحتن نأ جاتحن لا 
ةريزجلا؟ةلودلا ماهم هذه له : 
ةموكحلا: ةلودًنحن  يف ءايربلأا لتق نم نينملآا عيورت نم تاقرطلا عطق نم تاباصعلا هذه هسرامت ام سرامن نأ نكمي لا
.تاركسعملا 
ةريزجلا؟ ةجطلابلا نع اذام : 
ةموكحلا:ةلودًنحن ينميلا بعشلا ءانبأ نع ةجطلاب ةملك عمسأ نأ فسأأ انأ 
 
(Government: Repetition) 
The government repeated its self-reference ‘we are a country’ in order to express power over 
what it so called ‘jungle’, ‘gangs’ and ‘thugs’. This self-reference as ‘a country’ implies power in 
many respects, including space, fighting, and decision making. 
In summary, only the government used the regime to achieve positive goals, namely to express 
power and control. This is almost certainly because the government considers itself part of the 
regime and so has a vested interest in ensuring that its power is maintained. In contrast, the 
intentions attributed to AJ and the protesters were powerful in nature, as they sought to threaten, 
weaken, and issue commands to the regime.  
4.2.6 Army 
AJ and the protesters share the use of the army as a notion in order to achieve their specific aims 
of ideological intentions. In the case of AJ, these intentions seem to be empowering the army, 
while the protesters used language that aimed to incite the army to join the protests: 
The Yemeni army is the second largest military force in the Arabian Peninsula after 
Saudi Arabia, with nearly 90 thousand professional soldiers. 
 ةبارق نوفرتحملا هوبوسنم ةيدوعسلا دعب ةيبرعلا ةريزجلا يف ةيركسع ةوق ربكأ يناث ينميلا شيجلا90ًيركسعًفلأ 
 
(AJ: Assimilation) 
The AJ speakers used assimilation tactics in order to empower the army, giving the specific 
number of the army soldiers in Yemen, ‘90 thousand’, to stress that it is the second biggest army 
in the Arabian Peninsula and therefore possesses significant military influence. By the use of 
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assimilation here, AJ portrays how powerful the Yemeni army is; in a way that winning party is 
whichever the army stands by. 
The protesters tried to incite the army to join the protesters so as to empower the revolution and 
ensure victory against Saleh:  
We address the brothers in the Republican Guard and in the Central Security telling them 
that they have a chance. They are the country’s army, not killers and not a gang. 
 شيج ءلاؤه دلبلا شيج ءلاؤه ،ءلاؤه ةصرف مهمامأ نأب يزكرملا نملأا يفو يروهمجلا سرحلا يف ةوخلإا كلذك بطاخن نحن
 اوسيلو نطولاةلتق  اوسيلوةباصع  
 
Religious source: “Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever 
kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain 
mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely” 
Quran (Suratt Al Ma’idah (5),verse 32) 
 
(Protesters: Appeal to religion) 
By negating ‘killers’ and ‘gangs’ from the descriptions associated with the army, the protesters 
are reinforcing the idea that it defends the army and that the army should therefore be on the side 
of the protesters. The quote from the holy Quran ‘whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for 
corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely’ conveys strong emotions 
to the army that siding with the protestors and the uprising citizens would be in accordance with 
the teaching of their religion. 
To summarize, both AJ and protesters endeavoured to positively use the army in order to reach 
their ideological aims related to the revolution. AJ portrayed the army as being powerful in order 
to encourage them to protect the protesters, while the protesters themselves pushed the army to 
join in the fight against Saleh.  
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4.2.7 Fighting 
As with the aforementioned use of the army, AJ and the protesters both attempted to use the 
conflict occurring in Yemen to maintain their ideological stance about the revolution. They both 
described the high death count and AJ also described the intensity of the fighting. In order to 
describe the massive killing (high death count), both AJ and the protesters used assimilation:  
before and during the protests, about 800 were killed and 20 thousand were wounded in 
different Yemeni cities and provinces 
 وحن اهللاخو اهلبق طقس800ًًليتق يلاوحو20ًحيرجًفلأ .ةفلتخملا نميلا تاظفاحمو ندم يف 
 
(AJ: Assimilation) 
This regime killed the youth in the square;, 800 youths were killed. 
 تاحاسلا لخاد بابشلا لتق ماظنلا اذه800ًًباش.لتق 
 
(Protesters: Assimilation) 
Using specific numbers in reference to the killed and injured in Yemen glorifies the events of the 
revolution. These numbers are followed by the location of the killing and injuring which is ‘in 
different Yemeni cities and provinces’ and in the squares. By providing information on the 
numbers and locations illustrates AJ’s intention to glorify the revolution and make the protesters 
seem like victims. Likewise, the protesters used the same number as AJ, ‘800’ in reference to the 
number killed in Yemen, meaning that both groups used exactly the same discourse in achieving 
the same intention. 
Only AJ described the fighting intensity. By doing so, AJ attempted to glorify and exaggerate the 
revolution that it was a major event in Yemen and that protesters were achieving:  
A total of 26 Yemenis were killed by weapons, some of which are said to be heavy 
weapons.  
26  ةحلسأب اوضق ينميليق ةليقث ةحلسأ اهضعب يف ةحلسأ اهنأ 
 
(AJ: Deletion of the passive agent) 
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By deleting the actor of the report, who described the weapons as ‘heavy’, AJ evades 
responsibility for the provision of the facts about the fighting in Yemen, although these include 
numbers and are generally harmful and degrading to the government. The intensity of the 
fighting is another aspect of the war that AJ do not engage with, as they delete the passive agent, 
without stating the source of the information. 
Finally, only AJ and the protesters used the fighting in Yemen in order to achieve their 
intentions. Both groups referred to the number of people injured and slain, in an attempt to prove 
that the regime was killing large numbers of Yemeni people.  
4.2.8 Gulf Initiative 
Only AJ and the protesters used the GI in achieving their ideological intentions. Overall, the 
intentions here show a negative representation of the GI by both AJ and the protesters, both of 
whom represented the GI negatively, in a way that they distorted the image of the GI. AJ used 
deletion of the passive agent, subjection, assimilation, appeal to religion, dysphemism, 
indetermination, and metaphors. In contrast, the protesters relied upon personalisation:  
the Gulf Initiative which was amended three times because of his change of mind 
 يتلا يجيلخلا نواعتلا سلجم ةردابمتلدع تارم ثلاث هفقوم بلقت ببسب 
 
(AJ: Deletion of the passive agent) 
but the initiative grants Ali Abdullah Saleh an escape from prosecution 
 حنمت ةردابملا نكلحلاصًاللهًدبعًيلع ةمكاحملل عضخي لا نأ ،بورهلا 
 
(AJ: Subjection) 
 
This initiative excluded the revolution’s youth who stood under the sun for months, and 
months, in their millions, and millions. 
 رهشلأ ،رهشلأ سمشلا تحت فقو يذلا ةروثلا بابش تدعبتسا ةردابملا هذهنييلاملابً،نييلاملاب 
 
(AJ: Assimilation) 
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and the protesters’ leaders stay in Yemen’s squares believing that signing the initiative is 
a betrayal to the martyrs’ blood 
 ةيقافتلإا عيقوت نأ ًةربتعم ةينميلا تاحاسلا يف نيمصتعملا تادايق فقت نيفرطلا نم ةفاسم ىلعوءادهشلاًءامدلً ةنايخ 
 
(AJ: Appeal to religion) 
Did the Yemenis pay all of those sacrifices in exchange for a meagre settlement?  
تايحضتلا كلت لك نوينميلا عفد له لباقمًةليزهًةيوست  
 
(AJ: Dysphemism) 
 
that the GI which many have praised (using musical instruments)  
 اهل رمزو لبط يتلا ةيجيلخلا ةردابملا نأنوريثكلا 
 
(AJ: Indetermination) 
to fit the president’s size as his opponents say, and to respond to his concerns which have 
not stopped, it seems.  
 مءاوت يكًسيئرلاًساقمودبي ام ىلع اهليس عطقني مل يتلا هسجاوهل بيجتستو هوضراعم لوقي امك  
(AJ: Metaphor) 
In the first example, AJ accused Saleh of making numerous modifications to the GI. Although 
the actor of the modification is not stated in the extract, this is implicit knowledge as it is well 
known that Saleh amended the initiative. By deleting the passive agent, the image of the GI is 
distorted in order to stress the action of the amendment, rather than the doer of the action, who is 
unimportant because the GI is negative in all cases. 
Additionally, AJ distorts the image of the GI in order to portray Saleh as a coward, with the GI 
actively granting him ‘an escape’. The passive role given to Saleh here is of a coward and is 
illegal, so the GI does not sound like a viable solution to the Yemeni crisis. 
Once again, AJ shows the GI with a negative picture since the people of Yemen protested under 
the sun for months and in large numbers ‘in millions’, which is stressed by repetition. ‘Martyr’ is 
a religious adjective given to those who die or are killed in the pursuit of religious aims, which 
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can be seen in numerous sources in Islam, such as the Prophet (pbuh) stating that, ‘whoever dies 
or is killed in the cause of Allah is a martyr’. In this extract, AJ tries to distort the GI’s image by 
stating that signing the initiative is a ‘betrayal to the martyrs’ blood’, showing that the items are 
not only unacceptable but even constitute a betrayal against those who have died. In the fifth 
example, AJ used the words ‘a meagre settlement’ as a negative semantic reference to the 
initiative, which is more negative than other possible phrasing, such as ‘an unfair settlement’. 
This negative choice distorts the initiative’s image, indicating that the Yemeni people and the 
wider world all disagree with the initiative. 
Among the many ways AJ uses in distorting the GI’s image is indetermination. The verb ‘have 
praised’ is used with musical instruments in Arabic, which implies negative connotations, 
suggesting that the initiative is given a larger image than it actually deserves. Therefore, in 
distorting the GI’s image here, AJ decreases the size or importance of the initiative’s image. 
In the last extract, AJ compares the initiative with a garment that has had its size fixed, implying 
that Saleh modifies the items of the initiative according to his will and intentions. This 
metaphoric expression is an indication of the attempts made by AJ to distort the image of the 
revolution:  
because this initiative wanted to twist the arm of the Yemeni people by giving these 
criminal guarantees 
 هذه نلأينميلاًبعشلاًعارذًيولتًنأًتدارأًتناكًةردابملا  تانامض مرجملا اذه ءاطعاب 
 
(Protesters: Personalisation) 
In contrast, the protesters only used personalisation to distort the image of the GI, identifying the 
GI as a person who twists an arm and the Yemeni as a person whose arm is twisted. The 
‘guarantees’ offered by the initiative to Saleh derive from the initiative itself and, since Saleh is 
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referred to as ‘the criminal’, it is therefore implied that the initiative grants him rewards that he 
did not deserve. 
This analysis suggests that AJ was dissatisfied with the GI, and more so than the other two 
factions, because it sought to distort the status of the initiative using a wide range of linguistic 
tools.  
4.2.9 ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
‘Us’ and ‘them’ is a further notion that has emerged from the micro-analysis by which speakers 
convey their political ideological stands. In the following, these strands are analysed by AJ’s 
identification of the government as ‘the other’, AJ’s differentiation of ‘Saleh’ and ‘regime’ from 
‘people’ and ‘army’, the negative generalisation to Saleh’s circle and the identification of Saleh 
as ‘the other’. 
As in the previous sections of this chapter, the findings show that AJ identified the government 
as ‘the other’. In the following, a reference is made to ‘differentiation’ and ‘generalisation and 
specification’ as the two main linguistic components used in conveying the ideological stand of 
‘us’ and ‘them’. This differentiation between sides, whether ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘self’ and ‘the 
other’, was made by all data groups. There are a total of 17 occurrences by AJ, 25 occurrences 
by the government, and 96 occurrences by the protesters.  
AJ differentiates ‘Saleh’ from opposition, competitors, and people. In its differentiation, AJ 
refers to Saleh as ‘the president’, ‘the man’, ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh’, ‘Saleh’ and ‘The Yemeni 
president’. Perhaps more significantly, it also excludes him as an actor when differentiating him 
from the opposition. Instead, Saleh is attached as a genitive pronoun when mentioning ‘the 
competitors’ and ‘the opposition’, as Saleh’s other such as ‘his opponents’ and ‘his rivals’. 
Attaching Saleh’s pronoun rather than his name derogates him from power and importance. It is 
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also interesting to highlight that AJ differentiates the regime from the army, potentially 
encouraging the army to support the revolution and thereby oppose Saleh and his regime. The 
ranges of differentiation references employed by AJ are attached to appendix 9 (table 63). 
The opposition is made different from the regime, revolution, and tribes. For example, when the 
regime is made solid ‘the regime’, the opposition is made strong by attaching the regime as a 
genitive pronoun to it. Additionally, an interesting linguistic phenomenon here is that AJ does 
not specify a clear stance with regards to the opposition as being with or against the revolution. 
The evidence suggests that AJ differentiates the opposition from the revolution or the tribes, 
meaning that the opposition is either with or against the revolution. The most significant finding 
here is that AJ differentiates ‘Saleh and regime’ from ‘people and army’, showing a clear bias 
with regards to who it perceives to be against Saleh. 
The government attributes itself to Saleh, people, regime or debate speaker’s first name. On the 
other hand, it attributes ‘the other’ to the opposition or Tawakul Karman. While’s Saleh’s 
attributions are positive such as ‘the president Ali Abdullah Saleh’, the opposition is referred to 
Saleh’s other as negatively generalized groups ‘the killers’, ‘the criminals’, and ‘the gangs’. The 
opposition is differentiated through the use of pronouns, like ‘these’ and ‘they’, derogating the 
opposition from its power at the same time as empowering the president. The differentiation 
references by the government are attached to appendix 9 (table 64). 
The most significant finding here is that unlike AJ, the protesters do not differentiate themselves 
from the opposition, instead considering themselves to be the opposition to the regime. 
Furthermore, the Gulf is differentiated from the regime when referring to the leaders of Gulf 
countries, but from the youth demonstrators and Yemeni people when referring to the gulf 
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initiative. Similar to the government, protesters refer to their opponent ‘the regime’ using 
pronouns like ‘they’ and ‘this regime’. The protesters’ differentiation references are attached to 
appendix 9 (table 65). 
Secondly, data groups’ distinction of ‘the other’ is evident in their generalisation and 
specification of the social actors. All groups use generalisation extensively: 207 occurrences by 
AJ, 93 by the government and 497 by the protesters. Depending on their occurrence in the 
corpus, the generalized social actors are categorized into four connotations: negative, victim, 
faithful and strong. 
AJ generalises social actors with a mostly negative ideological connotation. Most of the 
negatively connotated actors are related to Saleh’s circle such as ‘the regime’, ‘the dictator’ and 
‘the regime officials’. Meanwhile, other Arab presidents are generalized as ‘Arab leaders’ and 
‘the tyrants’. The reference ‘Arab leaders’ is given without articles, which shows less importance 
and status to the presidents, as if AJ refers to ‘any presidents’. The people of Yemen are 
generalized as victims and are indicated as the whole Yemeni people or a sect of the people, such 
as young people or protesters. AJ portrays the faithful groups in Yemen, the protesters, using 
language like ‘opposition parties’, ‘the protesters’ leaders’, as well as the officials who joined the 
revolution in ways that include ‘the sheiks of Hashid tribes’, military leaders’, and 
‘ambassadors’. The Yemeni people as a whole are portrayed as being victims by AJ, but are 
nevertheless given a connotation of strength and power and are referred to as ‘the unarmed 
people’, ‘the protesters’, and ‘the opposition’. The occurrences of generalized social actors in the 
discourse of AJ can be seen in appendix 9 (table 66). 
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In contrast with AJ, the government generalises the opposition with negative connotations such 
as ‘the killers’, ‘the criminals’ and ‘the gangs’. Similar to AJ, the government shows the Yemeni 
people as victims such as ‘the Yemeni people’, ‘the innocent youth’, ‘the revolutionary Yemeni 
people’ and ‘the safe people’. It also generalises the regime and army as faithful such as ‘military 
leaders’ and ‘the ruling party’. The positively connotated actors of faith and strength by the 
government express power and support to the regime, mainly the Yemeni people and army. The 
occurrences of the generalized social actors made by the government are attached to appendix 9 
(table 67). 
As with AJ, the protesters represents Saleh’s circle negatively. Saleh’s circle includes the regime, 
Saleh’s family, the security forces, al Qaeda, and all who work with the circle. This circle is 
represented as being responsible for the killing that has taken place during the revolution in 
Yemen. The regime is attributed by ‘thugs’ and ‘the ones who misused the power’, which shows 
a semantic derogation of Saleh’s regime as a group. As with AJ and the government, the 
protesters generalized people and protesters as being the victims of the regime’s response to the 
revolution. Overall, all these groups are in support to the revolution and the overthrow of Saleh, 
meaning the Yemeni people, protesters, and army, are all portrayed as being faithful and strong. 
Table 68 in Appendix 9 lists the occurrences of the generalized social actors by the protesters. 
All data groups reveal the ‘us’ and ‘them’ notion through their use of the specification of certain 
individuals related to the revolution. Additionally, all data groups specify social actors 
extensively: 149 occurrences by AJ, 34 times by the government, and 148 occurrences by the 
protesters. Most of the specification occurrences are references to Saleh, however, and for this 
reason discussion was limited to those specified references of Saleh made by all data groups.  
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Table 15 References to Saleh 
Group Reference to Saleh 
AJ The Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saleh, the Yemeni president, 
the president, the man, the president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the tyrant, the 
dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, this man, this executioner, the president 
Saleh 
 اللهدبع يلع سيئرلا ،لجرلا ،سيئرلا ،ينميلا سيئرلا ،حلاص ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع ينميلا سيئرلا
حلاص سيئرلا ،دلاجلا اذه ،لجرلا اذه ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع ،روتاتكيدلا ،ةيغاطلا ،حلاص 
Government The brother president, the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, the president, the leader and symbol Ali Abdullah Saleh 
 يلع زمرلا دئاقلا ،سيئرلا ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع سيئرلا خلأا ،سيئرلا خلأا
حلاص اللهدبع 
Protesters  The ousted president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, this man, the ousted, the ousted 
Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons, Ali, he, Saleh, 
dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the entourage and the family, the snake’s 
head, the killer, the brother president, president Saleh, the ruler, person, 
gang leader 
ذه ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع ،عولخملا سيئرلاا  يلع ،حلاص اللهدبع يلع عولخملا ،عولخملا ،لجرلا
 سأر ،ةلئاعلاو ةيشاحلاو حلاص اللهدبع يلع ،روتاتكيد ،حلاص ،وه ،يلع ،هدلاوأو حلاص اللهدبع
ش ،مكاحلا ،حلاص سيئرلا ،سيئرلا خلأا ،لتاقلا ،ىعفلأاةباصع ميعز ،صخ 
 
Table 14 shows clearly that Saleh is generally specified in a similar way by AJ and protesters. In 
addition, the full address name of Saleh is shared by all groups, ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh’, as the use 
of the full name implies a neutral connotation. One specific reference of Saleh that is shared by 
AJ and the government is ‘the president’, whereas by the protesters and government share the 
reference ‘the brother president’. The most interesting linguistic pattern from the table is that 
most of the specific references about Saleh are shared by AJ and the protesters. Whereas 
‘president Saleh’ portrays the leader in a way that suggests power and domination, ‘dictator’, 
‘this man’ and ‘Saleh’ derogate him from his power as Yemen’s president. In this respect, AJ is 
demonstrating bias in the references it offers with reference to the president, suggesting that AJ 
considered Saleh as ‘the other’ in the same way as the protesters. 
Ultimately, the data show that AJ’s ‘the other’ was similar to that of the protesters. It considered 
the government its other. It also considered the government ‘the other’ of the protesters, as if it 
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spoke on the protesters’ behalf. This conclusion was drawn from AJ’s use of the differentiation 
and, generalisation and specification as the linguistic devices. This conclusion supports the 
findings of the previous notions discussed in this chapter, which showed that AJ shared the same 
ideologies as the protesters.  
4.2.10 AJ’s reference to Arab leaders 
Overall, AJ displayed negative connotations in references to the Arab presidents. First, AJ 
referred to the Arab presidents as generalized groups, such as ‘Arab leaders’ and ‘the tyrants’. 
Using the reference ‘Arab leaders’ without the article ‘the’ indicates less importance and status 
to the presidents, as if AJ refers to ‘any presidents’. The title ‘tyrants’ has particularly negative 
connotations, as it implies slavery and dominance over populations. 
Second, AJ aimed to distort the image of the Arab leaders, as can be seen in the two extracts 
below:  
You’re talking about these Arab rulers as if they are patriots of the first class, Ok give 
me one minute OK Jamal, I want to ask you 
 لولأا زارطلا نم نيينطو مهنأك لاو برعلا ماكحلاه نع يل يكحت مع ينعيسب  ةقيقدسب  لامج انأكلأسأ يدب 
 
The tyrants have caused the Arab countries to lose billions and billions, they looted the 
country, cursed and slaughtered people. Do several billions make much a difference? 
How much difference do several billions make? Let them lose several billions. 
 ينعي ايندلا اوحبذو دابعلا اونعلو دلابلا اوبهنو تارايلملا تارايلم ةيبرعلا نادلبلا اورسخ ينعي تيغاوطلاًرايلمًمكًىلعًةقراف
رايلمًمكًىلعًةقرافًلأه رايلم مك رسخت ام 
 
(AJ: Repetition) 
In the first extract, repeated ‘ok’ in a way that the moderator was trying to emphasise his 
reference to the Arab leaders as ‘these Arab leaders’. As noted earlier, use of the demonstrative 
pronoun ‘these’ demeans the status of the leaders, as the moderator was referring to all Arab 
presidents. In the second example, the moderator repeats the question that encourages a negative 
perception of the huge quantities of money wasted by the leaders of Arab countries. Presidents 
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are referred to as ‘tyrants’ who have ‘looted the country’ and ‘slaughtered people’. Both 
repetition and the examples above emphasise the attempts by AJ to distort the images of the Arab 
presidents, thereby inciting protests against them. 
To conclude, AJ represented the Arab leaders using derogatory generalized references, such as 
‘the tyrants’ and ‘these’, which distorted the image of these rulers and their regimes.  
4.2.11 The discourse of female speakers 
In this section, the significances of the way in which women used discourse and how others used 
discourse with them are analysed. The discourse of the female moderators is equal to their male 
counterparts and does not signify any emotional state which shows how experienced AJ 
moderators are. However, the discourse of Tawakul Karman, the only female speaker, is 
characterized by her emotional response to the revolution, which distracted from the debates. 
Linguistically, Tawakul appealed to religion and used idioms in stressing her emotions. 
Additionally, the discourse directed to women demonstrates more interruptions by men directed 
to women, than women to men. These factors are discussed in greater detail below.  
As noted above, the only female debate guest speaker was characterized as being emotional. 
Tawakul made 35 of the total 54 appeals to religion, suggesting that she preferred to convince 
the Yemeni people and the wider Arab audience by appealing to their emotions and piety, 
through the use of religious terms, rather than by logical reasoning supported by evidences. She 
also seemed to be emotional in the selection of idioms, as illustrated by the examples below:  
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We cannot go backwards; we cannot even stop in the middle of the road. Since yesterday, 
we forged a great path towards victory. 
 سمأ ذنم نحن ,قيرطلا فصتنم يف فقن نأ ىتح نكمي لاو ,ءارولا ىلإ عجرن نأ نكمي لاًًاعئارًاقيرطًانققش لامكإ وحن
رصنلا 
 
but there is a planned president, there is a planned president who they want to place in 
power. There are no elections or whatsoever (watermelon); there is a planned president 
who will be placed within 3 months. 
 سيئر كانه اذكه عضوي نأ داري خوبطم سيئر كانه اخوبطم اسيئر كانه نأ لاإخيطبًلاوًتاباختناًلا  داري خوبطم سيئر وه
 للاخ عضوي نأ3 رهشأ 
 
(Tawakul Karman: Idioms) 
The use of ‘great’ does not employ ideological view or convincing strategies, nor add or 
emphasise any practical actions or achievements. Likewise, the use of ‘whatsoever-watermelon’ 
is arbitrary and inappropriate for a politician in Arabic, because it is colloquial and adds no 
ideological power to the meaning. 
Moreover, Ali Al-Dhofairi (moderator of the In Depth debate) asked Tawakul to list the 
challenges that could be encountered on the completion of the revolution. Instead of focusing on 
the challenges, Tawakul elaborated on describing the completion of the revolution. Ali realised 
that she was attempting an emotional use of discourse, so he stopped her by saying: 
I don’t want to go back, please Ms. Tawakul if you don’t mind. I mean, with my full 
respect to all you said, this is not an emotional subject. 
 ينعي ,يل تحمس نإ لكوت ةذاتسأ اريثك ءارولل دوعأ نأ ديرأ لا ينعيةيفطاع ةلأسم تسيل ةلأسملا ام لكل لماكلا ريدقتلا عم ,
نلآا مت 
 
(AJ: Interruption) 
Ali was strict with asking her to stop being emotional by stating ‘this is not an emotional 
subject’. 
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The discourse of men addressed to women was also characterized by interruption as a discourse 
strategy. The table below details the number of interruption occurrences in the Behind the News 
debate, which was coded for micro-analysis. This debate was selected because it has male and 
female speakers. Speakers are Fairoz (moderator/female), Yasir (government/male) and Tawakul 
(protesters/female).  
Table 16 Interruptions: Behind the News  
Debate: Behind the News 
Interruption Number 
Fairouz interrupts Yasir 17 
Yasir interrupts Fairouz 26 
Fairouz interrupts Tawakul 6 
Tawakul interrupts Fairoz 2 
Tawakul interrupts Yasir 0 
Yasir interrupts Tawakul 2 
 
The major finding here is that Tawakul interrupted least. Yasir’s interruptions took the form of 
laughing, hemming, answering questions, commenting, and thanking. Tawakul never interrupted 
Yasir and the only two cases she interrupted Fairouz were by saying ‘okay’, thereby showing 
cooperation with the moderator. While Fairouz and Yasir spoke in the studio, Tawakul 
participated remotely, meaning that she may not have been able to interrupt others due to 
communication or technological difficulties. 
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All in all, Tawakul was the only female guest speaker in the debates. Her emotional state was 
evident in her common use of religious terms and idioms. Her emotional discourse was also clear 
to the moderator, Ali Al-Dhofairi, who once asked her to focus on the topic, which was not 
emotional. Tawakul made the least number of interruptions, yet was interrupted by the moderator 
and the male guest speaker on multiple occasions.  
 Discussion  4.3
This section provides a discussion of the findings of the CDA analysis that are presented in this 
chapter. First, AJ and the protesters share many ideological intentions, along with a large number 
of the same linguistic strategies. For example, AJ and the protesters both glorified the revolution, 
portrayed the people of Yemen and the protesters as victims, incited protesters, derogated and 
weakened Saleh, and distorted the regime’s image. Furthermore, AJ and the protesters were 
almost identical in their ideological strands, with AJ almost speaking on the behalf of the anti-
regime faction. In stark contrast, the government speakers held very different ideological 
intentions from either AJ or the protesters, and used different linguistic components even when 
the held similar ideology. As an example, AJ and the protesters employed subjection with 
reference to the Yemeni people, while the government used beneficialisation. When portraying 
protesters as victims, AJ and the protesters themselves used assimilation, whereas the 
government used dysphemism.  
Second, by excluding the government speakers from some of the debates, AJ seemed to violate 
its motto ‘the opinion and the other opinion’. In the four debates, only one government speaker, 
‘Yasser Al Yamani’, was invited as a guest and only to a single debate. In contrast, many 
protesters and neutral speakers participated in the debates. Consequently, the government was 
excluded from speaking extensively on the subject, defending its cases, or meeting its intentions. 
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As its social actors are excluded, this means that the government leaves no traces of its activities. 
According to the van Leeuwen’s framework, excluding social actors or social actions are ‘radical 
exclusions’, because the actors are not heard which did not allow the government to explain and 
justify its position in regard to the revolution. In addition, AJ also excluded social actors when 
responding to the claims made by either the government or the protesters. Furthermore, as with 
the protesters, AJ gave the impression of considering Saleh and his government, and many other 
Arab leaders, as ‘the other’. These others were derogated and referred to as ‘the tyrants’ and 
‘these’. Finally, the discourse of women in these debates was characterized by the female guest 
speaker Tawakul Karman as being emotional  with less interruptions than male moderators and 
male guest speakers.  
A number of interesting additional findings emerged from the analysis, supporting the evidence 
of the ideologies investigated in this research. Perhaps most importantly, AJ’s reports in the 
debates are strongly in favour of the revolution. For instance, the ‘In Depth’ debate includes a 
very long introduction and report about the Yemeni army and the situation of the economy, 
which was not related to the substance of the debate and could therefore be argued as being 
unnecessary. This report derogated the status of the Yemeni government, as it caused the army 
and economy’s degrading. Additionally, it was evident that the AJ moderators interrupted the 
government speakers much more commonly than the protesters. Fairouz, the moderator of 
‘Behind the News’, continuously and obviously interrupted Yasser al Yamani, the government 
speaker. Regarding the use of hedges, AJ mostly used these linguistic phrases to show 
uncertainty and avoid responsibility, rather than as a sign of hesitation or weakness. 
The moderators were shown to have strong moderation skills, demonstrating good control of the 
debates. In addition to his role in managing the conversation, Faisal Al Qasim, moderator of ‘The 
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Opposite Direction’, tended to ask questions and demand answers, even asking ‘Why don’t you 
answer?’ in order to avoid deviation from the agenda or themes of the debate. In the ‘Revolution 
Talk’, Mohammed Kreshan also shows good control over the debate, asking his guest ‘We don’t 
want your opinion about the Initiative but we want you to answer who is responsible for its 
failure’. 
Finally, the protesters generally showed confidence in speaking. Jamal Al-Maliki, the speaker 
advocating for the protestors on the ‘Opposite Direction’ debate, used words that denoted 
emphasis several times, demonstrating confidence and fluency. The protester speakers used no or 
fewer exclusions, indetermination, and hedges which emphasised their certainty of their claims. 
They frequently used modality for the actions that they wanted Saleh and other parties to 
perform or cease, such as to stop killing or to sign the Gulf Initiative. This indicated confidence 
about their goals and a commitment to their cause, even suggesting bravery in the face of death, 
by issuing orders to the regime.  
 Conclusion  4.4
This chapter has presented the CDA analysis of four debates taken from four different debate 
programmes held by AJ in order to situate the current study within the wider filed of CDA. The 
data was coded using aspects from van Leeuwen’s (2008, 2009) social actor network model and 
supplemented by further linguistic tools. The analysis was presented based on the emergent 
notions: revolution, people of Yemen, protesters, Saleh, regime, army, fighting, Gulf Initiative, 
‘us and them’, AJ’s reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women. The main 
conclusion drawn in this chapter is that all the notions or themes derived from the analysis were 
shared by AJ and the protesters, both of which differ from the notions and themes championed 
by the government.  
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As this research seeks to investigate the use of language within media discourse, the data and 
outcomes of the critical discourse analysis are triangulated using computer assisted corpus 
analysis in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Corpus analysis 
 Introduction  5.1
The previous chapter presented the critical discourse analysis of the four debates, which was 
conducted using aspects from the van Leuween framework (2008, 2009) and a selection of 
specifically selected linguistic elements. The purpose of chapter five is to triangulate the critical 
discourse analysis using computer assisted corpus analysis. This chapter therefore lists the 
selected corpus analysis terms and then outlines the computer software used for the analysis. 
This is followed by the background of the corpus, after which the results of the statistical 
analysis are presented, including concordances and collocations of the keywords of the notions 
that had emerged from the corpus analysis. In the analysis, the Arabic data was used in the same 
form as transcribed by AJ. The excerpts used here are translated for increased readability and 
transparency of analysis. Main keywords are given in Arabic as footnotes.  
 The analysed debates  5.2
When using AntConc, each group of the corpus is entered into the software, AJ (27,186 words), 
government (7,659 words) and protesters (30,512 words), and is analysed separately. Initially, 
the first thirty words, most commonly employed in each data group, are listed, as given by the 
software. After this, the keywords that are specific to data groups and those keywords shared by 
two or three of the groups were identified. The first twenty collocations with frequencies of one 
right and one left were provided, in addition to the first 20 concordances listed by the software. 
These concordances and collocations show ideologies underlying the way in which the speakers 
used these words. 
Table 17 incorporates the top thirty keywords of each of the data groups (AJ, government, and 
protesters), along with the frequency with which each of the keywords occurs. The content words 
176 
 
used for the analysis in this chapter are in bold. Attention is drawn to content key words only, as 
these are the most significant data with regards to the study.  
Table 17 Wordlists with frequencies 
Data group AJ 
27,186 words 
36.8% of total corpus 
Government 
7,659 words 
10.4% of total corpus 
Protesters 
30,512 words 
41.3% of total corpus 
Wordlist 
First 30 
words with 
frequency  
821 in 
608 from 
391 at 
351 Ali 
348 that 
281 not 
261 Saleh 
235 this 
230 al Qasem 
230 Faisal 
206 Yemen 
200 to 
200 Abd 
182 this 
169 about 
166 Allah 
161 al Dufairi 
153 the president 
142 the revolution 
141 no 
141 means 
127 is(question tool) 
125 Yemeni 
122 sir 
121 now 
115 that 
106 Owais 
106 Ghada 
104 or 
102 okay 
 201 in 
 201 from 
 187 that 
 149 al Yamani 
 149 Yasser 
ً120 the people8 
ً103 the president 
ً102 the Yemeni 
 102 this 
 99 the brother 
 94 to 
 84 no 
 83 at 
ً77 Yemen 
 69 people 
 68 Abd 
 68 Ali 
ً68 we 
54 about 
 52  today 
 51 all 
 49 Allah 
 46  power9 
ً46  Saleh 
ً42 I 
 40 did not 
 37 this 
 36 that 
32 South 
 32 he 
 
834 in 
745 that 
710 from 
403 at 
304 this 
294 no 
268 Ali 
247  this 
233 Saleh 
227 to 
221 he 
215 Abdul 
194 not 
186 now 
179 Allah 
176 that 
170 revolution 
164 I 
163 regime 
152 or 
151 that 
151 about 
142 Yemen 
136 there 
124 we 
119 was 
119 she 
118 initiative 
113 did not 
111 people 
 
Table 18 Shared keywords 
Data groups Shared content keyword 
AJ, government and protesters  Saleh, Yemen 
AJ and government  President 
AJ and protesters Revolution 
Government and protesters People of Yemen, We, I 
                                                 
8
 بعشلا 
9
 ةطلسلا 
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Table 19 Specific keywords 
Data group Specific content keywords 
Government   the South, power 
Protesters initiative, regime 
 
Table 17 indicates that the total number of words found in the protesters discourse (30,512 
words) is nearly four times the number of words in the government discourse (7,659 words). 
This strongly suggests that AJ excluded the government from expressing its side of the argument 
and meeting its goals by not ensuring that as many government speakers attended as the 
protesters. Another figure displayed on table 17 is the number of words found in the AJ 
discourse (27,186 words), which is similar to the number of words found in the protesters 
discourse. That means that the discourse of AJ is three times larger than that of the government 
speakers. 
Tables 18 and 19 show the content keywords which are shared by and specific to corpus groups 
as identified by the software: ‘Saleh’ and ‘Yemen’ are shared by all the groups; ‘president’ is 
shared by AJ and the government; ‘Revolution’ is shared by AJ and the protesters; ‘People of 
Yemen’, ‘We’ and ‘I’ are shared by the government and the protesters. Some words can also be 
seen to be specific to certain groups: ‘the South’ and ‘power’, are highly utilised by the 
government, whereas ‘initiative’ and ‘regime’ were extremely popular among the protesters. No 
specific content words are specific to AJ.  
Table 20 Notions and ideological intentions  
Notion Data group Ideological intentions 
Saleh AJ 
 
 Reference to Saleh, his family and circle 
 Derogating Saleh 
 Government  Solidarity to Saleh 
 Defend Saleh  
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 Protesters  Negative representation of Saleh 
 Weakening Saleh 
Yemen AJ  Avoid responsibility in Yemen 
 Government  Positive future in Yemen 
 Protesters  Avoid censorship of the events in Yemen 
President AJ  Derogatory references to Saleh 
 Government  Solidarity with Saleh 
 Used in positive context  
 Representation of power and censorship 
Revolution AJ  Used in neutral context 
 Used to ask questions 
 Associated with young people  
 Protesters  Used in positive context 
 In the revolution’s side 
People of 
Yemen 
Government  Pretend being supported by the people 
 Used as a synonym to Yemen 
 Given a patriotic role  
 Protesters  Victims and sacrifice 
 Speak on behalf of the people 
We Government  Reference to the Yemeni government/regime 
 To defend the government’s case  
 To respond to the protesters’ claims  
 To convince the world of the government’s case 
 Protesters  Reference to the parties that the protesters belong to 
 Present verb tense to show the revolution’s demands 
 Past verb tense to indicate a completed action 
I Government  Reference to the speaker only 
 As a conversation strategy: to interrupt and hold the floor 
 Protesters  Refers to the speaker only 
 To justify the revolution 
 To express censorship and control 
Power Government  Synonym to regime 
 As a destination that power is exclusive to the government 
South  Government   To show the South as a victim  
 To express solidarity and care 
Regime Protesters  Reference to Saleh and his family 
 Used in negative context 
 Demand entire circle’s resignation  
Initiative Protesters  Uncertainty of the initiative  
 
179 
 
The examination of the corpus is organised in accordance with the notions and sociolinguistic 
functions of the emergent keywords that have emerged from the analysis. Table 20 shows the 
notions, keywords from the wordlist on Table 17, in addition to their particular ideological 
intentions, as determined by the analysis. The majority of the notions derived from the computer 
analysis are the same as those identified by the CDA.  
5.2.1 Saleh  
It is particularly notable that the computer analysis shows the aims of AJ and the protesters were 
similar, with both groups using Saleh for ideologically negative intentions. The concordances of 
the use of Saleh by AJ demonstrate that Saleh was used to refer to the man, his family, and his 
wider circle of influence. Importantly, the reference was used in a way that derogated Saleh from 
his power as the president. Tables 21 and 22 show the first 20 concordances and collocations of 
‘Saleh’ by AJ.  
Table 21 Concordances of ‘Saleh’ by AJ (261 hits: 0.96%) 
Concordances 
 
1. Isn’t it enough that Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down without doing what al Qadhafi did? 
2. Al Qassem: Who is that Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh? Faisal Al Qassem: entirely. 
3. that Ali Abdullah Saleh’s son and his relatives still hold a strong grip on? What do you say about (the security) 
apparatuses  
4. you. This party will disappear when Saleh leaves. There are many people, for example, 
5. removing the pillars of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime that are represented by 
6. the army and security… It is also believed that Saleh’s departure will not keep any legitimacy for his sons 
7. What are you afraid of? Saleh will leave in two months or less. Why  
8. Faisal al Qassem: Who knows Ali Abdullah Saleh? Faisal al Qassem: Abbas al Musawa 
9. the Gulf (Initiative) states that Saleh’s family, relatives and assistants can remain in power. 
10. responsibilities, Ali Abdullah Saleh said some time ago to the protesters or to the  
11. al Qassem: That belongs to Ali Abdullah Saleh. Faisal al Qassem: Abbas al Musawa 
12. that Ali Abdullah Saleh’s family, sons, relatives 
13. Abdullah Saleh’s (family), sons, and relatives to 
14. Abdullah Saleh’s (relatives) to stay in their positions. It didn’t state that  
15. But the Initiative grants Ali Abdullah Saleh an escape, stipulating that he is not to be prosecuted and 
16. the revolution youth and their insistence to prosecute Saleh. Faisal al Qassem: Very well, I ask you 
17. the revolution youths are very concerned that Saleh will leave without being prosecuted and that he will have 
18. Don’t you think that the immunity Ali Abdullah Saleh has 
19. entirely, at least Ali Abdullah Saleh has killed(innocents), at least killing people is better than (destroying the 
country) 
20. Ali Abdullah Saleh’s record in breaking promises and conventions is full 
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Table 22 Collocations of ‘Saleh’ by AJ  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and family 
they sign 
he demands 
removes 
and hints 
and his regime 
and we see it 
and his opposition
10
 
but they 
and for a number 
and a decision 
and changed 
and immunity
11
 
and a third 
and the stepping down
12
 
and preventing 
and remains 
and inciting
13
 
and the close (Saleh’s entourage14) 
The Joint
15
 (The Joint Meeting Parties) 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
Table 21 illustrates that the concordances of Saleh appear in contexts of his family, relatives, 
political party, and the Gulf Initiative. In some of the concordance sentences, a nonstandard 
variety of Arabic is used, such as ‘meaning’ or ‘who knows’. The use of a nonstandard variety of 
Arabic only appears in sentences produced by AJ discourse, showing that the channel accords 
less status or importance to Saleh. The overall concordances of Saleh show a negative context in 
which Saleh is stated as with the phrases ‘grants Ali Abdullah Saleh an escape’ and ‘Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s record is full of breaking promises and conventions’. 
                                                 
10
 ةضراعملا 
11
 ةناصحلا 
12
 يلختلا 
13
 ضيرحتلاو 
14
 حلاص ةيشاح 
15
 كرتشملا ءاقللا 
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Saleh mostly collocates with his circle and family. Collocations generally portray Saleh with 
passive roles, including ‘changed’, ‘remains’, ‘preventing’ and ‘inciting’. This result coincides 
with the passive role allocation of the critical discourse analysis, as discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter.  
Similarly, the protesters used a negative representation to depict Saleh, in an attempt to weaken 
his status as the president of Yemen. Tables 23 and 24 present the concordances and collocations 
of ‘Saleh’ that were produced by the software.  
 
Table 23 Concordances of ‘Saleh’ by protesters (233 hits: 0.76%) 
Concordances 
 
1. The departure of Saleh alone is not enough. The regime must also leave. 
2. persuade me that if Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh remains, for example, he will remain for  
3. Al Maliki: Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh is the one who killed the Yemenis. Ahmed Ali 
4. the Yemenis, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and his father are the ones who committed those massacres 
5. Yemen to be a democratic country, Saleh’s departure is not enough; the whole family has to leave as well. 
6. Jamal al Maliki: Of course Ali Abdullah Saleh (knows) that everything is controlled from the palace. 
7. I will give you an example of Ali Abdullah Saleh; when… 
8. the regime, the regime is nothing but Saleh’s family, his entourage, and the national security 
9. the national security that Saleh’s family controls, and the journalists which he is one of. 
10. (Who) killed the Yemenis are Ali Abdullah Saleh, his entourage, and the family for whom brother 
11. until now he is not convinced that Ali Abdullah Saleh is the one who killed those (people). Jamal al Maliki 
12. to assure you that if Ali Abdullah Saleh could do like (al Qadhafi) did 
13. Jamal al Maliki: Ali Abdullah Saleh was unable to do like (al Qadhafi) did. 
14. They foiled Ali Abdullah Saleh’s plans to wage a civil war, and Ali Abdullah 
15. to wage a civil war, and today Ali Abdullah Saleh is incapable of waging any wars  
16. (they are ready) for whatever Ali Abdullah Saleh might do. I don’t want to say 
17. proud of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but there are more than 20 million Yemenis and  
18. (not) at all proud of him, Ali Abdullah Saleh led Yemen to… I will give you some 
19. in what way we are proud of him? Ali Abdullah Saleh … Waseem al Qurashi: This is not true at all. 
20. This is not true at all. Ali Abdullah Saleh… There is only one positive thing … 
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Table 24 Collocations of ‘Saleh’ by protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and his regime 
and an era 
he states 
and we found 
and for other than 
and for Saleh 
and as 
and senior 
and requesting 
and they will prosecute him 
and he will be prosecuted 
and it will blackmail 
and his clique
16
 
and about 
and it goes out 
and the donors 
and the party 
and the entourage 
and giving 
he puts it 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Table 23 reveals that the concordances of ‘Saleh’ by the protesters are characterized by a 
negative context in reference to Saleh and his family, such as listing evidence of the 
unsatisfactory conditions of Yemen during the era of his rule, for example ‘who killed the 
Yemenis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, his circle and the family’. In addition, the results from the 
concordances show that the protestors challenge Saleh through phrases like ‘Saleh is unable to 
start a war today’, in a way that weakens his status. It should be noted that the protesters 
primarily referred to Saleh using his complete name ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh’, without including the 
title of ‘president’ or even ‘Mr’. When referring to his family, only Saleh’s first name is 
commonly used which is derogatory in Arabic.  
Saleh’s most frequent collocation is with the words ‘and his regime’, which indicates that the 
protesters are unhappy with Saleh and his circle. This can even suggest that they desire the 
                                                 
16
 هكسمت 
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resignation of the entire regime. The second highest frequency is ‘and an era’, which also 
suggests the distress or disapproval of the protesters with regards to anything associated to Saleh. 
Other collocations relating to Saleh’s circle are ‘and the party’ and ‘and the entourage’. 
On the other hand, the government demonstrated solidarity with Saleh and defended his position 
as the president who should continue to maintain power. Tables 25 and 26 disclose the 
concordances and collocations of ‘Saleh’ by the government speakers.  
Table 25 Concordances of ‘Saleh’ by government (46 hits: 0.60%) 
Concordances 
 
1. all the people of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh has made great achievements in this country  
2. the steps brother President Ali Abdullah Saleh took to establish democracy for journalists in  
3. only… and that Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, at the Arab region level, is the one that  
4. the one raised by brother Ali Abdullah Saleh does not hang around the doors of embassies  
5. the doors of his masters. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh leads a national institution and defends the homeland,  
6. Sabotage, through terrorism. Ali Abdullah Saleh will not hand over power except to (safe) hands  
7. nobody will be spared. Ali Abdullah Saleh didn’t stretch his hand to… I challenge you…  
8. one document that Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons have plundered a land in Aden, and you  
9. initiative. Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah Saleh will stay as long as the Yemeni people want him to  
10. year 2013. Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah Saleh will stay as long as the Yemeni people  
11. nonsense. Brother President Ali Abdullah Saleh is a father to all the people. Brother Ali  
12. people. If brother Ali Abdullah Saleh wants to take revenge, he will take his revenge on  
13. the country’s leaders. Brother Ali Abdullah Saleh bandaged the country’s wounds and his own wounds, 
and returned  
14. Taiz. Brother Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh will never be a gangster. Yasir al Yamani 
15. national … Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah Saleh still enjoys a broad popularity in  
16. from Sa’ada to al Mahrah. Ali Abdullah Saleh is a symbol for all Yemen’s people. These members  
17. the president. The history of President Ali Abdullah Saleh since he took over power in  
18. How would he hand over power to them? Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power by the hands of the people. 
19. about the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh as an ousted president. I think that 
20. from the sea water. Ali Abdullah Saleh will remain (in power) until 2013, whether they like it or not. 
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Table 26 Collocations of ‘Saleh’ by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency  
 Allah  
will stay  
they hold  
he calls  
and those  
as if 
and his sons  
model  
Muhsin  
bandages  
his guarantees  
symbol  
stop (usually stop bloodshed) 
achieved  
made  
pillars  
Aba (a father, a part of a word)  
when  
will remain  
we will remain 
41 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
The concordances of ‘Saleh’ in the discourse of the government speakers show solidarity with 
him, as seen in the use of the term ‘brother’, which is commonly used to address associates in 
Arabic. The government language also portrays the achievements of Saleh in a positive light, 
such as ‘leads a national institution’ and ‘made great achievements’. These incidences generally 
indicate that the government speakers responded to the protesters by attempting to defend the 
president. Meanwhile, collocations show that the government associates Saleh with future 
certainty, as seen in utterances like ‘will stay’ and ‘and will remain’. The use of present simple 
verbs of action with regards to the regime are also evident, such as ‘he calls’ and ‘they hold’. The 
subject of these action verbs is almost always ‘Saleh’, except for the verb ‘we will remain’. 
In conclusion, the percentage of the concordance hits of Saleh by the three data groups is more or 
less the same (average percentage between 0.60% and 0.96%) indicating that ’Saleh’ is applied 
relatively equally in the discourse of all three groups, despite being used in different ways, for 
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different purposes. While AJ and the protesters both derogated Saleh from power and seemed to 
intend to weaken his status, the government demonstrated solidarity with Saleh and defended 
him.  
 
5.2.2 Yemen 
Yemen was the second keyword that was frequently used by all three of the data groups. In a 
similar way to the use of ‘Saleh’, AJ and protesters seemed to share the intention of opposing the 
government. The most significant finding here is that together AJ and the protesters both used 
language that suggested that they did not accept responsibility in Yemen. Tables 27 and 28 
demonstrate the first 20 concordances and 20 top collocations of ‘Yemen’ by AJ as analysed by 
AntConc.  
Table 27 Concordances of ‘Yemen’ by AJ (205 hits: 0.75%) 
Concordances 
 
1. hold the regime accountable for all Yemen’s tribal, political and social sins? 
2. that it will free Yemen of all its problems. This 
3. remains, not only in Yemen but also in other places. 
4. which is the intelligence and security in Yemen? Faisal al Qassem: Very well. 
5. He told them you destroyed Yemen, you destroyed all  
6. into war between the two halves of Yemen, which ended with his forces winning over 
7. the progress of the political process in Yemen. Which political process? Even 
8. Next power (struggle) in Yemen. Faisal al Qassem: Very well. 
9. entirely. It will not help Yemen in any way because the problem is in 
10. Ali Abdullah Saleh over Yemen. That means 
11. in Libya, Syria and Yemen are youths and (the elderly) will inherit it  
12. Dear (followers), was the of Yemen’s sergeant Ali Abdullah Saleh 
13. with Ahmer. Doesn’t the Yemen’s political and tribal nature require 
14. Dr. Waseem al Qurashi, the Organizing (Committee) of the Youth Revolution in Yemen, and 
15. you, as opposition, in Yemen and outside Yemen, gather  
16. in Yemen and outside Yemen, you gather thousands (of people) to vote 
17. international (statistics) indicate that Yemen is in the lowest ranking in the world? Faisal 
18. Ali Abdullah Saleh would have never come back to Yemen, unless he had 
19. (what) change can it bring about in Yemen? What? Is there 
20. elections or reforms in Yemen whereas the intelligence institution 
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Table 28 Collocations of ‘Yemen’ by AJ  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
 and other 
they suffer 
and deputy 
and structure 
and power 
and future 
and old 
 will help 
and outside it 
and Hussain 
and revolution 
and its retrograde 
and specifically 
and challenges 
and restrain 
and its influence 
and he rules 
and the Yemenis 
and the pregnant 
probabilities 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Table 27 demonstrates that AJ assigned a passivated role for Yemen: direct objects include ‘will 
free Yemen’, ‘destroyed Yemen’, and ‘help Yemen’; genitives are ‘Yemen’s sins’, ‘Yemeni 
nature’, ‘outside Yemen’, ‘Yemen’s sergeant’, and ‘two halves of Yemen’; and prepositional 
phrases, such as ‘over Yemen’ and ‘in Yemen’. No collocations show an active role by AJ 
associated with Yemen, as these are given to other parties, indicating that the channel takes no 
responsibility in escalating the events of the revolution. Examples of such, include ‘will help’, 
‘they suffer’ and ‘and he rules’. Interestingly, Yemen collocates with ‘and outside’ once again 
showing sides or parties other than those of Yemen. Tables 29 and 30 show the top 20 
concordances and collocations of ‘Yemen’ that AntConc produced for the discourse of the 
protesters.  
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Table 29 Concordances of ‘Yemen’ by the Protesters (142 hits: 0.47%) 
Concordances 
 
1. Intellectual )transformation( that will enable the existence of a real education which will create a 
productive society in Yemen. So, Saleh’s departure is not enough 
2. leave. By the way, the ruling party was not actually ruling Yemen. Who was ruling Yemen was a family 
3. (the) ruling party was not actually ruling in Yemen. Who was ruling Yemen was a family and its 
entourage. Moreover, they hired some 
4. for this family. The only guarantee, brother Faisal, for Yemen to be transformed into a democratic 
country is not Saleh’s departure 
5. Brother, part of the Gulf Initiative aimed to solve the world’s problem in Yemen, and not Yemen’s 
problem, and I am 
6. to solve the world’s problem in Yemen, and not Yemen’s problem, and I am not totally against the 
Initiative 
7. solution without (including) these dictators will undoubtedly be good for Yemen. We don’t want to say 
that the only solution 
8. represented by the state of the national security and the military security that run Yemen. Perhaps 
everybody wondered, when (the whole state) moved  
9. to Saudi Arabia, why did the regime remain? That is because what runs Yemen is not institutions, dear 
brother. According 
10. and not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Do you know how shameful it is that the oil minister in 
Yemen doesn’t know how much 
11. is not…We don’t claim that the Gulf Initiative is the historical document that will solve all Yemen’s 
problems. Firstly, I can’t 
12. … simply is that the existence of protesters who were able to lead Yemen to this critical historical stage 
13. …that we are in now. Those (protesters) are the only guarantee for the transformation of Yemen into a 
democratic country. I can’t say 
14. the public squares. Without the public squares, we will never be reassured about Yemen. Jamal al 
Maliki: Do you know how many 
15. to worry because we lost many lives. For the sake of those lives, Yemen deserve to lead a decent life, 
away from depending on foreign powers. 
16. (This country is) more civilized than its tribal sheikhs. Jamal al Maliki: The tribes in Yemen proved that 
they are more civilized than 
17. the regime that misrepresented Yemen as a group of fighting tribes. But those tribes proved  
18. more mature…They (tribes) did not carry weapons but to defend themselves. Yemen youths were able 
to prove…That’s why we talk 
19. (I lived) faithfully with those sacrificing youths without deceiving them. Dear brother, the youths and the 
tribes of Yemen are more civilized than this regime. 
20. without deceiving them. Dear brother, the youths and the tribes of Yemen are more civilized than this 
regime. It shouldn’t be… 
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Table 30 Collocations of ‘Yemen’ by the Protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
 and outside 
alone 
and tribes 
they lead 
they accuse 
and for more 
and perhaps 
and she will give birth 
and they ruled 
and it seeks 
and the Kingdom 
and allowing 
and the coronation 
and we cut short 
his departure 
salary 
in need 
for a Yemen 
for the observer 
for transferring 
 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
According to table 29, Yemen is mostly allocated to a passivated role, which are: direct object 
‘will solve all Yemen’s problems’, and ‘that runs Yemen’; prepositional phrases, like ‘in Yemen’ 
and ‘to Yemen’; and genitive ‘Yemen tribes’, ‘Yemen’s youth’, ‘transition of Yemen’ and ‘the 
Yemeni youth’. However, two indications of activated roles appear with the concordances: ‘for 
Yemen to transform’ and ‘Yemen deserves to live’. Through the allocation of a passivated role, 
the protesters effectively avoid censorship of the actions and reactions occurring in Yemen. The 
three top collocations in the analysis of Yemen are ‘and tribes’, ‘alone’ and ‘and outside’, in 
order to describe political sides in Yemen. 
In contrast, the government employed the word Yemen by associating itself with a promising 
future for the country. Tables 31 and 32 show the computer analysis of the word ‘Yemen’ with 
respect to the government’s language.  
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Table 31 Concordances of ‘Yemen’ by the Government (77 hits: 1.01%) 
Concordances 
 
1. and a Yemeni symbol that all the people of Yemen are proud of. Ali Abdullah Saleh made achievements 
2. in establishing democracy for journalists in Yemen? Dear brother, we don’t need to 
3. The brother President whom the people of Yemen from all over the country praise… We don’t 
4. (after it committed all these) crimes, allowed  the blood of the people of Yemen to be shed, it allowed… 
Yasir al Yamani 
5. We don’t act hypocritically, it shed the blood of the people of Yemen, allowed attacking the camps and  
6. (I tell) you, not only me, but also all the people of Yemen, that the brother President actually still enjoys  
7. still enjoys a broad popularity and he will lead Yemen to a safe side. He is the only man  
8. Yasir al Yamani: Dear brother, we are in Yemen, You should know very well that the country… 
9. (he) ordered the protection of the protestors in Yemen. Yasir al Yamani: But who is 
10. in this country not only Yemen is accused of terrorism.. And the people of Yemen are greater than to be 
11. not only Yemen is accused of terrorism. And the people of Yemen are greater than to be called beggars. 
The people 
12. greater than to be called beggars. The people of Yemen are great despite all the poverty they are enduring 
13. (we feel proud) of being Yemenis. Today in Yemen and for 9 months they have been blocking roads 
14. for Al Jazeera channel..Yasir al Yamani: The people of Yemen… Yasir al Yamani: The people of Yemen. 
Excuse me, 
15. al Yamani: The people of Yemen. Yasir al Yamani: The people of Yemen… Excuse me, I want to add 
something… brother Waseem 
16. We want youths who seek change in Yemen, who seek reform in Yemen, we want youths… 
17. …change in Yemen, who seek reform in Yemen, we want youths… When you talk about the revolution,  
18. the country’s reforms. The revolution happening today in Yemen has destroyed everything, destroyed 
everything… 
19. everything, destroyed everything in Yemen. When will they build Yemen? Don’t you see what 
20. everything in Yemen. When will they build Yemen? Don’t you see what is happening in Libya? Is 
 
Table 32 Collocations of ‘Yemen’ by the Government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
 and for transferring 
by its economy 
great people 
he rules 
they make 
and he will lead 
unite 
and Yemen 
and the chaos 
and stability 
is guaranteed 
is confirmed 
for a factor 
in favour of 
as a bomb 
its length 
evils 
will go 
they will build 
will support 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Table 31 shows that the government concordances of Yemen give the country a passivated role: 
including the genitive ‘people of Yemen’; prepositional phrase ‘in Yemen’; and object, ‘and he 
will lead’ and ‘they will build’. In addition, the table shows that Yemen is used in the sense of 
referring both to the country or people who geographically reside in Yemen. With regards to 
collocations, Yemen connects with positive future verbs like ‘and he will lead’, ‘they will build’, 
‘will support’ and ‘will go’, all of which are used to create the implication that the government 
intends to lead the whole country into a better future. The collocated verb ‘united’ indicates that 
not following the government may break Yemen into pieces, in mental, emotional, and 
geographical senses. 
In summary, the concordance percentage for Yemen is high among the government speakers, but 
low among the protesters which is of rhetorical tactics. One interpretation of this is that the 
government seeks to convince the people of Yemen, as well as their Gulf neighbours, that 
official leaders of the country are able to bring stability for the country and wider region. In 
contrast, both AJ and the protesters used Yemen in a way that showed they sought to avoid 
censorship of events in Yemen.  
5.2.3 President  
President was the notion shared by AJ and the government. As might be expected, the overall 
intended aims of using the president were similar to those related to the use of Saleh. AJ 
particularly relied upon the notion of ‘president’ to derogate Saleh from his power. The 
following tables show the concordances and collocations of ‘president’ by AJ.  
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Table 33 Concordances of ‘president’ by AJ (153 hits: 0.56%) 
Concordances 
1. accepting the president’s stepping aside while leaving his entourage in the army, a hideous mistake? 
2. the protesters achieved something great by barring the president from seizing power? Isn’t... 
3. (They tricked) them. They ousted the president and let them think that by ousting the president, they should 
have solved the problem, but 
4. agreement and revolt against the legitimacy of the UN appointed president, even 
5. crumbs. Faisal al Qassem: The vice president … Faisal al Qassem: Nice. 
6. to you the same story. This president, this leader or 
7. to my question about the popularity of the president; about this president 
8. the president, about this president. Faisal al Qassem: Go ahead. 
9. that you say that Mr. President still enjoys a broad popularity 
10. says brother, this president became physically deformed and no 
11. The public squares fight and reject the president. Those people are agents of foreign parties and they are  
12. during the bombing of president Ali Abdullah Saleh’ troops 
13. the protesters, while the vice president, in charge of running the state, sought 
14. to lift the immunity of President Saleh and those close to him, … were lost 
15. Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi directed them this time  
16. Al Yamani: So, does President Ali Abdullah Saleh seek 
17. opposition and the Yemeni authorities led by the President. Ali Abdullah Saleh 
18. putting the initiative into effect, so the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh 
19. The Gulf Initiative and if president Saleh’s stepping aside and authorizing (somebody else to assume)  
20. No way, the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah returns  
 
Table 34 Collocations of ‘president’ by AJ  
 Collocations  
Word Frequency 
 he gives 
it fortifies  
it precedes it 
and he runs it 
and we want 
 and his assistants 
and his forces 
and leaving 
and that 
and those around 
and the way 
size 
for seeing  
for holding responsible 
for possibility 
for removing 
for younger 
sibling 
motivations 
opponents
17
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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 نيضراعم 
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This analysis demonstrates that AJ used ‘president’ to refer to Saleh, addressing the ‘president’ 
by the title ‘Mr’, ‘this’, or nothing. These styles of address semantically derogate Saleh from his 
power and status. In a few concordances, ‘president’ is followed by Saleh’s full name ‘Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’ which shows respect in Arabic. 
Collocations of ‘president’ denote actors other than Saleh, including ‘and his assistants’, ‘and his 
forces’, ‘and that’, ‘and those around’, ‘for younger’, ‘sibling’, and ‘opponents’. The active roles 
of the president are indicated in a few collocations, as with ‘he gives’, ‘it fortifies ’, ‘it precedes 
it’, and ‘and he runs it’. The collocation ‘for removing’ indicates a negative connotation, 
suggesting a lack of neutrality with regards to the way in which AJ addresses Saleh, as more 
neutral nominal nouns could have been used in Arabic, like ‘replacing’ or ‘replacing him with 
another president’. 
From the opposite perspective, the government used ‘president’ in a positive context, 
demonstrating solidarity with Saleh and representing him as with power and control. Tables 35 
and 36 present the computer analysis of ‘president’ by the government speakers.  
Table 35 Concordances of ‘president’ by the government (103 hits: 1.34%) 
Concordances 
 
1. I tell you, not as you labelled the president. The brother president is not a such sergeant, you know 
2. as you labelled the brother president. The brother president is not such sergeant, you know who are 
3. who are the sergeants in this area. The brother president is a leader and a Yemeni symbol about whom all 
(the people of Yemen) are proud  
4. the Syrian regime didn’t follow the steps of the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh in providing 
5. to an acknowledgment from Al Jazeera channel to the brother president. The brother president, whom the 
people (of Yemen) acknowledge 
6. from Al Jazeera channel to the brother president. The brother president whom the people of Yemen 
acknowledge 
7. I am only… All the people of Yemen… The brother president actually still enjoys a broad popularity 
8. the millions who still support the brother president and who will continue to support him 
9. president and who will continue to support the brother president and the constitutional legitimacy. We are 
with 
10. today one million citizens are demanding the departure of the brother president. However, the Yemeni 
people are 25 million Yemenis 
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11. Yemeni people consist of 25 million Yemenis who support the brother president. We don’t overlook the 
other party. There 
12. more than 5 million demonstrators reiterate their support for the brother president every Friday. Yasir al 
Yamani: You 
13. kill you… Yasir al Yamani: The brother president acknowledged the role of the youth. Yasir al Yamani: 
14. nobody is allowed to protest. The brother president ordered the protection of the protestors and the 
demonstrators 
15. We are with the youth, with the change. The brother president called on the youth to form a political bloc 
16. the people and they are confident of themselves. The brother president deputized vice-president, gave 
him an authority  
17. of themselves. The brother president deputized the vice-president, giving him the authority  
18. please. Yasir al Yamani: Without insulting the brother president; we don’t allow dwarfs to insult his 
person  
19. (we) don’t allow dwarfs to insult his person. The brother president is a national symbol. Rather, we 
should criticise each other 
20. The Yemeni people still support the brother president. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of the people 
and insults 
 
Table 36 Collocations of ‘president’ by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
deputy 
fortified 
he leaves 
he takes them out 
he abandons 
and he accuses 
and he threatened 
and about 
and he will work 
and he will continue 
and legitimacy
18
 
and he gave him 
symbol 
situation 
alone 
for lieutenant general 
authorized 
sovereignty 
leader 
talk 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Concordances of ‘president’ in the language used by the government demonstrate that ‘president’ 
refers to Saleh and is preceded by ‘brother’, which expresses respect and solidarity with him. In 
addition, concordances indicate an active role for the president, with terms that include ‘the 
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brother president ordered the protection of the protestors’, ‘the brother president is a leader’, ‘the 
brother president actually still enjoys’, and ‘the brother president acknowledged the role of the 
youth’. In fact, the data show that Saleh is mentioned in positive contexts, even when he is 
accorded a grammatically passive role, as with ‘support the brother president’ or ‘the brother 
president whom the people of Yemen acknowledge’. Concordances also show defence of Saleh, 
with comments to accusers like ‘without insulting the brother president’ and ‘the brother 
president is not such a sergeant’. 
One of the two top collocations of Saleh is ‘fortified’, indicating a degree of support and 
confidence that he is the best choice for Yemen and that he should remain in power for a longer 
period, without trial. Collocations are either active verbs carried out by Saleh, like ‘he leaves’, ‘it 
takes them out’, ‘he abandons’, ‘and he accuses’, ‘and he will work’, and ‘and he will continue’; 
or adjectives that claim he is a great president, such as ‘alone (the only)’, ‘fortified’, ‘for 
lieutenant general’, ‘authorized’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘leader’. These collocations emphasise the 
government’s position that Saleh is best for Yemen and that he should continue as leader. 
Overall, the incidents in which the word ‘president’ was used by the government (103 hits, 
1.34%) is three times higher than its usage by AJ (153 hits: 0.56%), providing power and control 
by the government to Saleh. While AJ derogated Saleh from the presidency, the government 
associated him with a positive context, suggesting that he is the best option as Yemen’s 
president.  
5.2.4 Revolution  
Revolution was a notion shared by AJ and the protesters. It was expected that the use of this 
notion among the protestors would be positive. The most notable finding here is that while AJ 
used the revolution with neutral connotations, it associated the revolution with the young people 
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in Yemen which showed AJ’s support to the young people protesting in Yemen. Tables 37 and 
38 present the concordances and collocations for the notion of ‘revolution’, with their frequency 
of use by AJ.  
Table 37 Concordances of ‘revolution’ by AJ (142 hits: 0.52%) 
Concordances 
 
1. Don’t the revolution’s youth have the right to stay in the squares? 
2. Isn’t it wrong to end the Yemeni revolution in the … way 
3. Why don’t the revolution’s youth follow the wise proverb saying, “what 
4. social and economic al deterioration because of the revolution. Shouldn’t they now 
5. the Gulf (Initiative) is an attempt to get around the Yemeni revolution? 86.6 yes, 13.4 
6. we see and call for a continuation of the revolution and staying in the streets 
7. everyone is now a winner in the Yemeni revolution. Accept this initiative. Faisal: 
8. his speech to the protesters or to the revolution’s youth, he told them you destroyed 
9. deviated from the topic. The revolution’s youth and their insistence on prosecuting Saleh 
10. You say that the revolution’s youth, especially you, are [upset] 
11. the revolution, especially you as the revolution’s youth, are very upset 
12. This initiative excluded the revolution’s youth who stood in the sun 
13. Praised too much this revolution, that should continue 
14. it means that you as the revolution’s youth are …, do you deny it? 
15. to expire after the blessed Yemeni revolution, why 
16. What can the Yemeni revolution change except replacing 
17. I ask you, let me speak about us, the Yemeni revolution… as long as... OK 
18. ceven if the Yemeni revolution succeeded and removed this regime 
19. can this revolution achieves? What can it change? 
20. Who are you deceiving? The revolution and the family army… Faisal al Qasem 
 
Table 38 Collocations of ‘revolution’ by AJ  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
for youth 
and it came 
and it directed 
and continuing 
and future 
and its supporters
19
 
and for youth 
and it did 
and insults 
and peacefulness 
and revolution 
and the movement
20
 
and staying 
and their insistence 
6 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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it succeeded 
curvy 
upset 
it granted
21
 
disavowals 
for success 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
AJ accords more passivated than activated roles to ‘the revolution’. The three activated roles 
given are ‘what can it (the revolution) change?’, ‘(what) can this revolution achieves?’, and 
‘praised too much this revolution, that should continue’. Meanwhile, examples of the passivated 
role of ‘the revolution’ include ‘as the revolution’s youth’, ‘after the blessed Yemeni revolution’, 
‘the revolution’s youth’, ‘get around the Yemeni revolution’ and ‘end the Yemeni revolution’. 
The overall context in which AJ discusses ‘the revolution’ is neutral and is sometimes used in 
asking questions. As with the concordances, collocations of ‘the revolution’ are mainly passive, 
using ‘the revolution’ in genitive clauses. The most frequent collocation is ‘for youth’, in a way 
that AJ associates ‘the revolution’ very closely with young people. There are other collocations 
that connect ‘the revolution’ to young people, such as ‘upset’ or ‘their insistence’. Interestingly, 
‘the movement’, which is a more neutral synonym of ‘the revolution’, also collocates with the 
revolution.  
The protesters used the revolution in a positive context, demonstrating their support and demand 
for the movement. Tables 39 and 40 present the computer analysis of the ‘revolution’ in the 
discourse of the protesters.  
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Table 39 Concordances of ‘revolution’ by the protesters (170 hits: 0.56%) 
Concordances 
 
1. regime. Jamal al Maliki: Who… The Yemeni revolution didn’t lead Yemenis to 
2. that 50% are below poverty line. The revolution only exposed the snake and made it come out 
3. of its hole. The revolution was absolutely not the reason behind poverty that 
4. We are in front of the one who will guarantee … for Yemen. The revolution will establish a sound 
education system, 
5. The revolution will establish sound education system. The revolution, in its depth, is a social 
transformation 
6. departure of all who incited oppression during the revolution. It is not a personal issue 
7. The only guarantee to achieve the revolution goals and to transform Yemen into 
8. into a democratic Yemen is the revolution youths and their protests in the public squares. This 
9. the journalists who appeared during the revolution inciting the regime to kill those youths are part 
10. that to be controlled by anyone. The Yemeni revolution is, in fact 
11. intellectual, social… Jamal al Maliki: The revolution is a continuous action and this is an account  
12. and this is a superficial account of what happened. In fact, the revolution has already achieved something 
13. As for me, I took to the streets with the revolution youths because I, as a Yemeni a youth, 
14. Arab. The army that supports the revolution was the one that fights al Qaeda 
15. now all the South Yemen’s leaders are with the revolution against Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
16. It is the national army that supports the revolution now, whereas those who took his side 
17. Yemeni … I say on behalf of the revolution youths that we took to the streets revolting, first 
18. I took to the streets with the revolution’s youth because, as a Yemeni a youth, I saw that my country we 
being destroyed, I saw 
19. First, in the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate, the national Yemeni youth 
revolution 
20. Taiz’s massacre and holocaust, the revolution field’s massacre and Asr’s massacre. All these 
 
Table 40 Collocations of ‘revolution’ by the protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and youth 
supports 
and against 
it hinders 
they are unfair to 
and they set off 
and an event 
and mountain 
and its conspiracy with the regime 
and it is considered 
And our leaving  
and their staying 
and with peaceful 
and 
and the issue 
and policy 
and the Republic 
and the transition 
and the goals 
and completing 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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The overall context in which ‘the revolution’ is used by the protesters is positive, demonstrating 
that they are with the revolution. The protesters gave both active and passive roles to ‘the 
revolution’. Examples of the activated role are ‘the Yemeni revolution didn’t lead Yemenis to’, 
‘the revolution only exposed the snake and made it come out’, ‘the revolution will establish a 
sound education system’, ‘the revolution, in its depth, is a social transformation’, and ‘the 
revolution has already achieved something’. In contrast, the passivated roles involve: the use of 
‘the revolution’ as the object, as in ‘the army that supports the revolution’: as genitive, such as 
‘the revolution youths’, ‘the revolution goals’, and ‘the revolution fields’; and prepositional 
phrases, as with ‘during the revolution’ and ‘with the revolution’. Both of the roles given to ‘the 
revolution’ illustrate that the protesters support and even encourage this social and political 
uprising. ‘The revolution’ collocates with words that relate to the social actors, although these 
are mainly young people and the protesters themselves. These social actors support the 
revolution as ‘and youths’ and ‘supports’ are the top frequent collocations here.  
In summary, AJ and protesters shared a high frequency usage of the word ‘revolution’. The 
overall use of this notion among the protestors was with a positive connotation, unlike AJ, which 
primarily used the revolution as a point with which to ask questions. Nevertheless, AJ also 
associated the revolution with young people in Yemen, demonstrating a perception of optimism 
and power with regards to the revolution.  
5.2.5 People of Yemen 
The government and protesters used the ‘people of Yemen’ in order to achieve their ideological 
intentions related to the revolution. The results of the statistical analysis coincide with those of 
CDA in this area. A key finding in this particular area is that the protesters considered the people 
of Yemen as part of their group, seeming to speak on their behalf. In addition, the protesters 
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portrayed the Yemeni people as victims and sacrifices. Tables 41 and 42 show the concordances 
and collocations of the ‘people of Yemen’ by the protesters.  
Table 41 Concordances of ‘people of Yemen’ by the Protesters (111 hits: 0.36%) 
Concordances 
 
1. Yemenis to poverty. What brought the Yemeni people into such state of poverty is this 
2. Faisal: This regime caused 50% of the Yemeni people to live under the poverty line. 
3. is the Gulf Initiative only. The Yemeni people are patient and  
4. other (things), that we have to address the Yemeni people. The idea of frightening them 
5. that the real power should be in the hands of the people of Yemen and not a certain family 
6. from these faces that the Yemeni people are bored of. Jamal al Maliki 
7. to do what al Qathafi did. The Yemeni people stood against him, part of (the army) stood 
8. a civil war may start as they frighten us. The Yemeni people are ready for all likely scenario 
9. .. Jamal al Maliki: Haven’t the Yemeni people proven that they are more 
10. now that the community and the people have become the real strategic actor 
11. no one of those killers. The Yemeni people, with their dignity, will not accept that 
12. Certainly. Yasir al Yamani says that the Yemeni people are proud of Ali Abdullah 
13. you can’t talk about the Yemeni people. Waseem al Qarashi: He 
14. My country is being destroyed. I stress that the Yemeni people are truly great and noble. 
15. after him, if he does not submit to the people’s ambitions. Waseem al Qarashi: Notice that 
16. it (does not) mean youths only because the interest of the people is shared by all their categories and all 
17. honest in implementing this agreement. The Yemeni people are known for their tolerance 
18. Yemeni (people) are known for their tolerance. Yet the Yemeni people pay the price for what they  
19. the Yemeni people (pay) the price for what they have done, namely to get its freedom 
20. you say you will step aside from power. The Yemeni people know that this man 
 
Table 42 Collocations of ‘people of Yemen’ by the Protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and he despairs 
seeks it 
and its types 
got 
gets bored 
he breaks 
he decides 
he surprises 
they provoke 
he is satisfied 
they bribe 
the scare us 
and they bear 
and he will bear 
he got bored 
interests 
confrontation 
to be led 
for ambitions 
to get rid 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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The role given to the people by the protesters is mostly active, as can be seen in ‘the Yemeni 
people are patient’, ‘these faces that the whole Yemeni people are bored of’, ‘The Yemeni 
people stood’, ‘the Yemeni people are proud’, ‘The Yemeni people are ready’, ‘The Yemeni 
people will not accept’, ‘The Yemeni people are known for their tolerance’, ‘the Yemeni people 
pay’, and ‘The Yemeni people know’. There are a number of different connotations for these 
active roles, such as implying that the people are sacrifices and victims. Among the three top 
collocations in the analysis are the action verbs conducted by the people: ‘and he despairs’ ,
‘seeks it’ and ‘and they bear’, which creates the implication that the protesters are supported by 
the people and that the people undertake the responsibility for their actions, effectively making it 
seem as though the protesters speak on behalf of the people. Interestingly, the verb ‘and they 
bear’ collocates in the present and future tenses, in reference to the idea that the people are strong 
and will not back down.  
Unlike the protesters, the government used the people of Yemen as a synonym for the country, 
although the officials also claimed the support of the population. Tables 43 and 44 provide the 
software analysis of the usage of the notion of ‘people of Yemen’ by the government.  
Table 43 Concordances of ‘people of Yemen’ by the government (120 hits: 1.57%) 
Concordances 
 
1. power peacefully within the limits of the constitution and within the hands of the people. They speak on 
behalf of the people of the people, if they want 
2. within the hands of the people. They speak on behalf of the people, if they want while speaking on behalf 
of the people  
3. the people, if they want while speaking on behalf of the people. If they wanted to rise to power, why they 
shouldn’t come to it? 
4. Polling as long as they trust the people, speak on behalf of them. Who gave them the right to speak on 
behalf of the people? 
5. on behalf of the people. Who gave them the right to speak on behalf of the people? The people of the 
Yemeni people are not a million as (Al Jazeera channel) mentions 
6. Who gave them the right to speak on behalf of the people? The Yemeni people are not a million as (Al 
Jazeera) channel mentions 
7. a million today are demanding the departure of the brother president. 25 million of the Yemeni people 
support the president.  
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8. (let them) make it reach the street, if they speak on behalf of the people and they are confident. The 
brother president 
9. Let me tell you, we want a voting by the hands of the Yemeni people and not through Al Jazeera channel. 
10. Even zakkat which they give to the citizens is looted without the Yemeni people benefiting from it. The 
great Yemeni people don’t need it 
11. which they give to the citizens is looted without the Yemeni people benefiting from it. The great Yemeni 
people don’t need someone to 
12. The great Yemeni people don’t need someone to beg in their name. The Yemeni people are greater than 
you bet on. If you 
13. than you bet on. If you bet on the Yemeni people, come to the elections, come. 
14. I feel sorry that brother Waseem talks of the Yemeni people, saying that they go out because they are 
paid. The people 
15. the Yemeni people, saying that they go out because they are paid. The Yemeni people are greater than to 
be belittled by  
16. Yemeni (people) are greater than to be insulted by one of the Yemeni people. The vast majority of the 
Yemeni people 
17. one of the Yemeni people. The vast majority of the Yemeni people still support the brother president. 
Brother, 
18. support the brother president. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of the people and at the same time 
insults them by saying that they are hired 
19. the brother president. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of the people and insults the people of being 
hired and that they go out because they are paid. 
20. that they are hired and that they go out because they are paid. How can he speak on behalf of the people, 
go away! Go away! The people want you to 
 
Table 44 Collocations of ‘people of Yemen’ by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and he insults 
they fought 
he accepts it 
it means 
ask/consult 
he wants you 
and he specifies 
and we respect 
and across 
and we remained 
(part of word) 
and they wanted 
suffering 
for the country 
abilities 
it suffered 
resistance 
it will make them reach 
they will hold 
made 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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The table above shows that the government accords a passivated role to the people of Yemen. 
They also suggest that the people are being used by different factions for various purposes, using 
language like ‘speaks on behalf of the people’, ‘bet on the Yemeni people’, and ‘they speak on 
behalf of the people’. Additionally, people are given a patriotic role showing them as supporting 
and being with the regime, such as with the phrases like ‘the Yemeni people are not a million’, 
‘speaks on behalf of the people’, ‘bet on the Yemeni people’, and ‘they speak on behalf of the 
people’. The government uses words to suggest that it represents and supports the people, such 
as ‘how can he speak on behalf of the people, go away! Go away! The people want you to’. The 
most frequent collocations ‘and he insults’ and ‘they fought’ indicate that the government uses 
the populace in fighting and creating doubt about the protesters. 
Overall, both political groups used the people as a broad synonym to Yemen, although this was 
low among the protesters (.36%), but very high with the government (1.57%). This indicates that 
the government has a greater intention to use the people of Yemen for the pursuit of its intended 
aims related to the revolution. These uses include showing the media that the people support the 
government and are therefore against the revolution, perhaps increase local or international 
support for the government, or diverting it away from the protests.  
5.2.6 We 
Among the top keywords of the government and protesters was ‘we’. Analysis of its use gives a 
better understanding of the concept of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as an ideological linguistic notion. Data 
show that the government used ‘we’ in reference to the Yemeni government or the regime, when 
responding to the claims of the protesters, when defending its case, and when attempting to 
convince the world of its case. Tables 45 and 46 provide the computer analysis of ‘we’ by the 
government. 
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Table 45 Concordances of ‘we’ by the government (68 hits: 0.89%) 
Concordances 
 
1. democracy for journalists in Yemen. Dear brother, we don’t need an testimony from a channel 
2. the people of Yemen, from east to west. We don’t deny that there is a revolution, but 
3. to the brother president and the constitutional legitimacy. We are with the peaceful transition of power, 
with transferring 
4. 25 million Yemenis who support the brother president. We don’t overlook the other party. There are some 
5. who killed them. Yasir al Yamani: Dear brother, we are in Yemen, you should know very well 
6. the country, listen to me. Yasir al Yamani: We don’t kill them, we have still been protecting the protestors 
for 8 month  
7. listen to me. We don’t kill them, we have been protecting the protestors for 8 to 9 months  
8. bloods of those innocent, deceived youth. We are with the youth and change, but 
9. but who will benefit from this bloodshed? We, in power, are not benefiting. Who benefits? 
10. to power through these innocent bloods. We are with the youths and the change. The brother president 
11. upon implementing the Initiative. Yasir al Yamani: We… don’t interrupt me, brother Waseem. I 
12. brother Waseem. I didn’t interrupt you. We don’t need, despite our confidence in the voting 
13. the voting that was in our favour and the regime’s as well. We don’t need… Yasir al Yamani: one 
moment, 
14. He is the one who votes. Let me tell you, we want voting through the hands of the Yemeni people 
15. and not through Al Jazeera channel. Yasir al Yamani: We want to go to the polling, we are ready 
16. Yasir Al Yamani: We want to hold a ballot; we are ready to hand the Supreme Committee 
17. a homeland which you want to divide. Yasir al Yamani: We don’t beg. You know better who begs 
18. what they suffer, but they are great people. We are proud of Yemen and we are proud of being Yemenis. 
19. We are proud of Yemen and we are proud of being Yemenis. 
20. to the elections, as the brother president called for. We are ready to join …from the first 
 
Table 46 Collocations of ‘we’ by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
we say 
we want 
we are not 
Yemenis 
he manipulates
22
 
clear 
we kill them 
we are proud of 
we see 
we realise 
for the boxes 
two minutes 
it leads us 
with our will 
the battles 
exploiters 
the neighbours 
Al Anfi (name) 
its farthest 
we acknowledge 
6 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Table 45 demonstrates that the government’s concordances with ‘we’, referring to the Yemeni 
government or regime, exhibit the use of action verbs, but at a lower frequency than the 
protesters. The government states that it is not against the demands of young people in Yemen, in 
an attempt to provide a response to the claims of the protesters. It also focuses on giving 
justifications for retaining power. The action verb ‘we say’ collocates most with ‘we’, 
differentiating the government (us) from the protesters (them), while showing confidence in what 
they think or declare. The second top collocation is ‘we want’, which seems to be enable 
convincing arguments to be proposed to the world about the importance of the officials 
continuing to hold power in Yemen.  
The protesters used ‘we’ differently, instead applying it in reference to the parties to which they 
belong. They used the present verb tense to present the demands of the revolution and the past 
verb tense to discuss their fulfilled actions. Tables 47 and 48 show the computer analysis of ‘we’ 
by the protesters.  
Table 47 Concordances of we by the protesters (124 hits: 0.41%) 
Concordances 
 
1. can’t he prove… thus, we are in front of the one who will guarantee the revolution for Yemen 
2. to enable for an active society in Yemen. So we… Ali Abdullah’s departure is not enough 
3. repeatedly defending this regime. Thus, we are in front of a dictatorial regime that must be 
4. Jamal al Maliki: I will tell you why we are scared; first, we are frightened of the remnants 
5. about it while it was officially approved by the ministry, so we live in a country that has been run by a 
gang inside 
6. a gang inside the Republican Palace. We fear this gang that still 
7. Should be ended and disappear forever. We’ll keep searching… It is true that there is a price. The price 
8. for the critical historical period in which we live. Those (people) are the only guarantee 
9. basis. This is all what we understand, so we want the coming government to face 
10. The Gulf Initiative. What kind of security are we talking about? We have to worry because we sacrificed 
11. now it has free and noble (people). Now, we demand a family to be specific 
12. Waseem al Qarash: In what way can we recruit … We don’t have money to spend on recruiting (fighters) 
13. them. This happens every time. We take to the streets peacefully for every rally and we will always be 
14. the losers run the country. That is why we took to the streets. We… when… now 
15. the country. That is why we took to the streets. We… when… Now what are our demands? 
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16. when… now what are our demands? We demand the departure of a regime that has been arguing, and 
17. Abdullah Saleh... Waseem al Qarashi: We, as youth, went out to the public squares and we wanted 
18. the country. One of our demands is prosecuting… we demand prosecuting Ali Abdullah Saleh 
19. prosecution, with no exceptions. We demanded prosecution with no exceptions 
20. about their project. And what is their project? We talk about youth… Waseem al Qarash 
 
Table 48 Collocations of ‘we’ by the protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
we demand 
we search 
and completed 
and we were committed 
and we announced it 
we strive 
we call 
we pass 
we appreciate 
we fight 
we take control of 
we free 
we are afraid 
we greet 
we try 
we recruit (people) 
we communicate 
together 
continuing 
used to 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
Based on Table 47, ‘we’ concordances used by the protesters indicate an active agent role to the 
speaker, with the majority of instances of ‘we’ being followed by an active verb, like ‘fear’, 
‘keep search’, ‘want’, ‘took to the streets’, ‘demand’, ‘demanded’, and ‘talk’. Use of these active 
verbs in the past denotes an action achieved by the speaker, while those in the present refer to the 
continuous, ongoing demands of the revolution. In all cases, although ‘we’ is used by a single 
speaker, it refers to the group or party to which that speaker belongs. As with the concordances, 
collocations present an active agent role of the protesters, using the pronoun ‘we’ with action 
verbs. Most frequent verbs in this context are ‘we demand’ and ‘we search’, both of which are in 
the present tense to display the requests of the revolution. 
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To conclude, both the government and protesters employed ‘we’ as a linguistic vehicle with the 
aim of achieving their intended ideological purposes. When using ‘we’, the government 
responded to the protesters, defended its case, and sought to convince the world regarding its 
case and intentions. In contrast, the protesters used ‘we’ to list the demands of their revolution 
and to refer to completed past actions of their movement.  
5.2.7 I 
As in the use of ‘we’, ‘I’ was employed by the government and protesters to achieve their 
ideological aims. The most interesting finding in this analysis is that while the government used 
‘I’ as a conversation strategy, the protesters used it to justify the revolution and even to show 
control. In tables 49 and 50, the computer analysis of ‘I’ by the government is provided.  
Table 49 Concordances of ‘I’ by the government (42 hits: 0.55%) 
Concordances 
 
1. the opposition is suitable for replacing the regime. I tell you, not only me, but also all 
2. replacing the regime. I tell you, not only me, but also all the people of Yemen. The brother president 
3. don’t want any good for Yemen. Yasiral Yamani: I am not talking about brother Waseem. Yasir 
4. : We… don’t interrupt me, brother Waseem. I didn’t interrupt you. We don’t need, despite 
5. : Al Jazeera, if it was in another regime, I am sure that Ahmed al Shalby would provide a daily coverage. 
6. international media are there. Yasir al Yamani: I am proud to be from this regime 
7. they protect you. Yasir al Yamani: Brother Faisal, I don’t allow you, with respect to (Al Jazeera) changed 
8. (they) get their monthly salaries while they are demonstrating. But I feel sorry that brother Waseem talks 
9. the south. Yasir al Yamani: No, please let me finish, I haven’t finished my turn to talk. Yasir al Yamani: 
You 
10. Abdullah Saleh did not extend a hand to…, I challenge you to bring one document that 
11. they will continue to support the brother president. Yasir al Yamani: I gave you an example, brother 
Faisal, I 
12. : I gave you an example, brother Faisal, I told you, if the international community respects 
13. there is no objection. These are symbolic leaders. I didn’t interrupt you, listen. They are symbolic units 
14. not as he depicts it. Yasir al Yamani: I will give you an example, did you see at the level 
15. Yemen. When will things be fixed up inYemen? Yasir al Yamani: I hope, as you criticise the brother 
president, that 
16. Dear (sister), stop putting words in my mouth. I said these members, these leaders and these 
17. Abdullah Saleh as an ousted president. I think sister Tawakul knows  
18. traditionally speaking it is known for whom, but I insist that the president doesn’t manipulate, 
19. reaching through the Yemeni people. Yasir al Yamani: First, I thank you, sister Fairouz, for exposing 
20. finish Ms. Fairouz. Yasir al Yamani: Yes, I tell you, after that, … was formed 
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Table 50 Collocations of ‘I’ by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
I say 
I would like 
one 
I said 
I wish 
ousted 
sure of 
for the regime 
I was 
escaped narrowly 
I wonder 
I own 
I said 
I am proud of 
I give you 
I gave you 
I am sorry 
I challenge you 
I am sorry 
dirty 
7 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
In Arabic, ‘I’ is used as a subject pronoun for a singular speaker of either gender. Based on the 
above concordances, the use of ‘I’ by the one government speaker refers to himself only and is 
employed for a range of purposes, including: interruption, as in ‘I am not talking about brother 
Waseem’; holding the floor ‘please let me finish, I haven’t finished my turn to talk’; attacking 
the other speaker, as in ‘I don’t allow you’; illustrating, as in ‘I gave you an example'; and stating 
wishes, as can be seen in ‘I hope’. Collocations indicate the government use of ‘I say’ with ‘I’ in 
order to control the level of information that they reveal. Among the top collocations are ‘one’, 
which indicates that the government distinguishes itself as unique. 
Having seen the government usage of this word, tables 51 and 52 present the concordances and 
collocations of ‘I’ by the protesters. 
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Table 51 Concordances of ‘I’ by protesters (164 hits: 0.54%) 
Concordances 
 
1. a dictatorial regime that must be restrained. I am not… Jamal al Maliki: About 
2. the revolution. It is not a personal issue. I want to say that 
3. the show and from (appearing on TV with) that brother. I want to say that the issue 
4. there (isn’t) a real guarantee for his departure. I am talking about a real guarantee until 
5. to solve Yemen’s dilemma, even if I am totally not against the Gulf Initiative 
6. was once against … I can’t accept the idea that  
7. dear brother, do you know… I will give you an example of why we want 
8. (I don’t) say that the snake’s head has gone, I simply say that (the rebel’s) staying 
9. departure of all… Jamal al Maliki: First, I am convinced that no force can 
10. Ali Abdullah Saleh does... I don’t want to say only 
11. Dear brother… Jamal al Maliki: I speak in this bitterness because 
12. Yemen into, I will tell you some statistics, I don’t know in what way 
13. positive from your speech, that you said I acknowledge the revolution, and I thank you 
14. Al Qarashi: What youth? Waeem al Qarashi: I know to what it refers to, day 18 
15. electoral (process) because everyone knows. First, I want to point to 
16. now, the world, brother Yasir… In fact, I feel sorry for your situation because you are defending 
17. defend a regime like this (one). Honestly, I feel sorry for … and certainly this is 
18. Al Qarashi: He is a thief. Waseem al Qarashi: I say, brother Yasir might be disturbed 
19. now only some of the mercenaries are around him. I want also to clarify a point 
20. also to clarify a point here. When I speak about who are around him, I 
 
 
Table 52 Collocations of ‘I’ by the protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
 is restrained 
is destroyed 
is committed 
I am amazed 
spokesperson 
believer 
by itself 
I said it 
my heart 
therefore 
Franc 
I will speak 
boring 
let me 
I was created 
I spoke 
excuse me 
with a result 
I say 
bas (part of the name Abbas) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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The above tables demonstrate that the protesters use ‘I’ to refer to the speaker only and is 
accompanied by action verbs such as ‘I want to say’,’ I am talking’, and ‘I speak in this 
bitterness’, which provide strong justifications to the revolution and serious responses to the 
government statements. ‘I’ is also employed to show control of what is being said. The 
frequency of collocations is equal throughout, with a mix of action verbs and adjectives. These 
verbs serve roles such as helping the speaker to hold the floor, like ‘I will speak’ and ‘let me’. 
Overall, the government and protesters employed ‘I’ among their first 30 keywords, and both 
groups used the pronoun to refer to the individual speaker only. However, while ‘I’ was used as a 
conversation strategy by the government, helping them to interrupt or hold the floor, the 
protesters used this reference for ideological purposes, such as justifying the revolution and 
expressing power.  
5.2.8 Power  
Among the 30 top keywords, two notions were exclusive to the government: power and south. 
Power was used by the government as a synonym to the regime and to designate that authority 
should be exclusive to the government. Tables 53 and 54 present the software analysis of 
‘power’ as used by the government.  
Table 53 Concordances of ‘power’ by the government (46 hits: 0.60%) 
Concordances 
 
1. with the peaceful transmission of the power, with peaceful transfer of power, within the limits of the 
constitution, within the limits 
2. on behalf of the people of Yemen, and they wanted to reach power, why don’t they reach through 
3. reach power, why don’t they reach power through elections, as long as they 
4. benefit from these bloods? We, in power, are not benefiting, who benefits? who benefits from 
5. the parties that seek reaching power through these innocent bloods. We are with  
6. dear..., unfortunately, the brothers want to reach power through chaos, through bloods, through sabotage 
7. Ali Abdullah Saleh will not hand over the power except to safe hands through the people 
8. The president will not cling to power, and doesn’t want power, but he has to hand it over  
9. anyone, if they want to reach power as brother Waseem say that they have to 
10. cannot and cannot hand over power to the killers, the criminals and the gangs. Yasir 
11. these parties. The brother president will not hand over power to those gangs. There are national leaders 
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12. The brother president talks about the people, and he will hand over power to safe hands. He will not hand 
over power 
13. power to safe hands. He will not hand over power to the extremists who attacked camps 
14. the provinces, they killed the Yemeni people. How does he hand over power to them? Ali Abdullah Saleh 
reached  
15. Ali Abdullah Saleh reached power through the hands of the Yemeni people. He did not reach 
16. manoeuvre. We can’t hand over power to the innocent killing gangs. Yasir 
17. Before that, the president wants to transfer power within the limits of the constitution, within the 
legitimacy  
18. They speak on behalf of the Yemeni people. How does the brother president hand over power? There are 
elections, Is 
19. sensible that the brother president abandons power and hand over these gangs the control of 
20. dialogue to reach a joint agreement for transferring power through the hands of the Yemeni people, not 
through a military coup 
 
Table 54 Collocations of power by government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
behind 
peacefully 
he handed over 
they reach 
he transfers 
he hands over to them 
and he hands over 
and it is not 
and they stayed 
and he will hand over 
and the opposition 
and he/it became 
he transferred 
in order to reach 
for transferring 
for the killers 
for gangs
23
 
for these 
let them come 
with his will 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
As noted above, according to table 53, the government used ‘power’ to denote the regime. 
‘Power’ is given a passive role: object, ‘reach power’ and ‘We can’t hand over power’; genitive, 
including ‘hand over the power’ and ‘for transferring power’; and prepositional phrases, like 
‘reach power’, ‘in power’, and ‘abandons power’. Additionally, in the case of ‘how does he hand 
over power to them?’, ‘power’ was employed as a beneficiary. The passive role given to power 
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suggests that it was used as a tool. Furthermore, in not passing power to those who killed 
Yemenis, the government supported Saleh without clearly stating that the protesters were the 
killers. Collocations indicate that the government used ‘power’ as a destination that should not 
be reached by its opponents. Its belief in its sole eligibility in maintaining power is evident with 
the use of ‘peacefully’, ‘for the killers’, and ‘for gangs’. Among the collocations are verbs that 
denote transfer of ‘power’ like ‘they reach’, ‘he transfers’, ‘and he handed over’, ‘and it is not’, 
‘and they stayed’, ‘and he will hand over’, and ‘he hands over to them’, 
To summarize, compared to the total words spoken, the government made most references to 
power. It used power as a synonym for the regime and showed that it considered to be its 
ultimate exclusive right. 
5.2.9 South24  
‘South’ is the second high frequency notion that was exclusive to the government. The most 
significant finding here is that the government presented the south as victims, as well as 
expressing solidarity and the need for care to be shown to the south. The concordances and 
collocations of the use of the South by the government are shown in tables 55 and 56.  
Table 55 Concordances of South by government (32 hits: 0.42 %) 
Concordances 
 
1. Don’t interrupt me. Brother Waseem talked about South Yemen. He knows who transformed South 
Yemen and the people 
2. about the south. He knows who transformed South Yemen and the people of the south, into an advantage 
and booty in 
3. He knows who transformed the south, and the people of South Yemen into an advantage and booty in the 
provinces 
4. southern …He knows who killed the people of South Yemen in 1993 in the socialist … leaders 
5. Yemeni… for reform. He knows who looted the South and he knows who looted Ali’s house 
6. These extremist members looted the south and transformed the south and the people of the South Yemen 
7. extremist (members) looted the South and transformed the south and the people of the South into war 
booty, and he 
8. who looted South Yemen and transformed the south and the people of the South into war booty, and he 
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knows who 
9. and he knows who issued fatwa allowing shedding the bloods of the people of the south. Do you deny 
who are 
10. knows who issued fatwa allowing shedding the blood of the people of South Yemen. Do you deny who 
are 
11. who issued fatwa allowing shedding the bloods of the people of the south, the Yemeni Congregation for 
reform in 1994 
12. this talk, and you know that. They looted the south, they transformed the south… Yasir Al Yamani: No, 
13. and you know that. They looted the south, they transformed the south… Yasir Al Yamani: No, excuse 
me, I 
14. Yasir Al Yamani: You know how they looted South Yemen. You know who started the war in 
15. today, you know how they transformed South Yemen’s people into small groups and fighting factions. 
16. into small fighting factions. They looted South Yemen. They looted the sea, no one escaped them. 
17. to go back to Al Zandani and Humaid Al Ahmer, the people of the south are literate, they (will not 
accept) that Al Zandani rules them 
18. They will not accept that these … rule them. The people of South Yemen rejected you completely when 
you formed 
19. the land, the honour, the blood and everything in the south. They were supposed to reach them as partners 
20. all the country leaders of the people of the south. Why this blood? Is this blood 
 
Table 56 Collocations of South by the government  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
and it transferred 
literate 
looting
25
 
and relatives 
and people 
entirely 
they were oppressed 
they suffered 
martyrs 
they transferred 
they violated 
looted 
they rejected you 
they looted 
people 
they come 
upon them 
about 
and you 
moment 
15 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
As with ‘power’, the government used ‘the south’ to persuade the audience that the southern 
region would be better under Saleh’s regime and that it had suffered in the past when factions 
attempted to separate it from the official regime. As they did with ‘the people of Yemen’, the 
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government uses ‘south’ to indicate solidarity and concern for the Yemenis geographically 
situated in the South of Yemen. Furthermore, the concordances coincide with the collocations, as 
the top frequencies with respect to the government view of the south are ‘and it transferred’, ‘and 
relatives’, ‘they transferred’, ‘they looted’, and ‘looted’, in reference to the hardships that the 
south historically experienced when external parties tried to separate it from the other regions. 
Overall, the south was used with high frequency by the government, as a way to show solidarity 
and persuade an area of the country to side against the revolution. 
5.2.10 Regime  
The two keywords that were exclusive to the protesters were ‘regime’ and ‘initiative’, the first of 
which was used to refer to Saleh and his family. The overall context in which the regime was 
used by the protesters was negative, as the protesters demanded the resignation of the official 
rulers. Tables 57 and 58 present the computer analysis of the ‘regime’ by the protesters.  
Table 57 Concordances of regime by the protesters (163 hits: 0.53%) 
Concordances 
 
1. against the regime. Jamal Al Maliki: Who first 
2. Yemeni to poverty is this regime during 33 years. Do you know, brother 
3. that 15 figures of this regime, according to an official report are 
4. know, brother Faisal, that this regime led the Yemeni people to 
5. Saleh without the regime’s leaving… a part of it staying, it will not stay… 
6. he continued defending this regime repeatedly, so we are talking about a regime 
7. remaining in this regime. Jamal Al Maliki: First, who 
8. afraid first of the remnants of this regime, until this moment there is not 
9. all of it to Saudi Arabia. Why did the regime (officials) stay? It stayed because of who runs Yemen 
10. Al Maliki: I will tell you who is the regime? Jamal Al Maliki: First, let 
11. all (those) years he has been defending this regime, and who was paid to defend 
12. was paid to defend this regime, and everything is recorded, and the brother defends 
13. recorded, and the brother defends this regime day after day. Then he comes 
14. for it. He made the world laugh at us. This regime abused the national sovereignty. How many 
15. September 26. So, I will answer him. What is nature of the regime? The regime consists of a family 
16. So, I will answer him. What is nature of the regime? The regime consists of Saleh’s family and  
17. Jamal Al Maliki: The remnants of this regime. Jamal Al Maliki: They still 
18. that exploded on the hands of this regime, because we saw the blood that 
19. more civilized than this regime that misrepresented it. Dear brother 
20. misrepresent it. Dear brother, this regime misrepresented Yemen as...  
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Table 58 Collocations of ‘regime’ by the protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
remnants
26
 
for overthrowing
27
 
and overthrowing 
it falls 
and as if 
they defeat 
it shakes 
he plots 
it triggers 
it enjoys 
it collapses
28
 
he understands 
they follow 
and he falls 
and he stays 
and in favour of 
he signed it 
and its 
comprehensiveness 
and his partners 
brutality 
12 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Table 57 shows that the overall context in which ‘regime’ was used by the protesters was 
negative. For example, the regime has caused financial hardships, as in ‘Yemeni to poverty is 
this regime’, and made Yemen an internationally dependent state, as in ‘this regime abused the 
national sovereignty’. The government views the regime as Saleh and his family, with many of 
the high ranking posts in Yemen being occupied by the relatives of the president. The most 
frequent words that collocate with regime are ‘remnants’ (12 times) and ‘for overthrowing’ (5 
times), implying that the regime is perceived as being more than just Saleh and that the protesters 
demand the resignation of his entire circle in the government. 
Overall, the regime was commonly used by the protesters to refer to Saleh and his family, with a 
negative connotation that implied the need for their removal.  
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5.2.11 Initiative29  
The notion of ‘initiative’ (the Gulf Initiative to help find a solution in Yemen) is among the first 
30 frequent keywords that the protesters used. In support of the findings of the critical discourse 
analysis, the corpus analysis shows that the protesters were uncertain about the initiative and 
especially about its feasibility in fulfilling their revolutionary intentions. Tables 59 and 60 
outline the concordances and collocations of ‘initiative’ by the protesters.  
Table 59 Concordances of ‘initiative (GI)’ by the protesters (118 hits: 0.39%) 
Concordances 
 
1. until it happens. Jamal Al Maliki: The GI, brother, is a part 
2. I am not totally against the GI or against what happened 
3. say that the only solution is the GI. The people 
4. the street, without them, the initiative would not have been signed, and the world would not have cared 
about us 
5. their… except for … remaining. Jamal al Maliki: The GI and its all merits 
6. the street if we agreed that the GI is the solution, 
7. Jamal Al Maliki: Dear brother, the GI is not… we don’t  
8. (Do you) know how many (people) have died after signing the GI until today? 
9. the army’s bullets. Jamal Al Maliki: After the initiative and after signing the initiative 
10. Al Maliki: After the initiative and after signing the initiative, so what security  
11. what I avoid to say is that the GI is the only solution 
12. but with the GI or without the GI, and that it takes away all 
13. Al Qurashi: Before we reach the initiative, he talks… Waseem Al Qurashi 
14. about the General People’s Congress. The GI transfers power 
15. when he killed the youth. Waseem Al Qurashi: The initiative was supposed to transfer power 
16. Taiz after he signed the GI. It was supposed 
17. Secondly, he wants to retreat from signing the GI because he  
18. Of guarantees. Ali al Sarari: The initiative is only granted from 
19. And he did not state… he stated that the initiative… but he didn’t state that 
20. the situation. When we accepted this initiative, we accepted it because we saw 
 
Table 60 Collocations of ‘initiative’ by the protesters  
Collocations 
Word Frequency 
it applies 
it withdraws 
it allows 
and he deals with 
and he tries 
and he abandons 
and we refuse 
and its stance 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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and it granted him 
and when 
and for signing 
he signed 
and before it 
and it fell 
and invitation 
and the initiative 
and commitment 
and the procedure 
we agreed 
and his readiness 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
According to the concordances in table 59, the protesters seem to express doubt about ‘the 
initiative’ in terms of concept and procedure, using language like ‘what I avoid to say is that the 
GI is the only solution’ and ‘(do you) know how many (people) died after signing the GI until 
today?’. A number of words to denote uncertainty are associated with ‘the initiative’, like ‘the 
initiative was supposed’ and ‘it was supposed’.  
Overall, the initiative was among the top first 30 words of the computer analysis of the 
protesters’ discourse. Corpus analysis demonstrates that the protesters did not trust the initiative 
and were uncertain about whether it would be able to fulfil their aims.  
 Discussion 5.3
The computer-assisted corpus analysis was conducted in order to triangulate the coding of the 
critical discourse analysis. AntConc version 3.2.4w (corpus analysis software) was utilised in 
order to count the word lists of the entire corpus, which had been divided into three groups: AJ, 
the government, and the protesters. The top 30 keywords were then selected from the word lists 
for each of these groups. Some keywords were found to be shared, by two or all three of the 
groups, while others are specific to single groups. With the use of AntCont, the first 20 
concordances and first 20 collocations with frequencies were specified for each content word. 
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The notions that emerged are Saleh, Yemen, president, revolution, people of Yemen, we, I, 
power, South, regime, and initiative, matching the notion identified in the CDA.  
The most significant finding from this analysis is that AJ seems to have excluded the government 
from full participation in the debates, as fewer government representatives took part and only 
had the opportunity to speak 7659 words, compared to the 30512 words spoken by the protesters. 
The government speakers showed solidarity with Saleh, addressing him as brother, defending 
him, showing that they value Saleh’s family, and collocating him with future certainty, such as 
‘will remain’ and ‘will stay’. In contrast to the government position, AJ and protesters referred to 
Saleh in negative connotations. For instance, AJ gave Saleh passive roles, like ‘avoidance’ and 
‘breaking covenant’, while the protesters accused Saleh of causing Yemen’s unsatisfactory 
condition. The protesters also challenged Saleh by saying ‘Saleh is weaker than to start a war’ 
and declining to address him as the president. Among the protesters, Saleh was used to denote 
his family and circle, all of whom were targeted for resignation.  
Compared to that of AJ and protesters, the percentage of the concordance hits of ‘Yemen’ by the 
government is highest, meaning that the official speakers used this word most. In this way, the 
government attempted to give Yemen a patriotic image, showing how the country supported its 
president and arguing that Yemen’s good future are owed to national unity and Saleh’s 
endurance in power. While the government assigned a patriotic role to the ‘people’ that support 
the regime, the protesters used language that also suggested that they represented the ‘people’, 
arguing as if all Yemenis oppose Saleh. Additionally, the government represented people as 
being victims who are being misused, although the parties misusing them were not specified, 
which correlates with the critical discourse analysis. Instead, victimisation tactics were ascribed 
to generalized actors, like ‘thugs’, and anonymous actors, like ‘some members’. The protesters 
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also portrayed the populace as victims, as in ‘the people tolerates’, associating them with noble 
sacrifice through language like ‘the Yemeni people have provided’.  
Both AJ and protesters depict the ‘revolution’ with activated and passivated roles. The 
connotation that AJ uses for the revolution is neutral, enabling effective debate moderation, the 
protesters employ a positive connotation which explicitly supports the revolution. The top word 
that collocates with revolution is the same with AJ and protesters, which is ‘youth’.  
Although AJ and government share the content word ‘the president’, these two groups use this 
reference in markedly different ways. While the government refers to President Saleh with 
respect, solidarity and support, AJ derogates him from power with language like ‘exchange’ and 
‘placing another president’. To support this further, AJ’s percentage of concordance hits for 
president is three times less than the level of usage by the government.  
It is valuable to point out here that similar to the CDA analysis, the differentiation of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ is evident with the corpus analysis into the sociolinguistic functions shared by the 
political parties (namely, the government and the protesters). The government uses the reference 
‘we’ to describe the ruling regime, while protester speakers used it to refer to either themselves 
or to their parties. The pronoun ‘I’ was used by the government and protesters for a range of 
debating functions, like interruption, holding floor, stating wishes, and expression of censorship.  
‘Power’ is the ultimate goal of the government, which it will not pass to the protesters. In order 
to convince its audience that Yemen’s future is best with Saleh, the government speakers used 
the ‘south’ to create a feeling of solidarity between this region and the entirety of Yemen, as well 
as with Saleh’s regime. The use that the protesters made of ‘regime’ associates the ruling body 
with negative connotation implies that the regime is the cause of poverty of Yemen and its 
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dependence on foreign nations. The word regime refers to Saleh and, his circle and family. Top 
collocations of the regime are ‘remnants’ and ‘for overthrowing’ denoting that the aim of the 
revolution is to overthrow the president and the entire circle associated with him. The final 
notion pertains to the ‘Gulf Initiative’ and specifically the uncertainty of the protesters about its 
efficacy, with the concordances showing that their speakers are sometimes totally against the 
initiative and sometimes showing partial support.  
 Conclusion 5.4
This chapter sought to achieve the aim of triangulating the results of the critical discourse 
analysis. Computer assisted corpus analysis, AntConc version 3.2.4w was utilised as the 
triangulation method. In order for this to be done, the corpus analysis terms were listed and a 
brief introduction was provided of the computer software for analysis. Once this was done, the 
background of the corpus was provided, followed by the detailed results of the statistical 
analysis, including the concordances and collocations of the keywords, which are the notions that 
emerged from the corpus analysis. The Arabic corpus of AJ was used in the analysis, which was 
translation into English in order to present it in this research. 
The main result of this chapter was that the corpus analysis supported the results obtained from 
the CDA, supporting the hypothesis that AJ had partially excluded the government from its 
debates and thereby supported the ideologies of the protesters.  
The following chapter provides the analysis of the interviews that were conducted with AJ staff, 
which offer rich data to better understand the context of the debates and the ideological stance of 
Al Jazeera and its staff. These data are presented for the purpose of comparison with the varied 
analysis conducted of the debates. 
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Chapter 6: Interviews with Al Jazeera staff 
 Introduction 6.1
The main aim of the interviews which were conducted with AJ staff was to compare their 
perceptions and that of the channel itself with the CDA analysis which had been conducted of the 
debates, gaining a better insig ht into the data provided. In this chapter, a brief analysis of the 
interviews is provided. This begins with a background of the interviewees, after which the 
answers provided by AJ staff is presented in seven themes that emerged from their responses: the 
experience of the interviewees themselves, AJ policies, debate preparation, debate guest 
speakers, debate moderator, the discourse of AJ, and the debate transcription process. Each of 
these themes also involves sub-themes, the most important findings for each of which are 
highlighted and supported by excerpts from the interviews.  
 Interviews 6.2
In order to gather information on the ideologies of AJ channel and for the sake of comparison 
with the results of the textual analysis of the debates, a total of six interviews were conducted 
with AJ staff: four of the interviewees (two male and two female) were moderators of debate 
programmes, one was the head of the Output and one was the director of Al Jazeera net online. 
The first interview took place in Oman and the rest were held at the AJ network, in the Arabic 
News Room, in Qatar. All discussions were conducted face-to-face, except for the director of Al 
Jazeera net who was only available to be interviewed by phone due to his excessively busy work 
schedule. The ethnographic information of the interviewees can be seen in the following table 
(61). 
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Table 61 Ethnographic information of interviewees 
Interviewee 
designation(interview 
chronological order) 
Interviewee 
gender 
Initial given for 
the purpose of 
this study 
Interview 
means and 
location 
Length of the 
Interview 
  
Moderator  Female M1 Face-to-face; 
Hotel, Muscat 
33 minutes 
Head of Output Male HO Face-to-face; 
His office 
 AJA newsroom 
35 minutes 
Director of AJ net Male DN Phone; 
Senior 
producer’s 
office  
AJA newsroom 
5 minutes 
Moderator  Male M2 Face-to-face; 
Senior 
producer’s 
office  
AJA newsroom 
25 minutes 
Moderator  Female M3 Face-to-face; 
Senior 
producer’s 
office  
30 minutes 
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AJA newsroom 
Moderator  Male  M4 Meeting room; 
AJA newsroom 
29 minutes 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, enabling the researcher to drive the discussion forward in 
response to the answers given by the participants. The results are presented thematically, 
according to the principal themes that emerged from the analysis of the interviewee responses. 
The recordings were transcribed then answers were grouped and coded. Table 62 shows the 
major themes and their sub-themes.  
Table 62 Themes for analysis from AJ staff interviews 
Major themes for analysis Sub-themes 
Interviewees’ experience   Duration of experience at AJ 
 Experience before joining AJ 
 A critical incident encountered while working with AJ 
AJ policies  AJ policies of how debate programmes are generally 
conducted 
 AJ’s neutrality  
 AJ as a proactive tool for the Arab nation 
 AJ’s decreased popularity in the Arab world 
 Influence of Qatar policies on AJ 
Debate preparation  The process of debate topic selection 
 Writing the debate questions 
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 Preparation of the debate reports 
Debate guest speakers  Selection of guest speakers 
 Availability of all sides of the argument 
 Selection of real time versus virtual speakers 
 Guest speakers’ awareness of the questions before the 
programs 
Debate moderators  Control of debate moderation  
 Adherence to debate questions 
 Standing points to be won at debate 
Discourse of AJ  AJ’s policies on the selection of certain vocabulary 
 Exaggeration of the revolution events by AJ 
 Use of ‘thugs’ and ‘ousted president’ by AJ 
 Use of nonstandard Arabic by AJ 
 Language used with and about women 
AJ debate transcription   Reasons for transcribing the debates 
 Who transcribes the debates 
 Discrepancies between the debates and transcription 
 
6.2.1 Interviewees experience  
AJ staff were asked about three subthemes related to their experience: the duration of their 
experience at AJ, their experience before joining AJ, and a critical incident they had witnessed or 
been involved in during their tenure at the news channel. All interviewees are senior AJ staff 
who joined the channel at its inception. Consequently, they had served other Arabic media 
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networks before joining AJ. M1 joined AJ with the first batch in 1997, five months after AJ was 
launched. Before that, she worked in the Arabic department on Swiss radio, as well as on 
Algerian television and radio. HO joined AJ in 2001, before which time he had worked as a 
journalist at a Jordanian newspaper. M2 joined AJ in January 2001, after leaving Algerian TV 
and radio. M3 joined AJ in 2000, but had also worked on Algerian TV prior to moving to AJ. M4 
joined AJ three months after it was launched, but before that time he had worked for BBC Arabic 
and had been a journalist for several TVs and radio stations in Tunisia. This demonstrates that all 
the interviewees have extensive experience in journalism and with AJ in particular, with M1 and 
M4 having 19 years of experience at the channel and HO, M2 and M3 all having 15 years.  
The interviewees M1, M2 and HO were then asked about a critical incident that they had 
encountered during their time with AJ. Through learning of the incidents, AJ’s ideologies could 
be elicited. Both M1 and HO gave answers that were related to human feelings while the 
feedback elicited from M2 related to the practice of Arab versus Western channels. M1 stated 
that during the coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2008-2009 , she had started to cry live on air 
and that her voice was hoarse after listening to a Gaza woman screaming for help from her house 
as it was being bombed. M1 explained that journalists are forbidden from crying on air, 
according to the AJ Code of Ethics, in order to avoid influencing the audience with their 
emotional state, indicating that the channel attempts to avoid influencing the ideologies of its 
viewers.  
As with M1, HO’s response was related to the human emotions carried by journalists. He cited 
two incidents, the first of which occurred when he was the news director for one night and 
Mohammed al Qadhafi (son of Libya’s previous president) was talking to AJ over the phone. 
Suddenly, Mohammed’s house was shot severely to the extent that the call was lost. HO said that 
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he became very nervous that the phone call could have murdered Mohammed al Qadhafi’s 
family. However, Mohammed al Qadhafi answered the call from AJ half an hour later and 
reassured them that nobody had been hurt. The second incident took place when AJ’s journalist 
Tariq Ayoub was killed in 2003; HO was the one who wrote the news about his colleague’s 
death. The first incident stated by HO indicated the widespread of AJ and significant role AJ 
played in the region.  
When asked the same question, M2 described a critical situation that occurred when moving 
from two different schools in media, from the Algerian TV to Al Jazeera. According to M2, the 
Algerian TV was similar to the French media which was not the case with AJ. This suggests that 
media giants follow different schools in media, which could influence the ideologies of these 
channels.  
In conclusion, all interviewees are senior members of AJ so are familiar with the practices and 
policies of the channel. However, since the interviewees were selected by the channel, it seems 
possible that they have been selected for their loyalty to the channel and so would endeavour to 
present it in a positive light.  
6.2.2 AJ policies  
The policies of AJ which were elicited from the interviewees were on how debate programmes 
are generally conducted, AJ’s neutrality, AJ as a proactive tool for the Arab nation, possibility of 
AJ’s decreased popularity in the Arab world and influence of Qatar policies on AJ.  
M1, M3 and HO were asked about the channel policies in terms of the procedures for the debate 
programmes. Although all interviewees gave the same responses that policies govern programme 
content and style, they gave different names for the documents controlling the editorial policies.  
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M1 stated that AJ is committed to neutrality linguistically, including with respect to facial 
expressions. A standard vocabulary and pronunciation guide is circulated by the news 
management on correct editorial style, giving information about the proper way to say such as 
China capital Bekin or Beijing and Kofi Anan. The Editorial Style guide also unifies vocabulary, 
indicating whether revolution should be used or uprising, or whether it should be Houthis or 
Ansar Allah. M1 added that every employee knows about the dictionary by internal email, and 
that linguistic editors and producers check and correct any linguistic, editorial, or political 
mistakes. Deviation from policy results in a verbal warning from by the news director, the news 
supervisor, or news producer. 
According to HO, unlike other Arab news channels, AJ has systematic policies: 
In the past five years, AJ has created a Professional Behaviour List in line with the 
common rules of the news sector. The list is improved every year whereby AJ adds 
international updates in news, technology and ethics while considering the special 
characteristics of AJ and the Arab audience. 
(HO) 
 
The claim here is that AJ tries to balance common professional behaviour against educating the 
Arab audience. M3 referred to the AJ’s quality document that all AJ staff must follow as the 
Professional Behaviour Guide.  
With regards to investigating the neutrality of AJ, M1 was asked if she thinks that AJ is a neutral 
channel and HO was asked if he thinks that AJ focuses on its policies in its training programmes. 
Interestingly, M1 argued that no news channel is truly neutral and, while AJ strives to remain 
neutral, there will always be a degree of deviation. She elaborated that the Arab world has never 
seen such a media revolution like the coverage that AJ provided of the Arab Spring, in terms of 
its density, synchronisation, and power. She added that the strategic and national interests, as 
well as the ties between countries and diplomatic crises, means that AJ cannot please everyone. 
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For example, Al-Sisi the Egyptian President came to power as a result of a coup, however a large 
proportion of the Egyptians resent him being called the president who came as a result of a coup. 
Audiences have also taken sides on topics or individuals like Bashar, Sisi, the Arab Spring, and 
Islamists. HO said that AJ does not impose its policies on trainees, simply providing instruction 
on the general standards like neutrality, objectivity, and the professionalism. Nonetheless, AJ 
trainers might tell trainees about their experiences at AJ, which might influence their behaviour 
in some ways.  
M2, M3, M4 and HO were questioned on their perceptions about the accusations of some critics 
that AJ played a provocative role in Arab nations, promoting ideas like the Muslim 
Brotherhoods, or freedom and dignity. All of the participants indirectly agreed, but elaborated 
using different vocabulary and examples. HO said that if the Arab Spring succeeded and 
established democracy, freedom and the rights it fought for, AJ would have been thanked. People 
loved AJ when it fought for these values, but the deterioration of the Arab Spring resulted in AJ 
being hated by some of the populace. He claimed that many who criticise AJ for this position 
actually switched their position from support of the Arab Spring, once it became clear that the 
movement had lost popular appeal. Therefore, he stated that AJ did not maximise nor minimise 
the revolutions, instead simply providing the news. He added that AJ interacted spiritually only 
with the Arab Spring.  
M2 was linguistically clearer in his responses, stating that AJ had incited protesters:  
 We positively incited protest. We incited people to make their own decisions and 
to get rid of fear. People shouldn’t be afraid and shouldn’t be controlled. 
(M2) 
 
He said AJ had contributed to helping Arab people to overcome their fear of their rulers, arguing 
that Arab people are not naive so they were not being controlled, only inspired. He argued that if 
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AJ was broadcast in Switzerland, with the intention of making the Swiss people revolt against 
their government, they would not have succeeded because Switzerland is a democratic society. 
Therefore, M2 said that AJ told people that they had the right to be heard and to establish 
democracy, but that it did not incite negatively.  
However, M3 was linguistically conservative as she gave her agreement indirectly: 
A tool for inciting Arab people to demonstrate, let us analyse this beautiful phrase you 
have just said. 
(M3) 
M3 said there was no shame in demonstrating and that it should not be restricted to open 
societies, meaning that it would be great if AJ had incited a justified public outcry. M3 then 
stated that AJ had not incited anyone and that she was happy with the performance of the 
channel with respect to the Arab Spring. AJ helped the Arab people to slowly overcome their 
fears of criticizing their leaders and raised their awareness about the power of speaking freely 
about their opinions, as well as their ability to demand their rights.  
M4 gave a balanced response to this question, stating that whether or not AJ incited protesters is 
dependent of the view of each person regarding the issue. He gave Islamists as an example of a 
minority in the Arab world whose voice is not being heard by the governments, and who AJ 
therefore gives a chance to speak and share their opinion. In response to this decision of inviting 
Islamists to speak, some might think that AJ is being biased, while others might think that the 
channel is overly concerned with events in the community. M4 supported this statement, thus: 
One of AJ’s slogans says that it strives to give ‘a voice to the voiceless’. 
(M4) 
This interviewee argued that AJ generally talks about the suppressed and oppositions in the Arab 
world, seeking to provide a platform for those who are normally unheard. It is significant to 
investigate whether these accusations were valid. 
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M4 was the only interviewee who described that the way that AJ covered the Arab revolutions as 
being extremely sympathetic and perhaps overly so: 
AJ covered the Arab revolutions sympathetically. If we said that AJ covered these 
movements without sympathy then we are hiding reality. We covered the revolutions with 
a great deal of sympathy and sometimes even with exaggerated sympathy. 
(M4)  
M2 and M4 were asked for their perceptions regarding AJ’s decrease in popularity in the Arab 
world, in an attempt to elicit whether they believed that this could be attributed to the results of 
the Arab Spring. While M2 cared about how AJ was judged, but did not answer the question, M4 
agreed that AJ was losing its credibility. M2 said it was still early to judge the Arab Spring’s 
success or failure, and that more time is needed to test its success. M2 did not answer the part 
about AJ’s decreasing popularity.  
M4 agreed that AJ was losing credibility, although he argued that before the Arab revolutions, 
the situation was different and that a general agreement had between Arabs over issues like the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine and the American invasion of Iraq. While there were 
disagreements between political parties, they tended to be relatively weak and superficial. Even 
at the start of the Arab revolutions there had been general agreement on change and democracy. 
Although M4 thinks that blaming AJ is a shallow way of thinking, he generally agrees that the 
revolutions resulted in a deterioration of the political situation in the Arab world.  
M2, M3 and M4 were questioned about the influence of Qatar policies and agendas in the 
practices of AJ. There were fluctuations in the answers given by the participants. M2 redirected 
the question, asking the researcher for her opinion on the same issue, adding that AJ does covers 
issues in Qatar but there is comparatively to report. Given that AJ is an international channel, it 
therefore covers the most important news across the entire Arab world. He also added that AJ 
230 
 
once invited the Qatari prime minister, who challenged the interviewer to find an event that was 
not being covered by the channel, stating that if the event was found then too many events were 
being covered by AJ at the same time.  
The responses from M3 were that AJ was the recipient of numerous accusations and 
commendations, as all people are free to have an opinion. She therefore argued that it was a good 
thing that people could be free to criticise the channel for those policies that they did not like. On 
the subject of Qatari funding, M3 expressed amusement and pondered about how others could 
think that AJ served Qatar.  
Interestingly, M4 replied that definitely AJ follows Qatar’s policies and agenda. The news 
director and the channel’s director refer to the Chairman of Board of Directors, who is a Qatari 
royal family member, in order to decide over issues related to the channel. M4 said that AJ 
neglects to cover issues regarding the Gulf countries, at least covering them with the same daring 
and braveness as it reports other issues. He added that there are two reasons for not covering 
issues about Qatar, the first is because there are no political parties, revolutions, demonstrations, 
or stories of interest to the mass media. The other reason is that, 
There is no country in the world that funds a satellite TV channel with the huge amounts 
of money involved and simply turns it into a platform against itself. 
(M4) 
 
In other words, M4 thinks that AJ is like other Arab media networks in not covering events of 
the countries that sponsor their operations.  
In summary, AJ staff were asked about the AJ policies that are relevant to debates. The data 
show that there are written documents which specify the code of conduct and quality assurance 
of the programmes. The participants had a range of different views about AJ’s neutrality, 
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however. In general, they believed that AJ holds human principles, such as democracy, which it 
wishes to add to the Arab nation and that it remains the preferred media network for Arab 
audiences. However, the interviewees do not generally seem to think that AJ incited protest in 
the Arab world. Only one moderator thought that since Qatar has an influence on AJ’s practices 
and directions, arguing that this is a logical consequence of the funding that it receives from the 
Qatari government.  
6.2.3 Debate preparation 
Three sub-themes emerged from the questions and discussion of the procedure for the 
preparation of debate programmes: the process of the topic selection, writing the debate 
questions, and the preparation of the debate reports. M1, M2, M3 and HO were asked to provide 
a brief synopsis of the selection process for the debate topics. All of the participants agreed that 
the debate topics are selected in daily meetings by a group of staff, however there was 
disagreement regarding the parties who are involved. M1 and M3 agreed on producers, 
journalists and editors. M1 added news supervisor and M3 added the editing and news directors. 
HO said that questions are selected according to the importance of the topic, the ramifications or 
consequences of the topic, and what is judged to be important for the day.  
M1, M2 and HO were questioned about who drafts the debate questions. The most notable 
finding here is that all participants agreed that the moderator drafts the questions, after discussing 
the topic with the team who decided on the actual debate topic. HO best elaborated the process 
by stating: 
that when the topic is decided by the editing team, it is then given to the programme 
team, which includes the programme producer, the interview producer, the journalist 
who writes the report and the moderator. The programme team discusses the topic, and 
decides over the sub themes and the guest speakers. They then talk to the moderator. 
(HO) 
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So, AJ abides by a step by step process in the preparation of its debate programmes. Only M1 
added that the news producer is also involved in preparation of the questions.  
M3 and HO were questioned about who is in charge of preparing the AJ reports that are used to 
introduce the debates. Both of them reported that a journalist writes the debate report. M3 
specified the journalist as being a part of the debate team, from the news room or the field (from 
AJ office outside Qatar).  
In conclusion, a wealth of information was obtained from the interviewees about the debate 
preparation process at AJ, with broad agreement from interviewees that topics and sub-themes 
are set daily by a team, while the questions are formed by the moderator themselves. The 
questions are designed to be flexible enough to be modified by the moderators during the debate. 
Reports are prepared and read by AJ staff based on the debate theme and sub-themes.  
6.2.4 Debate guest speakers 
The interviewees were questioned on the guest speakers invited to the debates, in terms of their 
selection, the availability of all sides of the argument, the choice of real time versus virtual 
speakers, the degree to which guest speakers are aware of the questions before the programmes 
commence,  the differences between real time and virtual speakers, and whether or not guest 
speakers know the questions prior to the debate. M1 and M4 were asked about who chooses the 
guest speakers and based on what criteria. Both interviewees agreed that guest speakers are 
chosen in accordance with the specific requirements of the debate. M1 explained that these 
requirements are decided by the debate producer, with the interview producer choosing guest 
speakers to meet the corresponding interview requirements. She added that the debate producer 
specifies the interview requirements in the debate-preparation meeting, stating the desired 
characteristics for the guest speakers, and the interview producer gives a list of the available 
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speakers from which the actual guests are chosen. She underlined the importance of balance in 
the debate, meaning that a guest speaker should be chosen from the government and a different 
guest speaker from the opposition:  
There is often a balance in the selection of guest speakers. For example if, there is one 
from the government, we invite one from the opposition. In this way, we ensure a balance 
in the debate. 
(M1) 
 
M1 added that a Contact List has been created in the system since AJ was launched. The list is an 
information bank of the guest speakers including names and phone numbers. New names are 
added to this list daily, whenever AJ staff make contacts or meet people at conferences, or even 
when speakers are observed on other channels. Interestingly, M4 noted that the absence of a 
guest speaker from a debate might be due to a number of factors, such as their refusal to 
participate, but would never be because AJ had chosen not to invite a particular person. He 
stressed that AJ tries to invite people with different opinions. This particular information by M4 
contradicts with the textual analysis of the debates in this study, as the government speakers were 
absent from most of the debates. Only a small number of government representatives were 
invited, on multiple occasions, whereas a variety of speakers representing the revolution were 
invited.  
M2, M3, M4 and HO were specifically asked on the availability of parties to represent the two 
different sides of topics in the debate programmes. All interviewees stressed the importance of 
being able to present a spectrum of opinions, in both debate programmes and in the news, with 
M4 adding that any oversight will be corrected in subsequent programmes. For example, if one 
opinion is presented in a debate without the opposing view, the other opinion will be presented in 
the next debate. M3 commented that when the guest representing the counter opinion is absent, 
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the moderator often takes that side personally. Elaborating on this selection process, HO 
explained that the general rule for AJ is to approach guest speakers with different ideologies. On 
those occasions that they cannot reach a guest speaker from the opposite side like Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, the Houthis or Bashar, they bring a third party. On this subject, M2 noted AJ’s slogan (the 
opinion and the other opinion
30
), claiming that all programmes should therefore provide at least 
two opinions, that all individuals should be given time to speak, and that AJ strives to ensure that 
all major opinions are present, such as by inviting guest speakers via satellite even when the 
signal quality is poor.  
M3 said that AJ tries to have two or more different points of view in debate programmes and 
news broadcasts. These different views are represented by the guest speakers, or in the 
programme reports, and are evident in the questions: 
So there is always care taken to present the two or more opinions, (if one opinion is not 
presented by a guest), it will at least be included in the report or in the discussion 
questions. If a guest speaker is not present, the moderator will try to ask questions from 
the absent guest speaker’s point of view to challenge the present guest, in order to 
balance the debate. 
(M3) 
M3 added that while AJ had been regularly blamed for only presenting one side of a debate, the 
presence of imbalance was the fault of guest speakers rather than the channel. She cited 
numerous excuses and tactics used by guest speakers, including turning off their mobile phones 
at the last minute or being in countries that no longer deal with the channel. Although the 
interviewees claimed that AJ strives to present all points of view, the textual analysis of this 
study indicates that AJ excluded the government from the majority of its debates as government 
speakers were not present in some debates and when present, almost the same speakers presented 
the government.  
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When M1, HO and M3 were asked about the criteria for the selection of real time guests in 
comparison to those who participate virtually. They all agreed that the selection depends on 
guest availability. M1 elaborated that the selection of speakers is a technical and logistic issue: 
While guest speakers who are in Doha come to AJ, it is difficult to invite those who are in 
places where armed or unarmed conflicts exist, such as in Syria. There are also countries 
where AJ does not have an AJ office, like Egypt. In these cases, AJ hosts the guest 
speakers via satellite, Skype or phone call. 
(M1) 
The debates in this study witnessed some virtual speakers, such as the only female guest, 
Tawakul Karman who spoke virtually. It is assumed that she spoke virtually because she resided 
at a conflict zone, Yemen, and for cultural reasons that made travelling abroad difficult, as she is 
female.  
M1, M2, M3 and HO were asked of whether or not speakers know about the questions prior to 
the debates. All interviewees agreed that the guest speakers are only informed of the main points 
of the debate and so they have no specific knowledge of the questions beforehand. M1 said that 
the guest speaker does not have the right to see the questions, which was supported by HO and 
M2, who explained that questions are made and modified instantly during the debate, which 
means that the moderator is not restricted to specific questions.  
To sum up, feedback was elicited from the interviewees on guest speakers in the debates, which 
uncovered that these participants are drawn from a list of potential candidates that is continually 
updated. They added that AJ strives to include all sides of an issue in each debate, so as to ensure 
that no opinion is excluded. However, they noted that the selection of real-time verses virtual 
speakers is principally dependent on the availability of the speakers, with many being located in 
conflict zones and therefore unable to present in AJ studios. Besides, they agreed that only 
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debate themes and sub-themes are given to guest speakers. The flexibility of the questions during 
the debates also prevents guest speakers from knowing what will be discussed in advance.  
6.2.5 Debate moderators 
The related sub-themes of the debate moderators which were asked to the interviewees were 
control of debate moderation, adherence to debate questions, and standing points to be won at the 
debate.  
The moderators and HO were asked to outline the debate moderation process such as who 
watches the moderator during the debates and what kind of instructions the moderator can get. 
The interviewees all confirmed that the debates are managed by a team in the Control Room who 
communicate with and issues and give instructions to the moderator through an earpiece. 
Examples of these messages from the team are explanations, managing speakers to control time, 
and following up the guest speaker. M2 notes that if the moderator does not pay attention to an 
important comment by the guest speaker, s/he will be reminded and instructed to ask for 
elaboration on that comment: 
maybe you haven’t paid attention to a specific point said by the guest. The guest could 
have deviated from the discussion topic, or a point could need more elaboration, so the 
discussion topic is enhanced or maybe the guest had said something which I hadn’t paid 
enough attention to 
(M2) 
Interestingly, M3 and M4 gave opposing views on the frequency of the instructions: M3 said that 
communication occurs at all times, whereas M4 stated there are few interventions, especially if 
the moderator is experienced.  
M1 and M3 were asked on their adherence to the debate questions. This included such issues as 
whether the moderator is empowered to ask follow up questions, is permitted to deviate from the 
questions, whether each question is rigidly timed, and if it is permissible to cut off speakers. 
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Both M1 and M3 agreed that the moderator controls the debate questions and can therefore ask 
follow up questions or stop a speaker from talking, either because of time limit or when they are 
being aggressive or deviating from the topic. M1 elaborated that the moderator is only given the 
main points, rather than questions, and that they can therefore draft them in the way they deem 
most appropriate: 
The moderator is given the debate topic and sub-topics but not specific questions. 
(M1) 
She added that the moderator cannot change the main themes of the debate. Before entering the 
studio, the moderator and the producer agree on the subtopics. M1 explained that the moderator 
can interrupt guest speakers because they are running over time, or when they are being 
aggressive, provocative, or offensive to other guest speakers. M3 gave benefits of interrupting 
guest speakers such as making use of time which costs a lot and preventing the speakers from 
making use of the channel in prompting their ideas.  
In order to investigate interviewees’ ideologies further, M1, M4 and HO were asked about any 
standing points that they may try to win while moderating programmes. All agreed that a good 
moderator must be neutral. HO admitted that moderators may show bias, but stated that if this 
happens, they will be warned:  
Moderators are human beings so they sometimes violate AJ’s basic policies by not 
sounding neutral. This is unacceptable to us. As we are blamed for the same; we 
therefore follow it up. 
(HO) 
M4 said that nobody is neutral or does not make mistakes, but moderators must try to be 
unbiased. M4 described a professional moderator as one who is able to leave aside their biases, 
because the beliefs of the moderator are not important. Underlining the importance of neutrality, 
M1 agreed that the moderator should not be biased and attempt to retain credibility by refraining 
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from any ideological, political, ethnic, sectarian, religious, or other affiliations. HO said that 
unfortunately moderators sometimes become excited and deviate from neutrality or even breach 
etiquette, but that this is against AJ policy and will result in a formal warning. This was 
supported by the textual analysis of the debates of this study, which showed that moderators had 
good moderation skills, including neutrality in the way they controlled the debates.  
Each of the interviewees provided feedback on the debate moderators and agreed that they are in 
contact with the control room and receive instructions during the course of the debate. However, 
each participant gave different answers on the nature of the instruction, with different 
perspectives: some reporting that the instructions are detailed and others stating that they are 
general. All participants reported that moderators are neutral and do not try to win any ideology 
or side during the debate.  
6.2.6 Discourse of AJ 
The feedback elicited from AJ staff regarding official policies looked at the selection of certain 
vocabulary, exaggeration of the revolution events by AJ (such as the use of language like ‘thugs’ 
and ‘ousted president’), the use of nonstandard Arabic in the debates, and the language used with 
and about women.  
First, M2, M3 and HO were asked of AJ’s policies on the selection of certain vocabulary, 
unanimously agreeing that great care is taken in the selection of the vocabulary to be used. HO 
specified the existence of policies on whether specific words should be chosen, with AJ 
attempting to use neutral language that has no connotations, wherever possible. This position has 
been taken because AJ is a news channel, rather than a political party or a country. AJ staff 
discuss every word and give the specific word or name for a city or organisation. For example, 
the staff call Beijing not Bekin and they call the Islamic State, not Daesh, which was abbreviated 
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by the Islamic State’s enemies, not by the Islamic State itself. M2 stated that he abides by the 
vocabulary instructed by AJ. For example, the channel uses martyr
31
 for someone who dies in 
Palestine, whereas he himself might not use this word when he is outside the channel.  
M3 described AJ’s selection of vocabulary as being based on international standards, adding that 
no racist or offensive words should be used.  
M2, M3 and M4 were questioned about the accusations that AJ received that it contributed to 
inciting protests by exaggerating events such as if 100000 people are participating in a march, AJ 
referred to the figure as a million people
32
. The most notable finding here is that the interviewees 
gave indirect answers with regards to the accusations that AJ incited protesters through 
linguistically exaggerating events. M2 claimed that anyone has the right to criticise AJ in a 
professional, non-offensive manner, way and that criticism helps AJ to improve. In contrast, M3 
felt that there are many criticisms levelled against AJ from those parties who dislike the change 
in the Arab people. M3 added that AJ respects both sides and does not try to hide although there 
are accusations that are not based on any ground: 
There is one side which disliked AJ and didn’t like the way in which these nations 
protested so they took revenge because they hadn’t heard that the Arab person could 
speak out and demand. On the other hand, there is the other side who likes, encourages, 
respects and appreciates what AJ has done. Not all accusations are justified. 
(M3) 
  
M4 gave a different perspective to the accusation, commenting that it can be difficult to give a 
specific answer, because each accusing case would need to be studied in isolation, to determine 
whether it was true. However, he added that it is the protesters who exaggerate the numbers of 
people demonstrating, not the news channel, although he conceded that AJ should probably 
check facts more carefully before reporting any news. When events are exaggerated, then AJ is 
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should therefore not be the only side that is held responsible for the exaggeration. It is obvious 
from the feedback given by M4 that AJ relied on data from the protesters themselves when 
determining the number of protesters. This suggests that AJ was in contact with one side of the 
revolution event and that the government perspective may have been excluded. This finding 
coincides with the CDA analysis of this study.  
M1, M3, M4 and HO were questioned on their views of the use of thugs
33
 and the ousted 
president
34
 by AJ during the Arab revolution. There was universal agreement among the 
participants on the procedure at the channel, namely that the selection of vocabulary is decided 
through official meetings. However, their views of these particular terms varied wildly. M1 said 
AJ calls the President of Egypt the Egyptian President, but AJ Mubasher (AJ live channel), 
whose audience is Egyptian, was saying the president who came as a result of a coup
35
. M1 
stated that she does not represent AJ Mubasher, as she does not work there and she does not 
know how they work, so it is difficult to give her opinion.  
HO said AJ called Ali Abdullah Saleh the ousted president, because a revolution had risen up 
against him and the people of the country wanted to oust him from his position as a president, 
meaning that he had been ousted in reality. He also felt that referring to the snipers who attacked 
the protesters as thugs was a fair reflection of reality, because that is what they were called in 
Yemen and Syria. He said: 
One of our basic rules is that we don’t use names that people don’t use for themselves. 
(HO) 
For this reason, AJ used the terms already being employed by the people involved in that 
particular event. Nevertheless, the concern here is that AJ uses the vocabulary that is 
                                                 
33
 ةيجطلب 
34
 عولحملا سيئرلا 
35
 يبلاقنلإا سيئرلا 
241 
 
representative of one side of the event only and that no attempt was made to ask the other side 
(government) of what terms people were using during the event. For this reason, it can be argued 
that the selection of this vocabulary remains biased.  
M3 said they call the ousted president because he is ousted by the Yemenis, like when a woman 
ousts her husband, divorces him, according to Islamic Shari. She strictly stated: 
Thus, we don’t appease anyone. 
(M3) 
This statement by M3 indicates AJ’s strict policy in the selections of its vocabulary.  
M3 was the only participant who reported that AJ knew about the reference to Ali Abdullah 
Saleh as the ousted president. This is an interesting finding, as the analysis in this study suggests 
that AJ focused its guest speakers on the protesters, rather than involving a balanced panel 
containing adequate numbers of government representatives.  
Feedback was elicited from M2, M3, M4 and HO on the use of nonstandard Arabic in the 
debates. Most interestingly, a range of different answers were elicited from the interviewees 
regarding the use of nonstandard Arabic. While HO denied that some moderators speak 
nonstandard Arabic, adding that the moderator would be warned if this happened, M2 and M4 
admitted that the use of nonstandard Arabic exists, although they personally dislike it. 
Specifically, M2 stated that moderators can use any technique to heat up the debate but disagree 
with them in the matter of using nonstandard Arabic for debate heat-up purpose.  
M3 said that sometimes moderators speak in colloquial Arabic for the sake of solidarity, making 
themselves sound friendlier to the audience, and to communicate in the language that the 
audience understands. M3 added that she does not oppose the occasional use of dialects, as long 
as it is infrequent. This is because she believes that debates should be in standard Arabic, not 
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least because the audience of the channel are used to rational and serious discussions in this form 
of Arabic. M3 agreed that AJ’s policies involve the use of standard Arabic. M3 stated pride in 
the achievements of AJ in raising the awareness of Arabs, especially with regards to making 
them speak about their opinions and ask for their rights. She is also proud of AJ because it 
contributed to making standard Arabic more familiar to the general Arab audience:  
The use of the Arab language is one of AJ’s achievements in the Arab world. We use 
slightly nonstandard Arabic in order to get closer to the audience as the use of standard 
Arabic, can make them perceive us as being distant from them. 
(M3) 
 
In contrast, M4 stated that he does not support the use of nonstandard Arabic, especially in news 
broadcasts and popular debate programmes. The Opposite Direction is an exception to this, 
because it is a talk show, rather than an analytical or political programme. The Al Jazeera 
Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards states that standard Arabic should be used, however 
the interviews show that the moderators do not necessarily adhere to the use of standard Arabic.  
An additional linguistic aspect of the debates that emerged from this study was the use of I 
mean
36
. When asked, M1 and M2 stated that they thought that I mean was just a filler, whereas 
HO warned moderators from using this expression. M1 explained that she thinks I mean 
functions in the way as ellipses, commenting that some people say maybe and some say I mean 
to fill gaps in speech, such as when searching for the right word to use. HO agreed that I mean 
and other colloquial words might slip from moderators, however he stated that the official 
position is that these filler words are not allowed and so moderators are warned when they use 
them.  
                                                 
36
 ينعي 
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M1, M3, M4 and HO were asked about any policies concerning the language used with and 
about women during the debates. All interviewees agreed that AJ treats women in the same way 
as men. M1 added that there is a lack in the presence of women guest speakers:  
 
Politics is a field dominated by men so political space is wider for men than for women. 
This is the reality in the Arab societies where male culture is predominates. 
(M1) 
 
She stated that women’s participation as guest speakers is less because politics is usually 
dominated by men and the Arab world’s culture is also dominated by men. In addition, AJ tries 
to look for women as guest speakers, if they are available. When the topic is about or concerning 
women they will certainly invite women guest speakers. HO stressed that guest speakers are 
selected on the basis of their importance, not their gender, except when the topic of the debate 
itself is about women, when women guest speakers will be given priority. M3 stated that the 
main standard at AJ for choosing an employee or inviting a guest speaker is competence in the 
discussed field. Meanwhile, M4 agreed that there must not be any difference in dealing with 
guest speakers, with all being treated equally and with respect, irrespective of their genders. She 
feels that there is no preferential treatment for women or prejudice against them.  
Finally, the participating staff of the channel were asked about the discourse that is used for the 
debate. All of the participants agreed that AJ has policies on the selection of vocabulary that is 
included in the quality assurance and code of ethics documents, and that this vocabulary is 
decided by a management panel, based on what people typically use during the event. The 
interviewees gave different feedback on AJ’s exaggeration of the surrounding events of the Arab 
revolutions, however, with one moderator admitting that AJ had exaggerated the numbers 
gathering on squares and describing the coverage as sympathetic. Similarly, although the written 
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policies of AJ indicate that only standard Arabic should be used, the participants reported various 
perceptions of the use of nonstandard Arabic, giving the excuse that nonstandard Arabic varieties 
can be used in order to heat up the discussion and to be closer to the audeince. All of the 
interviewees approved that the gender treatment at the channel, for both staff and guest speakers, 
stating that equal treatment means that there is no difference in the way in which language is 
used with both genders.  
6.2.7 AJ debate transcription 
When directing questions, the following subthemes emerged with regards to the debate 
transcription: reasons for transcribing the debates, who transcribes the debates, and discrepancies 
between the actual content of the debates and the transcriptions of each.  
The queries concerning the transcription of the debates were directed to M1, HO and DN. All 
agreed that the reason that AJ transcribes debates is to provide easy access to the content and as a 
viable alternative when the video is unavailable. In this discussion, HO provided the history of 
the transcription: 
Transcription predates the existence of YouTube when there was no chance to watch or 
read the debate again. Despite the availability of YouTube nowadays, AJ continues to 
transcribe the debate programmes as a tradition that it aims to continue with. The main 
aim of the transcription nowadays is for AJ to document its programmes. 
(HO) 
M1 added that AJ transcribes the said debates because a big proportion of the audience does not 
watch programmes that are broadcasted late at night such as The Revolution Talk. Therefore, the 
audience could read the programme later on AJ Net website or on social media. DN linked 
transcription to research by stating that the online transcription of debates is intended to make the 
database easily accessible for researchers, as well as to make the debates available for a wider 
audience, since audio is sometimes unavailable. This statement is true in the context of this study 
as the debates formed the corpus of this study and significantly assisted the research process.  
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A discrepancy was observed in the feedback from M1, HO and DN on who transcribes the 
debates, however. While M1 said that debates are written down by a group of employees in AJ 
Net (in Arabic and English), DN and HO both explained that an external company transcribes the 
debates for AJ. HO added that transcription was done accurately, as per the conditions and 
policies of AJ and the transcription is checked to ensure that it is complete and accurate. DN 
stated that there are policies on how the transcription must be carried out and that these are 
included in their contract with the transcribing company:  
Transcription is carried out by a company via a contract with AJ and according to AJ’s 
conditions and policies. These conditions are accurate and documented by contracts. 
(DN) 
However, when the DN was asked to pass a copy of the policies or contract to the researcher, he 
refused.  
When asked about any discrepancies that may exist between the debate recordings and the 
written transcription, both M1 and HO were shocked to discover that discrepancies exist and 
provided excuses to explain this. M1 attributed the differences between the recording and 
transcription to the use of machines for transcribing the debates, arguing that these machines 
could not replace humans. M1 argued that there are programmes where speakers use Arabic 
dialects, like The Opposite Direction, meaning that the moderator or guest speaker typically 
speaks in dialect, which may be particularly difficult to transfer into standard Arabic. DN 
stressed that AJ does not intentionally modify the transcription and that any difference is a 
human error, rather than an editorial policy. Nevertheless, this study detected 935 discrepancies 
between the chosen debates and the transcription provided by AJ: 68 omissions of the filler I 
mean, 230 omissions of immediately repeated words (one after another), and 637 cases of other 
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discrepancies, which include omissions, substitutions, additions, reordering of the text, and 
spelling mistakes.  
HO was asked for the reasons for AJ videos on YouTube being modified. He attributed the 
trimming to the need to remove inappropriate words: 
In his programme, Faisal al Qassem brings two people and uses all kinds of talk live. It is 
normal that he will throw out words that violate professional, moral, judicial or 
journalistic standards. So, these words must be removed from the broadcast. 
(HO) 
 
Many of these words are evident in Faisal Al-Qassem’s The Opposite Direction programme. To 
support this point, HO added the consequences of the words not being trimmed: 
The viewers don’t have the right to litigate against AJ if the words violate the standard 
morals. However, if the programme is re-broadcast or uploaded online, the viewer has 
the right to take AJ to court. 
(HO) 
 
In summary, if the programme is re-broadcast containing inappropriate words, AJ could be taken 
to court and punished.  
In conclusion, feedback was obtained from AJ staff regarding the transcribed debates that are 
available on the website of the channel. Participants reported that AJ transcribes the debates as a 
tradition, for accessibility and research purposes, although the transcription itself is conducted by 
an independent company rather than the channel. AJ refused to pass a copy of the contract or 
procedure to the researcher, and attributed any discrepancies in the records to the use of 
machines for transcribing the debates. They stressed that AJ does not intentionally alter the 
transcription, although they conceded that culturally, ethically, and religiously inappropriate 
words are trimmed from the texts.  
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 Conclusion 6.3
The most significant finding of the interviews is that when asked about the channel’s policy and 
slogan (the opinion and the other opinion), the interviewees replied with examples about the 
other opinion, rather than the opinion. In their answers, ‘the other’ included Bashar al Assad, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak, Bin Ali and al-Qadhafi. In this way, the interviewees admitted 
that the Arab presidents are considered Al Jazeera’s ‘the other’. The interviewees unanimously 
stated all sides are invited to each debate on their conversation programmes, which conflicts with 
the main finding of the research, namely that the government was excluded from the debates 
with protesters outnumbering government speakers in terms of both number and words. 
Secondly, despite the interviewees’ assertions that moderators are followed up and warned if 
they display bias or speak in nonstandard Arabic, the CDA of this research reveals multiple 
occurrences of nonstandard Arabic being used by moderators. Not all of these instances serve to 
stimulate passionate debate, instead sometimes semantically derogating Saleh from the power he 
had as the president of Yemen during the time of the revolution. Third, the interview findings 
indicate that AJ supports the Arab revolutions and that the channel promoted principles such as 
freedom and liberty, thereby contributing to the inciting of protesters to the extent that M4 stated 
that AJ covered the revolution with ‘much sympathy’. In addition, AJ preferred to use similar 
linguistic terms of the revolution to those used by the protesters at the same time. It also used 
exaggerated descriptions from the protesters, such as the claim of a ‘million’ people 
demonstrating in Egypt, without ensuring the accuracy of the figure.  
The next point is that all of the interviewees agree that the moderator drafts the questions and has 
the power to change them during the debate. No mention was made of editing done to the 
questions, to ensure that the drafting is neutral and is fair to both sides of the debate. This relates 
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to the difference in the answers regarding Qatar’s influence and control of AJ. While M4 
observed that Qatar funds AJ and might therefore have a degree of influence over its strategies 
and agenda, this theory was dismissed by M3 and evaded by M2 who escaped the question. 
Although the interviewees denied the relevance that the director’s background would have on AJ 
policies and practices, one interviewee admitted that Qatar policies control AJ and that the 
decision to appoint a network director from the Qatari royal family serves a political purpose. 
This chapter has presented the analysis conducted of the interviews with AJ staff, which were 
investigated thematically, in order to situate this study within the wider filed of CDA of media 
and political debates. The following themes were explored: interviewees’ experience with AJ, 
AJ’s policies, debate preparation, debate guest speakers, debate moderators, discourse of AJ, and 
AJ’s transcription of debates. Interview responses were discussed based on the various sub-
themes of each of these topics, and key findings were highlighted. Finally, a discussion section 
was presented in which the feedback was discussed and linked to the textual analysis of the 
debates.  
The interviews have demonstrated a limited number of the interviewed staff of AJ but an overall 
agreement and similarities in the feedback received from the staff. The next chapter will compare 
the CDA analysis of the debates against the findings of the corpus analysis and interviews. The 
results will also be compared against the empirical studies examined during the literature review 
phase of this research, with specific reference to those that address media discourse, political 
discourse, and the discourse of women.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
 Introduction 7.1
The preceding chapters (4, 5 and 6) presented a comprehensive analysis of the data obtained by 
the diverse data collection approaches utilised in this study. Chapter four analysed four debates, 
one from each debate programme, using critical discourse analysis, aspects from the van 
Leeuwen model and further linguistic components. In chapter five, the CDA was triangulated 
using computer-assisted corpus analysis that incorporated the entire study corpus of 
transcriptions from fifteen debates. Finally, chapter six analysed the interviews conducted with 
AJ staff, which enabled their perceptions to be compared against the debate analysis.  
This chapter begins by discussing the conclusions of this study by discussing the major findings 
of the research. This process involves comparison of the CDA with the corpus analysis, as well 
as with the analysis of the interviews. This is followed by a brief commentary on the 
representation of women in the debates, focusing on the use of discourse by Tawakul Karman, 
the only female debate guest speaker. The results of the study are then compared with the 
empirical research and recommendations are included in for further research.  
 Conclusions  7.2
This study investigated the use of discourse in understanding power relationships in the Arab 
world, with particular emphasis on the ideologies held by Arab media and politics. At the time 
that this study commenced, the Arab revolutions were some of the leading events in the Arab 
region. For the purpose of this study, all of the political debates of the 2011-2012 Yemeni 
revolution staged at AJ were selected. These debates represented Arab media and political 
discourse, which has not been widely studied. The main data analysis methodology utilised was 
CDA, which was employed in conjunction with one debate from each debate program. Analysis 
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was triangulated by computer-based corpus analysis. Finally, the interviews that were conducted 
with AJ staff enabled the analysis to be compared against the perception of the channel.  
The most significant finding of CDA was that AJ excluded the government from its debates. 
Less government speakers were invited compared to the protesters and so they spoke less.The 
notions that emerged from the analysis were revolution, the people of Yemen, protesters, Saleh, 
regime, army, fighting and Gulf Initiative. The findings of the analysis indicated that AJ and the 
protesters shared similar ideological intentions, sometimes even using the same linguistic 
aspects. However, the ideological intentions of AJ were shown to bear little similar to those of 
the government.  
Results obtained by the computer analysis correlated with those of the CDA3.2.4w. Firstly, the 
cared notions that emerged from the CDA are the most frequent content keywords derived from 
the computer analysis. Additionally, the context in which these words were used was similar. 
Thirdly, corpus analysis asserted that AJ had excluded the government from its debates, only 
providing an opportunity for official representatives to produce fewer words of those produced 
by the protesters. This meant that the government was prevented from being able to linguistically 
reach its ideological intentions. Both analyses concluded that AJ and protesters shared the same 
ideological intentions. For instance, they used Saleh with negative connotation, derogated his 
presidency power, and assigned him negative roles. Even when AJ addressed Saleh as 
‘president’, the context in which this usage occurred was negative. Unlike the other groups, the 
government expressed solidarity with Saleh, by calling him ‘brother’ ‘the brother president’ or 
‘the brother Ali Abdullah Saleh’, an accepted use in Arabic to show closeness and camaraderie.  
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Another similarity that was found between the ideologies of AJ and the protesters was evident in 
the use of the word ‘Yemen’. Unsurprisingly, the government accorded the name of the country 
with a patriotic role and good future, whereas speakers from AJ and protesters both gave 
‘Yemen’ a passive role, indicating no censorship of the events in Yemen. Similarly, ‘the 
revolution’ was shown to collocate with the social actor ‘the youth’ among speakers from AJ and 
the protesters. This suggests that they were granting an ownership of the revolution by ‘the 
youth’, implying that they initiated and controlled the revolution and were therefore empowered 
to make decisions. Both analyses proved that the protesters remained relatively unclear about the 
Gulf Initiative, in terms of either being fully against it, or even regarding a modified version of 
the initiative. Overall, the results of the analysis show that AJ was distributing subtle political 
propaganda order to achieve its aims, primarily the exclusion of the government, which were ‘the 
other’ for AJ. Matching results of the CDA and corpus analysis ensures that the CDA was 
objective and came up with solid conclusions.  
However, the interview results did not correlate with the analysis. Overall, AJ staff unanimously 
expressed the opinion that the channel is neutral, which was justified by claiming that all points 
of views were included, that the channel does not exclude ‘the other’, that it makes every effort 
to abide by its slogan ‘the opinion and the other opinion’, that there are no underlying political 
intentions, and that the channel adheres to its strict quality standards and code of conduct. The 
interviewees added that AJ followed a rigorous system for conducting debates that includes a 
process that monitors moderators during debates. This conflicts with the linguistic analysis of the 
debates. The evidence suggests that the channel considered the Arab president to be ‘the other’ in 
this context. Accordingly, the government (‘the other’) was excluded from the debates, enabling 
the channel to support its ideological intentions, which resembled those carried by the protesters. 
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It can be argued that by giving more speaking opportunities to one side than the other, implies 
hidden propaganda, effectively suggesting that AJ was speaking on behalf of the protesters. This 
mismatch between the analysis and the interviews entailed controversy in AJ practices and 
potentially even suggests that AJ holds a degree of responsibility for the exaggeration and 
progress of the Arab revolutions. If this is the case, then AJ did not follow its slogan or adhere to 
its stated quality standards.  
On the subject of the use of discourse by and with women, the conclusion implied by these 
findings is that the discourse used by AJ female moderators did not signify any feminine-like 
language. Their discourse strategies and sociolinguistic functions by the female moderators do 
not differ from those by their male counterparts. When interviewed, the female moderators of AJ 
stated that the channel did not make any distinction between a female and male moderator, and 
that it treats its staff equally.  
The discourse produced by Tawakul, the only female guest speaker, indicated that while 
Tawakul seems to have used hedges to convince the audience of her sensible realistic arguments, 
there were also observable emotional occurrences of discourse by using more appeals to religion 
and more idiomatic discourse. Religious terms are an effective way to create emotional 
resonance with the primarily Arab audience, who hold strong ties to religion as a way of life. 
These occurrences seem to indicate that the discourse of Tawakul revealed passion about the 
events of the revolution, as if the overthrow of Saleh was a religious demand. She also made 
extensive use of exaggerated adjectives and adverbs which were more emotional in tone than 
those used by her male counterparts. These language choices are inappropriate for political 
discourse, especially when the language was colloquial and added no ideological power to the 
meaning. Most significantly, Ali Al-Dhofairi (moderator of the In Depth debate), realised 
253 
 
Tawakul’s emotional use of discourse, as evident when he abruptly stopped her from speaking 
and admonished her that, ‘This is not an emotional subject’. To conclude, Tawakul was the only 
female guest speaker in the debates, and her emotional use of discourse is implied through her 
reference to religion and use of idioms.  
Although AJ caused a media revolution in the Arab world by diverting from the accepted 
orthodoxy in the traditional Arab media, it faithfully follows the lead of governments. In effect, 
AJ showed that they do not accept ‘the other’, the governments. However, as with the local 
media, AJ only provides one stance, although in this study the position of bias is that of the 
protestors. By siding with the protesters, AJ can be said to have moved from its position of 
supposed neutrality and violated its slogan, ‘the opinion and the other opinion’.           
 Comparison with empirical research  7.3
In the following, this research is compared and contrasted against the empirical studies that are 
most relevant to the contributions of this study. This comparison is divided into three main areas: 
media discourse, political discourse and gender.  
7.3.1 Media discourse  
Through study of the discourse of AJ, this study contributes significant findings, as there is a 
relative paucity of research into the linguistic role of media in shaping political protests and 
social resistance, especially that of the discourse of AJ. This is despite the fact that AJA is the 
most popular and influential network in the Arab region and is the main source of news for 
native Arabic speakers. Another significant contribution of this research is that it utilised an 
authentic contemporary corpus that has not been previously investigated, namely the Yemeni 
revolution discourse of AJ. A careful review of literature indicated the absence of empirical 
CDA research with regards to the discourse of the Yemeni revolution staged at AJ. For instance, 
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Fahmy and Al Emad (2011) investigated the differences between AJA and AJE in their news 
coverage. Although their findings indicated that AJ was ideological in its coverage, the focus of 
their research was on the differences between the two channels operating in two languages. The 
study carried out by Barkho (2011) was closer to that of the current research, as it attempted to 
investigate the ways in which the internal guidelines of AJ sustained its ideologies in the shaping 
of news narratives. The findings of CDA in the current research support those by Barkho, 
concluding that AJ was shown to use its organisational power in dissimilating and inculcating its 
ideology and viewpoints during the Middle East conflict. Interviews with AJ staff here contradict 
the findings by Barkho and the CDA analysis of this research, as interviewees claimed the 
channel maintained neutrality in its discourse. This claim contrasted with the outcomes of the 
linguistic analysis, which suggested that the discourse by the channel is actually ideological. This 
means that, while Barkho’s study used AJ’s internal guidelines and this research used AJ’s 
discourse in political debates, both studies yielded similar findings with regards to the 
ideological strands of the channel. 
The findings of this research on the ideological strands of media correlate not only with those 
carried out in the context of the Arab world but with international media. It coincides with the 
study, for instance, by Hardman (2008) who found that British newspapers use a series of 
strategies to evaluate political leaders and their decisions, enabling the media organisations to 
achieve their ideologies. Another example is the recent study by Hodges (2015), who concludes 
that media hides assumptions within discourse.  
Another significant contribution of this research to the area of media discourse is the use of 
computer software in analysing Arabic corpus. This approach has not been widely used in 
empirical studies. For example, in a comprehensive analysis of religious metaphors, El-Sharif 
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(2011) did not use computer software for the concordances of the media discourse, claiming that 
no software was capable of analysing Arabic. However, the current study contends that this is 
not the case, instead encouraging further research in Arabic media corpus by guiding researchers 
to the use of AntConc software for wordlists, concordances and collocations. This, by itself, not 
only encourages but also enhances the research of Arabic corpus, providing accurate and rapid 
analysis results.  
A further contribution of this research is to the linguistic analysis, which was achieved by 
interviewing those AJ staff members who deal with debates. The majority of CDA studies limit 
their scope to the linguistic analysis; the current study has provided deeper analysis through 
comparison of insider perspectives and the discourse used by the channel. Although 
investigations have been carried out into the ideological strands of media, including those of AJ, 
complementing the analysis by conducting interviews with the journalists who actually produce 
the discourse was significant, especially that the results did not correlate. This raises remarks of 
whether the channel is aware of its ideologies and whether concealing these ideologies is pre-
planned with its staff. This is especially noteworthy given that the researcher was not included in 
the selection of the interviewed staff and that the selection was made by the channel only. It is 
also interesting to note that all staff gave almost identical answers.  
Overall, the results of this study agree with the findings of extant CDA research on media 
discourse, showing that the discourse of media is often ideological. However, this study bridges 
the gap in literature through a study of the discourse of AJ on the struggle during the Yemeni 
revolution. By studying the link between AJ’s motto “the opinion and the other opinion” and the 
discourse used by AJ, this study has contributed to testing whether or not AJ is a controversial 
channel, as it has been accused of being in the literature. In addition, this study analysed the 
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Arabic language using van Leeuwen’s (2008, 2009) social actor network model. A careful 
review of literature indicated that no studies have employed this framework in the examination 
of Arabic discourse, meaning that this study is the first to analyse Arabic using the social actor 
network CDA model. This study demonstrated the effectiveness of this model in detecting the 
ideological strands of Arabic language.  
7.3.2 Political discourse 
In addition to its contribution to the examination of Arabic media discourse, this study 
contributed to the investigation of political discourse related to the Yemeni revolution, which is 
an area that has been neglected by linguistic research. A careful review of literature found few 
studies on the political debates of revolution discourse. The political discourse of the Yemeni 
revolution is contemporary and is continuing until the date of submitting this dissertation, with 
the political unrest in Yemen deteriorating due to the involvement of many parties, such as Al 
Qaeda, ISIL, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saleh’s forces, following his resignation from power in 
2012.  
In addition, the revolution discourse studied in the literature utilised frameworks other than that 
used for this research. For example, Tileaga (2008) used a critical discursive approach to analyse 
the political discourses of the Romanian revolution. This study therefore contributes to the 
literature of revolution discourse by utilising the social actor network CDA framework devised 
by van Leeuwen (2008, 2009). By using this framework, it was possible to reveal the explicit as 
well as the implicit ideological intentions of the debate speakers. This has clearly illustrated the 
extent to which Arab political discourse can be rich in hidden ideological strands. Revealing 
implicit intentions is especially valuable in discourse of this kind, as politicians tend to conceal 
information in political forums (Shenhav, 2017). 
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The closest study to the discourse genre and source of the current research was conducted by 
Albirini (2011), who studied diglossia in the political debates staged at AJA. Diglossia here 
denotes the shifts between standard Arabic and dialectical Arabic. In terms of scope of the 
linguistic tools used by politicians using Arabic discourse, this study is larger and contributes 
more findings, such as the representation of social actors, repetitions, idioms and dysphemism. 
Another study on the ideology of political discourse was conducted by Atawneh (2009), who 
studied the headlines of 428 reports to examine how the discourse of the Israelis and Palestinians 
mirrors the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Atawneh concluded that politicians use 
threats to demonstrate power (ibid). These findings are similar to those of the current study, 
which concluded that threatening language was made by the protesters against the president and 
government of Yemen. Similarly, ‘threatening’ and ‘appealing’ were two of the sociolinguistic 
functions of the discourse of AJ and the protesters, which aimed to threaten Saleh and his 
regime, supporting the findings of similar research (Dunmire, 2005; Johansson, 2006). Besides, 
the protesters appealed to the international community to be in their side and not support Saleh. 
This study contributes significant understanding of the use of threatening as a linguistic device, 
which has not been studied before in Arabic language in the context of the Yemeni revolution.  
The findings of this study agree with those of Iiie (2009) in that political forms of address 
constitute ideologies held by the politicians. In the current study, the way in which Saleh was 
addressed by AJ was similar to the way used by the protesters, which differed profoundly from 
the way in which he was referred to by the government representatives. Both AJ and the 
protesters gave primarily negative reference to Saleh, such as ‘the man’ and ‘the ousted 
president’. Even on those occasions when AJ provided a neutral reference, such as ‘the Yemeni 
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president Ali Abdullah Saleh’, the reference was made in a context that was negative. Overall, 
the forms of address used by all parties were shown to serve their intended political ideologies.  
An important notion that emerged, which was important for all data groups (AJ, protestors, 
government), was ‘the people of Yemen’. This concept is similar to that of ‘nation’ in the study 
by Shenhav (2004), as both refer to those individuals ruled by the regime. Findings of this study 
indicate that all groups, AJ, protesters and government gave ‘the Yemeni people’ a passivated 
role which mainly shows them as victims. In addition, the protesters praised, empowered and 
glorified ’the Yemeni people’, in so doing making most of them in their discourse. Victimizing 
the people of Yemen shows sympathy and care from the side of the political speakers, potentially 
including the people in the side of the speaking politician.  
The ideological function of the political framing ‘us’ and ‘them’ was the product of many 
empirical studies discussed in the literature review of this research. These studies include those 
of Buckingham (2013), Carvalho (2011), Guillem (2009), Jaworski and Galasinski (2000), 
Leudar et al. (2004), Mazid (2007), Oddo (2011), Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010), and Tileaga 
(2008). The overall findings of these studies reveal a positive self-representation while negative 
other-representation, which correlates with the findings of this research. The differentiation 
examples from the selected debates clearly illustrated that among the ‘other’ representation by 
the government are ‘they’, ‘the members’, ‘innocent killers gangs’ and ‘the others’, all of which 
refer to the protesters or opposition. From the other position, the protesters used ‘Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’, ‘the ousted’, ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons’, ‘dictator’, ‘the killers’, ‘the thieves’, ‘the 
president’, ‘president Saleh’, ‘the ruler’, ‘Ali Saleh’ and ‘he’ in reference to ‘the other’, namely 
Saleh and his family. These references uncover the ideologies held by each of the political 
parties in the AJ debates.  
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The results of this study support the use of ‘abolition discourse’, which means the use of 
traumatic past as a strategy to convince the audience regarding the topic (Waterton and Wilson, 
2009). In this research, the protesters referred to traumatic past events that had occurred in 
Yemen during Saleh’s reign, likely in an attempt to distort his image and to therefore convince 
others that he should abdicate power. This study therefore contributes an Arabic political context 
to the literature that demonstrates the use of tragic or unpleasant past events as a linguistic tool 
utilised by politicians to negatively represent their opponents.  
The findings of this research support the empirical literature, such as the study by Badarneh 
(2010), which discusses the use of religion by AJ and the representatives of the protesters to 
achieve various sociolinguistic functions, including ideological propaganda. The speakers used 
Quranic and prophetic hadith as their religious sources in achieving their specific propaganda 
aims. ‘Distorting regime’s image’, ‘threatening Saleh’, ‘inciting protesters’ and ‘glorifying the 
revolution’ were among the top ideological functions achieved by referring to religion in this 
research. Religious quotations are extremely influential among the Arab majority, as they hold 
strong Islamic beliefs. 
However, the results of this study contradict those of Simon-Vandenbergen (2008), who 
concluded that remarks on the private lives of opponents are generally intended to lower their 
credibility and ultimately damage their public face. In contrast, the current study noted that 
opponents did not refer to each other’s private lives in the debates, and therefore ‘private life’ 
was not a linguistic device used to achieve ideological strands in this research. A justification 
here is that in the Arab Muslim culture, it is considered extremely sensitive to address details of a 
person’s family life such as his wife or attitude; therefore these were not touched upon in the 
debates. 
260 
 
This research has supported the findings of previous empirical studies which argue that the 
ideology concealed by political discourse can be best investigated by CDA triangulated by 
corpus analysis. Ample evidence has been found to suggest that the vast majority of politicians 
manipulate and hide propaganda intentions in their discourse. This is supported by the study of 
Cheng and Yao (2016), who concluded that the dynamics of power distance, including the 
ideological stance, can best be investigated by a methodological synergy of corpus linguistics 
and CDA.  
7.3.3 Gender  
This study contributed to the examination of the discourse of women in the Arab world. 
According to Sadiqi (2003), the Arab Islamic world merely witnesses studies in language and 
gender. This is typically evident with the CDA studies on gender of Arabic language. An initial 
and comprehensive review found no literature on the discourse used with or by women during 
the Yemeni revolutions. In addition to addressing this lack, the current study contributed to 
findings related to the discourse of AJ female moderators and the discourse of the female guest 
speaker Tawakul Karman. The study of Tawakul’s discourse is particularly significant, as few 
studies can examine the discourse of female Arab politicians given the extremely limited level 
female participation in politics in the Arab world. The findings of this study contradicted those of 
Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013), who showed under-representation of the female gender, unlike this 
study that suggested no difference in the way in which language was used with women.  
However, this study supports the findings of Hess-Luttich (2007), who used CDA to determine 
that men make more interruptions than women in political talks on television. During the textual 
analysis of the debate on the Behind the News programme, Yasir (male government guest 
speaker) interrupted Tawakul (female protesters guest speaker) twice, whereas Tawakul did not 
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interrupt Yasir at all. Even when talking to Fairouz (the debate moderator), Yasir interrupted 
Fairouz 26 times, whereas Fairouz only interrupted him 17 times. 
Another important finding is the suggestion that Tawakul appealed to the emotions of the 
audience through the use of religious discourse and idiomatic language. Her discourse was also 
characterized for being emotional, as she described the themes of glory and triumph rather than 
focusing on the questions directed to her. Additionally, by interviewing the female staff of AJ, 
this study illustrates the ways in which the channel perceives female guest speakers, in terms of 
selection and the use of discourse. Both the interviews and the linguistic analysis suggest that AJ 
deals with its guest speakers with equality, irrespective of their gender. However, the debates 
featured a poor level of female participation in terms of guest speakers on the topic of the Arab 
revolutions. This was exacerbated by the only female taking part showing more emotional 
discourse than her male counterparts. In addition, a review of AJ’s Code of Ethics and, Quality 
Assurance and Editorial Standards suggested no gender bias in the channel’s policies.  
 Recommendations for further research  7.4
This section provides recommendations for further research. This study has contributed 
significant findings on the discourse used by media and politicians in the Arab world, 
specifically within the context of revolutions. The study used the revolution discourse staged live 
on the AJ channel, which is the most popular and trusted news network in the region. The 
corresponding ideological intentions of media and politicians were analysed using CDA in an 
attempt to uncover the interests and power relations in the context, which in turn conceal the 
ideologies and values underlying discourse. 
Analysis was triangulated by corpus analysis and complemented by the perceptions of AJ staff. 
Discourse of AJA was used because this channel is an authentic source of news and is held to be 
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representative of media in the Arabic region. However, while AJ is a trusted source of news and 
events for an extremely broad cross-section of the population, it might be useful for future 
studies to consider a combined debate corpus of a competing channel. One such option could be 
Al Arabiya, a Saudi owned news channel, which has been described as “a counter-missile 
directed at the Qatari news channels” due to its focus on those areas that are not well explored by 
Al Jazeera, such as the relationship between Qatar and Israel (Fandy, 2007). Optionally, instead 
of focusing on the content produced by foreign TV channels, future studies could utilise debates 
aired on local Yemeni television channels, comparing the findings against the programmes of 
foreign channels like Al Jazeera or even western broadcasters. Bearing in mind the politically 
deteriorating situation of Yemen after the revolution, which has evolved into widespread war and 
famine, it would be significantly valuable to study the current discourses. This could provide 
powerful insights into topics such as how AJ or other channels report the events or how 
politicians defend their ideological stands. 
In addition, future studies could benefit from following multimodality as the CDA framework by 
considering images of the television debates, as images constitute ideological assumptions and 
have not been widely addressed in the literature at the time of writing. This may be attributed to 
the fact that the popularity of the study of images as a discourse type has only recently emerged. 
For this reason, a relative paucity of research exists on debate photography and imagery, 
meaning that despite the potentially enormous contribution of image discourse to political 
debates, the area remains largely unexplored (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). It has been 
argued that critical multimodal discourse analysis can effectively draw the political ideologies 
infused widely in culture (David and van Leeuwen, 2016). Furthermore, the impacts of the use of 
language, images, layout and organisation may be significant in this area of media and politics, 
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so would benefit from studies using multimodal analysis. Additionally, time was not considered 
as a variable due to the inherent limitations of this doctoral dissertation. However, a study of the 
ways in which the discourse of media channels such as Al Jazeera change over time may offer 
valuable research avenues. Most importantly, a recent study of the role played by the media in 
shaping media and political discourse with regards to the ‘Syrian Spring’ by Ayasrah (2015) 
warned that wartime translators tend to manipulate the translated message in order to serve their 
own ideologies. Therefore, it is recommended that a future study be conducted into the 
ideologies sustained by Arab media organizations based on the translation of discourse, as this 
could be a valid and important topic for research. 
 
264 
 
 References 
 
Al Shroof, A., 2015. Interviews on AJ debate practices [Interview] 2015. 
Alaghbary, G. S., 2014. The United States' reaction to teh Arab Spring: a critical stylistic 
analysis. Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict, 2(1), pp. 151-175. 
Al-Ali, M. N., 2006. Religious affiliations and masculine power in Jordanian wedding invitation 
genre. Discourse & Society, 17(6), pp. 691-714. 
Al-Azn, S., 2014. Arab nationalism, islamism and the Arab uprisings. In: The new Middle East: 
protest and revolution in the Arab world. Cambridge: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, pp. 
273-284. 
Albirini, A., 2011. The sociolinguistic functions of codeswitching between standard Arabic and 
dialectal Arabic. Language in Society, 40(50), pp. 537-562. 
Amar, P., 2011. Discourses of 'men in crisis': industries of gender in revolution. Journal of 
Middle East Women's Studies, 7(3), pp. 36-62. 
Archakis, A. & Tsakona, V., 2010. 'The wolf wakes up inside them, grows werewolf hair ad 
reveals all their bullying': the representation of parliamentary discourse in Greek newspapers. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 42(4), pp. 912-923. 
Atawneh, A. M., 2009. The discourse of war in the Middle East: analysis of media reporting. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 41(2), pp. 263-278. 
Attar, M., 2012. A critical discourse analysis of the 'GM Nation'? public debate. [Online]  
Available at: https://theses.ncl.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/10443/1399/1/Attar12.pdf 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Ayasrah, B. M. F., 2015. The role of translation in shaping media and political discourses in 
times of conflict: the Syrian ''Spring'' in context. [Online]  
Available at: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.681232 
[Accessed 2016]. 
Ayyad, A. Y., 2012. Uncovering ideology in translation: a case study of Arabic and Hebrew 
translations of teh 'Road Plan'. Journal of Language and Politics, 11(2), pp. 250-272. 
Badarneh, M. A., Migdadi, F. & Momani, K., 2010. Intertextual borrowing in ideologically 
competing discourses: the case of the Middle East. Journal of Intercultural Communication, 
Issue 22. 
Baker, M., 1992. In other words: a coursebook on translation. London: ROUTLEDGE. 
265 
 
Baker, M., 2007 a. Patterns of idiomaticity in translated vs. non translated text. The Study of 
Language and Translation, 22(2), pp. 11-21. 
Baker, M., 2007 b. Reframing conflict in translation. SOCIAL SEMIOTICS, 17(2), pp. 151-168. 
Baker, M., 2010 a. Interpreters and translators in the war zone: narrated and narrators. The 
Narrator, 16(2), pp. 197-222. 
Baker, M., 2010 b. Narratives of terrorism and security: 'accurate' translations, suspicious 
frames. Critical Studies on Terrorims, 3(3), pp. 347-364. 
Baker, M. & Maier, C., 2011. Ethics in interpreter & translator training. The Interpreter and 
Translator Trainer, 5(1), pp. 1-14. 
BAKER, P., 2007. Using corpora in discourse analysis. London: Continuum. 
BAKER, P., 2010. Corpus methods in linguistics. In: Research methods in linguistics. London: 
Continuum, pp. 93-116. 
Barkho, L., 2011. The role of internal guidlines in shaping news narratives: ethnographic insights 
into the discursive rhetoric of Middle east reporting by the BBc and Al-Jazeera English. Critical 
Discourse Studies, 8(4), pp. 297-309. 
Baxter, J., 2010. Discourse-analytic approaches to text and talk. In: Research methods in 
linguistics. London: Continuum, pp. 117-134. 
Bednarek, M. & Caple, H., 2012. News discourse. London: continuum. 
Bednarek, M. & Caple, H., 2013. Why do news values matter? Towards a new methodological 
framework for analysing news discourse in critical discourse analysis and beyond. Discourse & 
Society, 2(1), pp. 1-24. 
Billig, M. & MacMillan, K., 2005. Metaphor, idiom and ideology: the search for 'no smoking 
guns' across time. Discourse & Society, 16(4), pp. 459-480. 
Bloor, M. & Bloor, T., 2007. The practice of critical discourse analysis: an introduction. 
London: Hodder Arnold. 
Breeze, R., 2011. Critical discourse analysis and its critics. International Pragmatics 
Association, 21(4), pp. 493-525. 
Buckingham, L., 2013. Mixed messages of solidarity in the Miditerranean: Turkey, the EU and 
the Spanish press. Discourse & Society, 24(2), pp. 186-207. 
Carabine, J., 2001. Unmarried motherhood 1830-1990: a genealogical analysis. In: Discourse as 
data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 267-310. 
266 
 
Carvalho, M., 2011. How the war was sold: a critical discourse analysis of Time Magazine 
articles on the war on Iraq prior to the occupation. [Online]  
Available at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/547/ 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Chiluwa, I., 2012. Social media networks and the discourse of resistance: a sociolinguistic CDA 
of Biafra online discourses. Discourse & Society, 23(3), pp. 217-244. 
Day, S. W., 2011. Regionalism and rebellion in Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Don, Z. M. & Lee, C., 2014. Representing immigrants as illegals, threats and victims in 
Malaysia: elite voices in the media. Discourse & Soceity, 25(6), pp. 687-705. 
Dunmire, P. L., 2005. Preempting the future: rhetoric and ideology of the future in political 
discourse. Discourse & Society, 16(4), pp. 481-513. 
Edley, N., 2001. Analysing masculinity: interpretive repertoires, ideological dilemmas and 
subject positions. In: Discourse as data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 
189-228. 
Edwards, G. O., 2012. A comparative discourse analysis of the construction of 'in-groups' in the 
2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British National party. Discourse & Society, 23(3), pp. 245-
258. 
El-Nawawy, M. & Iskandar, A., 2003. Al-Jazeera: the story of the network that is rattling 
governments and redefining modern journalism. Cambridge: Westview Press. 
El-Sharif, A., 2011. A linguistic study of Islamic religious discourse: conceptual metaphors in 
the prophetic tradition. [Online]  
Available at: https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/2417 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Ezeifeka, C. R. & Osakwe, N. N., 2013. Gender representation in the 1999 Nigerian constitution: 
a critical discourse analysis for socio-political equity. Discourse & Society, 24(6), pp. 687-700. 
Fahmy, S. S. & Al Emad, M., 2011. Al-Jazeera vs Al-Jazeera: a comparison of the network's 
English and Arabic online coverage of the US/Al Qaeda conflict. International Communication 
Gazette, 73(3), pp. 216-232. 
Fairclough, I. & Fairclough, N., 2012. Political discourse analysis: a method for advanced 
students. London: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Fairclough, N., 2001a. Language and power. London: Longman. 
267 
 
Fairclough, N., 2001b. The discourse of new labour: critical discourse analysis. In: Discourse as 
data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 229-266. 
Fairclough, N., 2007. Critical discourse analysis as a method in social sceintific research. In: 
Methods of critical discourse analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 121-138. 
Fairclough, N., 2008. Analysing discourse: textual analysis for research. London: Routledge: 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
Flowerdew, J. & Leong, S., 2010. Presumed knowledge in the discursive construction of socio-
political and cultural identity. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(8), pp. 2240-2252. 
Foucault, M., 1972. The archaeology of knowledge & the discourse of language. New York: 
PANTHEON BOOKS. 
Frumuselu, M. & IIlie, C., 2010. Pseudo-parliamentary discourse in a communist dictatorship: 
dissenter Parvulescu vs. dictator Ceausescu. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(4), pp. 924-942. 
Gadavanij, S., 2002. Discursive strategies for political survival: a critical discourse analysis of 
Thai no-confidence debates. [Online]  
Available at: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/803/1/uk_bl_ethos_270747.pdf 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Gee, J. P., 2005. An introduction to discourse analysis: theory and method. London: Routledge: 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
Gelvin, J. L., 2012. The Arab uprisings: what everyone needs to know. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Guillem, S. M., 2009. Argumentation, metadiscourse and social cognition: organizing knowledge 
in political communication. Discourse & Society, 20(6), pp. 727-746. 
Hammond, A., 2007. Populat culture in the Arab World: arts, politics, and the media. Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo. 
Hardman, D., 2008. Political ideologies and identity in British newspaper discourse. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10601/1/Political_Ideology_and_Identity_in_British_Newspaper
_Discourse.pdf 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Hess-Luttich, E., 2007. (Pseudo-) Argumentation in TV-debates. Journal of Pragmatics, 39(8), 
pp. 1360-1370. 
268 
 
Horton-Salway, M., 2001. The construction of M.E.: the discursive action model. In: Discourse 
as data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 147-188. 
IIie, C., 2009. Strategic uses of parliamentary forms of address: the case of teh UK parliament 
and the Swedish Riksdag. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(4), pp. 885-911. 
Ingramz, H., 2007. Yemen: Imams, presidents and revolutions. Sanaa: Library of Assadiq Center. 
Jager, S., 2007. Discourse and knowledge: theoritical and methodological aspects of a critical 
discourse and dispositive analysis. In: Methods of critical discourse analysis. Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, pp. 32-62. 
Jaworski, A. & Galasinski, D., 2000. Vocative address forms and ideological legitimizqation in 
political debates. Discourse Studies, 2(1), pp. 35-53. 
Jewitt, C. & Bezemer, J., 2010. Multimodal analysis: key issues. In: Research methods in 
linguistics. London: Continuum, pp. 180-196. 
Johansson, M., 2006. Constructing objects of discourse in the broadcast political interview. 
Journal of pragmatics, 38(2), pp. 216-229. 
Johnson, K. A. et al., 2010. Interjournalistic discourse about African Americans in television 
news coverage of Horricane Katrina. Discourse & Communication, 4(3), pp. 243-261. 
Kadri, A., 2014. A depressive pre-Arab uprisings economic performance. In: The new Middle 
east: protest and revolution in the Arab world. Cambridge: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS, pp. 80-106. 
Karimaghaei, Z. & Kasmani, M. B., 2013. The representation of social actors in TOP NOTCH 
2A and 2B. Asian Journal of Social Sceinces and Humanities, 2(1), pp. 27-38. 
Kawakib, A.-M., 2016. Discourse change in a changing society: a critical discourse analysis of 
political advertisement in Jordan before and after the Arab Spring. CIRCULO de Linguistica 
Aplicada a la Communication, 65(3), pp. 1-41. 
Kennedy, G., 1998. An introduction to corpus linguistics. London: Longman. 
Komlosi, L. I. & Tarrosy, I., 2010. Presumptive arguments turned into a fallacy of 
presumptuousness: pre-election debates in a democracyof promises. Journal of Pragmatics, 
42(4), pp. 957-972. 
Lahlali, E. M., 2003. Moroccan classroom discourse and critical discourse analysis: the impact 
of social and cultural practice. [Online]  
Available at: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/451/1/uk_bl_ethos_396583.pdf 
[Accessed 2014]. 
269 
 
Lassen, I., 2008. The red gold: analysing a nexus of practices. Critical Discourse Studies, 5(1), 
pp. 1-9. 
Leudar, I., Marsland, V. & Nekvapil, J., 2004. On membership categorization: 'us' and 'them' and 
'doing violence' in political discourse. Discourse & Society, 15(2), pp. 243-266. 
Macagno, F. & Walton, D., 2010. What we hide in words: emotive words and persuasive 
definitions. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(7), pp. 1997-2013. 
Maingueneau, D., 2006. Is discourse analysis critical?. Critical Discourse Studies, 3(2), pp. 229-
235. 
Matthews, R. H., 2007. Oxford concise dictionary of linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Mazid, . B.-e., 2007. Presuppositions and strategic functions in Bush's 20/9/2001 speech. Journal 
of Language and Politics, 6(3), pp. 351-375. 
McEnery, T. & Xiano, Y., 2006. Corpus-based language studies: an advanced resource book. 
New York: Routledge. 
Meyer, M., 2007. Between theory, methods and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA. 
In: Methods of critical discourse analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 14-31. 
Norman, P., 2012. What place has grammar in the English curriculum? an analysis of ninety 
years'policy debate: 1921 to 2011. [Online]  
Available at: https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk//handle/10026.1/1180 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Norton, J. E. & Gieve, S., 2010. The erasure of linguistic difference in media representations of 
encounters with others on British television. Language Awareness, 19(3), pp. 205-225. 
Nuolijarvi, P. & Tiittula, L., 2011. Irony in political television debates. Journal of Pragmatics, 
43(2), pp. 572-587. 
Oddo, J., 2011. War legitimation discourse: representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US prsidential 
addresses. Discourse & Society, 22(3), pp. 287-314. 
Officers, A., 1993. Secrets and documents of teh Yemeni Revolution. Sharja: Arabian Cultural 
House. 
Oktar, L. & Kansu-Yetkiner, N., 2012. Different times, different themses in Lady Chatterley's 
lover: a diachronic critical discourse analysis of translator's prefaces. Neohelicon, 39(2), pp. 337-
364. 
270 
 
Pasha, T., 2011. Islamists in the headlines: critical discourse analysis of the representation of the 
Muslim brotherhood in Egyptian newspapers. [Online]  
Available at: http://content.lib.utah.edu/utils/getfile/collection/etd3/id/163/filename/17.pdf 
[Accessed 2014]. 
Rashidi, N. & Souzandehfar, M., 2010. A critical discourse analysis of the debates between 
republicans and democrats over the continuation of war in Iraq. The Journal of Linguistic and 
Intercultural Education, 1(3), pp. 55-78. 
Richards, J. C. & Schmidt, R., 2002. Longman dictionary of language teaching & applied 
linguistics. London: Longman Pearson education. 
Sadiqi, F., 2003. Women and linguistic space in Morocco. Women and Language, 26(1), pp. 35-
43. 
Scollon, R., 2007. Action and text: towards an integrated understanding of the place of text in 
social (inter)action, mediated discourse analysis and the problem of social action. In: Methods of 
critical discourse analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 139-195. 
Shaw, S., 2000. Language, gender and floor appointment in political debates. Discourse & 
Society, 11(3), pp. 401-418. 
Shenhav, S., 2004. Once upon a time there was a nation: narrative conceptualization analysis. 
The concept of 'nation' in the discourse of Israeli Likud party leaders. Discourse & Society, 
15(1), pp. 81-104. 
Shenhav, S. R., 2007. Detecting stories: revealing hidden 'voices' in public political discourse. 
Journal of Language and Politics, 6(2), pp. 177-200. 
Shenhav, S. R., 2008. Showing and telling in paliamentary discourse: the case of repeated 
injerjections to Rabin's speeches in the Israeli parliament. Discourse & Society, 19(2), pp. 223-
255. 
Shenhav, S. R., 2009. We have a place in a long story, empowered narratives and the 
construction of communities: the case of US presidential debates. Narrative Inquiry, 19(2), pp. 
199-218. 
Shinko, R. E., 2004. Discourses of denial: silencing the Palestinians, delegitimizing their claims. 
Journal of International Affairs, 58(1), pp. 47-69. 
Simon-Vandenbergen, A.-M., 2008. "Those are only slogans" A linguistic analysis of 
argumentation in debates with extremist political speakers. Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology, 27(4), pp. 345-358. 
271 
 
Taylor, S., 2001a. Evaluating and applying discourse analytic research. In: Discourse as data: a 
guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 311-330. 
Taylor, S., 2001b. Locating and conducting discourse analytic research. In: Discourse as data: a 
guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 5-48. 
Thomas, L. et al., 2004. Language, soceity and power. London: Routledge. 
Tileaga, 2008. What is a 'revolution'?: National commemoration, collective memory and 
managing authenticity in the representation of a political event. Discourse & Society, 19(3), pp. 
359-382. 
Tileaga, C., 2008. What is a 'revolution'?: National commemoration, collective memory and 
managing authenticity in the representation of a political event. Discourse & Society, 19(3), pp. 
359-382. 
Tripp, C., 2014. The politics of resistance and the Arab uprisings. In: The new Middle East: 
protest and revolution in the Arab world. Cambridge: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, pp. 
135-154. 
van Dijk, T. A., 2007. Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity. In: Methods of critical 
discourse analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 95-120. 
van Leeuwen, T., 2008. Discourse and practice: new tools for critical discourse analysis. 
Oxford: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
van Leeuwen, T., 2009. Critical discourse analysis. In: Discourse, of course: an overview of 
research in discourse studies. Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, pp. 277-292. 
vom Bruk, G., Alwazir, A. & Wiacek, B., 2014. Yemen: revolution suspended?. In: The new 
Middle East: protest and revolution in the Arab world. Cambridge: CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, pp. 285-308. 
Waterton, E. & Wilson, R., 2009. Talking the talk: policy, popular and media responses to the 
bicentenary of the abolition of the slave trade using the abolition discourse. Discourse & Society, 
20(3), pp. 381-399. 
Weatherall, A., 2002. Gender, language and discourse. New York: Routledge. 
Weizman, E. & Fetzer, A., 2006. Political discourse as mediated and public discourse. Journal of 
Pragmatics, 38(2), pp. 143-153. 
Wodak, R., 2007a. Pragmatics and critical discourse analysis: a cross-disciplinary inquiry. 
Pragmatics & Cognition, 15(1), pp. 203-225. 
272 
 
Wodak, R., 2007b. The discourse-historical approach. In: Methods of critical discourse analysis. 
Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 63-94. 
Wodak, R., 2007c. What CDA is about - a summary of its history, important concepts and its 
developments. In: Methods of critical discourse analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, pp. 
1-13. 
Wooffitt, R., 2001. Researching psychic practitioners: conversation analysis. In: Discourse as 
data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 49-92. 
Yates, S. J., 2001. Researching internet interaction: sociolinguistics and corpus analysis. In: 
Discourse as data: a guide for analysis. London: The Open University, pp. 93-146. 
Zayani, M. & Sahraoui, S., 2007. The culture of Al Jazeera: inside an Arab media giant. 
London: McFARLAND . 
Zubaida, S., 2014. Women, democracy and dictatorship in the context of the Arab uprisngs. In: 
The new Middle East: protest and revolution in the Arab world. Cambridge: CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, pp. 209-225. 
Zurayk, R. & Gough, A., 2014. Bread and olive oil: the agrarian roots of the Arab uprisings. In: 
The new Middle East: protest and revolution in the Arab world. cambridge: CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, pp. 107-134. 
  
273 
 
Appendices  
Appendix 1: Study Corpus 
 
No 
Date 
(Chronolog
ical order) 
 
 
Program 
 
 
Debate Title and Subtitles 
 
AJ 
Moderator 
 
 
Speakers 
 
 
Revolution Stage 
 
Video 
duration 
in minutes 
 
Number of 
words 
1 22/5/201
1 
Revolution 
Talk 
Yemen revolution's progress 
and the gulf initiative 
5) The protesters and 
the failure of the 
Saudi initiative 
6) Yemen and civil 
war's possibilities 
7) Yemen's 
revolutionists betw 
een the peaceful and 
armed paths 
8) Expectations of the 
next stage 
Mohammed 
Kreshan 
7) Jamal al-Milaiki (researcher 
and a Yemeni activist) 
8) Abdulmalik al-Mikhlafi 
(leader in the joint 
Congress) 
9) Ali al-Maamari (formal 
spokesperson of the 
Parliamentary bloc for 
liberated independent) 
10) Abbas al-Masawi (Yemen's 
extension media in Beirut) 
11) Sarhan al-Otaibi (Head of 
the Saudi Society for 
Political Sciences)  
12) And others 
Saleh indicated that he would not accept 
to sign the agreed terms of the 
agreement although his spokesperson 
said he would. The opposition signed 
but he did not.  
 28 5,425 
2 24/07/20
11 
Revolution 
Talk 
Yemen between the 
determination of change and 
destiny's doubts 
1) Filed development 
in Yemen 
2) Al-Qaeda's 
scarecrow 
3) Vow of civil war in 
Yemen 
4) New initiation for 
solving the Yemen 
crisis 
5) Yemeni councils 
between two 
terminologies 
6) Talks of transfer of 
power 
Hassan 
Jamool 
1) Mohammed al-Saadi (a 
leader in the Joint Meeting 
2) Abbas al-Masawi (Yemen's 
extension media in Beirut) 
3) Najeeb al-Nafii (a journalist 
and political analyst) 
Clashes between Houthis and Islah 
opposition party, local tribes and 
Islamist militants in Zanjibar and other 
towns controlled by al-Qaeda; and 
protesters and army defectors.  
47:30 5,754 
3 19/09/20
11 
In Depth  Yemen…at the edges of the 
revolution 
6) Massacres continue 
Ali al-
Dufairi 
3) Humood al-Hattar (Former 
Yemen minister of 
Endowments) 
Forces loyal to Saleh's regime shot 
dozens of people in Sanaa. This came 
after Hadi, acting president after Saleh's 
23:53 + 
missing 
5,482 
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and uprising rise 
7) Gulf initiative and 
the regime's 
behaviour 
8) Implementation 
mechanism in a 
timely manner 
9) Revolutionary 
escalation Friday 
and army's role 
10) Extent of political 
parties' influence in 
society's sectors 
4) Tawakul Karman (a leader 
in National Youth 
Revolution of Yemen) 
 
 
decree of transferring power to Hadi 
while Saleh was in Saudi Arabia, was 
claimed to sign the GCC transitional 
deal of power in a week time. 
4 25/09/20
11 
Behind the 
News 
President Saleh's speech after 
returning to Yemen 
1) New in Saleh's last 
speech 
2) Saleh's speech and 
fuelling the Yemeni 
crisis 
3) Visions behind the 
lines 
4) Saleh's expected 
departure for 
treatment 
Leila a-
Sheikli 
1) Tariq al-Shami (Head of 
media Unit in the National 
Conference Ruling party) 
2) Ali a-Sarari (a leader in the 
Gathered Congress) 
3) Mashari Al-Naeem 
4) Ahmed Aayid (a political 
activist) 
Saleh returned to Yemen after being in 
Saudi Arabia, almost a million 
protesters protested 'largest number of 
the revolution'. Saleh gave a speech that 
he would support the GCC plan. 
23:57 2,820 
5 3/10/201
1 
In depth Consequences of the Yemen's 
revolution 
1) Political block out 
situation in Yemen 
2) Gulf position of 
Yemen's revolution 
3) Post gulf initiative 
stage 
4) Yemen issue with 
the Security Council 
5) Future scenarios of 
Yemen 
Ali al-
Dufairi 
1) Abdulraqib Mansour (head 
of Yemen's revolution mass 
in Egypt) 
2) Adil al-Shuraiji (a professor 
of sociology at Sanaa 
University) 
Same as 24/09/2011 48:41 6,542 
6 4/10/201
1 
The 
opposite 
Direction 
Is Yemen's political system 
still valid for power? 
1) Electronic armies 
and Yemen in 
international reports 
2) Arab political 
systems and media 
Faisal al-
Qasem 
1) Waseem al-Qurashi 
(spokesman of the 
organizing committee of 
Yemen's youth revolution) 
2) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader 
in Yemen's ruling party) 
Security forces killed many in 
residential areas in Sanaa. Saleh and UN 
criticized by protesters for not failing to 
negotiate the crisis and therefore 
negotiation with the regime had 
stopped. 
47:38 7,010 
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blackout 
3) The system and 
fighting terrorism 
4) The revolution and 
the family's army 
7 8/10/201
1 
Behind the 
News 
Last explicit connotations of 
Yemen's president 
5) Tawakul withdraws 
lights from Saleh 
6) Sceneries of the 
delivery of authority 
7) Saleh and the 
security council's 
decision 
8) Youth and problems 
of the delivery of 
power 
Fairouz 
Zayyati 
3) Tawakul Karman (a leader 
in National Youth 
Revolution) 
4) (Yasir al-Yamani (a leader 
in Yemen's ruling party) 
7/10/2011 was the 'Friday of al-Hamdi' 
to reference a former Yemen president 
who was killed in 1977. Huge protesters 
protests took place calling Saleh to 
leave. 
25:06 3,343 
8 23/11/20
11 
Behind the 
News 
Signing the Gulf initiative 
1) Youth of the 
revolution and the 
continuation of sit-
ins 
2) Evaluation of the 
post signing stage 
3) The initiative and 
implementation 
mechanism 
4) Saleh and getting 
away from some 
agreement 
Leila a-
Sheikli 
1) Jamal Omar (delegate of 
secretary General for 
United Nations) 
2) Radwan Masoud (member 
of the organizing 
committee of the Youth's 
revolution) 
3) Abdu al-Jundi (Deputy of 
Yemen's minister of media) 
4) Ali AbdRabu al-Qadi 
(Member of the National 
Council and member of 
Representative's Council) 
Saleh signed the GCC agreement and 
gave speech.  
25:15 2,743 
9 3/12/201
1 
Behind the 
News 
Security situation in Yemen 
1) Bombing of Taizz 
and regression of 
safety in Yemen 
2) Saleh and receiving 
more warranties 
3) Horizons of transfer 
of power  
Ghada 
Owais 
1) Ali a-Sarari (a leader in the 
Gathered Congress) 
2) Mashari Al-Naeem (Head 
of International Relations 
of the GCC Council) 
3) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader 
in Yemen's ruling party) 
7 people killed in Taizz.  24:42 2,968 
10 13/12/20
11 
The 
opposite 
Direction 
Yemen to the first square 
5) Army security file 
6) Continuation of sit-
ins in the Change 
Square 
7) Youth of the 
Faisal al-
Qasem 
3) Jamal al-Milaiki (researcher 
and a Yemeni activist) 
4) Abbas al-Masawi (a 
Yemeni journalist) 
Al-Qaeda fighters escaped prison in 
Aden and killed military personals near 
Zanjibar. 
47:02 7,064 
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revolution and their 
persistence in 
Saleh's trial 
8) Upcoming struggle 
for undertaking 
Yemen's power 
11 9/01/201
2 
Behind the 
news 
Debate around giving Saleh 
and his agents the political 
immunity 
1) The legitimacy of 
giving Saleh the 
political immunity 
2) Secret behind 
Saleh's clinging to 
the immunity 
3) Rights of the 
affected in Yemen 
Leila a-
Sheikli 
1) Mahmoud Rifat 
(international lawyer and 
expert in international law) 
2) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader 
in Yemen's ruling party) 
3) Hussein al-Suhaili (an 
activist in the national 
youth revolution) 
Approved law granting immunity to 
Saleh 
25:31 3,105 
12 21/1/201
2 
Behind the 
News 
Approval of Saleh's political 
immunity 
1) Fallouts of the 
complete political 
immunity to Saleh 
and his associates 
2) Granting the 
immunity and 
Yemen's stability 
plan 
3) Saleh and the legal 
accounting 
mechanism 
4) Future of Yemen 
after Saleh 
 
Leila a-
Sheikli 
1) Abdulgalib al-Odaini 
(spokesperson of the joint 
opposing parties) 
2) Fakhr al-Azab (member of 
the organizing committee 
of the Yemen's revolution) 
3) Ibrahim al-Sayadi (activist 
and political researcher)  
Immunity law approved 24:09 2,800 
13 23/02/20
12 
Revolution'
s talk 
Challenges of the transitional 
period in Yemen 
1) Development 
direction in the 
transitional period 
2) Way and plan of 
fighting corruption 
3) Position of the 
Southern revolution 
from the political 
operation  
Ghada 
Owais 
1) Saleh Sumai (Yemen's 
minister of electricity) 
2) Khalid al-Ruwaishan 
(Former minister of 
Culture) 
3) Abdulfaqih al-Faqih (a 
leader in the mass joint 
Meeting) 
4) Muhsin Muheeb (Assistant 
secretary in the Southern 
revolution) 
Saleh arrived from abroad in order to 
inaugurate Hadi who won the 
presidency elections of Yemen 
49:00 5,901 
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4) Restructuring of the 
national army 
5) Saleh and the 
shadow government  
14 06/03/20
12 
The 
Opposite 
Direction 
Where is Yemen heading after 
Ali Abdullah Saleh? 
1) Yemen and the post 
saleh challenges 
2) Yemen's remaining 
under the 
domination of 
Saleh's regime 
3) Iran's intervention in 
the Yemeni affair 
4) Debate on the 
presidential 
referendum  
5) Fighting qat(drugs) 
in Yemen 
 
Faisal al-
Qasim 
1) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader 
in Yemen's ruling party) 
2) Ali Nasser al-Bakiti 
(spokesman in the name of 
the general forum of the 
revolutionary powers) 
 47:04 7,037 
15 21/05/20
12 
In depth Merits of the transitional 
period in Yemen 
1) Extent of al-Qaeda's 
influence in the 
political conduct of 
the military 
operation 
2) Yemen, army's 
skeleton and 
security 
3) The political 
maturity in front of 
Yemen's president 
4) Problems of the 
national dialogue 
5) Yemen between the 
conspiracy of the 
previous regime and 
the stability period 
Ali al-
Dufairi 
1) Nasr Taha Mustafa (Former 
Syndicate of Yemeni 
journalists) 
2) Saeed Ali Obaid (researcher 
and specialist of Yemen's 
affair) 
 48:31 5,901 
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 هو يقول في الأمس هي
 أماكن فيًثلاثبأن التوقيع سيكون 
 طلبها الأمين العام طلبتهاًوكل الخطوات التي
 فيًاحدًاللذيناختلف فقط وهذا يذكرني 
 أمام كاميرات التلفزةووالذين يقدمون المبادرات 
 هي المبادرة سيدًقرشياشرت الي المبادرة الحقيقية 
 يقع توقيعها من قبل الرئيس تقعدون أن 
 تؤثر على استقرار هيلأن هذه الازمة في الواقع 
 لأنه اذا أردا المجلس أن يفشلو
 الجزيرة الأفاضل. مشاهدينوأحيي 
 الأمن فيلن نتقاتل مع اخوتنا 
 المبادرةًالخليجيةأو من الأخوة في 
 كل طارئ خطأي من قبل المعارضة ماًسنواجهوسنواجه 
 اسمحلي فقط سيد المساوى هذاًمنًابرز
 قدمت لنا مكتوبة كانتهذه مسألة 
 الموجود انقسام في كل مكان اوأو فئة مقابل فئة، 
 تعنت النظام علىًفقة المعارضةبأن سبب عدم موا
 هو عضو اللجنة التنظيميةواذن هو السيد وسيم القرشي 
حتىًنصححًالصفةًولاًنقعًبأيًلبسًلشباب الثورة في صنعاء، 
ربماًيساءًفهمهًاذنًالسيدًوسيمًقرشيًهوًعضوًاللجنةً
 سيد قرشي أي دورالتنظيميةًلشبابًالثورةًفيًصنعاء،ً
 لوا يتلقون الرصاصوهم مازا مئتيًشابأكثر من 
 وبخمس واربعين ثانية أناسمحلي في البداية 
 حرب على بعض المناطق شن فيمحاولات للنظام 
 هو يقول في الأمس
 أماكن بثلاثبأن التوقيع سيكون 
 وكل الخطوات التي طلبها الأمين العام
 اختلف فقط وهذا يذكرني..
 والذين يقدمون المبادرات أمام كاميرات التلفزة
 الي المبادرة الحقيقية هي المبادرة اشرت
 دون أن يقع توقيعها من قبل الرئيس
 لأن هذه الازمة في الواقع تؤثر على استقرار
 لأنه اذا أردا المجلس أن يفشل
 الجزيرة الأفاضل. مشاهديوأحيي 
 بالأمنلن نتقاتل مع اخوتنا 
 بلادًالخليجأو من الأخوة في 
 المعارضةوسنواجه كل طارئ خطأي من قبل 
 اسمحلي فقط سيد المساوى
 هذه مسألة قدمت لنا مكتوبة
 أو فئة مقابل فئة، الموجود انقسام في كل مكان
 تعنت النظام هوبأن سبب عدم موافقة المعارضة 
 اذن هو السيد وسيم القرشي هو عضو اللجنة التنظيمية
 لشباب الثورة في صنعاء، سيد قرشي أي دور
 
 
 ازالوا يتلقون الرصاصأكثر من مئتيشاب وهم م
 اسمحلي في البداية وبخمس واربعين ثانية
 حرب على بعض المناطق بشنمحاولات للنظام 
 noitcerroc/nuonorp fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuonorp bus+brev fo noissimO
  reifisnetni-tcejbo etelpmocni fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitagored citnames/eman dna mrof sserdda fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/brev fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/xiffus fo noitiddA
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitagored citnames/nuon nommoc fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-sserts fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitamrofni artxe fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-rotacidni tcefrep tsap fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 nuonorp yb noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 citnames/hpargarap yrotanalpxe na fo noissimO
 noitagored
  
 ekatsim gnillepS
 reifisnetni-)taht( nuonorp evitacidni fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 
102/70/42 2
 1
 noituloveR
 klaT
 الأمور في اليمن سارتمن التدهور الأمني  03:74
 تأمين اتجاهًفيليحول تحريكه 
 الاصطناعيةيشاركنا أيضا عبر الأقمار 
 هو محاولة وليسًوليسهي انعكاس لخلل أمني 
 انما الآنوالى مثل هذه الأحداث 
 بين أجنحة صراعأن تكون 
 للثورةًأعلنت انضمامها
 آخرتتناقض يوما بعد 
 نظام عبدالله صالح هويعني 
 محطات رئيسية اربعةان 
 الأمور في اليمن دارتًمن التدهور الأمني
 تأمين باتجاهًليحول تحريكه
 الصناعيةًيشاركنا أيضا عبر الأقمار
 هي انعكاس لخلل أمني وهو محاولة
 الأحداث انما الآنالى مثل هذه 
 بين أجنحة صراعاأن تكون 
 الىًالثورةأعلنت انضمامها 
 الآخرتتناقض يوما بعد 
 يعني نظام عبدالله صالح
 محطات رئيسية اربعان 
 brev fo noitutitsbuS
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 evitcejda fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue/’oN‘ fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni +noitcerroc/noitanuN fo noitiddA
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-elcitra fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon eninimef fo noissimO
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 أن يفتخر بهايريد  يلبسهاأللتنزه أن 
 العسكر ولا القوات تستطيعبالنسبه لبقية المحافظات لا 
 مرجعيات لاهوتية نتيجةنتيجة تواجد 
 بن لادن لو قرات له كتابات أسامةمرجعية حتى 
 حتى تنظيم القاعدة الجنوبي القياديحتى الوحيشي 
 مليون ستين داهية فيولولا موقفها صدقني لذهب اليمن 
 من فزاعة مثلاباكستان ثم اعطيك  مثلاسأعطيك 
 شرحت وجهة نظرك نعمسيد المساوى، 
 الثورة ستطمسبأنها ستنسي الثورة و
 من الزحف نحو العاصمة، بالتالي ستبقى الساحات
 أن الأخ المساوى طبعاأنا أقول أولا 
 لديه معلومات انًبحاول أن يظهر أنه
 يبقى السؤال سيد السعيدي طيب
 ياًبنًبجدتهاولست أدري من هو حميد 
 القصر الجمهوري سيكتسحتصريحه بأنه سيقتحم 
 يشاءونقل اجعلهم يقولون ما 
 ما هي رؤية شباب الثورة للحل ماًهوًاو
 أن أنقل مباشرة الى المجلس الانتقالي أريد
 أو ينسهم نظرتهم لكن هناك أيضا
 مبادرتهممن حقهم أن يطرحوا 
 الموضوع بهذاسأخذ رأيك 
 أشكره على  لانهكلمتين للأخ عباس 
 أنت تدافع عنها الذيمن القيادة السياسية 
 الوصول فيما حظوظ هذه المساعي 
 بدعم من واخيراالذي أصر عليه الرئيس 
 لكن الفرصة هذه تضيعو لازال هناك فرصة
 يعكس بالفعل ينظرًدخل في متاهات السياسة ولم
 ا جزءانالشارع واللقاء المشترك هم لا
 حقيقية فرصًانه مازال هناك
 رئيس الحزب باسمالى ناطق 
 للتفاوض ولا للحوار لاوانه لا مجال 
 سنحاكمك سنحاكم حزبك لا بينما يقول الأخ
 الاسلاميون هوًالحاكمون في اليمن
 الطرفين يجمعوجاء من اجل ان يلتقي 
 ، والرئيس عليطالماهذه المبادرات لم يكتب لها النجاح 
 انا مؤمن بان الفعل الثوري نعم
 عليه شيئ من الملل وأدخلأو يجد أن المسافة طالت 
 الثورة معايشمن الناس يعرفون في اليمن 
 يريد أن يفتخر بها لها يلبسأللتنزه أن 
 العسكر ولا القوات يستطيعًبالنسبه لبقية المحافظات لا
 نتيجة تواجد مرجعيات لاهوتية
 بن لادن لو قرات له كتابات لأسامةمرجعية حتى 
 حتى الوحيشي قيادي جنوبي حتى تنظيم القاعدة
 مليون ستين داهية الىًولولا موقفها صدقني لذهب اليمن
 من فزاعة مثالاباكستان ثم اعطيك  مثالاسأعطيك 
 سيد المساوى، شرحت وجهة نظرك
 الثورة ستكمشبأنها ستنسي الثورة و
 بالتالي ستبقى الساحاتوالعاصمة، من الزحف نحو 
 أنا أقول أولا أن الأخ المساوى
 بحاول أن يظهر أنه لديه معلومات
 يبقى السؤال سيد السعيدي
 ولست أدري من هو حميد
 تصريحه بأنه سيقتحم القصر الجمهوري
 يشاؤواقل اجعلهم يقولون ما 
 ما هي رؤية شباب الثورة للحل
 أن أنقل مباشرة الى المجلس الانتقالي أرد
 لكن هناك أيضاوأو ينسهم نظرتهم 
 مبادرةًمن حقهم أن يطرحوا
 الموضوع فيًهذاسأخذ رأيك 
 أشكره على  أنهكلمتين للأخ عباس 
 أنت تدافع عنها التيمن القيادة السياسية 
ًللوصولما حظوظ هذه المساعي 
 الذي أصر عليه الرئيس بدعم من
 فرصة لكن الفرصة هذه تضيع لازال هناك
 دخل في متاهات السياسة ولم يعكس بالفعل
 الشارع واللقاء المشترك هما جزءان
 حقيقية فرصاًانه مازال هناك
 الى ناطق رئيس الحزب
 وانه لا مجال للتفاوض ولا للحوار
 بينما يقول الأخ سنحاكمك سنحاكم حزبك
 الاسلاميون همالحاكمون في اليمن 
 ان يلتقي الطرفينوجاء من اجل 
 هذه المبادرات لم يكتب لها النجاح، والرئيس علي
 انا مؤمن بان الفعل الثوري
 عليه شيئ من الملل ودخلأو يجد أن المسافة طالت 
 الثورة معاشمن الناس يعرفون في اليمن 
 ekatsim gnillepS
 noitcerroc/xiffus brev fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuon a fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/xiffus lanoitisoperp fo noitiddA
 noitagored citnames/elcitra fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcnujnoc fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuon fo noissimO
 msimehpue/brev fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpsyd/noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 egdeh fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/nuonorp evitacidni fo noissimO
 ’iko‘ yrotcudortni fo noissimO
 msimehpue/rohpatem citsacras fo noissimO
 msimehpue/brev fo noissimO
 gnidne brev fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc+bus fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnillepS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-xiffus noissessop fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 )gnorw llits(xiferp fo noissimO
 msimehpue/nuonorp evitaler fo noitutitsbuS
 nuonorp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-snoitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 الثوريقضية الحسم  فياذ يعول عليه في مسألة أو 
 مليارات دولار 8تقدر الخسائر بنحو 
 بسحب ارصدة الوزارة الداخليةاتهم وزير 
 % من سكانه دولارين04نحو  4ويقل دخل 
 الأسبق الوزيرالقاضي والوزير ووزير الأوقاف اليمني 
 الاخبار حسب ما شاهدنا في تقريبا 22استكمل العدد 
 ؟اليومومسألة تصاعد الاحتجاجات الشعبية في اليمن 
 اذ يعول عليه في مسألة أو قضية الحسم
 دولار مليارات 8بنحو  اليمنيةتقدر الخسائر 
 بسحب ارصدة الوزارة الخارجيةاتهم وزير 
 % من سكانه دولارين04نحو  ويقل دخل
 القاضي ووزير الأوقاف اليمني الأسبق
 حسب ما شاهدنا في الاخبار 22استكمل العدد 
 ومسألة تصاعد الاحتجاجات الشعبية في اليمن؟
 reifisnetni-jda dna nuonorp fo noissimO
 msimehpsyd/jda fo noitiddA
 ekatsim-jda fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/rebmun fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuon fo noissimO
 egdeh-’yletamixorppa‘ fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuon fo noissimO
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 بقايا بلاطجة النظام المخلوع صالح
 ينتصرون في معركتهم يحسمونًمعركتهمًاوالشباب اليوم هم 
 والتي تمنحهم المبادرة الخليجية جزء كبير من الضمانات
 دولية لضوطلكن اشرت 
 قد صدر تصريحلاحظتم خلال الاسبوع الماضي فان 
 بحل سلمي لخروجتدعو كافة الأطراف 
 مسألة توقيع صالح
 الى توكل ايضالكن الآن أريد أن أتوجه 
 الآن للخوض فيهمضطرونًلكن 
 ثورة الى ازمة بان هذه ثورة تتحول من
 بعض الىًمناقشةفي العمق نحتاج 
 أي حق يمتلكنحن نراه مخلوعا ولا 
 علي عبدالله صالح انهنتحدث عن 
هناك  بعدًثلاثةًاشهرًهنالكرئيس مطبوخ يراد ان يوضح هكذا 
 رئيس
 الأنبل والأقوى هيثورتنا هي فعلا 
 مقبولة أم لا؟ هيأن المبادرة الخليجية في ذاتها 
 وفقا للدستور لانهعلى النائب ممارسة صلاحياته 
 صالحعليًعبداللهًبقايا بلاطجة النظام المخلوع 
 هم ينتصرون في معركتهمالشباب اليوم 
 كبيرا من الضمانات جزءاوالتي تمنحهم المبادرة الخليجية 
 دولية ضغوط الىًلكن اشرت
 قد صدر تصريحاًلاحظتم خلال الاسبوع الماضي فان
 بحل سلمي إلىًلخروجتدعو كافة الأطراف 
 صالح عليًعبداللهمسألة توقيع 
 لكن الآن أريد أن أتوجه الى توكل
 الآن للخوض فيه مضطرينلكن 
 تتحول من ثورة الى ازمة وانبان هذه ثورة 
 بعض لمناقشةفي العمق نحتاج 
 أي حق يملكًنحن نراه مخلوعا ولا
 علي عبدالله صالح انًنتحدث عن
 رئيس مطبوخ يراد ان يوضح هكذا هناك رئيس
 
 ثورتنا هي فعلا الأنبل والأقوى
 أن المبادرة الخليجية في ذاتها مقبولة أم لا؟
 على النائب ممارسة صلاحياته وفقا للدستور
 
  msimehpue -eman tnediserp lluf fo noitiddA
 msimehpue-ecnetnes fo noissimO
 tniop regnorts -noitanun fo noitiddA
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitanun fo noitiddA
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue -eman tnediserp lluf fo noitiddA
  reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
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 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue -brev fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc /nuonorp dexiferp fo noissimO
 gnorts ssel-esarhp emit fo noissimO
 
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 قال أنهما اللتينشكر في هذا السياق السعودية والامارات  75:32
 التي  الفرصةوأعمال العنف وتفويته 
 كان يخطط لها المتطرفون كانتالتي 
 أبعد من ذلك منبل انه ذهب 
 بالعكس لاًلا، أبدا
 باطلة تهمًوهي جميعا
 من الناشطين الشباب الناشطينلنسمع 
 لا يأتي في سياق ليسًكل ما قاله
 جاء متأخرا انهان البعض اعتبره 
 للشبابووجه خطابه 
 واضح وخطابناترافقها الدبابات والأطقم العسكري، 
 باصداره قرارعندًعبدربه منصور هادي نائبه 
 الإصلاحالمتطرفوًحول هذه النقطة، 
 على الساحة اليمنية تنفيذهما عاد علي صالح من أجل 
 استهل بها عودته اوكما جاء في الكلمة التي 
 الشكر للامارات العربية المفتوحة نعم
 وتسعون للوصول تركضونوجه رسالة كيف 
 ريخ وبوازيقوصوا الاطقمًوترافقها
 نجا من محاولة اغتيال خرجهل سيحاكم لأنه 
 لم يقل هوًاذاًطيب
 على الجرائم سيحاسبوااذا غادروا السلطة 
 نعرف ان الدم لا يضيع يمني شعبنحن 
 قال أنهما اللتانشكر في هذا السياق السعودية والامارات 
 التي  فرصةوأعمال العنف وتفويته 
 يخطط لها المتطرفون كانالتي 
 بل انه ذهب أبعد من ذلك
 لا، أبدا بالعكس
 باطلة لتهموهي جميعا ا
 لنسمع من الناشطين الشباب
 لا يأتي في سياق هوكل ما قاله 
 ان البعض اعتبره جاء متأخرا
 اليًالشبابووجه خطابه 
 واضح خطابناترافقها الدبابات والأطقم العسكري، 
 عبدربه منصور هادي نائبه باصداره قرار
 الإصلاح متطرفوحول هذه النقطة، 
 على الساحة اليمنية تنفيذاما عاد علي صالح من أجل 
 كما جاء في الكلمة التي استهل بها عودته
 الشكر للامارات العربية المفتوحة
 وتسعون للوصول ترفضونوجه رسالة كيف 
 وصواريخ وبوازيق أطقموترافقها 
 هل سيحاكم لأنه نجا من محاولة اغتيال
 لم يقل اذاًهوطيب 
 على الجرائم سيحاسبوناذا غادروا السلطة 
 نعرف ان الدم لا يضيع اليمني الشعبنحن 
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 reifisnetni-noititeper fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnilleps/elcitra fo noitiddA
 sisahpme rof drow dedda/ tcejbo fo noissimO
 noitcerroc-nuonorp yb loot noitagen fo noitutitsbuS
  reifisnetni/’ti taht‘ fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc-noitisoperp fo noissimO
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 ekatsim gnillepS
 noitcerroc-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 noitcerroc-elcitra fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-brev fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/elcitrap lanoitidnoc ,nuonorp fo redroeR
  sisahpme dedda-nuonorp larulp eninimef fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-elcitra fo noitiddA
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 قد يتنحى ممكنتنبأ إنه 
 إنه يكون هناك يتوقعواوبدأوا 
 الرخيص العالمفي صناعة 
 تنبأ إنه قد يتنحى
 إنه يكون هناك يتوقعونوبدأوا 
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
  reifisnetni/egdeh a fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
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 مرة واحدة فييعني في كل الجبهات 
 النظام الحاكم في اليمن المؤتمر الشعبي وما بينطبعاًما بين 
 أيضا مكونوما بين 
 الرئيسالمعارضة  
 الى اتفاق والمعارضةمن اتفاق بين الحكومة 
 المتعددة للنسخنحن نعرف تفاصيل أو تلخيص 
 يتعامل معها ايجابيا كانهكل المرات 
 الرئيس موافق بانهًقال المصدر الرئاسي
 الخامسة الىًالنسخةام ان بعد كل هذه التعديلات ووصولنا 
 بشكلًرئيسيالموقف الخليجي والموقف السعودي 
 او طرحت قضية مثلاوهي اشترطت 
 مبادرة لاخراج الرئيس فيًفيلم تكن هناك 
 محاولة لاخراج نظام صالح فيهي كانت 
 ليس على ان يظل علىالسعودية حريصة 
 السعودية قد تتساءل ولأنيشكل عبئا على السعودية بتصرفاته 
 وتفرضون رئيسا تتدخلوننقول لأنكم 
 هذا شيئ لا تخطئه العين لمدلولاته ليكونو
 تكون هناك اشكالية مثلاولا 
 هو أن التنظيمات رئيسقامت بسبب 
 طالبت وبالتالي والاحزابًالرسميةالعمل الرسمي عبر الانتخابات 
 أن يكون بهذه الحنكة ويسبق احزاب المعارضة
 المعارضة استطاعت بأنلكن كما قلت 
 اذا طالت مسألة الحوارانهًلكن الآن أعتقد 
 جمال بن عمر هي الزيارة الخامسة له هو
 من تسهيل من قبل القوات قبل منلا من تساهل 
 لازالت حتى الآن فهيًأما القضايا الأخرى
 تكون الولايات المتحدة انولكن علاقة شخصية فيه بحيث 
 التفكير في اليمن بناًفبدأ
 له قال تصريحًأخيرحتى جمال بن عمر في 
 مرتبطة بشخص الرئيس التغييرقضية التغيير اليوم هل هي 
 نبحثهما مع ضيفي كلًهذهًالامور
 سيناريوهات المستقبل يبحثًأهلا بكم من جديد في العمق
 الأفق يلوح سيناريو الحرب الأهليةهل 
 الرئيس علي صالح صالحًالحرس الجمهوري أولاد
 سابقة سلسلة الأقارب سابعةفي حلقات 
 أولى مدرسةفرقةًوبين قوى 
 في التفاف شعبي لانهبالاضافة إلى 
 و القبلية مدرعأن تشن الفرقة أولى 
 النظام الطرفالذي يريد أن يفجر الأوضاع عسكريا هو 
 يبني سلطة يمكنأن يهدم سلطة لكنه لا يمكن 
 من الجماهير وفيوفي صنعاء 
 طبعا قوى النظام قوىجماعة علي محسن الأحمر و
ًالاوضاعفي الرياض لدعم 
 لن يتم التعيير بين ليلة وضحاها مطلوبولذلك  0102في فبراير 
 يكون المسؤول المحلي انهًاو نوع من الوكالة او
 يعني في كل الجبهات مرة واحدة
 بينما بين النظام الحاكم في اليمن المؤتمر الشعبي وما 
 وما بين أيضا مكون 
 الرئيسيالمعارضة 
 الى اتفاق والمعارضمن اتفاق بين الحكومة 
 المتعددة النسخنحن نعرف تفاصيل أو تلخيص 
 يتعامل معها ايجابيا كانًالرئيسكل المرات 
 الرئيس موافق بانًقال المصدر الرئاسي
 الخامسة للنسخةام ان بعد كل هذه التعديلات ووصولنا 
 الرئيسيخليجي والموقف السعودي الموقف ال
 وهي اشترطت او طرحت قضية
 لم تكن هناك مبادرة لاخراج الرئيس
 هي كانت محاولة لاخراج نظام صالح
 السعودية حريصة ليس على ان يظل
 السعودية قد تتساءل لأنيشكل عبئا على السعودية بتصرفاته 
 وتفرضون رئيسا تدخلوننقول لأنكم 
 عين لمدلولاتهوهذا شيئ لا تخطئه ال
 ولا تكون هناك اشكالية
 هو أن التنظيمات رئيسيقامت بسبب 
 العمل الرسمي عبر الانتخابات وبالتالي طالبت
 يسبق احزاب المعارضة انأن يكون بهذه الحنكة و
 لكن كما قلت المعارضة استطاعت
 لكن الآن أعتقد اذا طالت مسألة الحوار
 جمال بن عمر هي الزيارة الخامسة له
 لا من تساهل من تسهيل من قبل القوات
 لازالت حتى الآن فالولاياتًالمتحدةأما القضايا الأخرى 
 ولكن علاقة شخصية فيه بحيث تكون الولايات المتحدة
 فبدأ التفكير في اليمن
 له قال التصريحًالأخيرحتى جمال بن عمر في 
 قضية التغيير اليوم هل هي مرتبطة بشخص الرئيس
 نبحثهما مع ضيفي كلاًالأمرين
 سيناريوهات المستقبل نبحثًأهلا بكم من جديد في العمق
 الأفق يلف هل سيناريو الحرب الأهلية
 الحرس الجمهوري أولاد الرئيس علي صالح
 في حلقات سابقة سلسلة الأقارب
 أولى مدرسة الفرقةوبين قوى 
 في التفاف شعبي انهبالاضافة إلى 
 القبلية قوىمدرعةًوالأن تشن الفرقة أولى 
 الذي يريد أن يفجر الأوضاع عسكريا هو النظام
 يمكن أن يهدم سلطة لكنه لا يبني سلطة
 وفي صنعاء من الجماهير
 جماعة علي محسن الأحمر وطبعا قوى النظام
ً...في الرياض لدعم 
 ولذلك لن يتم التعيير بين ليلة وضحاها 0102في فبراير 
 يكون المسؤول المحلي مااو نوع من الوكالة او 
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 دولًالخليجًوالسعوديةلكن دول المنطقة 
 دولة الكويت مثلاولا تعمل كما كانت تعمل 
 الشعب اليمني لم يعد  يعطيمع مصالح الشعب اليمني، و
 لدول الاقليم جداانا اعتقد ان اليمن مهمة 
 ان تراعي ايضاولكن ايضا على هذه الدول 
 النظام كان يراهن طبعاو
 بمجيئ شهر رمضان مثلاالناس كانوا يعتقدون انه 
 لك جزيلاتل الثورة اليمنية في مصر شكرا رئيس تك
 وستلد اليمن انًتستمران نتوقع ان هذه الثورة 
 الله أمان وفيدمتم بخير 
 
 دولًالخليجًوالسعوديةلكن دول المنطقة 
 ولا تعمل كما كانت دولة الكويت
 مع مصالح الشعب اليمني، والشعب اليمني لم يعد 
 انا اعتقد ان اليمن مهمة لدول الاقليم
 ولكن ايضا على هذه الدول ان تراعي
 والنظام كان يراهن
 مضانالناس كانوا يعتقدون انه بمجيئ شهر ر
 رئيس تكتل الثورة اليمنية في مصر شكرا لك
 وستلد اليمن ستستمران نتوقع ان هذه الثورة 
 الله وبأماندمتم بخير 
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 الى أقصاه أقصاهًأبناء اليمن من 83:74
 نسل اليمنيات كي لا يبقى انقطعهل 
 الملايين تشاهدواولا تزالوا 
 متمسكين بالاخ الرئيس وسيظلوا
 ياسر اليماني الاخنعم بالتأكيد،
 مليون يمني وأنا منهم 02أكثر من  لكن
 تتحدث عن نجاح يتحدثونكل هذه وبالأخير 
 شكل اعتز به شيئبأي 
 تستطيع أن تظهر يعني
 لتصور لتأتيوسائل الاعلام 
 نتكلم عن ذهاب نحن
 لا يحتاج عظيمالشعب اليمني 
 يا أخي فيصل قبلًثلاثًاياموفي أمريكا 
ًهوعيلتمن أجل شخص 
 أتحدث باسم أنس اتحدثًاليومأنا 
 سنة ايضا قتل 21اليوم توفيق الحاج عمره  قتل
 بالقناصةوتم استهدافهم 
 تخرج هذه المظاهرات تخرطأنت تعرف كيف 
 مليون  05 يساواًضد أي رئيس عربي
 الملايين هاًأهم من كل
 الشيئًالآخراسمح لي 
 أن يوصلوا السلطة يريدوا
 آمنة أياديًالا الى
 السلطة الىاذا ارادوا الوصول 
 هذا السؤال علىتجب 
 علي عبدالله صالح انًطول الفترة الماضية تعرف
 نتكلم الان عن حماية الوحدة و
 كمواطنين درجة ثانية هووتعامل معهم 
 6002 عاميوليو في  81في 
 الجميع يعلم هذا الأمر انًوأنا لن أقاطعك،
 دولة جيدة لانًتكونوهي تمتلك كل المكونات 
 ان تنكر ان الرجل يكافح الارهاب تستطيعهل 
 تحصل تحقيقات طيبًفعلا
 كل الاعلام أنًلكن للأسف
 الى أقصاه أقصىًأبناء اليمن من
 نسل اليمنيات كي لا يبقى قطعهل 
 الملايين تشهدواولا تزالوا 
 الرئيس متمسكين بالاخ وسيظلون
 نعم بالتأكيد، ياسر اليماني
 مليون يمني وأنا منهم 02أكثر من  هناك
 كل هذه وبالأخير تتحدث عن نجاح
 بأي شكل اعتز به
 تستطيع أن تظهر أيًعين
 لتصور تاتيوسائل الاعلام 
 نتكلم عن ذهاب
 لا يحتاج العظيمالشعب اليمني 
 يا أخي فيصل يومًالثلاثاءوفي أمريكا 
ًوعائلتهمن أجل شخص 
 باسم أنس اليومًأتحدثأنا 
 سنة ايضا قتل 21اليوم توفيق الحاج عمره 
 بالقنصوتم استهدافهم 
 أنت تعرف كيف تخرج هذه المظاهرات
 مليون  05 يساويضد أي رئيس عربي 
 أهم من كل الملايين
 شيئًآخراسمح لي 
 أن يوصلوا السلطة يريدون
 آمنة أيادًالا الى
ًطةللسلاذا ارادوا الوصول 
 هذا السؤال عنتجب 
 طول الفترة الماضية تعرف علي عبدالله صالح
 نتكلم عن حماية الوحدة والآن
 وتعامل معهم كمواطنين درجة ثانية
 6002يوليو في  81في 
 وأنا لن أقاطعك، الجميع يعلم هذا الأمر
 دولة جيدة لتكونوهي تمتلك كل المكونات 
 ابان تنكر ان الرجل يكافح الاره استطيعهل 
 فعلا تحصل تحقيقات
 كل الاعلام أنناًلكن للأسف
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 العربية فيًالدولليس هناك مشروع 
 للإصلاح اليمنيقالوا أنها أملاك للتجمع 
 العربية الأخرى كما يقول البعض فيًالدول
 ليس قضاء ليسًقضينريد قضاء عادل ونزيه 
 على أن 6002 يونيو 81كان هناك اتفاق في 
 لا مانع. فليتقدمًقضاء نزيه وعادل،
 بالأخ الرئيس سيمسكواأبناء الشعب 
 ماشيعن هذا الجيش القاتل كما يقول لك، 
 ،جيشًالعائلةهي أجهزة أمن العائلة والجيش اليمني هو 
 المنتخب أن يعين القادات ومن حق الرئيس الجديد 
 في سوريا الى تركيا الىًرموش ذهبفي الوقت الذي ق
 العسكريين أمامنا في الساحات معارضيهًومنشقيهبينما 
 مازالت تصرف حتى اللحظة
 قطاعين طرق الىليس الى عصابات و
مش عيب  عليكنيا رجل مش عيب  عليكنهؤلاء طيب مش عيب 
 عليكن
 بأي شيئ لاًلا يستطيع أن يقول لحميد الأحمر
 إصلاحًاليمنليمن في اليمن يريد شباب يريد التغيير في ا
 تشاهد ما في ليبيا ألمًمتى سيبنون اليمن
 عام 04الثورة هذه تزيد  تاتيًحتى
 والجغرافيةوالاجتماعية والثقافية وكل شيئ وكل ذلك 
 وكذا والمصالحيةدقيقة المذهبية 
 علي عبدالله صالح ولاوليس النظام اليمني، 
 أصحح المعلومة بسًأولا حتى حتى
 نتحدث عن شباب نحن
 شوف الفرق بين كلامي وكلامه اناًاتعاملأنا تكلمت 
 المزراب لتحت يعني من تحت الدلفة
 علي عبدالله صالح لنسقطًأن نخرج الى الساحات
 حميد الأحمر انتقدًكما تنتقد الأخ الرئيس
 هذه الحال هذاًأنه أوصل بلده إلى
 لماذا لا تسمح لهؤلاء الشباب طيب
 الى متى يريد أن يجثم طيبالمفتوحة شباب السماوات 
 بالديمقراطية يؤمنوااذا كانوا 
 باسم الشعب اليمني يتحدثوا من أوصاهم
 مع أبناء الشعب ويتحدثوا
 اليمنيًالشعب
 الانتخابات يهابوالماذا 
 هذه  فقدانًهذاوكانوا يخافون من 
 سقطائهموبالتاليً
 المال وبالتالي علىمسيطرين على الجيش والاعلام و
وانًيذهبًعليًعبداللهًصالحًيجب أن تصحح المعادلة أولا 
 وابنائه
 سيظل أسمعت؟ًليس،ًعليًعبداللهًصالحعلي عبدالله صالح 
 ها هو فيصل القاسم يحييكم من الدوحة
 العربية بالدولليس هناك مشروع 
 للإصلاح الوطنيقالوا أنها أملاك للتجمع 
 العربية الأخرى كما يقول البعض بالدول
 نريد قضاء عادل ونزيه ليس قضاء
 على أن 6002 يوليوً81كان هناك اتفاق في 
 قضاء نزيه وعادل، لا مانع.
 بالأخ الرئيس سيمسكونأبناء الشعب 
 عن هذا الجيش القاتل كما يقول لك،
 ،الجيشًالعائليهي أجهزة أمن العائلة والجيش اليمني هو 
 من حق الرئيس الجديد المنتخب أن يعين القادات
 في الوقت الذي قرموش ذهب في سوريا الى تركيا
 حاتالعسكريين أمامنا في السا المعارضينًوالمنشقينبينما 
 اللحظة هذهمازالت تصرف حتى 
 ليس الى عصابات وقطاعين طرق
مش عليكمًيا رجل مش عيب  عليكمهؤلاء طيب مش عيب 
 عليكمعيب 
 لا يستطيع أن يقول لحميد الأحمر بأي شيئ 
ًالإصلاحًفيًاليمنشباب يريد التغيير في اليمن في اليمن يريد 
 تشاهد ما في ليبيا ألامتى سيبنون اليمن 
 عام 04الثورة هذه تزيد  تاريخًحتى
 والاجتماعية والثقافية وكل شيئ وكل ذلك
 وكذا والمصلحيةدقيقة المذهبية 
 وليس النظام اليمني، علي عبدالله صالح
 أولا حتى أصحح المعلومة
 شباب أنًنحن نتحدث عن
 أنا تكلمت شوف الفرق بين كلامي وكلامه
 المزراب الىًتحتيعني من تحت الدلفة 
 علي عبدالله صالح لكيًنسقطأن نخرج الى الساحات 
 حميد الأحمرانًتنتقدًكما تنتقد الأخ الرئيس 
 أنه أوصل بلده إلى هذه الحال
 لماذا لا تسمح لهؤلاء الشباب
 شباب السماوات المفتوحة الى متى يريد أن يجثم
 بالديمقراطية يؤمنونًاذا كانوا
 يباسم الشعب اليمنأنًيتحدثواًمن أوصاهم 
 مع أبناء الشعب ويتحدثون
 المنيالشعب 
 الانتخابات يهابونلماذا 
 وكانوا يخافون من هذه 
 سقطائهم بالتالي
 مسيطرين على الجيش والاعلام والمال وبالتالي
 يجب أن تصحح المعادلة أولا
 
 علي عبدالله صالح سيظل
 من الدوحة مرةًأخرىها هو فيصل القاسم يحييكم 
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صالح:ً"لاًنريدًالسلطةًولسناًبحاجةًالىًالسلطة،ًلكنًاحناً 60.52
ًباجةًانًنسلمًالسلطةًالىًأياديًآمنة"
 الى جانب ملف صالحو
ًكيفًولماذا؟ولكن 
 الشعب اليمني، أبناءًقتلوا
 السلطة علىًتسليمهل هو مستعد 
 فاقد الشرعية والمشروعية غيران هذا الرجل 
 ، على كل ولكنلكنًربما
 نعمل على تشكيل مؤسساتنحاولًًوالآن
 دعيني ربما أطرح وهنانعم 
 شاهدنا الذيبينما في بقية الدول العربية 
 الذي يقوده حميد التيورفضت الاعتراف بهذا المجلس 
 لكن مستمدة منًالشعبهي المستمدة من الدستور 
 في اللقاء الاخوانأو من 
 
 ........
 ........
 الى جانب ملف صالح
ًمتىًوكيف؟ولكن 
 قتلوا الشعب اليمني،
 السلطة لتسليمهل هو مستعد 
 ان هذا الرجل فاقد الشرعية والمشروعية
 على كل ولكن
 والآن نعمل على تشكيل مؤسسات
 دعيني ربما أطرح هنانعم 
 شاهدنا التيبينما في بقية الدول العربية 
 ورفضت الاعترف بهذا المجلس الذي يقوده حميد
 هي المستمدة من الدستور لكن مستمدة
 في اللقاءالاخوةًأو من 
 
 msimehpue/hceeps fo noissimO
 
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 loot noitseuq fo noitutitsbuS & redroeR
 msimehpue/N fo noissimO
 nuonorp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitagored citnames/loot noitagen fo noissimO
 segdeh fo noissimO
 egdeh fo noissimO
 noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitaler fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-esarhp lanoitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon larulp laiuqolloc fo noitutitsbuS
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 بعدها رئيسا شرفيا التيًيعودغير التوفيع على المبادرة  51:52
 حتى لو تخلينا عن السلطة موجودينفأنتم 
 تعقيداته أكثر بكثير تبدوابيد أن المشهد اليمني 
 ماضية الى غايتها أنهاثورة يقول المؤمنون بها 
 سنتحدث إليه بشكل سريع طبعاولكن قبل ذلك 
 أطراف الأزمة لأحداسمحوا لي أن أتحدث 
 الثورة اليمنية الشبابية اولابسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  نعم
 وشموليته بكاملههذا النظام 
 علينا كشباب للثورة علىفكان لزاما 
 هذه هي نتيجة هذا النظام منوالعشرات من النساء، 
 إذن وجبت محاكمة هذا النظام طيبواختطف الشباب 
 مطالب الشباب أنهًأولا أريد أن أؤكد
 من خلال مشاوراتي مع جميع الأطراف علىوأكدت 
 تشكيل لجنة عسكرية اعادةتؤدي الى 
 مقبلالأسبوع ال معناه 82تقريرا من الأمين العام سيقدمه يوم 
 الوفاق بين أطراف اعتادت على الصراع هذهالى أي حد يضمن 
 نية بين الأطراف إذاًفيهأنه 
 كان هناك تقدم في تطبيقوهناكًدعم قوي من المجتمع الدولي، 
 أشكرك سيد جمال ولكنلم أحصل على جواب واضح هنا، 
 في مجلس التعاون الخليجي الاشقاءممثلا في الأخوان 
 ونحن آبائهم ئناأبنافالمعارضة هم 
 الىًجهدًكبيروالموقف يتطلب 
 فاصل قصير لنأخذًسنضطر
 بلغةًالتنحيولم يقبل كما قلتم 
 التداول السلمي للسلطة الثوارًتعبيرا عن قناعاته بأن
 التزامه هييعرف فيها كل طرف ما 
 من تجربتي وتجربتك أكبرتجربته مع المعارضه 
 آليه تنفيذيه يرافقهاولكن قبولنا بها لا بد أن 
 يتطلب إلى وقت  هوما إحنا بصدد معنا 
 ما بذله في هذه الفترة أن لا يضيع جهده
 بعدها رئيسا شرفيا ليعودغير التوفيع على المبادرة 
 حتى لو تخلينا عن السلطة موجودونفأنتم 
 تعقيداته أكثر بكثير يبدواًبيد أن المشهد اليمني
 ماضية الى غايتها أنهثورة يقول المؤمنون بها 
 ولكن قبل ذلك سنتحدث إليه بشكل سريع
 أطراف الأزمة معًأحداسمحوا لي أن أتحدث 
 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم الثورة اليمنية الشبابية أولانعم 
 وشموليته بكمالههذا النظام 
 فكان لزاما علينا كشباب للثورة
 والعشرات من النساء، هذه هي نتيجة هذا النظام
 الشباب إذن وجبت محاكمة هذا النظامواختطف 
 مطالب الشباب أنًأولا أريد أن أؤكد
 وأكدت من خلال مشاوراتي مع جميع الأطراف
 تؤدي الى تشكيل لجنة عسكرية
 الأسبوع المقبل 82تقريرا من الأمين العام سيقدمه يوم 
 الى أي حد يضمن الوفاق بين أطراف اعتادت على الصراع
 ين الأطرافنية ب إنًكانًحسنأنه 
 دعم قوي من المجتمع الدولي، كان هناك تقدم في تطبيق
 أشكرك سيد جمال لكنلم أحصل على جواب واضح هنا، 
 ممثلا في الأخوان في مجلس التعاون الخليجي
 ونحن آبائهم أبناؤناًفالمعارضة هم
ًجهداًكبيراوالموقف يتطلب 
 فاصل قصير لأخذسنضطر 
 بالتنحيًولم يقبل كما قلتم
 تعبيرا عن قناعاته بأن التداول السلمي للسلطة
 التزامه هويعرف فيها كل طرف ما 
 من تجربتي وتجربتكأكثرًًتجربته مع المعارضه
 آليه تنفيذيه يرافقهًولكن قبولنا بها لا بد أن
 ما إحنا بصدد يتطلب إلى وقت 
 ما بذله في هذه الفترة وأنأن لا يضيع جهده 
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 في كل الأطراف الذي ذكرتها لاًيعنيًمعناالمجتمع الدولي 
 يكونوا على إطلاع معناأن يشرفوا اشرافا مباشرا لكي 
 اليمني الشعبًومن قبل كل فئات
 علي عبدالله صالح الرئيسلم نعتد بشرعية 
 ستقوموبالتالي الأجهزة سوف 
 بتحري كامل بعملية
 سيتابع بلاًشكًالكل على العموم
 الأطراف الذي ذكرتهاالمجتمع الدولي في كل 
 أن يشرفوا اشرافا مباشرا لكي يكونوا على إطلاع
 اليمني المجتمعًومن قبل كل فئات
 لم نعتد بشرعية علي عبدالله صالح
 تقوموبالتالي الأجهزة سوف 
 بتحري كامل
 سيتابع بلاًشكًالكلعلى العموم 
  msimehpue/ecnetnes fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/nuon fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-)ecnerefer(nuon fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/tneserp ot erutuf morf esnet brev fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuon+noitisoperp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni ssel/egdeH fo redroeR
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 أختي العزيزة هذه الأطراف لا تريد أن تخرج اليمن نعم 24:42
 المدعو حمود المخلافي حمودوالاخوان المسلمين بزعامة 
 والشيوخ الأطفاليقتلون الأبرياء 
 تعز أنًمن يقصف عم هؤلاء علما
 منطق بما تقوله؟ هنالكهل 
 تقتل الأبرياء ووأن تحمي المواطنين 
 للشعبًالخيرلا يريدون باليمن الخير لا يريدون 
 فيما يصير في تعز فيًفيليس لها يد 
 .... اسمحيليلن يكون رجل عصابات 
 أيام 5في خلال  منكان من المفترض تشكيلها 
 حددتها الآلية التنفيذية حددهاالآليات التي 
 مسار وًهناك
 المبادرة تنفيذ 
 في واردليس مجلس التعاون الخليجي الآن  لا
 حريصين معنا سيكونواهم أشقاء 
 إشعال هذه الجبهة يطرح سؤال التوقيتتوقيت 
 تبقى من هذه السلطة ومابين السلطة من جهة 
 
 أختي العزيزة هذه الأطراف لا تريد أن تخرج اليمن
 والاخوان المسلمين بزعامة المدعو حمود المخلافي
 والشيوخ والأطفاليقتلون الأبرياء 
 تعز بأنهؤلاء علما  من يقصف عم
 منطق بما تقوله؟ هناكهل 
 تقتل الأبرياء وأنوأن تحمي المواطنين 
 لا يريدون باليمن الخير لا يريدون
 ليس لها يد فيما يصير في تعز
 لن يكون رجل عصابات ...
 أيام 5كان من المفترض تشكيلها في خلال 
 الآليات التي حددتها الآلية التنفيذية
 هناك مسار
 المبادرة وتنفيذ
 ليس مجلس التعاون الخليجي الآن في وارد
 حريصين معنا سيكونونهم أشقاء 
 توقيت إشعال هذه الجبهة يطرح سؤال
 تبقى من هذه السلطة مابين السلطة من جهة 
 
 reifisnetni-rellif fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/eman reporp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-noitisoperp fo noitiddA
 nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-tcejbo+evitineg+nuonorp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/)rellif(noitisoperp delbuod a fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-ecnetnes labrev fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/ecnetnes a fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 noitcerroc/reifisnetni-noitagen fo al noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 % من المصوتين78وحوالي  %68كيف تنظر يعني  20:74
 على طريقة الحوار كاملانًكان يحاور المعارضة عامين
 بالشعب اليمني الاستهتاربهذه الالفاظ تم 
 الشعب اليمني قادر النظام
 ان كانت المبادرة الخليجية كانًنهو المبادرة الخليجية ا
 الان ومنطق اللحظة يحتم الىًالىوبالتالي محطتنا 
 ازدادت المعاناة ازدادًازداد الفقر
 الى المقاصل في اليمن ايضاًانتهت 2691ثورة 
 ؟جيبًعلىًالسؤالارديك ان تجيب على السؤال، 
 رأسها الى أخمص قدميها أخمصهاما زالت تابعة من 
 الشخوص هذه في كل الثورات الشيوخوستبقى نفس 
 هناك كثير من الآليات لكن
 ليست مؤسسات ليسلأن الذي يدير اليمن 
 يجب اجتثاث المؤتمر بملايينه انهان كنت تعتقد 
 هؤلاء الطواغيت ماًتخسرما تخسر مليارات 
 ضد الشعوب عندك حق مععندك حق تعاملت 
 فرط بها الأماملم ي لاهذا النظام فرط بالسيادة الوطنية كما 
 هذه الشعوب هذاالذي ضحى من أجله كل 
 مطالب شعب قتل منه وجرح الآلآف وعشرات الآلآف
 % من المصوتين78وحوالي  %6.68كيف تنظر يعني 
 على طريقة الحوار كاملينكان يحاور المعارضة عامين 
 بالشعب اليمني استهتاربهذه الالفاظ تم 
 الشعب اليمني قادر
 هو المبادرة الخليجية ان كانت المبادرة الخليجية
 وبالتالي محطتنا الان ومنطق اللحظة يحتم
 ازدادت المعاناة ازداد الفقر
 انتهت الى المقاصل في اليمن 2691ثورة 
 ارديك ان تجيب على السؤال؟
 ما زالت تابعة من رأسها الى أخمص قدميها
 وستبقى نفس الشخوص هذه في كل الثورات
 هناك الكثير من الآليات
 لأن الذي يدير اليمن ليست مؤسسات
 يجب اجتثاث المؤتمر بملايينه انان كنت تعتقد 
 تخسر مليارات هؤلاء الطواغيت ما
 عندك حق تعاملت ضد الشعوب عندك حق
 هذا النظام فرط بالسيادة الوطنية كما لم يفرط بها الأمام
 الذي ضحى من أجله كل هذه الشعوب
 الآلآف وعشرات الآلآفمنهًمطالب شعب قتل منه وجرح 
 reifisnetni - %6.0 fo noitiddA
 noitcerroc -gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc /nuon sisahpme fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/)nuonorp delbuod(rellif fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-brev fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitseuq a fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/egdeh fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitagen fo on fo noissimO
 nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-ecnetnes fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitagen fo al fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-evitineg+noitisoperp fo noitiddA
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 شباب متعلم قادر على شوًهناكوهناك شعب يقظ وهناك 
 ، أليس يعني ألا تعتقدسؤالبس أسألك 
 مخططات علي عبدالله أفشلًأحدثوا توازن قوى وبالتالي
 هذا الرجليقولون أن سجل  يقولاليمنميون 
 
 وهناك شعب يقظ وهناك شباب متعلم قادر على
 ألا تعتقدبس أسألك، أليس يعني 
 مخططات علي عبدالله أفشلواأحدثوا توازن قوى وبالتالي 
 اليمنميون يقولون أن سجل هذا الرجل
 
 reifisnetni-noitseuq laiuqolloc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-tcejbo fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/tcejbus larulp yb ralugnis fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/brev fo noissimO
 eht dniheB 2102/10/9 11
 swen
 ووجهت الثورة السلمية 13:52
 النقطتان هاذانوانتفت 
 حصانه يكونًله لا نجد قانونا وضعيا
 الحصانه الىًالرئيس ليس بحاجهالأخ 
 عام وثلاثونطيلة ثلاثة 
 3991وًً4991في صيف 
 في النهاية المسألة أن ما حدث انًنتحدث بمنطق اليوم
 على الاخرين ويحرموايحللوا لانفسهم 
 أيضا في الجرائم فيهاًوتعتبر شريكة
 الذين قاموا بالقاء لفرنسيونفان القادة ا
 ي نهر السينف الجزائريونبالقاء الاخوة 
 وهذه عملية ابتزاز وهذاًلم يلاحقوا قضائيا
 ستنطبق أنهاًبشروط معينه بأغلب الظن
 مذكرات توقيف اذاًاختصاص أصيل في اصدار
 عاما المنصرفة 33الولكن أنا أتكلم على 
 تصرفت الحكومات المقبلة تصرفاذا ما 
 اغلب الظن فانوفي هذه الحالة 
 علي عبدالله صالح هيبان من يتحمل المسؤولية 
 في السن والطاعنهالقيادة الكهولة الكاهلة 
 الاصرار والترصد وبسبقهي جرائم مكتملة الاركان 
 علي عبدالله صالح الرئيسالتي تحدثت عنها والاخ 
 نقطة فيًخصوصان اختم مع محمود رفعت 
 مشروع القانون هذا اذا اجازه البرلمان هذا
 نظر للمستقبلكيف يمكن ان ن ماًالمستقبلاذا 
 
 السلمية اليمنيةووجهت الثورة 
 النقطتان هاتانوانتفت 
 حصانه لهًيكونلا نجد قانونا وضعيا 
 الحصانه لهذهًالأخ الرئيس ليس بحاجه
 عام وثلاثينطيلة ثلاثة 
 4991وًً3991في صيف 
 نتحدث بمنطق اليوم في النهاية المسألة أن ما حدث
 على الاخرين ويحرمونيحللوا لانفسهم 
 أيضا في الجرائم هيوتعتبر شريكة 
 الذين قاموا بالقاءالفرنسيينًًفان القادة
 في نهر السين الجزائريينبالقاء الاخوة 
 لم يلاحقوا قضائيا وهذه عملية ابتزاز
 ستنطبق بأنهابشروط معينه بأغلب الظن 
 اختصاص أصيل في اصدار مذكرات توقيف
 المنصرفةعاما  33ولكن أنا أتكلم على 
 تصرفت الحكومات المقبلة اذا ما
 اغلب الظن انوفي هذه الحالة 
 علي عبدالله صالح هوبان من يتحمل المسؤولية 
 في السن الطاعنهالقيادة الكهولة الكاهلة 
 الاصرار والترصد بسبقهي جرائم مكتملة الاركان 
 التي تحدثت عنها والاخ علي عبدالله صالح
 نقطة بخصوصان اختم مع محمود رفعت 
 مشروع القانون هذا اذا اجازه البرلمان
 اذا كيف يمكن ان ننظر للمستقبل
 
 reifisnetni/jda fo noitiddA
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noitutitsbuS
 rorre/evitineg+ brev fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni/evitineg yb noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 sraey fo redroeR
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 nuonorp yb evitineg fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitartsnomed+noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
  reifisnetni ssel/noitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/elcitrap lanoitidnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/brev fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitagored citnames/nuon ecnerefer fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitseuq fo noissimO
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 من هذا أكثرًهذا 90:42
 hctaW sthgiR namuH
 الرئاسيةًأهم صلاحياته
 أننا ملتزمون بكافة بنود احناًوقلنا بأننا
 مخالفا لهذه المنظومة أنهكما 
 هناك مصالح وطنية شاملة دون الدخول في هذا القانون
 أننا نرفض مشروع الحصانة وكما
 الأرض وجوهلأنه لا يوجد قوة على 
 اتفاقيات اتفاقًفهنالك أمور أو
 مثلا موضوع ترسيم مثلالتي تخص سيادة الوطن 
 الأمور السياسية الامرتم ضمان 
 ركنوا للمعارضة ارنكلأنهم 
 الشباب فعلا كانلو 
 اللقاء المشترك اقطابالى قادة أو 
 بصلاحيةًتامةًبالرئيسفيما يتعلق 
 من هذا أفضلًهذا
 sthgiR namuH hctaW
 الرئيسيةأهم صلاحياته 
 وقلنا بأننا ملتزمون بكافة بنود
 مخالفا لهذه المنظومة أنًكما
 دون الدخول في هذا القانون منهناك مصالح وطنية شاملة 
 أننا نرفض مشروع الحصانة كما
 لأنه لا يوجد قوة على الأرض
 فهنالك أمور أو اتفاقيات
 ترسيم التي تخص سيادة الوطن مثلا موضوع
 تم ضمان الأمور السياسية
 لأنهم ركنوا للمعارضة
 الشباب فعلا كانوالو 
 اللقاء المشترك قادةًالى قادة أو
 بعملًالرئيسفيما يتعلق 
 ytilauq otni ytitnauq morf reifisnetni fo noitutitsbuS
 ekatsim gnilleps/nuon reporp fo redroeR
 jda fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp laiuqolloc fo noissimO
 msimehpue/nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/)eugnot fo pils(drow sselgninaem fo noissimO
 ekatsim/nuonorp larulp enilucsam fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni ssel/ nuon fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni fo noissimo/N fo noitutitsbuS
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 مستقبلا لانتهاكاتفي المرحلة السابقة وعدم اتم انتهاكها 
 تفسير هذا القانون يتمتؤكد بأنه 
 نقطة هذه هوجهًالضررمحفوظة في المحاسبة والمساءلة 
 هو طريقنا هذابأن هذا جهدنا 
 من هذه حقوقأن تنتزع 
 هل هناك ضمان اذاًولكنه عائد
 مجموعة كبيرة هنالك
 هذه الأيام والأحزاب التنظيمية الجديدة التي نشأت
 نظام علي وكذلكالتي هي قائمة الآن 
 على مدى عقود فيًفيالأنظمة أثبتت فشلها 
 وبعدها كانت معارضة والآنجزءا من النظام سابقا 
 حكومة الوفاق وفيوأصبحت جزءا من النظام كما ترين 
 التوافق ربما فيما حدث ربمافهنالك نوع من 
 قيقيةانها ح نجدلو شخصنا المشكلة في اليمن 
 ما بين أسرة عنادهنالك 
 الشعب اليمني لو اراد فعلا التجديد عبر تحول سياسي
 ثورة الشعب التيًهيًالسلميةالثورة الشعبية اليمنية 
 ، وأنتم كنتم يدا بيدحتىوالآن في الواقع 
 تحققوا تغييرا لنًلم تنجزوا شيئا
 الاحزاب السياسيه وبالتاليوجميع فئات المجتمع الشعبي اليمني 
 مستمرون فنحنوبالتالي 
 نهاية المطاف وفيًبخطنا الثوري الذي اخترناه
 بانه اريدًانًاقولفيما يتعلق بالقانون اولا 
 يسفر عنه تشريعات انًوما يمكن
 هيكلية جديدة وبنىفي اطار الحوار الوطني 
 علي صالح باولادًالنقطة الثانية فيما يتعلق
 سيكون من الاجراءات فانهمالتالي ضمن اطار معاونيه وب
  يمكنًانسيكون هناك القانونيين الذي 
 ما يمكن ان يتم اتخاذه يحددوا
 الكوارث حال هناكًفيأو لاخراجهم من سجونهم 
 هنا يجب ان تكون عداله حقيقية لذلك
يحصل التحول  يحولًفي الحركات السياسية والأحزاب حتى
 السياسي
 
 مستقبلا انتهاكاتتم انتهاكها في المرحلة السابقة وعدم 
 تفسير هذا القانون لاًتؤكد بأنه
 محفوظة في المحاسبة والمساءلة هذه نقطة
 هو طريقنا وهذابأن هذا جهدنا 
 من هذه حقوقناأن تنتزع 
 ولكنه عائد هل هناك ضمان
 مجموعة كبيرة هناك
 هذه الأيام فيوالأحزاب التنظيمية الجديدة التي نشأت 
 نظام علي كذلكالتي هي قائمة الآن 
 الأنظمة أثبتت فشلها على مدى عقود
 جزءا من النظام سابقا وبعدها كانت معارضة
 حكومة الوفاق فيت جزءا من النظام كما ترين وأصبح
 فهنالك نوع من التوافق ربما فيما حدث
 انها حقيقية لوجدناًلو شخصنا المشكلة في اليمن
 ما بين أسرة لعنادهنالك ا
 عبر تحول سياسيوالتحولًالشعب اليمني لو اراد فعلا التجديد 
 ثورة الشعب السلميةًالتيًهيالثورة الشعبية اليمنية 
 والآن في الواقع، وأنتم كنتم يدا بيد
 تحققوا تغييرا لمًلم تنجزوا شيئا
 الاحزاب السياسيه فبالتاليوجميع فئات المجتمع الشعبي اليمني 
 مستمرون نحنوبالتالي 
 نهاية المطاف فيبخطنا الثوري الذي اخترناه 
 فيما يتعلق بالقانون اولا بانه
 وما يمكن يسفر عنه تشريعات
 هيكلية جديدة وبناءًالحوار الوطنيفي اطار 
 علي صالح اولادًالنقطة الثانية فيما يتعلق
 ضمن اطار معاونيه وبالتالي سيكون من الاجراءات
 سيكون هناك القانونيين الذين 
 ما يمكن ان يتم اتخاذه يحددون
 الكوارث حينأو لاخراجهم من سجونهم 
 هنا يجب ان تكون عداله حقيقية
 السياسية والأحزاب حتى يحصل التحول السياسيفي الحركات 
 
 msimehpue/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 noitagored citnames/evitagen yb evitamriffa fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/rellif a fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 msimehpsyd/nuonorp evissessop fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitisoperp fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/)rellif(noitisoperp delbuod fo noissimO
 msimehpue/rekram esruocsid+noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni– noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni ssel/egdeh fo noissimO
  msimehpsyd/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpsyd/elcitra etinifed fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni ssel/oN+noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 reifisnetni ssel/noitcnujnoc fo noitutitsbuS
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 msimehpue/noitisoperp fo noissimO
 
 reifisnetni-nuonorp+oN sisahpme+noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 egdeh fo noissimO
  noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
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 أخرى مشاكلًعدةمع الشباب الى  00.94
 شباب الثورة من جانبهم اعتبروا
 استمرار نتيجةًأماني اليمنيين بيمن جديد
 وما يشابهها الفقرفضلا عن قضية 
 الرئيس اليمني حملها منهي التي تنتظر 
 مرات) 5الفقيه ( الحافظومن تعز عبد
 البدء في وعلي عبدالله صالح 
 متى ستعود كهرباءو
 أيام ثلاثًالكهرباء عادت منذ
 من شرقه الى غربهومن شماله الى جنوبه 
 شمولية نرىلم 
 أخرى مشاكل عدةًمع الشباب الى
 اعتبروا جانيهمشباب الثورة من 
 استمرار بسببأماني اليمنيين بيمن جديد 
 وما يشابهها القفرفضلا عن قضية 
 هي التي تنتظر الرئيس اليمني حملها
 مرات) 5الفقيه ( الحفيظعبد ومن تعز
 البدء فيعليناًعلي عبدالله صالح 
 متى ستعود كهرباء
 أيام ثلاثةًالكهرباء عادت منذ
 من شماله الى جنوبه من شرقه الى غربه
 شمولية نرلم 
 noitcerroc/dA+N fo redoeR
 ekatsim gnillepS
 nuon fo noitutitsbuS
 ekatsim gnillepS
  msimehpue/noitisoperp fo noissimO
 )eman(nuon reporp fo noitutitsbuS
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 لاحظنا السيد الوزير  لكن
 الت معتمةأن الشوارع ما زلاحظناً
 صنعاء سترينواذا عدت قريبا 
 الألغام الحقلمن هذا 
 الأمنية المسألةمسائل أخرى مثل 
 تحارب هذا الفساد أنًالتي يمكن
 أن يتقبل عزوجلمن الله 
 قضى على كذلكًالذي هدم أو الذي
 المؤتمر الشعبي منغير الاحرار الشرفاء 
 حكومة لمساراو اي انحراف 
 صوتم للرئيس 6002 عامفي 
 فشعبنا في القلوب الحاليةاما نحن في هذه المرحلة 
 بشكل جدي الىًالانتخاباتلم يذهب 
  والثقافيًلكل ألوان الطيف السياسي
 يعني البلد ككلو
 ولا مؤثرة. لا أظن أن المقاطعة كانت فعالة
 قالت هنالك نسبة مشاركة كبيرة
 الجنوبيةومنها قضية 
 أن يتخيل يعني أحدًمالا يستطيع
 في كفة والأزمة  أنهاًأنا في رأيي
 مؤتمرًوطنيستنظم 
 ويتأسفاللهجةًيتكلم بمثل هذه 
 قالواهو وغيره 
 مثل هذه القضايا الكبيرة هذهمن أجل 
 أننا وستجدوالكل الآراء 
 الأزل منذعبر التاريخ 
 تحل هذه القضيةأنًأن تلبى و
يعطواًًعبدربه منصور أنوينبغي لحكومة الوفاق مع الأخ الرئيس 
 الأولوية
 أنا أقول طيبأنا بالنسبة للحوثيين 
 للحوثيونالذي ستقدمه الحكومة 
 برأيك؟كافيةًهل مدة السنتين للمرحلة الانتقالية أمام هذه 
 ويتفقوا وحوارأن يجتمع الجميع على مائدة واحدة 
 ان فشلت هذه اللجنة حتىمن قال 
 الىًأصغرهامن أكبرها 
 الوقت فسفيًنولكن 
 ، نعم اللجنة العسكريةحقيقةًأنًنعم
 بذلت جهود تشكر
 إن كل قيادي ويقولهاأنا قلت لك قبل قليل 
 شعار الدولة هولهم مطلب واحد ولا غيره 
 نحن نناضل عشرين سنة
 كيف تردماًوبين قانون الحصانة 
 عن مصير  ايضاًبما تبقى من الوقت
 يأتي عقب مشكلة هوقانون العدالة 
 للشهداءًسالت دماءاذا 
 لاحظنا السيد الوزير 
 أن الشوارع ما زالت معتمة
 صنعاء ستجدينواذا عدت قريبا 
 الألغام حقلًمن هذا
 الأمنية المسائلمسائل أخرى مثل 
 تحارب هذا الفسادإنًالتي يمكن 
 من الله أن يتقبل
 الذي هدم أو الذي قضى على
 المؤتمر الشعبي فيًغير الاحرار الشرفاء
 حكومة فيًمساراو اي انحراف 
 صوتم للرئيس 6002 العامفي 
 اما نحن في هذه المرحلة فشعبنا في القلوب
 ل جديبشك للانتخاباتلم يذهب 
 الثقافيلكل ألوان الطيف السياسي 
 يعني البلد ككل 
 ولا مؤثرة. يعنيلا أظن أن المقاطعة كانت فعالة 
 هنالك نسبة مشاركة كبيرةانًقالت 
 الجنوبًومنها قضية
 مالا يستطيع أن يتخيل يعني
 أنا في رأيي في كفة والأزمة 
 مؤتمراًوطنياستنظم 
 ويتأسفالطريقةًيتكلم بمثل هذه 
 قالوغيره هو 
 من أجل مثل هذه القضايا الكبيرة
 أننا وستجدونلكل الآراء 
 الأزل ومنذعبر التاريخ 
 أن تلبى وتحل هذه القضية
وينبغي لحكومة الوفاق مع الأخ الرئيس عبدربه منصور أن 
 الأولوية يعطي
 أنا بالنسبة للحوثيين أنا أقول
 للحوثيينالذي ستقدمه الحكومة 
 للمرحلة الانتقالية أمام هذه برأيك؟هل مدة السنتين 
 ويتفقوا للحوارأن يجتمع الجميع على مائدة واحدة 
 من قال ان فشلت هذه اللجنة
 لأصغرهامن أكبرها 
 الوقت بنفسًولكن
 نعم اللجنة العسكرية
 تشكر الحقيقةًبذلت جهود
 إن كل قيادي وأقولًأنا قلت لك قبل قليل
 الدولةلهم مطلب واحد ولا غيره شعار 
 عشرين سنة فينحن نناضل 
 وبين قانون الحصانة كيف ترد
 بما تبقى من الوقت عن مصير 
 قانون العدالة يأتي عقب مشكلة
 الشهداءاذا سالت دماء 
 egdeh fo noissimO
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 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 
 )ko( rellif fo noissimO
 noitcerroc-gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 rorre/jda fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/)elcitra etinifed+noitisoperp( yb noitcnujnoc fo noitutitsbuS
 egdeh fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
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 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
  reifisnetni-noitisoperp fo noitiddA
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 noitisoperp fo noissimO
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 استهتار بدماء الشهداء استفزازًاستفزازيعني 
 عن حدها زادًمسالة الدماء ومسالة ايضا الفاسدين
 للمستقبلًوهذا شيئ مهم
 بني مطر والحليمتين ذهبت المنطقةلكن هذه 
 حتى الجيش هذهًعمايلولا هو الذي أخذ أموال الشعب 
 الكهرباءيكسر في  همًمنلا أعتقد اطلاقا أن الشعب 
 هذا الترحيبمعًما الدور الاقليمي والدولي المطلوب الآن 
 الاستثنائيةحديث الثورة 
 يعني استهتار بدماء الشهداء
 عن حدهازادتًمسالة الدماء ومسالة ايضا الفاسدين 
 فيًالمستقبلوهذا شيئ مهم 
 ر والحليمتين ذهبتبني مط المناطقلكن هذه 
 ولا هو الذي أخذ أموال الشعب حتى الجيش
 لا أعتقد اطلاقا أن الشعب يكسر في الكهرباء
 هذا الترحيب علىما الدور الاقليمي والدولي المطلوب الآن 
 الاستثنائيحديث الثورة 
 msimehpue/nuon delbuod a fo noissimO
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 %89.99حصل فيه الأخ عبدربه منصور على 
 البداية لهذهالذي ظهر جديدا سيبدأ 
 عانى الشعب يكفيًماشركاء مكملين لهذا الوطن 
 نضع العقبات نزرعللخروج من هذه الأزمة لا أن 
 تهديد عاملولتحويل اليمن 
 رأينا في ليبيا نرىكما 
 أن الأخ يعواًالذي أغسلت أدمغتهم أن
 هذه الأطروحات! مثلأنا أستغرب أنه يطرح 
 هناك استقرار انًنعم هو يقول
 بالنسبة للشرعيةوكان الدماء تسيل في كل م
 الذي قال:الأخيروشاهدنا التصريح للسفير الأمريكي 
 اليمن تزرعًلإيران في اليمن تريد
 في خزينتها وانًتجعلهاأن تحتفظ بهذه الأموال 
 تستطيع البلاد فهلتعاني في الأصل البلاد 
 ما لا يدرك كله لا يترك جله انهألا يكفي 
 التي خرج بها عبدالله صالح
 الآخرين في البلدان معًمعة مع السفاحين مقارن
 عن علي الآنأخي أنا عم بحكي لك 
 أنما احتراما لأبنائهولكنه ليس احتراما للشعب 
 أن نحدد دونًكل الجمهوريات
 في الجمهوريات العربية هو نظام الجيش النظامًالنظام الوحيد
 الإخوان سواء سواء تنظيم القاعدة
 بهذه المناصب كفوئةان هذه القيادات غير 
 المنشقيننحن عندما نتحدث يجب ان نتحدث عن 
 تحويل اليمن الانقلابيونالتي كان يريد 
 الثورة أهدافها اوًتستكملوبه تستكمل 
 هذا التوازن ظلًفي
 يقول لك الرجل ايران تنفق الملايين لاحباط الثورة ألا
 الىًالاستقراراليمن بحاجة 
 هذا الطرف من حقهم انهوانه هؤلاء، 
 هم من أخرجوا من هذه الأزمة
 شاب من الشباب الواعد وهوأنا أتمنى على الأخ علي، 
 والشهداء الثكالىًأمهات
 الوسائل بمختلفًتم الضغط على المواطنين
 القمح، استخدموا كل امكانيات الدولة ،ًاستخدموااستخدموا الدقيق
 نعم 1.59، 84021صوت 
 %99.89حصل فيه الأخ عبدربه منصور على 
 البداية بهذهًيدا سيبدأالذي ظهر جد
 عانى الشعب أنهشركاء مكملين لهذا الوطن 
 نضع العقبات نأتيللخروج من هذه الأزمة لا أن 
 تهديد لعاملولتحويل اليمن 
 كما رأينا في ليبيا
 أن الأخ يقتنعواالذي أغسلت أدمغتهم أن 
 أنا أستغرب أنه يطرح هذه الأطروحات!
 نعم هو يقول هناك استقرار
 تسيل في كل مكان بالنسبة للشرعيةالدماء 
 وشاهدنا التصريح الأخير للسفير الأمريكي الذي قال:
 اليمن زرعلإيران في اليمن تريد 
 أن تحتفظ بهذه الأموال في خزينتها
 تستطيع البلاد هلًتعاني في الأصل البلاد
 ألا يكفي ما لا يدرك كله لا يترك جله
 عبدالله صالح عليًالتي خرج بها
 مع السفاحين الآخرين في البلدان مقارنة
 أخي أنا عم بحكي لك كلام عن علي
 لكنه ليس احتراما للشعب أنما احتراما لأبنائه
 أن نحدد بلاكل الجمهوريات 
 النظام الوحيد في الجمهوريات العربية هو نظام الجيش
 تنظيم القاعدة فيًالإخوان سواء
 بهذه المناصب كفؤةان هذه القيادات غير 
 منشقينندما نتحدث يجب ان نتحدث عن نحن ع
 تحويل اليمن الانقلابيينًالتي كان يريد
 وبه تستكمل الثورة أهدافها
 هذا التوازن طلفي 
 يقول لك الرجل ايران تنفق الملايين لاحباط الثورة
 للاستقرارًاليمن بحاجة
 وانه هؤلاء، هذا الطرف من حقهم
 من هذه الأزمة اليمنهم من أخرجوا 
 شاب من الشباب الواعد هوأنا أتمنى على الأخ علي، 
 والشهداء الثكلىأمهات 
 الوسائل بكافةتم الضغط على المواطنين 
 استخدموا الدقيق، القمح، استخدموا كل امكانيات الدولة
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 هذه النتائج التي يتحدث الابن علي
 لهذه الانتخابات، و اليوم يطعنوشهدت 
 أن الشعب اليمني وأناًبتحدثًمعكطيلة عام يا أستاذ فيصل 
 واليوم يطعن بالاخت توكل
 من هذه الأزمة للخروجًاليمنوسيعمل جاهدا الأخ الرئيس 
 في كتاف وفي دماسي الكثير علىًالاخرينمن يمارس المظالم 
 الوطني الوفاقوفي حكومة 
 أن الدولة كلها سخرت واًأنه الدولة كلها،
 أنا أسألك ،ًطيبفي طور فرعون جديد، آه
 يستطيع تحريك لاخاض الانتخابات وهو 
 يخرج للتصويت فلمومن ثم 
 النظام اطرافوانما بارادة 
 التاريخيين الاخوانوأنا أتكلم عن قادة 
 السياسة الأحزابًنمثل عددا من
 الذي تغير! ماوهم الآن في السلطة 
 ، طب لماذاأناًسؤال بس بدي أسألك
 يعني... وهوًلمًيقضيًفيًالحكملماذا تحكمون عليه 
 هذه البداية كانتيا أخي اذا 
 الاقتراع صناديقًمن الوصول الى
 ممثل كذلك للحوثيين أنوالأخ علي يتحدث 
 جدد. لهًعين محافظين
 عبدربه منصور منذًالوهلةوالأخ الرئيس 
 الوطني الىًالمؤتمروأن يأتوا 
 وقهروالجنوب ظلموا أبناء ا
 كل قيادات وباؤوامنفردا الى الوحدة 
 علي عبدالله صالح انهونحن نعرف 
 4991 لحربلانه يدعي انه من قام 
 أبشع الجرائم ممارسةالجنوب تم 
 يا أخي تعلمهل 
 القيادة بماًاقترفتهأن نعترف بما اقترفته 
 هذا أخطر من الممارساتوباسم الثورة 
 علي عبدالله صالح نظامالتي كان يمارسها 
 الموضوع بنهايةأسألك سؤال 
 القادة اليمنين قادةعلى 
ساعة بربك؟  42كيف تتوقع لبلد لبلد أن ينهض وهو سكران 
 (مقتطع في اليوتيوب) 
 اليوم سلم السلطة ماًيزالعلي عبدالله صالح 
 
 الابن علي بهاهذه النتائج التي يتحدث 
 اليوم يطعن هووشهدت لهذه الانتخابات، و
 أن الشعب اليمني طيلة عام يا أستاذ فيصل
 اليوم يطعن بالاخت توكل هوو
 من هذه الأزمة لخروجًوسيعمل جاهدا الأخ الرئيس
 من يمارس المظالم في كتاف وفي دماسي الكثير
 الوطني المؤتمروفي حكومة 
 أنه الدولة كلها، أن الدولة كلها سخرت
 في طور فرعون جديد، آه، أنا أسألك
 كخاض الانتخابات وهو يستطيع تحري
 يخرج للتصويت لمًومن ثم
 وانما بارادة النظام
 وأنا أتكلم عن قادة التاريخيين
 السياسة أحزابنمثل عددا من 
 الذي تغير! منوهم الآن في السلطة 
 بس بدي أسألك سؤال، طب لماذا
 لماذا تحكمون عليه يعني...
 هذه البداية كانيا أخي اذا 
 الاقتراع مراكزمن الوصول الى 
 ممثل كذلك للحوثيين أنهتحدث والأخ علي ي
 عين محافظين جدد.
 والأخ الرئيس عبدربه منصور
 الوطني للمؤتمروأن يأتوا 
 قهرواًأبناء الجنوب ظلموا
 كل قيادات وناءوامنفردا الى الوحدة 
 علي عبدالله صالح انونحن نعرف 
 4991 فيًحربلانه يدعي انه من قام 
 الجنوب تم أبشع الجرائم
 يا أخي فعلاهل 
 أن نعترف بما اقترفته القيادة
 باسم الثورة هذا أخطر من الممارسات
 التي كان يمارسها علي عبدالله صالح
 الموضوع فيًنهايةأسألك سؤال 
 اليمنين القادةًعلى
ساعة بربك؟  42كيف تتوقع لبلد لبلد أن ينهض وهو سكران 
 (مقتطع في اليوتيوب) 
 علي عبدالله صالح اليوم سلم السلطة
 reifisnetni-evitineg fo noitiddA
 msimehpsyd/nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-ecnetnes a fo noissimO
 msimehpsyd/nuonorp tcejbus fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap dn2 dna ts1+elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 msimehpue/evitineg fo noissimO
 noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap dn2 fo noitutitsbuS
 egdeh-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-)ko(rellif fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitagen fo al fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap ts1 fo noissimO
 noitagored citnames/noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap dn2 fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 loot noitseuq hw fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp tcejbus fo noissimO
 msimehpue/ecnetnes fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnillepS
 msimehpue/nuon evitineg fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp tcejbus fo noitiddA
 msimehpue/evitineg eht fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/esarhp lanoitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 brev fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuonorp tcejbus fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 ekatsim/nuon fo noissimO
  msimehpsyd/egdeh a yb brev fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-evitineg detaeper fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 msimehpue/-)tcejbus(noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap ts1 fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
  msimehpue/oediv morf noissimO
 
 
 
 noitcerroc/brev fo noissimO
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 أيضا أبناؤهوبقي  13:84 htped nI
 ثورة اليمنين السلمية كلًالمخاوفويثيرهذه مجتمعا 
 كثيراًمواجهة تأخرت
 المعارضة اتهمت الرئيس قوىبعض 
 عشان توفر لأنهوتجعل لها أولويه 
 هذه الحالة غير مسبوقة يكونربما 
 هناك عناصر غير طبيعية مسألةلكن هل 
 أيضا أبناءهًوبقي
 ويثيرهذه مجتمعا ثورة اليمنين السلمية
 كثيرًمواجهة تأخرت
 المعارضة اتهمت الرئيس القوىبعض 
 عشان توفر إنهوتجعل لها أولويه 
 هذه الحالة غير مسبوقة تكونربما 
 لكن هل هناك عناصر غير طبيعية
 ekatsim gnillepS
  msimehpue/N+renimreted fo noissimO
  ekatsim gnillepS
 reifisnetni-elcitra etinifed eht fo noitiddA
 noitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/xiferp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
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 أعنقد أنه أخذ أنههو لا شك 
 البصر غضهًنتهم به النظام السابق هو
 التنسيق اذا كان هناك معهي نفسها تنسق، 
 فيما لو تخلى اذاعيد الوحدة إنه 
 وحقيقة هي بحاجة فمنًهوعبدربه هادي واضح 
 الآن نصرًأن أسأل الأستاذأريد 
 فيه الحرب الجادفي قيادة الجيش بدأ تقدم 
 تستولي على المزيدووهي تحصد، 
  اليعهد علي عبدالله صالح 
 الطائرات الأمريكية كانت
 هذا عهد كان الأمريكيون رعوهاهم الذين 
 الواقع أن الأمريكيين لديهم نريدًأن
 ةوالأكثر شماع الحجةالأمريكيون هم الأكثر 
 والقاعدة نفسها حتىليست فقط للشعوب بل 
 الجيش والتحديث مشترواكل  4991من العام 
 لقوات الجيش لبقيةوليس 
 تضخم على حساب بنيأكثر من موضة صدامية و
 رئيس جهاز الأمن أنأعتقد 
 لا أتحدث عن الشخصيات طبعايعني أنا 
 ملف الأمن قضيةسيطرة كبيرة في 
 .أنًازاحتهًصعبةلا أعتقد 
 الرئيس أنفسهم أخوًهم قالوا هم أنفسهم ابن
 الرئيس لتقديراتوهذا متروك 
 عنه لواء من اللواء بدلاوتم تعيين 
 الاكثر استعصاء الجيش واجهزة الامن؟
 مسجلة فيًفي الأوراق ولا
 هذه المرحلة الأولى هذاولكن 
 الآنًهيالمرحلة الثانية 
 المتعلقة بالجانب الفني هيالآن 
 المسلحة القواتًكل معسكراتلأخراج أولا 
 بالتالي وهو في خطابه بالضبط
 ألقاه قبل أسبوعين اليًالمهم
 تحدثت عن نوايا الرئيس ذاا
 الاستحقاقات السياسية الأخرى من
 اليوم استحقاقات الانتقال نبحث
 القاعدة تنظيمًتنامي ايضا نشاط
 اللواء علي محسن الأحمر طبعا
 عليهما المبادرةاللذين نصا  اللذانهو الأمران 
 الجيش والحوار الهيكلةاعادة 
 البعض ينادي فيها التيالانفصال 
 هل لديه القدرة الكافيه لكن
 .. اعتقد انه تغيير كبير لا
 الرئيسي على الأقل ملففي 
 بعد الموقف الدولي انهًلكن في تقديري
 الدولي بعد القرار الوطنيجلسة مجلس الأمن 
 هو لا شك أعنقد أنه أخذ
 البصر غضنتهم به النظام السابق هو 
 هي نفسها تنسق، التنسيق اذا كان هناك
 عيد الوحدة إنه فيما لو تخلى
 عبدربه هادي واضح وحقيقة هي بحاجة
 الآن ناصرأريد أن أسأل الأستاذ 
 فيه الحرب الجدلجيش بدأ تقدم في قيادة ا
 وهي تحصد، تستولي على المزيد
  الذيًعهد علي عبدالله صالح
 الطائرات الأمريكية كان
 هذا عهد كان الأمريكيون يرعوهاهم الذين 
 الواقع أن الأمريكيين لديهم
 والأكثر شماعة حجةالأمريكيون هم الأكثر 
 ليست فقط للشعوب بل والقاعدة نفسها
 الجيش والتحديث مشترياتكل  4991من العام 
 وليس لقوات الجيش
 أكثر من موضة صدامية وتضخم على حساب
 أعتقد رئيس جهاز الأمن
 يعني أنا لا أتحدث عن الشخصيات
 سيطرة كبيرة في ملف الأمن
 لا أعتقد.
 الرئيس أنفسهم أخًهم قالوا هم أنفسهم ابن
 الرئيس لتغييراتًوهذا متروك
 عنه لواء من اللواءوتم تعيين 
 اجهزة الامن؟ لاالاكثر استعصاء الجيش و
 في الأوراق ولا مسجلة
 ولكن هذه المرحلة الأولى
 هيًالآنالمرحلة الثانية 
 الآن المتعلقة بالجانب الفني
 المسلحة قواتًلأخراج أولا كل معسكرات
 بالتالي وهو في خطابهو
 ألقاه قبل أسبوعين الذيالمهم 
 الرئيستحدثت عن نوايا 
 الاستحقاقات السياسية الأخرى على
 اليوم استحقاقات الانتقال سنبحث
 تنامي ايضا نشاط القاعدة
 اللواء علي محسن الأحمر
 اللذين نصا عليهما المبادرةًهو الأمران
 الجيش والحوارهيكلةًاعادة 
 البعض ينادي فيها الذيًالانفصال
 هل لديه القدرة الكافيه
 اعتقد انه تغيير كبير
 الرئيسي على الأقل الملففي 
 لكن في تقديري بعد الموقف الدولي
 جلسة مجلس الأمن الدولي بعد القرار
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 msimehpue/nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 egdeh-elcitrap lanoitidnoc fo noissimO
  noitcerroc/evitineg+noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnilleps/eman reporp fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler dradnats yb laiuqolloc fo noitutitsbuS
 ekatsim/rekram eninimef fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/esnet brev tneserp yb tsap fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/elcitrap lanoitidnoc+brev fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnilleps/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 egdeh fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/rettel a fo noitiddA
 msimehpue/evitineg fo noitiddA
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
  reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 msimehpue/rellif fo noissimO
  msimehpue/N fo noissimO
 msimehpue/ecnetnes fo noissimO
 gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitagored citnames/nuon fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 rorre/noitagen fo al fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-noitisoperp fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noissimO
 nuonorp+esarhp emit fo redroeR
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 ekatsim gnilleps/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 .. /noitcnujnoc yb reifisnetni+noitisoperp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler dradnats yb laiuqolloc fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-elcitrap lanoitidnoc fo noissimO
 nuonorp fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni ssel/esnet erutuf yb tneserp fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue/noitcurtsnoc fo elcitrap ts1 fo noissimO
 reifisnetni fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitaler fo noitutitsbuS
 egdeh-tub fo noissimO
  reifisnetni-noitagen fo al fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/elcitra etinifed fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni-esarhp evitaler fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-jda fo noissimO
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 أستاذ سعيد طيبًأسأل
 بدأ توه هوًالحوار الوطني
 49ترتيب الانفصال العودة ل 
 المرويينبعضًيعنيًولقي له 
 هذا الجزء أنهمن الحراك أنا أعتقد 
 من أكثر من مصدر طبعاوأنا قرأتها 
 الايرانيون يبحون عن موطئ
 تحدث ممكنوالمتغيرات اللي 
 .. استقطاباتفي عقد المؤتمرات في 
 كل الأموال انًوقانون أعتقد
 للسعودية تأثير كبير
 الفارق بين أهداف هوًلها اليوم هذا
 أنا لا أريد أن أقول انه يعني ..
 يشكلوا دولة انهمالآن هم لا شك 
 لدينا دولة للحوثيينومضبوط 
 قاعدة ولدينا ايضا منطقة دولةولدينا 
 يضع اشتراطات فيًجانبيالحراك أحيانا 
 اليوم تشاركتًأحزاب المعارضة التي
 الى آخرهوبدعم اقليمي ودولي 
 قوة جاهزة سيظلواًفي تقديري
 التي تحكم اليوم رئيس الوزراء
 أعتقد بأنها ليست صعبة أناو
 الشكل السابق الشاكلًمجموعة ليست على
 يعني بعض الخطابات لاًزالباسم النظام السابق 
 لم تكن هناك ثورة اوًوكأن النظام
 هذا معلومات لا تحليل يعني؟
 هناك اتفاقات بينه وبين الرئيس خاصةن وان كا
 بها يؤمنواثورة جديدة 
 لا يشكل أحمد علي انهًأنا أعتقد
 إلى العمل المدني ويتجهوا
 لم تكن هناك ثورة أوًوكأن النظام
 تورطوا في مواجهات مع شباب الثورة لأنهم
 أنا لا أريدهم لاربما يعني أنا أقول انما 
 للعمل السياسي المجالأو يفتح أمامهم 
 .أسرتهًعهد علي عبدالله صالح وعهد
 على موقع الجزيرة الرسميةصفحة البرنامج 
 البرنامج على موقع وصفحةفي العمق 
 أستاذ سعيد
 بدأ الحوار الوطني نوه
 .4991ترتيب الانفصال العودة ل 
 المرويين يعنيًبعضولقي له 
 هذا الجزء أنًمن الحراك أنا أعتقد
 من أكثر من مصدر بصراحةوأنا قرأتها 
 يبحون عن موطئ يعنيالايرانيون 
 تحدث يمكنوالمتغيرات اللي 
 .. استقطابفي عقد المؤتمرات في 
 كل الأموال انهوقانون أعتقد 
 للسعودية تأثير كبير مثلا
 لها اليوم هذا الفارق بين أهداف
 يعني .. هذاأنا لا أريد أن أقول انه 
 الآن هم لا شك يشكلوا دولة
 ينمضبوط لدينا دولة للحوثي
 ولدينا قاعدة ولدينا ايضا منطقة
 يضع اشتراطات تيارًالحراك أحيانا
 اليوم أحزاب المعارضة التي
 بدعم اقليمي ودولي الى آخره
 قوة جاهزة سيظلونفي تقديري 
 رئيس الوزراءوالتي تحكم اليوم 
 وأعتقد بأنها ليست صعبة
 مجموعة ليست على الشكل السابق
 الخطاباتباسم النظام السابق يعني بعض 
 وكأن النظام لم تكن هناك ثورة
 لا تحليل يعني؟وهذا معلومات 
 وان كان هناك اتفاقات بينه وبين الرئيس
 بها يؤمنونثورة جديدة 
 أنا أعتقد لا يشكل أحمد علي
 إلى العمل المدني ويتجهون
 وكأن النظام لم تكن هناك ثورة
 تورطوا في مواجهات مع شباب الثورة لأنه
 نا أقول انما أنا لا أريدهمربما يعني أ
 للعمل السياسي مجالًأو يفتح أمامهم
 عهد علي عبدالله صالح وعهد.
 على موقع الجزيرة الرئيسيةًصفحة البرنامج
 البرنامج على موقع وصفحاتفي العمق 
 noitagored citnames/brev+rellif fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-nuonorp fo noissimO
 reifisnetni/4991 yb 49 fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/rellif+tcejbus fo redroeR
 noitcerroc/nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
 msimehpue/reifisnetni fo noitutitsbuS
 msimehpue/rellif fo noitiddA
 msimehpue/brev yb egdeh fo noitutitsbuS
 evisnetni ssel/N ralugnis yb larulp fo noitutitsbuS
 rorre/nuonorp fo noitiddA
 noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 msimehpue/nuonorp fo noissimO
 nuonorp evitartsnomed fo noissimO
 reifisnetni -esarhp evitartsnomed fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 eht fo elcitrap ts1 fo noissimO
 msimehpue/noitcurtsnoc
 reifisnetni-nuon yb evitineg eht fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 msimehpue/nuonorp tcejbus fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/nuon fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 msimehpsyd/noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 ekatsim/noitcnujnoc fo noitiddA
 reifisnetni fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni-nuonorp evitaler fo noissimO
  noitcerroc/gnidne esac fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcnujnoc fo noissimO
 rorre/tcejbus fo noitutitsbuS
 noitcerroc/noitagen fo al fo noissimO
 reifisnetni-elcitra etinifed fo noissimO
 rorre/noitcurtsnoc eht fo elcitrap dn2 fo noissimO
 noitcerroc/jda fo noitutitsbuS
 reifisnetni/larulp yb ralugnis fo noitutitsbuS
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Appendix 6: Interview questions 
 
Background / كراشملا ةيفلخ 
1. For how long have you been working with Al Jazeera? Where did you work before? 
؟اقباس لمعت تنك نيأ ؟ةريزجلا ةانقب لمعلل تممضنا ىتم 
2. What is a critical incident you have encountered while working with the debates? 
؟تارظانملا/تاراوحلا صخي اميف اديدحتو ةانقلا عم لمعلا للاخ كفداص يذلا مساحلا فقوملا نع ينثدح 
 
 
General  /ماع 
3. Are there any channel policies in terms of how program procedures take place? If yes, what 
are they? 
 يأ دجوت له؟خلا ثبو ذيفنتو ريضحت نم جماربلا ةرادا صخي اميف ةانقلل تاسايس 
4. Do you train the channel’s policies in your training programs?  
بيردتلا جمارب للاخ نوموقت له ؟ةانقلا تاسايس سيردتب 
5. On what basis does the channel use new terms such as بةجطلا and عولخملا سيئرلا? Does Al 
Jazeera consider the language it uses the formal standard contemporary Arabic? 
 اهمدختست يتلا ةغللا ةريزجلا ربتعت لهو ؟)عولخم سيئر وأ ةجطلاب :لاثم( ةديدج تاحلطصم رايتخا متي ساسأ يا ىلع
؟ةرصاعملا ىحصفلا ةيبرعلا ةغللا يه 
 
 
Topic and question selection / ةلئسلأا رايتخاو عوضوملا  
6. How are topics selected and by who?  
؟اهراتخي نمو تاقلحلا عيضاوم رايتخا متي فيك 
7. Who drafts the questions? When? 
؟ىتم ؟تاقلحلا ةلئسأ ةغايصب موقي نم 
8. Who drafts the report which introduces the debates? 
؟ةقلح لك ةيادب يف اهثب متي يتلا ريراقتلا بتكي نم 
 
 
Speakers  / نوثدحتملا 
9. How are the speakers selected (who chooses and on what bases)?  
؟ساسأ يأ ىلعو ؟نيثدحتملا راتخي نم 
10. Is there any difference in the selection of real time vs. virtual speakers? 
سأ يأ ىلعاودجاوتيل نيثدحتملا رايتخا متي سا  قيرط نع( ايضارتفا اوثدحتي وأ ويدوتسلأابSkype؟لاثم ) 
11. Do speakers know about the questions prior to the debates?  
؟راوحلا دعوم لبق ةلئسلأا نع نوثدحتملا فرعي له 
 
Moderator  / عيذملا 
12. On what bases are the moderators selected? Why are there no Qataris? 
 ؟نييرطق نيعيذم دجاوتي لا اذامل ؟ةيراوحلا جماربلل اديدحتو ةانقلاب لمعلل نيعيذملا رايتخا متي ساسأ يأ ىلع 
13. Who watches the moderator? Does s/he have an earpiece? What instructions can the 
moderator get? 
 ءانثأ عيذملا ةعباتمب موقي نم؟عيذملا اهيلع لصحي يتلا تايملعتلا يه ام ؟نذلأا ةعامس ربع ةعباتملا نوكت له ؟راوحلا 
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14. Can the moderator ask follow up questions? Can s/he deviate from the questions? Are 
questions rigidly timed? Can the moderator cut off speakers? If yes, according to what: 
topic such as a taboo, time or speaking tone? 
 عيذملا ناكماب له ؟ةمارصب ةلئسلأا تيقوت متي له ؟ هعباتملل ةلئسأ ةفاضإ هناكماب له ؟ةلئسلأا رييغت عيذملا ناكماب له
 ؟ثدحتملا توص ةربن وأ تقولا وأ ملاكلا ةيساسحك هفاقياب موقي ساسأ يأ ىلعو ،ثدحتملا فاقيا 
15. Are there any policies concerning the language used with and about women? 
 نعو عم همدختسملا ةغللا صوصخب تاسايس دجوت له؟ةيراوحلا جماربلا يف ةأرملا  
16. Why do some moderators sometimes use nonstandard Arabic? 
؟انايحأ ةيماع ةيبرع ةغل نيعيذملا ضعب مدختسي اذامل 
17. Do moderators have certain standing points which they try to win while moderating 
programs? 
؟راوحلا للاخ اهب زوفلا نولواحي رظن تاهجو/ءارآ نيعيذملا ىدل دجوت له 
18. Why do some moderators use ‘I mean’? 
؟)ينعي( ةملك نيعيذملا ضعب مدختسي اذامل 
 
Transcription  / )ينورتكللاا ةريزجلا عقومب ةباتك تاراوحلا غيرفت( 
19. Why does Al Jazeera transcribe debates? 
ب ةريزجلا موقت اذامل؟تارظانملا/تاراوحلا غيرفت  
20. Who, when and how are the debates transcribed after being staged? 3 
؟تارظانملا/تاراوحلا غيرفت متي فيكو ىتمو نم 
21. Who checks whether the transcript is accurate and complete? 
؟لمتكمو حيحص غيرفتلا نأ نم دكأتلاب موقي نم 
22. Who decides on which debates are transcribed? And how are they transcribed?  
 ؟اهغيرفت متي يتلا تاقلحلا رايتخاب موقي نم 
23. Although the Yemeni revolution started in January 2011, no written corpus is available 
for the debates which took place in Al Jazeera channel between March and August 2011 in 
two debate programs (The Opposite Direction and In Depth) and between January 2011 to 
April 2011 in one debate program (Behind the News). Why? 
؟تنرتنلاا ىلع ةغرفم جماربلا تاقلح ضعب دجاوت مدع ببس ام 
24. What are the reasons of any discrepancies between the debate recordings and the written 
transcription? 
؟ويديفلاو غيرفتلا نيب فلاتخا دوجو ببس ام 
25. Are there any factors, policies or people who influence the transcription?   
؟غيرفتلا ىلع رثؤت لماوع وأ تاسايس يأ دجوت له 
26. Why does Al Jazeera sometimes cuts parts of videos on YouTube? 
؟غيرفتلاب ابوتكم نوكي عطقملا نأب املع ؟ويديفلا نم ازجا عاطتقاب ةريزجلا موقت اذامل 
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Appendix 7: CONSENT FORM  
 
  
I, the undersigned [please give your name here, in BLOCK CAPITALS] 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
of [please give contact details here, sufficient to enable the investigator to get in touch 
with you, such as a postal or email address] 
 
…..………………………………………………………………………………………… 
hereby freely agree to take part in the study entitled [A Critical Discourse Analysis of 
TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Revolution: the Ideological Balance of 
Broadcasts] 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
1 I confirm that I have been given a Participant Information Sheet (a copy of which is 
attached to this form) giving particulars of the study, including its aim(s), methods and 
design, the names and contact details of key people and, as appropriate, the risks and 
potential benefits, and any plans for follow-up studies that might involve further 
approaches to participants.  I have been given details of my involvement in the study. I 
have been told that in the event of any significant change to the aim(s) or design of the 
study I will be informed, and asked to renew my consent to participate in it.  
 
2 I have been assured that I may withdraw from the study at any time without 
disadvantage or having to give a reason. 
 
3 I have been given information about the risks of my suffering harm or adverse effects.  I 
have been told about the aftercare and support that will be offered to me in the event of 
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this happening, and I have been assured that all such aftercare or support would be 
provided at no cost to myself.  
 
4 I have been told how information relating to me (data obtained in the course of the 
study, and data provided by me about myself) will be handled: how it will be kept secure, 
who will have access to it, and how it will or may be used. 
 
5 I have been informed that my name will not be mentioned in the audio recording and 
will therefore not appear in the study.  
 
 
 
  
Signature of participant ……………………Date …………………………. 
 
 
 
Signature of (principal) investigator……………… Date………………… 
 
Name of (principal) investigator  
MS. RAIYA SULAIMAN SALIM AL KHARUSI 
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Appendix 8: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Title of study 
A Critical Discourse Analysis of TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Revolution: the 
Ideological Balance of Broadcasts 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a study. Before you decide whether to do so, it is 
important that you understand the research that is being done and what your involvement 
will include. Please take the time to read the following information carefully and discuss it 
with others if you wish. Do not hesitate to ask us anything that is not clear or for any 
further information you would like to help you make your decision. Please do take your 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This study aims at uncovering how language can be used to formulate and circulate 
hegemonic political ideology in the TV political debates of the 2011 Yemen revolution-
how ideology is used as a tool of hegemony. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. If you do 
decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that you have to complete it. You 
are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any 
time, or a decision not to take part at all, will not affect any treatment/care that you may 
receive (should this be relevant). 
 
How long will my part in the study take? 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for no more than one 
hour.  
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will receive an invitation to attend an interview. You may ask for the questions to be 
disclosed to you in advance, and you will be free to discuss and comment on them. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
By taking part in this study, you share information about your program production in 
terms of selecting topics, formulating questions and recording.  
 
 
How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The personal data which will be obtained are your occupation and number of years of 
experience with Al Jazeera channel. Unless you accept that your occupation and years of 
experience are added, they will be omitted from the study’s data. Your name will not be 
collected.  
 
 
What will happen to the data collected within this study? 
Interviews will be recorded, transcribed and compared with the analysis of data. 
Recording and transcription of the interviews will not be accessed to anybody unless with 
the consent of the interviewer. All data will be stored on encrypted files, and kept on a 
personal computer which is password protected. 
 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by the ECDA for Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities: 
protocol number to be assigned on approval. 
 
Who can I contact if I have any questions? 
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If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details personally, 
please get in touch with me, in writing, by phone or by email:  
 
Ms. Raiya Al Kharusi 
Email: raya@aou.edu.om 
Phone: +968 99214977 
 
Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or concerns about any 
aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of this 
study, please write to the University’s Secretary and Registrar at 
Secretary/Registrar.s.c.grant@herts.ac.uk 
 
 
Thank you very much for reading this information and giving consideration to 
taking part in this study. 
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Appendix 9: ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
 
Table 63 Differentiation: AJ 
The opposition (his opponents/ his rivals/ the 
opposition) 
Saleh (the Yemeni president/ Saleh/ Ali 
Abdullah Saleh/ the man/ the president) 
The competitors (his competitors) Saleh (-) 
The people (the Yemeni people) Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh) 
The army (the army) The regime (the government) 
The opposition (his opponents) The regime (the regime) 
The revolution (the revolution’s youth) The opposition (the opposition and the ruling 
party) 
The tribes The opposition (the youth) 
 
Table 64 Differentiation: government 
The opposition (the killers, the criminals and 
gangs, the gangs, the extremists) 
Saleh (the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh) 
Tawakul (Tawakul Karman) Saleh (the president Ali Abdullah Saleh) 
The opposition (the opposition, these, the 
members) 
The people (the Yemeni people, the people, the 
people, the Yemeni people) 
Tawakul (Tawakul Karman) The people (the Yemeni people, some youth, 
these youth, the innocent youth, the innocent) 
The opposition (they, the members, gangs that 
kill the innocent, the others) 
The regime (we, we in the ruling party) 
Tawakul (Tawakul) Yasir (I) 
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Table 65 Differentiation: protesters 
Saleh (the ousted president, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, he, family, who kills him, a president 
who runs the country while being abroad, 
ousted, war criminal, president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, the ruler, the criminal, a person) 
The people (his great people, the Yemeni 
people, the people, his people, the Yemenis, 
their people)  
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh, the ousted, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh and his sons, dictator, the 
killers, the thieves, the president, president 
Saleh, the ruler, Ali Saleh, he) 
The opposition (we, the national youth 
revolution, we, the revolution’s youth, we, the 
protesters, the youth, the revolution’s youth 
forces, the opposition, the squares, the youth) 
Saleh (the dictators, Ali Abdullah Saleh) The revolution (the revolutions, the national 
youth revolution) 
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh) The army (the army) 
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh, the entourage and 
the family, Saleh) 
America (America, the brothers in the 
European Union and the United States of 
America) 
The people in the eyes of Saleh (terrorists) The people in the eyes of the world (the people 
of peace, the people of safety, the people of 
love) 
The regime (Yasir al Yamani and other than 
brother Yasir al Yamani like defenders of the 
family regime), they, the regime, the gang, 
The opposition (The national youth revolution, 
the opposition, the youth lines, the youth, a 
revolution government, the Yemeni youth, the 
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conspiracy government and termination 
government, the remnants of the thugs of the 
ousted regime, the gang, the thugs, regime) 
protesters and the opposition, the revolution 
youth) 
The regime (the regime) The revolution (the Yemeni revolution) 
The regime (they, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s thugs, 
the regime) 
The people (the people, their people, the 
Yemeni people) 
The regime (they) The world (the world) 
The Gulf (who came up with the initiative) The opposition (our youth) 
The Gulf (who came up with the initiative, 
some forces) 
The people (our people, the Yemeni people) 
The regime (this regime) The Gulf (the brothers in the Gulf) 
 
Table 66 Generalized social actors: AJ 
Connotation  Social actors 
Negative The regime, the dictator, treacherous government, treacherous regime, 
the ruling clique, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s group, the sheikhs, his sheikhs, 
the elderly, his competitors, the regime officials, Al Ahmer (Ahmer, 
Bait Al Ahmer), the rulers (Arab rulers, the Americans, the Arab 
rulers and the tyrants) 
Victim The wounded people, his civilians, Yemen’s people, the protestors, the 
people’s sectors, the Yemenis 
Faithful Opposition parties, the protesters’ leaders, the sheikhs of Hashid 
tribes, military leaders, ambassadors 
306 
 
Strong  The Yemeni people, the people, the unarmed people, the protesters, 
the revolutionary Yemeni, the protesters, the opposition 
 
Table 67 Generalized social actors: government 
Connotation Social actors 
Negative The opposition, the killers, the criminals, the gangs, the extremists, 
the parties, these few members 
Victim The Yemeni people, the Yemeni people, the innocent, these youth, 
the innocent youth, the revolutionary Yemeni people, the safe people 
Faithful National leaders, military leaders, leaders from the people, the ruling 
party 
Strong  The people, the millions 
 
Table 68 Generalized social actors: protesters 
Sociolinguistic function Social actors 
Negative His regime, the regime, the killers, chief country leaders, the 
remnants of this regime, and those who work with them, this 
regime’s figures, the dictators, Saleh’s family, the entourage, the 
national security, Saleh’s family, the oppressors, the tyrants, who 
kills them(people), the regime’s thugs, the ones who misused the 
power, patronage networks, the killers and the corrupts, al Qaida  
Victim The people of Yemen and those who work with them, the martyrs     
Faithful his great people, the people of peace, the people of safety, the people 
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of love, the Yemeni people, great people, the protesters, the tribe, the 
society, the martyrs, the wounded, the tribes, the Houthis, all the 
forces, (the army, our army, our forces, the armed forces, our 
brothers in the army) 
Strong  The youth, the opposition, the revolution’s youth, the youth and the 
opposition, the people, the heroes, the national youth revolution 
forces, the protesters, the holy fighters, the Yemenis 
 
 
